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V ' ^ V 1 ^ - - UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

HISTORY OF THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION
IN WORLD WAR II

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NORTHERN FRANCE
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RHINELAND
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ARDENNES-ALSACE
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CENTRAL EUROPE

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All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced
j, in any form without permission. For information address Infantry

Journal Press, 1115 17th Street NW, Washington 6, D.C.

First Edition

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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IN HUMBLE GRATITUDE TO THOSE SOLDIERS
OF THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION
WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR THEIR COUNTRY

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CONTENTS

DIVISION COMMANDER'S MESSAGE xi

FOREWORD xiii

PART ONE: THE UNITED STATES

Chapter 1: IN THE BEGINNING 1

PART TWO: THE UNITED KINGDOM

Chapter 2: AT SEA 10

Chapter 3: WILTSHIRE COUNTY 13

PART THREE: FRANCE

Chapter 4: THE SITUATION 18

Chapter 5: CROSSING AND COMMITMENT 23

Chapter 6: THE POCKETS 27

Chapter 7: THE FFI 33

Chapter 8: OPERATIONS IN BRITTANY 38

Chapter 9: POW EXCHANGES 57

Chapter 10: THE BRETONS 65

Chapter 11: ADIEU 69

PART FOUR: GERMANY: THE SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE

Chapter 12: THE WESTERN FRONT 79

Chapter 13: TETTINGEN-BUTZDORF 84

Chapter 14: NENNIG-BERG-WIES 99

Chapter 15: TETTINGEN COUNTERATTACK 117

Chapter 16: ORSHOLZ 132

Chapter 17: THE 302d MOVES UP 139

Chapter 18: NENNIG COUNTERATTACK 149

Chapter 19: SINZ 159

Chapter 20: INTERIM 177

Chapter 21: CAMPHOLZ WOODS 185

Chapter 22: SINZ-BANNHOLZ ATTACK 196

Chapter 23: SECOND BANNHOLZ 214

Chapter 24: BANNHOLZ-ADENHOLZ 218

Chapter 25: PILLBOXES 151, 152, 153 231

Chapter 26: SHOOT THE WORKS! 239

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Chapter 27: FEBRUARY 19, 1945: INITIAL OBJECTIVES 244

Chapter 28: FEBRUARY 19, 1945: SECOND OBJECTIVES 254

Chapter 29: REDUCTION OF THE TRIANGLE 265

PART FIVE: GERMANY: ACROSS THE SAAR

Chapter 30: THE BRIDGEHEAD 283

Chapter 31: THE SECOND DAY 301

Chapter 32: THE THIRD DAY 309

Chapter 33: THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DAYS 317

Chapter 34: THE FIGHT FOR THE HILLTOPS 328

Chapter 35: CT 376 340

Chapter 36: LAMPADEN RIDGE 365

Chapter 37: RESTORING THE BRIDGEHEAD 388

PART SIX: GERMANY: THE RACE TO THE RHINE

Chapter 38: OUT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD 400

Chapter 39: PUSH TO THE EAST 412

Chapter 40: THE PURSUIT 421

Chapter 41: LUDWIGSHAFEN 432

PART SEVEN: GERMANY: OCCUPATION

Chapter 42: KREFELD 449

Chapter 43: D0SSELDORF 467

PART EIGHT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Chapter 44: OCCUPATION 489

PART NINE: APPENDIX

DECORATIONS 505

BATTLE HONORS 511

ANTECEDENT HISTORY OF THE 94th DIVISION 512

DIVISION COMMAND POSTS 515

DIVISION ASSIGNMENTS 516

ATTACHMENTS 516

REDEPLOYMENT INFORMATION AND INACTIVATION DATES. 518

THE COMMANDERS 519

GLOSSARY 525

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MAPS

ROUTE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO BRITTANY 22

LORIENT POCKET 40

ST. NAZAIRE POCKET 41

DIVISION ZONE AND FRONT LINE, NOVEMBER 30, 1944 53

ROUTE FROM BRITTANY TO REIMS STAGING AREA 74

EXTENT OF VON RUNDSTEDTS WINTER OFFENSIVE 78

ROUTE FROM REIMS STAGING AREA TO SIEGFRIED SWITCH LINE 80

SIEGFRIED SWITCH POSITION 90

COUNTERATTACK OF THE 4 16th REPLACEMENT BATTALION 96

THE 11th PANZER DIVISION S FIRST COUNTERATTACK 122

THE 11th PANZER DIVISION'S ATTACK OF JANUARY 20, 1945 142

THE 11TH PANZER DIVISION'S ATTACKS ON JANUARY 21 AND

JANUARY 22 150

THE DIVISION FRONT, JANUARY 31, 1945 178

THE 302D INFANTRY'S OPERATIONS IN CAMPHOLZ WOODS 186

TOPOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THE SINZ AREA 198

ATTACK OF THE 2d BATTALION, 376th, IN BANNHOLZ WOODS 220

FALL OF THE TRIANGLE, FEBRUARY 19-21, 1945 264

THE SAAR BRIDGEHEAD, FEBRUARY 22, 1945 290

THE SAAR BRIDGEHEAD, FEBRUARY 24-26, 1945 322

THE SAAR BRIDGEHEAD, FEBRUARY 27 TO MARCH 2, 1945 334

THE 376th BRIDGEHEAD, FEBRUARY 22 TO MARCH 2, 1945 358

THE DIVISION FRONT PRIOR TO THE ATTACK OF THE 6th SS MOUN-
TAIN DIVISION 364

THE ATTACK AGAINST LAMPADEN RIDGE 376

THE ROUTE FROM THE SAAR BRIDGEHEAD TO THE RHINE 422

THE FALL OF LUDWIGSHAFEN 440

THE ROUTE FROM BAUMHOLDER TO WILLICH 448

THE SITUATION AS OF APRIL 3, 1945 452

DOSSELDORF OCCUPATION ZONE, APRIL 25, 1945 468

THE ROUTE FROM DtiSSELDORF TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA 488

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN OCCUPATION ZONE, JUNE 17, 1945 491

CZECHOSLOVAKIA^ OCCUPATION ZONE, JUNE 17 TO SEPTEMBER 14,

1945 492

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To the Men of the 94th Infantry Division:

Two years have passed since the occurence of the events recorded
in this history. They have been years during which most of us have
been happy to forget many of the desperate encounters which we must
re-live in these pages.

The deep sense of comradeship and devotion to a common cause for
which many of our friends laid down their lives or suffered terrible
wounds, are far too valuable in these troubled postwar days to be
neglected. The qualities of manhood upon which they were based are
the qualities our people always seek. You who led confidently in war
must just as confidently lead in peace.

For the Division, I want to extend our thanks to the authors who
have worked on this volume. Lieutenant Laurence G. Byrnes, who
was unlucky enough to draw the job of putting it in its final form, has
worked hard and diligently, and I hope this may be appreciated.

It may seem to many of you, that the volume concentrates on the - *
accomplishments of the Infantry to a certain degree of exclusion of
the supporting arms. Still you must remember that the accomplish-
ments of the Cavalry, Antitank, Artillery, Engineer, Signal, Quarter-
master, Ordnance, Medical and other units are measured in the progress
of the Infantry.

I earnestly hope that your perusal of this volume will bring back to
you the cat's eyes on the lights of vehicles through the rain on a muddy
night; the stumbling effort of the ration details; the urgency of am-
munition hauls; and as you worked forward to the line the tense
alertness of the silent sentry at the guns; the whispered greeting of a
tank driver digging in the shadow of his vehicle; and finally the in-
fantry deep in their waterlogged foxholes, waiting for that hellish
period just before dawn when man's vitality is lowest and yet his
greatest effort is required.

And with all this may you say again "well done" in lasting satisfac-
tion.

HARRY J. MALONY
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding 94th Infantry Division

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FOREWORD

FROM shortly after VE-Day until the present time, many men of
the 94th Infantry Division, both commissioned and noncommis-
sioned, have been associated in various capacities with the task
of preparing this division history. Delays have been numerous — occa-
sioned by redeployment, separation from service and the difficulty of
finding someone, following the inactivation of the division, to carry
the work to completion. Moreover, it is to be regretted that from
the outset no accurate records were kept of the persons employed on
this project nor of the extent of their individual contributions.

Major Samuel H. Hays, Assistant Division G-3, was appointed the
first full time Division Historian on May 12, 1945, by Major General
Harry J. Malony, who charged him with preparing a complete and
comprehensive outline for a history of the 94th Division and with
gathering the necessary documents and data from which such a book
could be written. Realizing the enormity of his task, Major Hays
sought and obtained the assistance of Major Carl H. Schofield and
Captain Frederick D. Standish, II, who, along with Major Hays, were
appointed members of the Division Historical Board. At this same
time, Technician Fourth Grade Raymond O. Kraus was detailed as
clerk to the Historical Board. Between mid-May and the end of July
1945, these officers drew up the original outline for the division history,
gathered the required source material, compiled an exhaustive narra-
tive on the enemy's actions within the Saar-Moselle Triangle and
across the Saar River, in addition to writing an account of the capture
of Tettingen-Butzdorf.

On July 31, 1945 the continuation of the project, or the actual
writing of the manuscript, was turned over to Major Paul W. Marshall
of the 319th Engineers, who was assigned the assistance of Major John
N. Smith, Captain Thomas J. Mclntyre, Lieutenant George F. Shaw,
Lieutenant Robert Gordon, Lieutenant Harold N. Cheatham, and
Lieutenant John N. Willett, all of whom were appointed to the Divi-
sion Historical Board replacing the original members. In addition the
following personnel were placed on duty with the new Historical
Board: Sergeant William P. Williams, Technician Fourth Grade Peter
A. Scacco, Technician Fourth Grade John L. Obal, Technician Fourth
Grade Louis J. Persinger, and Technician Fifth Grade William A.
Newman. Work began immediately, though it was not possible to
assign a writer to each of the chapters outlined in the Hays' plan as
the new Division Historian desired. The mass of records which had
been gathered was studied exhaustively, while hundreds of interviews
were conducted with combat personnel of the division, on all levels:

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xiv

FOREWORD

squad, platoon, company, battalion and regiment. It was during this
work that redeployment struck hardest. When Major Marshall left
the Historical Board in September to take command of the 319th Engi-
neer Battalion, Major Smith assumed his responsibilities as Division
Historian. Every possible effort was made to replace members of the
historical force returned to the United States. However, it was a losing
battle. During this period, the following were some of the many
persons who contributed to the history: Captain Charles E. Wright,
Lieutenant Joseph M. Levy, Lieutenant Raymond B. Thomas, Lieu-
tenant George C. Walsh, Lieutenant Francis E. English and Lieuten-
ant McNull. Gradually the personnel situation grew worse. By the
time Major Smith was ready for redeployment, work had reached a
standstill. There was a manuscript in rough draft, but no one to con-
tinue the work. Also, the division itself was preparing for return to

In March of 1946, following the inactivation of the 94th Infantry
Division, Lieutenant Pierce U. Wheatley, formerly of the 301st Infan-
try, became Division Historian. He spent several months working on
the history, prior to his separation, but reported that he "was far from
satisfied" with the manuscript when he returned to civilian life.

Again there was no one to continue the project. Finally, in Septem-
ber of 1946, the present historian took over. The form of the manu-
script was rearranged; the text completely rewritten. Maps were pre-
pared and numerous pictures obtained from the official files of the
U.S. Army Signal Corps. A new appendix was drawn up and the
decoration rosters contained therein were checked and rechecked
against available records. A roster of the next of kin of men of the
94th Division killed in action was compiled, subsequent to which
arrangements were made for distribution of free copies to these per-
sons. Advertising, subscription, publication and distribution problems
were worked out with the Infantry Journal Press. These and a multi-
tude of other tasks, relative to the production of The History of the
94th Infantry Division in World War 11, are responsible for the delay
in the publication of this volume.

Unless otherwise specified, all photographs used in this history are
by courtesy of the U. S. Army Signal Corps.

the U. S.

L.G.B.

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PART ONE
THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to authority contained in letter TAG
AG 320.2 (5-26-42) MR-M-GN, . . . the 94th
Infantry Division is activated this date.

FROM DIVISION GENERAL ORDER
NO. 1, SEPTEMBER 15, 1942.

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Chapter 1: IN THE BEGINNING

THE LEADING ELEMENTS of the 94th Infantry Division had
landed on Utah Beach by September 8, 1944— D plus 94. The
original command post was set up in the outskirts of the village
of St. Marie-du-Mont, Normandy, and the Division prepared to exe-
cute whatever combat mission Headquarters US Ninth Army might
assign. Behind the Division lay two solid years of training. Both units
and individuals had been tested and retested; they were as letter-perfect
and as battle-ready as training alone could make them. The prevailing
mood was one of confidence — confidence mixed with the apprehension
that comes to troops as yet untried in battle. Come what may, the
Division felt that it would conduct itself in keeping with the traditions
that it had acquired since activation.

It was on the 15th of September, 1942, that the 94th Infantry Divi-
sion was activated. The place was Fort Custer, Michigan; the time
1630 hours. Major General Harry J. Malony, the Commanding Gen-
eral, received the Division colors from Colonel Arthur M. Payne
(Retired), who had commanded the 376th Infantry Regiment during
World War I. This simple yet impressive ceremony was attended by
Brigadier General Harlan N. Hartness, Assistant Division Commander;
Brigadier General Louis J. Fortier, Division Artillery Commander;
the cadre of the Division and leading citizens of the nearby towns of
Battle Creek and Kalamazoo, Michigan.

The entire enlisted cadre of the Division, and the officer cadre below
regimental level, had been drawn from the 77th Infantry Division then
stationed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. To this skeleton force had
been added a sprinkling of ROTC lieutenants and Officer Candidate
School graduates sufficient to give the 94th its required officer strength.

Soon after activation it became evident that the range facilities at
Fort Custer were entirely inadequate. An extensive reconnaissance of
the surrounding countryside revealed no solution to the problem. This,
and the fact that the filler replacements needed to man the Division
were not then available, led Second Army Headquarters to issue orders
late in October for movement of the 94th to Camp Phillips, Kansas,
the following month. An advance party consisting of twenty-seven
officers and one hundred and twenty-one enlisted men departed from
Fort Custer, for the new station, on the 1st of November, followed
by the main body of the Division on the 15th. Three days later all
personnel had closed at Camp Phillips.

Camp Phillips was a "theater of operations" type camp. Construc-
tion was of wood and tar-paper, and barracks were one story high.
The camp-site was bleak, windswept and on the whole generally de-

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IN THE BEGINNING

porting each regiment and from personnel of the regiments themselves.

The Division's stay at Camp Phillips was characterized by extremes
in weather. The winter of 1942 was one of the most severe Kansas
had ever experienced. It impeded training and caused acute misery
among the troops. Out-of-doors activities were conducted in zero and
sub-zero weather. At times the firing ranges were used under near-
blizzard conditions. The coming of spring and early summer brought
other extremes. First, it was rain and glue-like mud, then oppressive
heat and blinding dust storms. On several occasions, it became neces-
sary to issue dust respirators and goggles to the guards to enable them
to continue walking their posts.

With the coming of August, 1943, the 26th Infantry Division and
the 94th traded Assistant Division Commanders, and Brigadier General
Henry B. Cheadle replaced General Hartness, who proceeded to the
Yankee Division.

Late the same month, the Division began movement to the Second
Army Maneuver Area in central Tennessee. Headquarters opened in
Gallatin on the 30th of August and the following day the troops
detrained at Portland. Almost immediately the Division was ordered
to provide 1,500 overseas replacements. Despite this heavy loss in
trained personnel, the 94th came through the eight operations of Phase
III of the maneuver with flying colors. These activities kept the outfit
busy until November rolled around.

On the 7th and 8th of November, the Division moved by motor
from the maneuver area to Camp Forrest, near Tullahoma, Tennessee.
This was a temporary station provided until the 84th Infantry Division
could clear Camp McCain, Mississippi. While at Forrest, each infan-
try battalion transferred one hundred men to the 8th Infantry Division,
which had been alerted for overseas movement. Many items of combat
serviceable equipment were also handed over to the 8th Division.

Late in November the 94th moved by motor to its new home in
Mississippi. The same tar-paper and wood construction that had been
so uncomfortable in Kansas again was encountered. Post facilities
were about the same as at Camp Phillips; however, the terrain offered
a welcome relief from the treeless prairies where it was said, "there's
nothing between us and Canada but barbed wire fences."

Post-maneuver training began as soon as units were settled on the
new reservation. All types of exercises and problems were presented
and the ammunition allowance for all arms was most liberal. Extended
rifle-platoon maneuvers were held in Holly Springs National Forest,

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with units operating independently for six days at a time. Also, the
Expert Infantryman Badge tests were conducted.

Inundation of the area surrounding Grenada, Mississippi, by flood
waters of the Yalobusha River, led the local mayor, on March 29,
1944, to call on the 94th for help in evacuating marooned families.
Division speedily answered this appeal by dispatching Company C,
319th Engineers and assault boats equipped with outboard motors.
From an area approximately thirty-five miles square, bounded by the
villages of Oxberry, Cascilla, Holcomb, Parsons and Philipp, the engi-
neers rescued 153 persons between the 29th and 31st of the month.

The Governor of the State of Mississippi visited the 94th, on the
19th of April, accompanied by 140 honorary Mississippi colonels, all
proudly wearing the "golden chickens'* of their rank. For the benefit
of the visitors, a field artillery demonstration was conducted by Gen-
eral Fortier's men. In addition, elements of the 302d Infantry crawled
through a soggy infiltration course. During the latter demonstration,
detonation of nitro-starch charges planted in water holes previ-
ously dug in the course, liberally showered most of the spectators
with mud.

On May 5, 1944, the 94th Division was alerted for overseas service
and the training week stepped up to a minimum of forty-eight hours
so that all POM (Preparation for Overseas Movement) requirements
could be met. TE-21 inspections were started and specialized training
was pursued more intensely than before.

Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson visited the Division on
May 26, 1944, and the following day, at a review staged in his honor,
he attached streamers to the guidons of several infantry units, recog-
nizing them as having qualified as Expert Infantry Companies. (In
June the 376th Infantry qualified as the first Expert Infantry Regiment
in the United States Army, while the Division itself won the distinc-
tion of being the first Expert Infantry Division.) During this visit of
the Under Secretary of War, two special exercises were conducted:
a night operation in which an infantry battalion and its supporting
artillery demonstrated their defensive fires, and a dawn attack by an
infantry regiment, with attached tanks, supported by accurate and
powerful artillery fire. Later, in writing to General Malony, Mr.
Patterson remarked, "My visit to the 94th Infantry Division . . . was
a gratifying experience. You have an outstanding organization. I am
proud of the honorary membership that was conferred upon me."

Movement of the main body of the Division to Camp Shanks, New
York, the designated Port of Embarkation, began on July 23, 1944.

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PART TWO
THE UNITED KINGDOM

We have 105s and hand grenades,
And our bayonets shine in the sun,
And we won't be back to the Michigan tract
Till the whole damn thing is done.

FROM THE 94th DIVISION SONG

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Chapter 2: AT SEA

EVEN AS THE TUGS were nosing the Queen Elizabeth away
from the wharf and into the channel of the Hudson, the inevit-
able "chain of command"1 was being instituted below decks.
Division headquarters operated from the once-beautiful main dining
room of the ship. The vessel itself was divided into three parts: Red,
White, and Blue. Each section had an orderly room and in these the
three regimental headquarters were located. For the duration of the
voyage only, all the units below regimental level were attached to
the 301st, 302d or 376th Infantry. These units established their indi-
vidual command posts in convenient locations throughout the ship and
maintained contact with the regimental headquarters to which attached
by either phone or runner. Existing telephone communications aboard
the Elizabeth were excellent and used extensively. All headquarters
operated around the clock, according to schedules that had been set
up before sailing. Thus, it was possible for the division commander
to contact any or all of his subordinate units, down to the lowest level,
with a minimum of delay.

Aerial escort was provided the first day out, but with the coming
of the 7th the Queen was on her own. For protection there were only
speed and the deck guns. The latter were primarily for antiaircraft
purposes and were manned by artillerymen of the 301st Field Artillery
Battalion, which had been selected as "Gun Battalion" for the ship
during the crossing. Under the supervision of British crew chiefs, the
artillerymen practiced for hours each day: loading, tracking and
simulating fire. On several occasions live rounds were expended for
training purposes. At the completion of the crossing, Lieutenant Com-
mander Bullen, RNVR, Gunnery Officer of the Queen Elizabeth com-
mended the battalion in writing, and in addressing Lieutenant Colonel
Samuel L. Morrow's men at the final muster on board, said: "This
is only the second time in over two years of carrying troops across
that I have commended the draft gun battalion. This is the finest
draft gun battalion that I have ever seen."

Daily during the voyage two meals were served and due to the great
number of persons on board, feeding was accomplished in relays. Each
man had a mess card on which was indicated the dining hall he was
to attend and the number of his shift: first, second, third, fourth, fifth
or sixth. As the galleys were ready to feed each sitting, announcement
was made over the ship's speaker system. The call "Number One Mess
Cards, Form Your Lines!" would send the initial groups scurrying
and leave the last shifts sulking at the prospect of the long wait ahead.

!For Glossary of Military Terms and Abbreviations see page 525.

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Only a iW of the 9 1th proved themselves poor sailors jnd those who

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

One night a brightly lighted hospital ship was sighted, and the
Elizabeth fled the scene. Being silhouetted against the lights of this
other American vessel was the last thing the skipper or his passengers
desired, in waters that were known to be the hunting ground of Ger-
man submarines. On two occasions in the dead of night, the course
was shifted so sharply men were hurled from their bunks. These sud-
den and abrupt changes of direction were followed by an increase in
speed and excessive zig-zagging. When under forced-draft the Queen
would quiver and vibrate as she took off like a frightened deer. There
was never any explanation from the crew as to what had caused these
hasty sprints, but the word "radar" was whispered back and forth with
knowing winks.

Land was sighted the morning of the 11th and many Irishmen saw
the home of their fathers for the first time. The Elizabeth sailed
proudly into the North Channel; the antiaircraft guns swung smoothly
as they practice-tracked the British planes that crossed and recrossed
the course of the ship on their routine patrols. The men broke out
binoculars and initially inspected the United Knigdom by courtesy of
Bausch & Lomb. As the day progressed the Queen Elizabeth swung
into the beautiful Firth of Clyde, proceeding into what seemed a fairy
land. Glasses were no longer needed to study the tiny villages that
dotted the shoreline. In turn, the absence of wooden construction,
thatched roofs and the fresh greenness of the country side were dis-
cussed. Everything was trim, precise and well ordered. There was
absolutely no sign of bomb damage.

In stately grandeur and at a leisurely pace, the Queen sailed up
the Clyde to Greenock, Scotland, near Glasgow. There she anchored
in mid-stream as there were no wharfing facilities capable of handling
a ship of her tonnage.

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Chapter 3: WILTSHIRE COUNTY

THE MORNING OF August 12, 1944, the troops of the 94th
began debarking from the Queen Elizabeth. Full equipment was
carried and the Scottish climate was mild enough to make ODs
only slightly uncomfortable. Debarkation was accomplished by means
of lighters which steamed alongside the Queen to receive troops from
unloading-ports located at approximately the deck level of the lighters.
Looking up from the decks of the smaller vessels, a striking impression
of the tremendous size of the Elizabeth was obtained. New York to
Scotland in less than six days! The Division was really "on the way."

On shore at Greenock, the 94th was received by personnel of the
Transportation Corps. Units were divided into groups for entrap-
ment and TC personnel supervised the loading. The whole affair was
conducted in an orderly and efficient manner, with troops being dis-
posed of as fast as they disembarked.

The English railway coaches were a great novelty and experts on the
relative merits of American and British rolling stock sprang up like
mushrooms. In the midst of these discussions, the American Red Cross
appeared on the scene with hot coffee and doughnuts. Huge amounts
were consumed to delay inroads on the K rations which had been issued
each man prior to leaving the Elizabeth.

Debarkation was completed on the 13th and the Division moved
to temporary stations in Wiltshire County in southern England. On
the arrival of units at their destinations, they were met by members
of the advance party who were on hand to act as guides and settle
the troops in the billets that had been procured. The advance detach-
ment reported that they had left the States on July 2, 1944 aboard the
SS John Ericsson, a sister ship of the famous Gripsholm. Their cross-
ing had taken ten days in convoy. In spots the weather had been bad
and they were happy to see the docks of Liverpool. From there they
moved by train to Stockton House, Codford St. Mary, England, where
they remained until the 20th of July. The advance detachment then
travelled to Chippenham where the process of drawing equipment for
the Division began. Arrangements were made also, at this time, for the
billeting of the 94th upon its arrival.

Division headquarters was established in Greenway Manor House
at Chippenham on the 13th of August and the special unit companies —
94th Signal, 94th Quartermaster, 94th Ordnance and the Reconnais-
sance Troop — located in the same town. The 301st Infantry and the
Division Artillery with all its battalions were billeted in Trowbridge.
The 302d Infantry set up at Grittleton, the 376th at Pinkney Park

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—

and S!verst0?i. svtuie the ?}yth Medkai Battalion ■ and f he JH-rh Engi-
neers TOW-d to billets at firombam arid.Melksham, .respectively,

hiunoJiatety upon arrival, in .southern- England the s>4th bepm mak-
ing preparatiopsfpr ent ry into rhe combat/zone. As rapidly as; vehicles
were issued they were rendered combat serviceable by 'the addition i>F
wife-oat.tiHg.'pf>.ies. erected horn. the front bumpers, and by the addition

■

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

local pubs were visited and acquaintances were made among the con-
genial English people. Each group found the other highly interesting
and if the supply of "arf and arf" was short, at least conversation
was unrationed. Over and over again the phrase "Now, back in the
States/ ' was heard. As the barriers of reserve melted away, the towns-
people admitted they were living on short rations but hastened to
explain how much better off they were than the bombed-out people in
the cities. Bath, Bristol and London were visited by many members
of the 94th who saw for the first time the damage aerial bombardment
can do to a large city. In London, some of the troops actually came
under enemy fire, for V-ls were landing with disgusting regularity.
Stonehenge, a work of the ancient Druids, was also visited by some of
the Division.

On August 30, 1944, an alert warning order was received from
Headquarters US Ninth Army and the Division was advised that it
would move to the Continent in the near future. The following day
another order from the same source informed the 94th that it must
be prepared to move on six hours' notice any time after 0001 hours,
September 3, 1944. Movement actually began on September 3, 1944,
the earliest date specified by higher headquarters. Units proceeded by
motor to Southampton, Weymouth and Portland where the troops
boarded Liberty ships and various other craft for the crossing of the
English Channel. This journey to port from the temporary areas in
Wiltshire County required three days for completion.

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PART THREE
FRANCE

/ realize that your division has been in its
present role for some time and I would like
very much to move you to a more active sector.
This question has come up several times, but it
has been impractical to make any change.

FROM A LETTER TO THE CG,
94th INFANTRY DIVISION,
FROM LT. GEN. OMAR N.
BRADLEY, CG, 12th ARMY
GROUP, NOVEMBER 14, 1944.

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Chapter 4: THE SITUATION

ON D PLUS 94, (September 8, 1944) the 94th Infantry Division
( opened its first combat command post in the outskirts of the
village of St. Marie-du-Mont in Normandy, a few miles inland
from Utah Beach. General Malony, the Division Commander, had
landed on the 5th, accompanied by his G-4, Lieutenant Colonel John
D. F. Phillips. The same day both officers proceeded to Headquarters
Ninth Army, which had become operational that day when it assumed
command of the VIII Corps of the Third Army, at Mi-Foret. There,
Lieutenant General William H. Simpson, whose troops were engaged
in the reduction of Brest and in containing the enemy forces pocketed
against the Brittany coast, personally assigned to General Malony the
task of relieving the 6th Armored Division facing the German forces
in and around Lorient. He gave specific instructions to the effect that
the Division's mission was exclusively "containing." Under no circum-
stances was the 94th to attack.

In brief and by way of background, the series of events that had
brought the 6th Armored Division to Lorient are worthy of note.
After the fall of St. L6, on July 18, 1944, the Third Army, commanded
by Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., went into action. The
Third, teamed with the First, had two goals: (1) to capture the port
cities of Cherbourg, Brest, St. Nazaire, Lorient, Bordeaux and Nantes,
thus relieving the pressure on the beachhead ports; (2) to hit the
German forces in France as hard as possible, and, should the blow
prove staggering, to pursue the enemy as long and far as possible. In
the drive for the ports, General Patton's forces swept down the Nor-
mandy coast; seized Coutances and Granville. They next moved on
Avranches and Pontorson, both of which fell to their advance. This
opened the way into Brittany, across which the armor swept against
slight and sporadic resistance. The VIII Corps pulled up in front of
Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire. Immediately preparations were made
for a final, all-out assault on Brest with a force of three divisions,
while the rest of the corps (the 83d Infantry and 6th Armored Divi-
sions) spiked down the German forces holed up at the other two ports.

Meanwhile, XX Corps went after Rennes, Laval, Chateaubriant and
Le Mans. After this the fighting in France moved eastward toward
Chartres and Paris. Antwerp fell to the British Second Army on Sep-
tember 4, 1944 and its port facilities were found intact. On the 19th
of the month, after a bloody and costly struggle, Brest was taken.
Because of the costliness of this assault and the fact that Antwerp
was in Allied hands, it was later decided to contain permanently the

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

presented a situation made to order -fox these guerrilla or

landed was £his: Brest was about to Ml. Lotimt ami St Na^lre were
completely in German ..hands with . the enemy feverishly striving to

.mmediare and pressing problems. Ik would htw io expedite the
landing of his troops who would soon be coming ashore piecemeal;

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• ■ i

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THE SITUATION

then dispatch them to Brittany where the 6th Armored Division was
awaiting relief. However, before steps could be taken in this direc-
tion it was necessary to gain complete and first-hand knowledge of the
situation existing on the front that the Division was about to take over.
Toward this end, General Malony visited the command post of the
armored division to be briefed on all matters pertaining to this first
battle mission. Once cognizant of all aspects of the disposition of the
force to be relieved, the situation and the terrain, the CG of the 94th
returned post haste to Utah Beach, to assemble his command as they
came ashore and start units moving toward Brittany.

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Chapter 5: CROSSING AND COMMITMENT

THE WATERS off Utah Beach presented a scene of desolation
and destruction as the 94th began debarkation. Visible were
the wrecks of more landing craft and Liberty ships than a man
would care to count. Masts, funnels, bows and sterns were thrust up
from the waves at all manner of grotesque angles. Among and beyond
the naval wreckage were LSTs, LCIs, Liberty ships, freighters and
tankers waiting to unload. Plying from ship to ship and from shore
to ship were various smaller craft: power boats, DUKWs, Rhinos and
LCTs. Overhead were scores of barrage balloons — awkward, gray
shapes floating high above the decks of the vessels to which they were
attached by steel cables. Their purpose was to discourage low-level
attack by enemy aircraft and this they did well.

On Utah Beach itself was more debris of all types. Moreover, the
sea had spewed bits and pieces of smaller military equipage above
high water mark and these were gradually being ground into the sand.
Dug into the dunes behind the beach and heavily camouflaged were
the pillboxes, gun emplacements, firing pits, communication trenches,
dugouts and shelters that had formed the German beach defenses.
Long-barreled 88s still protruded from their firing apertures; pano-
ramic range cards painted around the circumference of the open-type
emplacements had not yet begun to fade from weathering. Barbed
wire was strung with wasteful abandon and everywhere were Achtung
Minen signs, complete with skull and crossbones.

Landing craft rammed themselves against the beach, discharged their
cargoes and wiggled back into deep water. Men and machines milled
about everywhere. Utah Beach seemed a place of utter confusion. It
was. But, out of the confusion order was being wrought. The situa-
tion was not as much a "can of worms" as it appeared.

Behind the beach, on the road to St. Marie-du-Mont was more
evidence of the fury of the fight that had taken place three months
earlier. Buildings were for the most part shattered and shell-torn.
Shell craters were everywhere and the roads were liberally pockmarked
in addition to being practically worn out. Telephone wires by the
score were strung in the ditches paralleling the roads and American
engineer signs bearing the legend "Mines Cleared to Shoulder" were
much in evidence. St. Marie-du-Mont was highly interesting to the
men of the 94th, merely because it was the first of many such towns.
However, it was not until the truck columns rolled through Carentan,
Coutances and Avranches that the effects of total war were really seen.
St. Marie had been hit but not pulverized.

Division headquarters had been among the first elements to move.

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24 THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

It motored to Southampton and there boarded the Liberty ship Lucian
B. Maxwell, on September 4, 1944. The following day this vessel
moved to the mouth of the harbor and there joined a large convoy of
U.S. troop and supply ships. On the morning of the 7th, the convoy
sailed into the Channel and after an uneventful crossing dropped
anchor off Utah Beach at 2030 hours the same day. Later that evening
the port commander directed the skipper of the Maxwell to discharge
personnel and cargo the following day. This was accomplished. On
September 8, 1944 Division headquarters came ashore and went into
operation in the vicinity of St. Marie.

Movement orders for displacing the division from Great Britain
to the Continent had set up the following order of march: Combat
Team 301, Combat Team 302 and Combat Team 376. The CTs moved
out in the order indicated; however, bad weather disrupted plans for
sailing and debarkation.

The 301st Infantry, quartered in Trowbridge, departed on Septem-
ber 4, 1944 for Southampton under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
Donald Hardin, the regimental executive officer, since Colonel Roy N.
Hagerty, the regimental commander, was moving with Division Head-
quarters. Foot elements of the regiment boarded the Neutral/a and
the Crossbow the evening of the 5th after a 24-hour delay and began
landings on Utah Beach on the 6th. The regimental command post
was set up in the outskirts of St. Marie-du-Mont. On the 8th Colonel
Hagerty came ashore and after a conference with General Malony
left for the 6th Armored Division headquarters at Plouay, France.
Also on the 8th, the 301st pulled stakes at St. Marie and headed for
Lorient. An overnight bivouac was made en route, in the vicinity of
Rennes. On the 9th the regiment moved into the line beginning the
relief of the 6th Armored Division.

The 302d Infantry began movement to Southampton on September
5, 1944, when the motorized elements moved to the port. By the
6th, all vehicles and their accompanying personnel had been loaded.
Foot troops followed on the 7th and debarked on Utah Beach the
following day, unloading ahead of the motor elements. The foot
troops then marched to the vicinity of Vierville, the beachhead loca-
tion of the regimental command post. On the 9th, the motor elements
of the regiment began unloading, but due to rough water off the beach
a week passed before all personnel were ashore. On the 10th an
advance party from the 302d left for Lorient; two days later, the regi-
ment minus the 2d and 3d Battalions departed for Rennes, where it
was expected it would reassemble. Colonel Earle A. Johnson's regi-

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CROSSING AND COMMITMENT

mental headquarters, 1st Battalion and Antitank Company moved to
the vicinity of Plouay on the 15th where the command post opened at
1800 hours. The 2d and 3d Battalions completed their movement on
the 16th and rejoined the regiment. This same afternoon all three
battalions were committed.

The 376th, which had sailed from the United Kingdom on the 7th
of September, began landing on the 9th. Orders for movement to
Lorient had to be countermanded when the St. Nazaire pocket was
added to the Division's containing mission and the relief of elements
of the 83d Division was directed. The regiment's march objective
was shifted accordingly. Colonel Harold H. McClune's men moved to
Rennes and from there to the new front.

Because of bad weather the Division Artillery also experienced diffi-
culty in crossing the Channel. The 301st Field Artillery Battalion
reached Weymouth on the 3d of September and loaded in LSTs during
the 4th and 5th. Debarkation began on Utah Beach the next day. For
three days the battalion bivouacked in the vicinity of the beach; on
the 9th it moved to Rennes. The following day the 301st Field Artil-
lery headed for forward positions in the Pont Scorff area. These were
reached by nightfall.

The 356th Field Artillery Battalion departed from Trowbridge on
September 4, 1944. It crossed the Channel without incident and on
the 10th moved to Rennes where it remained overnight. The morning
of the 11th the 356th moved to positions south of Plouay. Position-
area surveys were completed and wire communications necessary for
registration were laid before sundown. The battalion's first mission
was to reinforce the fires of the 128th Field Artillery of the 6th
Armored Division, this battalion being in direct support of the 1st
Battalion, 301st Infantry.

The 919th Field Artillery Battalion departed from Trowbridge on
September 5, 1944, reaching the coast of Normandy on the 8th. This
battalion, the direct support artillery of the 376th Infantry, upon de-
barkation headed for Vigneux, Loire Inferieure (St. Nazaire sector)
and went into bivouac there on the 14th. The battalion officially
rejoined the combat team when it relieved the 908th Field Artillery
Battalion of the 83d Division on September 17, 1944. Battery A took
positions to the north of Vigneux, in the center of the sector of 3d
Battalion, 376th, while Batteries B and C went into position to the
south of Vigneux supporting the 1st Battalion of this regiment.

The 390th Field Artillery Battalion also left Trowbridge on the
5th of September. After a 24-hour delay at Portland, the unit sailed

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

for France on the morning of the 7th. The LSTs reached Utah Beach
at 0330 hours on the 8th and began unloading at 0730 hours. Follow-
ing debarkation, the battalion moved to Beaumont and on the 9th
trucked to Rennes for an overnight stay. The next day reconnaissance
parties reconnoitered position areas and observation post locations as
the main body closed at Plouay. Positions were occupied on the 12th;
communications were established and registration completed by 1915
hours of the same day.

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Chapter 6: THE POCKETS

IN REGARD TO TERRAIN the pockets of Lorient and St. Nazaire
were almost exact opposites. At Lorient, where the enemy held
, some one hundred square miles of French territory, the mountains
ran practically down to the seacoast and the area was heavily forested
in parts. Three rivers, the Leita, the Scorff and the Blavet flowed south-
ward into the Bay of Biscay, from the American lines toward the Ger-
man positions. Here the observation favored the Division, but numer-
ous hills and ridges within the enemy-held area provided the Germans
with a fair degree of visibility. Time and again, the enemy brought
forward mobile artillery to the high ground behind his lines, employing
it with telling effect on the American positions.

At St. Nazaire, the 680 square miles of German-dominated terrain
was flat, swampy and intermittently forested. Due to the extremely
level ground, a rise of a few dozen feet would often prove a deciding
observation factor. Unlike Lorient, where the opposing lines crossed
the rivers in the area, at St. Nazaire existing water barriers outlined
the greater part of the perimeter of the German pocket. On the north
the German and American lines paralleled the opposite banks of the
Vilaine River and the Brest-Nantes Canal. To the west and south the
enemy was protected by the Bay of Biscay. Only on the east was there
no watercourse to separate the opposing lines. St. Nazaire itself was
located directly south of La Grande Briere (the Great Swamp) on the
bank of the Loire River at its mouth.

Hedgerows, which were ever present in Normandy and Brittany,
dotted the landscape in both sectors. The German soldier, by reason
of long training and experience, had become a past master at the
defense of these walls of living vegetation. But, in due time, the men
of the 94th learned to play the game. There were numerous stories
of opposing patrols passing each other on opposite sides of the same
hedgerow, only to discover the other's presence and engage in a fire
fight facing and firing in the direction of friendly lines. At St. Nazaire,
there was an additional menace as many of the roads paralleled the
hedgerows, making ambush a constant threat.

The relative stability of the front-line positions led to skillful and
continuous camouflage by both sides. As autumn progressed, German
vehicles and weapons, which were painted a light tan mottled with
soft greens and reds, blended perfectly with the natural vegetation
surrounding them. Carefully prepared positions were extremely diffi-
cult to locate and more than one patrol encountered rude surprises.

During the Division's stay in Brittany the rainfall was extremely
heavy and the ground became muddy or sodden. Often, turf that

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e of supporting the weight of an artillery p>nm«c-mover

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THE POCKETS

of battle represented within the pockets this was understandable. Some
units consisted only of commanders and their staffs while others were
overstrength by reason of the number of stragglers that had joined
them. During the months that the Division opposed the German gar-
risons in the Channel ports, intensive training on the part of the enemy
raised the combat efficiency of most front-line elements to an excellent
status. Morale and efficiency of rear-echelon personnel, however,
remained poor throughout.

Highest ranking German in Brittany after the fall of Brest was
General der Artillerie (Lieutenant General) Wilhelm Fahrmbacher
who assumed command of the infantry troops in and around Lorient.
The general had his headquarters in the city of Lorient in a huge
bunker reportedly capable of housing 1,000 men. This fortification was
reported to be suspended on giant springs which acted as shock absor-
bers when the area was under bombardment. During October of 1944,
rumors leaking out of the pocket hinted the headquarters was soon
to be moved as the bunker rocked excessively.

Other high ranking Germans in the Lorient pocket were Konter-
admiral (Rear Admiral) Kaehler, Colonel Haversang and Colonel
Kaumann. Admiral Kaehler reportedly came from Brest by submarine
prior to the fall of that city. Colonel Haversang had commanded the
859th Regiment of the 265th Infantry Division, remnants of which
were within the pocket. (Other elements of this division were located
at St. Nazaire.) In charge of Fortress Lorient itself was Colonel Kau-
mann and early rumors stated this officer might consider surrender.
Later it was learned the colonel was hospitalized and recovering from
wounds. Possibly there was a connection since no surrender overtures
were forthcoming.

Generalmajor (Brigadier General) Junck, who was believed to have
been the CG of the 265th Infantry Division, took command of all
German forces in the St. Nazaire pocket when it was formed in August
of 1944. Formerly this officer had been connected with the Luftwaffe,
commanding the 3d Parachute Division, one of Germany's crack units.
Also at St. Nazaire were Konteradmiral Mirew, Generalmajor Huenten
and Colonel Kaeseberg. The admiral, who was a fanatic determined
to fight to the last man, was in command of Naval District Loire.
General Huenten had command of Fortress St. Nazaire while Colonel
Kaeseberg, formerly a regimental commander in the 275th Infantry
Division, had charge of all enemy defenses south of the Loire River.

At Lorient there were approximately 500 pieces of enemy artillery
available for action. Three hundred of these were in stationary posi-

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

tions, but the remaining two hundred were capable of a high degree
of mobility. These weapons ranged in caliber from 20mm antiaircraft
guns to 340mm coast defense weapons that had been turned around
to hurl their 700-pound "flying barracks bags" against the troops of
the 94th. Enemy artillery in the St. Nazaire sector came to a slightly
greater total. There were an estimated 525 pieces available; calibers
ranged up to and including 340mms. Ammunition for all types of
artillery was plentiful and the enemy used it unsparingly.

All indications pointed to the fact that a long stand would be made
in both areas. Consistently, the Germans attempted to hold as much
farming land as possible, and made extensive use of obstacles, mines
and demolitions. On the OPL, positions were well constructed, skill-
fully camouflaged and alert. Ammunition for all infantry weapons was
most plentiful, though there were indications of shortages in other
classes of supplies. Food, for instance, was a critical item, and trans-
portation, especially motor, was limited. In addition to the areas within
the pockets, the Germans held the islands of Re, Groix and Belle in
the Bay of Biscay. Belle Isle was of particular value to the enemy
for food crops were grown on its farm land and it supplied great
quantities of potable water. Moreover, it served as a prisoner of war
enclosure, hospital center, rest area and antiaircraft strongpoint.

In regard to active defense against Allied air power, the pocketed
enemy never relented. This was forcibly called to the attention of
certain personnel of the AAF who were shot down over the port cities,
for their mistakes in believing these centers were in friendly hands.
In addition to the A A defenses of the "Flak Cities," as Lorient and
St. Nazaire came to be called, Quiberon Peninsula jutting into the
Bay of Biscay between the two pockets was one long line of antiaircraft
guns. La Rochelle, Royan and Pointe de Gavre, outside the Division
area to the south, also contributed their share to the antiaircraft menace.

The Germans were credited with radio, air, and submarine com-
munication with the Vaterland. Mail planes were frequently identified
over the Division area and on two occasions dropped mail sacks fell
within the American lines, giving the G-2 and order-of-battle personnel
of the 94th valuable information. Substantiated reports also hinted
that the pockets were receiving aid from Spain, via submarine. During
the stay of the Division in Brittany, changes in command personnel
at the besieged ports conclusively proved that submarines were being
used successfully. It was also soon evident that the two pockets were
in communication with each other by means of surface craft that plied
the waters between these ports.

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litutunani Colonel Albert t. Tumor, jr . iMWji'om Sfeaof Dflfcsr.. a*fc» roacf rfirscd'ont of M<-„i,.*v;

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lb the division zone communication* -wfre an everpres$in£
n and the $4* Signal Company laid wer l000 miles of w.re
npting a solution- Extensive use was made by the signalmen of
French phone facilities and captured Gennan materiel, One hundred

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

also resorted to liaison officers, partly because of their lack of other
adequate means of communication and partly because of the chance
for errors, due to language difficulties, in the transmission of vital
messages.

Because of the vastly extended front and the miscellaneous French
forces operating within the Division zone, the supply situation was
an extremely difficult one. During the four months the Division re-
mained in Brittany, 1,847,888 rations and 1,357,108 gallons of gasoline
were drawn by the 94th and its attachments. To keep pace with the
demands placed upon it, it was necessary for the 94th Quartermaster
Company to establish two separate railheads. One of these was located
at Baud to supply the Lorient sector and the other at Messac to handle
the needs of the forces in front of St. Nazaire. At both installations
use was made of prisoner of war labor. To supply the attached cavalry
units stretched along the Loire River, special arrangements were made
with the supply depots located at Le Mans. During the period from
September 10 to December 31, 1944, 6,287 long tons of ammunition,
a good deal of which was hauled on organic transportation, was placed
in the ASP. Of this amount, 3,487 long tons were expended against
the enemy. Throughout this entire period, unit distribution was made
to the regiments thereby releasing all their transportation for tac-
tical use.

To provide adequate medical support for both sectors, the 319th
Medical Battalion split its clearing company. One station went into
operation about a mile north of Nozay, in the St. Nazaire area, while
the second, serving the Lorient sector, was set up near Pont Scorff.
In spite of the handicap of divided forces, efficient service was main-
tained at all times. The battalion headquarters worked in conjunction
with the installation at Nozay, occupying a chateau in the vicinity of
the St. Nazaire sector's clearing station.

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Chapter 7: THE FFI

HEN GENERAL MALONY'S 94th Infantry Division took
over the task of containing the German forces in the ports of
Lorient and St. Nazaire, it was not operating alone. Within
the Division area were many thousands of French fighting men, mem-
bers of the FFI (French Forces of the Interior, also called Alaquis)
or of the FTP (French Partisans) . For the most part these troops were
patriots although there were some who had jumped on the bandwagon
after the Americans assumed control in Brittany. These French ele-
ments were all poorly organized and ill equipped. There was little
evidence of a definite chain of command and tables of organization
and equipment were non-existent. Battalions varied in strength from
two hundred to eighteen hundred men, while arms and equipment con-
sisted of items dropped by the Allies and articles seized from the
enemy. There was no standard uniform or badge of recognition. The
troops lacked training and discipline; units were loosely knit and
jealous of their integrity.

A great deal of friction existed among the various factions of the
French military. Not only did the FFI resent the higher pay earned
by the soldiers of the communist FTP, but they disagreed with their
political beliefs. The FTP, which was a much smaller organization
than the Maquis, paid its soldiers approximately three times the wages
of the FFI, and, more important still, paid them with greater regularity.
Furthermore, both the FFI and the FTP looked down on the French
regular army troops who later came into the Division area. The regu-
lars were referred to by the guerrillas as "moth-ball" soldiers because
of the fact that they had gone into hiding during the occupation and
had not participated extensively in the sabotage and underground
activities conducted by the other two organizations.

Gradually, however, as the political situation in France began to
crystallize, General Charles de Gaulle came into his own and took
steps to revitalize and reorganize the military. The French disarmed
the FTP units, then withdrew them from the lines. Efforts were made
also to inject a core of experienced regular army personnel into the
Maquis units and, in the final phase, units of the FFI were absorbed
by the new French regular army. These changes were spread over a
period of months and it was not until early in 1945 that the French
Army and not the FFI became the dominant factor on the scene in
western France.

Prior to D-day, one of the best sources of supply possessed by the
underground forces in France was the prearranged drops made by
Allied aircraft, to keep the resistance groups functioning. But, with

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the conquest of Normandy and Brittany, this aid to the French ceased.
It was then the problem of the Allied ground forces and the French
government to keep these troops supplied. The French countryside,
ravaged by years of occupation, its rail and communications facilities
disrupted by the retreating enemy and the normal attrition of battle,
could do little toward solving the problem. On the other hand, Ameri-
can forces were racing across France and the US First and Third
Armies were constantly clamoring for more and more ammunition, fuel
and food. All these items had to come through the beachhead ports,
which were taxed to the utmost. As a result, supplies for the French
underground groups rated only a low priority. Initially, units of the
94th attempted to supply the French forces working side by side with
them, but this soon proved an overwhelming task. Also, it tended to
defeat the Division's long-range program for making the French self-
sustaining.

Captain Samuel H. Hays, Assistant G-3, and Captain John W.
Schaub, Assistant G-4, undertook the task of working out tables of or-
ganization and equipment for the French guerrilla units soon after they
came under division control. The result of their efforts provided a sound
basis for requisitioning purposes, introduced an outline for uniformity
of weapons and personnel within the battalions and enabled the Divi-
sion to proceed with plans for supplementing their equipment. Arms
and equipment captured by the Allies during the Brittany campaign
were released to the Division by higher headquarters and these were
turned over to the French. Through American supply channels 2,344
rifles, 1,817 carbines, 283 machine pistols, twenty-four mortars, nine-
teen 105mm howitzers, five 155mm howitzers and nineteen other
artillery pieces ranging in caliber from 20mm AA guns to 88mm high-
velocity weapons were issued, along with ammunition for all these
pieces. This improved French fire power greatly. Communications
Zone was able to procure for the Division several thousand French
rifles and these were also distributed to the FFI. By exchanging rifles
between particular French battalions a degree of uniformity was in-
troduced which eliminated to some extent the serious ammunition
supply problem caused by the fact that units often had Czech, Dutch,
Belgian, Russian, British, French and American weapons in a single
command. Two artillery batteries, Batterie LeRoy armed with four
105mm German Field Howitzers and Batterie Finistere equipped with
three modified German Schneider 155mm Howitzers, were trained and
supervised by the men of the 356th Field Artillery Battalion. Two
more French batteries were organized and trained by a cadre from the

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THE FFI

919th Field Artillery. Armament for the latter batteries was American
3-inch guns mounted on makeshift turntables for additional traverse.

In mid-October of 1944, the French set up headquarters in Vannes
and Nantes to act as higher echelons for the subordinate French units
in the immediate zone of the 94th. All questions and problems were
referred through these channels in an effort to unify requests and to
determine approximate needs, which were extremely difficult to com-
pute due to the lack of administrative organization and experienced
supply personnel.

On the 23d of December, the French opened their own railheads
at Redon and Nantes. At the same time, plans were under way for
the opening of a third railhead to supply their troops at Lorient; the
latter was put into operation after the 94th departed for the Western
Front.

Initially, coordination with the French proved extremely difficult for
it was necessary to depend upon a policy of mutual cooperation which
was not always successful. In all fairness it must be admitted that
this was due in large part to the lack of familiarity on the part of
Maquis staff officers with US Army methods. Internal politics and the
barrier of language also hindered mutual advancement.

On September 29, 1944, General Simpson visited the Division at
Chateaubriant, and discussed at length with General Malony the exist-
ing situation in front of the Channel ports. Together they reviewed
past operations and the army commander informed the CG of the 94th
that original plans had not contemplated the Division's being assigned
this mission. He further stated that there would, in all likelihood, be
new developments for the 94th by the middle of November. During
the visit of the army commander, General Malony asked for additional
equipment for the French and was informed again that the needs of
the First and Third Armies were paramount; FFI battalions were on a
very low priority. General Simpson expressed his gratification with
the Division's conduct but announced with regret that when the Ninth
Army moved to the Western Front the 94th would remain behind
passing to the control of 12th Army Group.

On October 2, 1944, Colonel Earl C. Bergquist, Division Chief of
Staff, held a conference at Chateaubriant which was attended by the
ranking French leaders. This conference, the first of many, opened the
94th Division's campaign to sponsor better relations between the two
nationalities and improve the fighting efficiency of the French. Methods
of operation, troop dispositions and chain of command were discussed,
in addition to the ever-pressing problem of supply for the FFI battal-

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

ions. As a result of this meeting, the Division made delivery on the
6th of the month of the initial shipment of rations and gasoline agreed
upon at the conference. Beginning on that date, daily allocation to
the Maquis was 10,000 rations and 600 gallons of gasoline.

A short time later, Captain Le Flock of the French Navy presented
himself at the Division command post in Chateaubriant to announce
that the French Navy would begin operations shortly from a head-
quarters in Vannes. Available ships, it was learned, were little more
than armed fishing smacks but they later proved a most valuable aid
in spying on German shipping and keeping Division G-2 posted on
enemy activities on and around the islands in the Bay of Biscay.

Early in October the French Air Squadron, Groupe Patrie, com-
manded by Major Lapios, came under control of the 94th Division.
This unit, equipped with eleven A-24 dive bombers, was used pri-
marily for reconnaissance missions. However, during the first month
with the 94th, Groupe Patrie flew 84 sorties, dropped 30,900 pounds
of bombs and on several occasions strafed enemy positions.

On October 6, 1944, a Colonel Michelin appeared at Division Head-
quarters announcing that he was the new commander of the IV Region
of the French Forces of the Interior and that his command post was
located at Rennes. In conference with General Malony he discussed
an extensive reorganization of his forces which he would undertake
in the near future. Following this visit, Colonel Michelin informed
Division by letter that he had also assumed control of the FFI forces
at St. Nazaire. Shortly thereafter, General Hary, who had been com-
manding the IV Region, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Payen, called
on the Division Commander to report that Colonel Michelin was acting
without proper orders or authority and that General Hary continued
as CG of the region in question.

In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Felix, who had commanded
the FFI at St. Nazaire, proceeded to Paris after being relieved by
Michelin, and reported to General de Gaulle. This resulted in his
being promoted to the rank of colonel and officially confirmed as com-
mander of the French forces in front of St. Nazaire. With a new
staff, Colonel Felix returned to Brittany on the 17th of October and
resumed operations. The French picture was further clarified on the
20th, possibly as a result of Colonel Felix's visit to General de Gaulle,
when General de Larminat visited the division command post to pay
his respects. General de Larminat had been placed in over-all com-
mand of the French forces employed between Bordeaux and Lorient
and was to operate under the direction of 6th Army Group as French
Forces of the West.

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THE FFI

The last major shift in French command took place on the 26th of
October. On that date, General de Larminat placed Colonel Chomel
in charge at St. Nazaire and gave command of the Lorient area to
General Borgnis des Bordes. Policy and command thus settled, the
French forces showed steady improvement. By the time the 94th left
Brittany there were twenty-one organized battalions of French infantry
at St. Nazaire and thirteen at Lorient operating as units of the French
19th Division and Brigade Charles Martel. Between September and
December of 1944, the Division aided in the training of all these
battalions by conducting schools, supplying instructors and giving
demonstrations. Subjects emphasized were detection and neutraliza-
tion of mines and booby traps, the installation of antipersonnel mines
and the handling of signal communications. Division also assisted in
the training of several French artillery units which operated within
the division's fire direction net. Repeatedly, American artillery for-
ward observers were attached to French patrols to provide supporting
fire and protection, since the French forces had no independent
artillery.

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Chapter 8: OPERATIONS IN BRITTANY

TO THE 301st Infantry goes the honor of being the first regi-
ment of the 94th Infantry Division to see combat in World War
II. Colonel Hagerty's men began relieving the 6th Armored
Division on September 9, 1944, and completed this relief two days
later. On the 13th, control of the sector, bounded on the east by the
Blavet River and on the west by the Leita, passed to the 301st. The
front lines ran generally parallel to and south of Quimperle, Redene,
Pont Scorff, Hennebont and Nostang.

First contact was made with the enemy on the 10th, shortly after
Company K manned an observation post in its area, when a small
enemy thrust, aimed at this OP, was repulsed with unknown casualties
to the attackers. Later the same day Company E of the 301st reported
that two of its men had been killed and that the enemy attempted to
burn their bodies in a haystack. However, the bodies were recovered
by personnel of the company before they were destroyed. On the fol-
lowing day, members of Company B captured the first prisoners taken
by the Division; these POWs were promptly delivered to the 94th
IPW Team by Lieutenant Walter H. Maddox. To add to the list of
firsts, on this same date, September 11, 1944, No. 2 piece of Battery
B of the 301st Field Artillery fired the first rounds delivered by the
94th Division Artillery in the second World War. On the 29th of
the month, Private First Class Dale Proctor, Company K, 301st Infan-
try, earned the first Distinguished Service Cross awarded to a member
of the Division. While serving as a telephone operator and observer,
this soldier was severely wounded when the enemy concentrated an
artillery barrage on and around his OP. Despite his wounds, Private
First Class Proctor remained at his post continuing to give accurate
fire directions while aid men dressed his wounds. Even then, although
suffering great pain, he pleaded to be allowed to continue directing
fire; it was necessary to pry the telephone from his hand in order to
evacuate him. The following day this soldier died of wounds.

Colonel Johnson, the CO of the 302d Infantry, opened his command
post in the vicinity of Plouay on September 15, 1944 when he arrived
in the Lorient sector with his regimental headquarters, antitank com-
pany and 1st Battalion. The following day, the 2d and 3d Battalions
arrived and rejoined the regiment. That afternoon the 302d was com-
mitted with all three battalions going into the line. The 1st Battalion
was employed on the right, holding the line from the Scorff River to
the vicinity of Caudan; the 2d Battalion took positions in the center
of the regimental front, extending from Caudan to Hennebont on the
Blavet River; the 3d Battalion was committed on the left, along a line

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area where it encountered a group of Germans in prepared positions.
A fire fight ensued in which four of the enemy were killed and ten
prisoners were taken. Among the latter was an officer, the first cap-
tured by the Division.

Hardly had the 94th completed plans for besieging Lorient, when
its containing mission was extended to include the German forces
in the pocket at St. Nazaire. General Malony immediately left for
Le Mans by liaison plane, to contact the commanding general of the
83d Infantry Division, whose troops the 94th was to relieve. When
the CG returned, plans were formulated calling for a shift of the bulk
of the infantry to the St, Nazaire sector. The artillery was to be split
between the two sectors with the greater strength remaining at Lorient.

Division Field Order No. 2 was issued on the 15th, directing the
organization of the Nantes Task Force, commanded by Brigadier Gen-
eral Henry B. Cheadle, Assistant Division Commander. Composition
of this force was as follows: 376th Infantry Regiment; 919th Field
Artillery Battalion; 473d AAA Battalion (Automatic Weapons, Self-
Propelled); Company C, 319th Engineer Battalion; Company C, 319th
Medical Battalion; and the 1st Platoon of Company D, 319th Medical
Battalion. In addition, there were FFI troops in the sector of the
Nantes Task Force, but no accurate estimate of their strength or com-
position was then available.

As the 376th Infantry had not yet cleared the assembly area in the
vicinity of Rennes, the original orders to proceed to Plouay were
countermanded and the regiment was instructed to proceed directly to

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Almost immediately following the relief of the 331st Infantry,
Colonel McClune requested and secured permission for a limited ad-
vance to straighten his lines and generally improve the forward posi-
tions. Without opposition from the enemy, advances of up to fifteen
hundred yards were made which brought the towns of Le Temple,
Fay-de-Bretagne and Blain well behind the regimental front.

To maintain effective contact between the divided elements of the
Division in front of the two Channel ports, Captain Scott C Ashton,
commanding the 94th Reconnaissance Troop, was directed to patrol
the area between the right boundary of the Nantes Task Force and
the left of the containing force at Lorient. Because of the great area
to be patrolled, the I&R Platoon of the 302d Infantry was temporarily
attached to the Recon Troop, which the Division Commander initially
decided to keep under his own control. In addition to maintaining
contact between the two pockets, the troop established liaison with
the FFI units in its area and operated an outpost in the village of Etel.

On September 22, 1944, the 1st Battalion, 301st, at Lorient, relieved
the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 302d Infantry which then passed into
Division reserve in the vicinity of Plouay. This relief was the be-
ginning of sixty-five consecutive days in the line for all three battalions
of the 301st plus the 3d Battalion 302d. Both the 1st and 2d Bat-
talions, 302d remained in Division reserve for a short period during
which readjustments were made in the Lorient sector; following this,
the 302d Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, moved by motor to the area
of the Nantes Task Force. On the 28th the 1st Battalion took over
positions in the new sector on the right of the 376th, while the 2d
Battalion acted as local reserve. The 1st Battalion, 302d, plus one
platoon of the regimental Antitank Company and a platoon of the
Cannon Company, supported by a battery of the 688th Field Artillery
Battalion, took over the Foret du Gavre from Company L of the
376th. These woods viewed on a map or studied from the air pre-
sented an unusual picture. From a plaza-like junction in the center of
the woods, ten roads radiated to form the spokes of a huge wheel.
These routes were arrow-straight and led to the outer perimeter of
the forest. Company B took over the "cart-wheel" which was de-
scribed as a "spooky place where your back is always exposed"; Com-
pany C dug in near La Piardierre; while a platoon from Company A,
reinforced with heavy machine guns and a battery of the 473d AAA
Battalion moved to Redon to guard the river and canal bridges lo-
cated there. Initially there were three battalions of FFI in the zone
of the 302d, all disposed on the regiment's right. Following the

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Held Order No, 3> dated Seprm^bcr 21, 1944, and e&zctm the
fol^ ihe Division V mission to iocU^e pr(v-

to Auxerre," (Auxent is ibcatccJ cast of Orleans and soi^foast^f
Paris, in central France. Thus, the Division front extended some 450

■

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Auxerre.) It assigned the 15th Cavalry Group (-) the task of prevent-
ing enemy forces from entering the area north of the Loire from Nantes
to Auxerre and designated that contact be maintained with the Nantes
Task Force in the vicinity of that city. Lieutenant Colonel Robert
Quinn, the cavalry group commander, organized the Loire area; with-
out delay he began his extensive patrol mission which was somewhat
eased by the fact that all bridges over the Loire had either been blown
by the Germans or knocked out by Allied air power.

General Malony now had three separate and widely scattered zones
under his command: Lorient, St. Nazaire and Loire. In addition, the
94th Reconnaissance Troop, operating from Redon to Nostang in the
Lorient sector, was patrolling an area with a frontage of more than
fifty airline miles. Not only was the 94th stretched from "hell to
breakfast," it had grown in size. By mid-October the total number
of American and French troops under Division control exceeded
thirty-five thousand and the 94th was the only division in the theater
with its own private navy and air force, Groupe Patrie.

Field Order No. 3 also set up the Lorient Task Force and added
the 688th Field Artillery Battalion and Company F of the 15th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron to the Nantes Task Force. Brigadier Gen-
eral Louis J. Fortier, Division Artillery Commander, took over the
former, composed of the following units: 301st Infantry Regiment;
3d Battalion, 302d Infantry; 301st Field Artillery Battalion; 356th
Field Artillery Battalion; 390th Field Artillery Battalion; 199th Field
Artillery Battalion; 256th Field Artillery Battalion; 94th Reconnais-
sance Troop; Company F (composite), 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron; Company A, 319th Medical Battalion; and one platoon,
Company D, 319th Medical Battalion.

Because of the extent of the 94th's front, it seemed desirable that
the division reserve, which consisted of a single battalion, be centrally
located in the event of trouble. Toward this end, the reserve was
moved from the vicinity of Plouay to the Foret de Domnaiche, near
Chateaubriant, when the 302d Infantry (-) was transferred to the
St. Nazaire sector. On October 6, 1944, this reserve was moved to the
vicinity of Nozay and twelve days later shifted to La Gacilly, in
attempts to find an ideal location for hasty deployment in either sector.
On the 27th, the Division reserve was again moved. This time the
location chosen was the former French Army training center at
Coetquidan, in the vicinity of Guer, where in addition to adequate
billets there was sufficient and suitable ground for refresher training.

On the 12th of November, the 2d Battalion, 376th, was relieved by

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

• '^ ^ „ _

Bartahoii, 301st; to pass to Lorienr sector reserve, notthwtst of P!uujv-
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the dayJight Uours in refresher training/ with emphasis on intmtxy-
tank cooperation ;a»d rh* :Ui^ck of '.fortified are*i% hv jssauit reams.

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trauung mih the tanks of the attached cavalry latei proved exaemdy
valuable. The rigorous schedule followed by units syhiie they were;.,
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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

sections. The Photo Intelligence Team worked at the Division Head-
quarters in Chateaubriant, and, after having made a preliminary esti-
mate of the needs of each sector, provided complete aerial photo
coverage of the respective fronts. Patrols at both Lorient and St.
Nazaire were expertly briefed by PI personnel prior to difficult
missions.

General Malony, his infantry restrained by definite orders against
offensive action; his artillery rationed in regard to ammunition; his
zone of responsibility stretched "over half of France"; and possessed
of only a small reserve, decided to commit the Division to a period
of intense battle indoctrination. Emphasis was placed on patrolling
(the 376th alone sent out 634 between September and December),
infantry-tank cooperation, general battle know-how and infantry-artil-
lery cooperation. This last was developed to the point where the ordi-
nary rifleman could and did, over and over again, call for artillery
fire on targets of opportunity. The Division was not destined to remain
forever on the "forgotten front," and when it emerged from hiding,
the CG wanted it to be able to step into the big league and hold its
own.

In keeping with the policy of the Division Commander numerous
patrols, both combat and reconnaissance, were constantly sent out
from all levels: regiment, battalion and company. These activities
were carefully coordinated by the Lorient and St. Nazaire Task Force
Headquarters (changed respectively to CT 301 Reinforced and CT 376
Reinforced on September 21, 1944 and to Lorient Sector and St.
Nazaire Sector on October 13, 1944) to eliminate the danger of
friendly patrols encountering each other in enemy territory with pos-
sible disastrous results.

On the 2d of October Company K of the 301st sent out a strong
combat patrol under Lieutenant David H. Devonald, II. Three FFI
soldiers accompanied the fifty-odd Americans chosen for this mission.
At 1255 hours, the patrol ran into an ambush and was brought under
intense enemy small-arms and artillery fire. As best they could the
men dug in under this withering fire. Requested artillery support
was promptly supplied by the 301st Field Artillery Battalion, which
had a forward observer with the group. A relief patrol was organ-
ized from personnel of Company I, commanded by Captain Charles W.
Donovan, but this group was never able to reach the isolated members
of Company K.

Private Harry Glickman, a member of the Company K patrol,
supplied the following description of the engagement:

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OPERATIONS IN BRITTANY

Everything ran well until we got about 5,000 yards from our lines. Then
it happened. Two scouts dropped dead and two more were wounded, as the
crack of rifles was heard from all sides. Ambush! The patrol leader acted
quickly and deployment started. "Call for artillery time fire to cover us," he
yelled. If I ever loved the artillery it was then ... It was probably the artillery
that saved us from annihilation. Concentration after concentration poured in on
the Heinies as we withdrew to better positions.

Then it started. Those five hours of fighting against terrific odds. They
threw everything at us ... I saw acts of bravery that day which it seemed
could happen only in motion pictures; men charging machines guns and
wounded men firing their weapons with one hand . . . The Germans paid a
heavy toll, but in the end, we also suffered heavy casualties. Twenty-six wounded
and five dead, out of about fifty men.

Toward the end ... the enemy began to organize and charge. There was
only one thing to do. "Concentration Seventeen . . . forty yards left . . .
Time Fire . . . For Effect." Behind a hedgerow we waited. Forty yards wasn't
too far for safety even with a hedgerow as protection. Twenty seconds later
the "On the way!" was sent over the radio and we heard the far-away rumble
of the artillery . . . Wait until you hear a 105mm shell coming down on you.
Wait until you hear twelve of them scream — scream like sirens as they start
their descent. The sound was enough for the Germans. They dove for any
sort of cover . . . The top of the hedgerow snapped in pieces and came down
on us. We could have kissed the artillery fellows.

But it was to no avail. The enemy had many more reinforcements and our
relief was still far off and had been halted. A little while later we realized
the inevitable — the radio was on the blink, ammunition low and men were
dying of wounds . . . We were ordered to give in.

They didn't treat us badly. They let us keep our watches and other valuables
(except cigarettes). What happened in prison camp and how we each lost about
twenty pounds is another story, but I shall always remember the day the German
captain called me aside, "Please," he said, "tell me, how soon do I get to
America after I am captured. I have a cousin in Milwaukee."

Only two members of this patrol escaped the trap. Information
obtained from French sources shortly after the engagement, to the
effect that over one hundred Germans had been killed in the encounter,
was later substantiated when men of the patrol returned to the Divi-
sion following a prisoner-of-war exchange. It was also learned at that
time that the artillery forward observer with the group had destroyed
his concentration overlay to prevent its falling into enemy hands.
After its destruction he adjusted more than 300 rounds from memory.

On the following day, the 3d of October, Lieutenant Colonel Francis
H. Doh's battalion of the 301st dispatched a routine combat patrol in
the Pont Scorff area. After penetrating the enemy lines to a depth of
about one mile this patrol was brought under intense German machine
gun fire and hopelessly pinned down. Totally disregarding the volume

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

of hostile fire, Private First Class Herbert Austin of Company F stood
up and rushed the German position. Standing practically face to face
with the occupants of the machine gun nest, firing his BAR from the
hip, Private First Class Austin shot it out with the enemy gun crew,
killing them all. This fearless action prevented numerous casualties
and enabled the patrol to continue and complete its assigned mission.

After securing permission from Division, on the 6th of October,
elements of the 3d Battalion, 376th, undertook an advance northeast
of Bouvron, to shorten and strengthen the line of strongpoints between
the 302d Infantry and this battalion. Principal activity during the
operation centered in the area along the Brest-Nantes canal in the
vicinity of the village of La Pessouis. From positions south of the
canal Company I jumped off in the face of enemy artillery and small-
arms fire that was particularly heavy in the neighborhood of the
chateau just east of La Pessouis. By late afternoon, the village had
been taken and the infantry pushed to the high ground beyond. As
the troops began to dig in they were subjected to accurate, sustained
fire from two directions. Apparently the artillery supporting the 302d,
across the canal, had mistaken Company I for enemy troops. It was
therefore decided to withdraw; as a result, the enemy reoccupied the
town. Incessantly, for the next two days La Pessouis was pounded by
American artillery and mortar fire. On the 8th, the town again was
assaulted and taken by the 3d Battalion, 376th. This time it remained
in American hands.

As a result of these operations the battalion front advanced approxi-
mately thirty-five hundred yards. American losses totaled four killed
and six wounded, against more considerable casualties inflicted upon
the enemy, whose force in opposition was estimated at two reinforced
rifle companies.

In mid-October the Division Artillery came into possession of a new
weapon, officially known as the Launcher, Rocket, Multiple, 4.5-inch,
T-27. Each T-27 was composed of ten banks of eight rocket tubes each,
mounted on a 2l/2-ton truck which served as a prime mover and from
which the rockets were detonated electrically. In turn, each of the
artillery battalions experimented with "The Fiery Farts," as these
counterparts of the German Nebelwerfer came to be known, forming
temporary rocket batteries for this purpose. While malfunctions were
frequent, these rocket launchers were used repeatedly against area
targets much to the discomfort of the pocketed enemy troops.

During the period from the 23d to the 28th of October, a series
of truces were arranged with the Germans to permit the French Red

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

first few such incidents, Division Artillery adopted German tactics and
some "chickens came home to roost."

Thinly held front lines, both American and German, facilitated
the movement of line-crossers and certain members of the FFI became
particularly adept at this type of work. From loyal French civilians
behind the enemy lines they obtained much valuable information.
However, information received was not always accurate and G-2 and
S-2 personnel were often hard pressed to evaluate correctly the intelli-
gence received.

On one occasion, working on the report of a line-crosser, Lieutenant
"Jimmy" (FFI officers often used assumed names to prevent reprisals
against members of their families still in enemy-held territory) ar-
ranged for a note to be delivered to a German battalion commander,
who was reported to be contemplating surrender, asking for a meet-
ing. At the appointed time, Lieutenant "Jimmy," Captain James S.
Young, Lieutenant Joseph E. Glover and Private A. M. Brooks, all of
Headquarters Company, 302d Infantry, started from Fergerac, in the
St. Nazaire sector, under a flag of truce and walked to the appointed
meeting place along the Brest-Nantes canal which separated the op-
posing lines. Upon arriving, Private Brooks, who was acting as in-
terpreter, hailed an enemy gun position beyond the canal from which
a runner was sent for the local commander. Captain Young describes
what followed:

In about ten minutes a German officer (a true Prussian if I ever saw one)
came striding down the road, field boots and all. He was wearing a raincoat
so wc couldn't see his rank. He came to the south side of the canal, turned a

3uarter-face and at rigid attention said: "Was Wollen S/e?" German for "What
o you want?" Obviously this joker wasn't the guy. I told Brooks to tell him
we had come to accept his surrender, to which he answered, "We are Germans
here, and Germans do not surrender! You must go now!" Whereupon he
about-clicked and strode off. . . . The next day the FFI commander west of
Redon strode into FFI headquarters very7 indignant. He had first-hand informa-
tion that an American battalion commander, backed by a battalion of infantry
and a battalion of tanks, had demanded the surrender of the Germans or he
would attack immediately. The FFI commander felt left out of the show.

At midnight on the 8th of October 1944, the 94th Infantry Division
passed to the control of 1 2th Army Group, commanded by Lieutenant
General Omar N. Bradley. This change of command was brought
about by the movement of General Simpson's Ninth Army (refitted
and reorganized after the reduction of Brest on the 19th of September)
to the Western Front. The 12th Army Group operating under the
code name Eagle had a forward echelon in Luxembourg City and a

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OPERATIONS IN BRITTANY

rear headquarters in Verdun. Division maintained contact with Group
by telephone, radio and liaison officers. The two former methods of
communication were far from satisfactory as the distance from the
Division CP at Chateaubriant to Eagle Rear at Verdun was roughly
five hundred miles and, as time went on, more and more reliance was
placed upon the 94th's "carbine-carrying couriers/' Often it was
necessary for the liaison officers to proceed to Eagle Forward, a factor
which increased the length of the journey by another seventy-five
miles. Liaison officers worked in shifts traveling by both artillery Cub
planes and command cars or jeeps. For the most part though, vehicles
were used since flying conditions in Brittany were usually unpredictable.

Early on the morning of the 20th of October, the enemy launched
his first real attack since the Division had assumed responsibility for
the pockets. A group of approximately 250 Germans, of the 3d Com-
pany, 986th Kriegsmarine, attacked the position of the 1st Battalion,
301st. Three prisoners were taken from the attacking force; from one
of these the identity of the assaulting troops was learned. This pris-
oner also stated that the mission of his company was to seize and hold
Grand Champ, adding that it was the practice of his unit to repeat
an unsuccessful attack after two or three days had elapsed. The same
day, an enemy force estimated at between one and two hundred in-
fantry, effected a penetration of the French line southwest of Nostang
but were beaten back by the FFI. This attack, which was supported
by an artillery bombardment on the town of Nostang, was believed
to be a reconnaissance in force. At 1755 hours on the evening of the
20th, General Fortier reported to General Malony: "Things have been
very hot today. They've shelled us with about 2,500 rounds and the
shelling hasn't ceased . . . one round comes over about every fifteen
seconds/'

The following day the French withdrew from the positions which
had been under attack, but hasty orders from Division to the local
French commanders returned the FFI to their lines before the enemy
was able to occupy the area.

On the 28th, the Germans repeated their attack against the French
positions in conjunction with a diversionary thrust against the 1st
Battalion, 301st, in the Hennebont section. Such a development had
been anticipated. At 0725 hours, the enemy started his push against
the 1st Battalion with an artillery preparation of several hundred
rounds. Forward OPs located some of the enemy gun positions and
effective counterbattery fire was employed. German infantry moving
forward under the cover of their artillery support encountered stiff

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

opposition. After failing to penetrate the American lines they with-
drew. Later in the day, another hostile force estimated at a battalion
attacked the FFI positions in the vicinity of Ste. Helene, south of
Nostang. Advancing behind a force of five armored cars, the attackers
succeeded in driving the French back from the Etel River, thus securing
the high ground that was obviously the object of this thrust.

Orders were received on the 29th of October, from 12th Army
Group, to hold in reserve one battalion as a counterattack force against
possible German landings on the coasts of Normandy or Brittany
from the Channel Islands. This directive came as a result of a recom-
mendation from the G-2 of Brittany Base Section, Communication
Zone, who foresaw the possibility of harassing German forces landing
from the islands of Guernsey or Jersey which were held by a force of
between twenty-six thousand and thirty-one thousand enemy troops.
The new responsibility was assigned to Division reserve, in addition
to its other duties, and a complete reconnaissance conducted of the
Normandy and Brittany coasts to determine accurately possible points
of attack. Routes of advance and areas of deployment were checked
and charted. A detailed plan then was formulated. As each suc-
cessive battalion took up the duties of Division reserve, the battalion
staff officers familiarized themselves with these plans, which could be
put into effect on an hour's notice. Because of this additional mission
location of the reserve was not changed for there was always the pos-
sibility that it would have to be committed within the Division zone.

At the request of the commanding general of each sector, a series
of boundary changes were made on the 2d of November. The bound-
ary between the Lorient and St. Nazaire sectors was shifted from the
Vilaine River, to a line connecting Ploermel, Malesdroit, Questambert,
Muzillac, Billiers and the lighthouse on the coast south of Billiers.
This further increased the zone of the St. Nazaire sector. Conse-
quently, on the 14th of the month, General Cheadle divided the St.
Nazaire Sector into North and South Sub-sectors. Colonel Johnson,
CO of the 302d Infantry, was given command of the former while
Colonel McClune of the 376th took over the latter. All FFI and FTP
troops within these sub-sectors came under the control of the appro-
priate regimental commander.

The defenses of the Lorient Sector were further improved on the
14th of November when all French forces north and northwest of
the line Kerambourn, Lovan, Kermahan and Kermoel were placed
under the control of General Fortier, Commanding General of the
Lorient Sector. From the same line east to the Brest-Nantes canal, a

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Having long realised that his troops V- ere going >u!e trojn tnact'-'
and the monotony of life m a Stork front. GenerM Maiony din
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bunded .prior to departure for the Western Front and it took place
the «iRk of December ?-R 1944.:

ft had long been thought that it the German garrison *
could be separated from the forces on the Qutherou Pc-nitV

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OPERATIONS IN BRITTANY

west of the Etel River and support fire from the He de Groix. As a
result of this action fifty-nine prisoners were taken, nine bunkers were
reduced and the desired positions obtained. American losses were ex-
tremely light. A hit on one of the AT guns, firing direct fire, killed
two of the crew and caused the destruction of the piece. In addition,
there were only four wounded.

On the 15th of December, the 94th Reconnaissance Troop outpost
on the He de Houat, between Belle Isle and St. Nazaire, which was
maintained to report on enemy shipping between the pockets, was
attacked by a force of about eighty Germans who landed by motor-
boat. Three other enemy vessels, containing about 120 additional
troops, remained outside the island's harbor to protect the landing
party.

At the same time the German landing party attacked the outpost,
a French naval smack carrying Staff Sergeant Orval L. Love, supply
sergeant of the Recon Troop, to the He de Houat was engaged by the
enemy craft off the beach. In the fight that followed the captain of
the French vessel was killed and Sergeant Love was wounded and
taken prisoner. The four Recon men manning the island outpost were
overwhelmed and their radio was captured intact. Following the fight,
Sergeant Love was removed to the German hospital at Lorient while
the other cavalrymen were taken to the PW cage on Belle Isle.

News of the beginning of Von Rundstedt's winter offensive in the
Ardennes reached the Division late on the 16th of December. Se-
curity measures were immediately intensified, as it was thought likely
that the enemy would drop saboteurs and parachutists throughout
France to cause confusion in the rear areas by disrupting communica-
tions and attacking supply depots. The 94th was also alerted against
the possibility of the German forces in the pockets staging breakout
attacks to divert American reserves as was openly hinted by German
POWs in the cages at Rennes. Throughout the remainder of Decem-
ber, the Division watched and waited, but by the end of the month
it was clear that the desperate drive of the enemy was being checked
and that the danger was past.

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Top: Lieutenant Baldwin of the 6th Armored Diviiion h belp&d from a German ambulance,
preparatory to being moved by boat to the American-held side of the Etel River. Bottom:
Lieutenant William J. Reynolds if moved to the Etel quay as Lieutenant Colonel Clarence R,
Brown, Oivi$ion Surgeon, checks other American wounded just repatriated.

Chapter 9: POW EXCHANGES

A NDREW G. HODGES of the American Red Cross joined the
r\ 302d Infantry at Camp McCain, Mississippi, and shipped over-
XjX-seas with the regiment. Hodges, who had been a football and
basketball star at Howard University in Birmingham, Alabama, was
kept out of service by a bad right arm that was a memento of his
football days. While in Brittany Mr. Hodges took over the duties of
Division Red Cross Field Director when that position became vacant.
Fearing that stories concerning poor treatment of American prisoners
by the Germans within the pockets might have some foundation in
fact, Andy went to work. Entirely on his own, although the sector
commanders were aware of his activities, Hodges began to make trips
through the German lines under a Red Cross flag, carrying literature,
cigarettes, toilet articles and candy to American and other Allied
prisoners of war at Lorient and St. Nazaire.

On his fourth journey behind the enemy lines, Hodges remarked to
several German officers that he would not have to make so many
trips if a swap could be arranged. The remark was dropped in an
offhand manner to see what reaction the Germans would make. Noth-
ing developed immediately, but on his next visit Hodges was informed
that the German command was willing to make a prisoner exchange.
This was reported to Colonel Bergquist, the Chief of Staff, and Lieu-
tenant Colonel William H. Patterson, G-l. Together they consulted
General Malony, who agreed to the exchange if higher headquarters
would give its approval; the "Chief" soon obtained the necessary per-
mission over the signature of the Commanding General of ETOUSA.

Although the initial conversations took place at St. Nazaire, the
first exchange was to be effected within the Lorient pocket. The agree-
ment called for a trade of personnel : rank for rank, branch for branch,
with physical condition as nearly equal as possible. The prisoner-of-
war camp at Rennes was combed for volunteers, and, after some 5,000
Germans had been questioned, sufficient personnel were gathered to
effect an exchange.

An armistice was arranged for November 17, 1944, and repre-
sentatives of both sides met in an abandoned school in the little
fishing village of Etel, west of Auray and south of Nostang. Here
the last-minute details were worked out. The Germans minutely in-
spected the volunteers, rejecting thirteen of the seventy-one Supermen
in the lineup. Also, at this point two of the volunteers ceased to be
such. Lieutenant Schmidt, the German G-2 of the Lorient Sector,
remarked that since there were not enough suitable volunteers, Colonel
Bergquist could have only fifty-six of the seventy-one American pris-

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62 T HE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

"What do you care about just one Englishman?" the Germans asked. "You
don't even know his name."

"The hell I don't. He's Captain Michael R. O. Foot."1

The German leaned forward: "I'm afraid we can't exchange Captain Foot.
He's given us a lot of trouble. He's escaped four times and been recaptured
four times. He knows too much."

"In that case," Hodges replied, "I can only say that the exchange can't come
off. We want them all, or none."

"You would sacrifice the freedom of the other men for just one English
officer?"

"Yes, or for just one French private. It's all or none."

Finally the Germans said they would exchange Foot for five German majors.

"Then you admit that one British captain is the equal of five German
majors?" Hodges said.

When the interpreter translated this for the ranking German officer, he
banged his fist on the table, and cried "Nein, nein."

After further parley, the Germans proposed three captains and three lieuten-
ants for Foot. Hodge refused. In the end the Germans agreed to swap Foot
for one German major or captain.2 The agreement was then sealed on a glass
of brandy. Hodges was blindfolded and came back.

It proved impossible to find a German captain or major, on the
Continent, wearing the Iron Cross, who was willing to go back into
the lines. This necessitated flying a German field officer from England
to complete the quota. Due to inclement flying weather, Captain
Foot's opposite had not been delivered by the time set for the ex-
change. Therefore, Hodges oflPered to deliver the major as soon as he
arrived and the Germans, who trusted Andy, agreed without question.
The exchange proceeded without further interruption.

The Americans freed as a result of this exchange had much the
same story to tell as those released at Lorient. Food was bad, German
morale low, and, in the rear areas, the enemy troops acted as if they
would be glad to have the war end immediately. The St. Nazaire men
did report that the German intelligence personnel they encountered
were stricter and more thorough than the G-2 people at Lorient.

Capture of the Reconnaissance Troop outpost on the He de Houat

JCaptain Michael Foot is the son of British Brigadier R. O. Foot, who directed the
antiaircraft defenses of London which were so successful in knocking down German
V-ls over the British capital. The captain was seriously wounded, while attempting his
last escape, when a French farmer discovered him hiding in a cellar and, mistaking him
for a chicken-stealing German, stabbed him in the face with a pitchfork. On exchange,
Captain Foot was immediately evacuated through medical channels and sent to the
general hospital at Rennes. Brigadier Foot later visited Mr. Hodges, General Malony
and the other officers who participated in the exchange to thank them personally for
the return of his son.

2Final agreement was for one major or captain who had been decorated with the
Iron Cross.

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on the 1 5th of December ■necessitated a. third exdiani-e, Ii has .already
been mentioned that Sergeant Love, .who Has Houndvd, was taken
to the German hospital at Loriem .-. while the other lout Keco.n men
Hent to the PW cage on Belle ixle. Here they pined tv.o men from
the 3d Battalion, joist Infantry. . h ho had been - i apt u red while .on
patrol missions. On the 13th of the montlv these men were joined
by ten' American airmen, the crew or a BIT jjhoJ down on then return
from a mission to Regensburg /.■The bombe- crew r.^ptaf ted they had
lost direction when enemv ilak knocked otit all radio .tomimmicattoit

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

to lighten the plane. When the tanks were almost dry the ship broke
through the overcast; below was what looked like the coast of England.
Flak being tossed up at the bomber did not detract from this im-
pression since, at that time and until the end of the war, all aircraft,
unless properly reported, were subject to antiaircraft fire. In addition
the crew knew they were long overdue. The pilot made a good land-
ing on the bomb-pocked field at Lorient. It was not until Germans
with drawn weapons surrounded the plane that the crew realized their
mistake. Division artillery observers who had watched the whole affair
through their glasses from forward OPs, destroyed the plane with
several rounds of 105mm after the crew had been removed.

Time was now running short; the 94th's stay in Brittany was almost
over. Hasty messages between 12th Army Group and Division re-
sulted in permission for one more swap. To this third exchange the
Germans agreed, but tacked on a qualifying clause. Assurance had
to be given that the air personnel would not fly again in the ETO.
This condition was met and on the 28th of December the last of the
94th's bargains were concluded. An extra man was given the Germans
at this time, in payment for Sergeant Love, who had been returned
on credit, on Christmas Day because German hospital facilities at
Lorient were unable to provide the treatment his wound required.
As a result of these three exchanges 140 Allied soldiers were liberated.
Included in this number were 105 Americans, thirty-two French (FFI)
and three British. With one exception, the Division recovered every
man unfortunate enough to fall prisoner to the enemy in Brittany.

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Chapter 10: THE BRETONS

MEAL INTRODUCTION of the 94th Division to the French
people and their customs came neither at St. Marie-du-Mont
- nor on the long motor journey through Normandy and Brittany.
The days spent in the vicinity of the beach were too few and too filled
with activity for any real contact to be made with the local people.
As fast as possible, troops were assembled and dispatched to Brittany.
The motor columns whipped through Carentan, Coutances, Granville
and Avranches; without stopping, they headed for the assembly area
outside Rennes where they spent a night in bivouac, before moving
to either the Lorient or St. Nazaire sector. En route, the troops of the
94th had quick glimpses of the French population and little besides.
The trip to the front was more a study of the terrain of northwestern
France and an object lesson in the destructive powers of modern war
than anything else. Those men of the Division who made this journey
will remember it always, but when they detrucked in Brittany they
still knew very little about their new allies.

As the various units moved into the line their contact with the
French really began, for in both sectors there were bands of Maquis
already on the line and at one time or another, all of the infantry
battalions worked directly with various FFI groups in the Division
zone. In the early days, some units integrated members of the Maquis
into their ranks, where they served as riflemen and scouts, side by
side with the Americans as brothers-in-arms even wearing the 94th
shoulder patch. A few of these volunteers were still with the Division
when the move to the Western Front was made.

As the rear elements of the Division closed in the new area, supply
and service installations set up in the numerous French towns and
villages behind the lines while higher command posts were placed
within or near populated spots. Thus, with the military forces of the
two nations cooperating on a common front and the majority of the
American installations located among the civilian population, contacts
were close and constant. In and out of the lines the men of the
neuf-quatre (94th) were welcomed by the people of Brittany.

To most of the 94th the first point of interest was the costumes
of the people among whom they found themselves. For the most
part the dress of the civil population was poor. Wooden shoes were
common, as they were the only sensible and available footwear for the
gooey fields, dirty stables and muddy roads. On Sundays and religious
holidays activity in the villages increased greatly and the people ap-
peared in their best clothing. The women wore high, starched lace
bonnets and picturesque provincial costumes; the men generally wore

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black suits and a round, black felt hat complete with Little Lord
Fauntleroy ribbons which trailed behind. But, even this Sunday finery
showed signs of age and hard wear.

It was soon discovered that in Brittany apples were seldom eaten —
and for good reason. On the subject of pommes there were two
schools of French thought. The younger generation was of the opinion
that apples were to be used exclusively as missiles and with this in
mind they employed them effectively on every passing vehicle. At first
they were tossed gently, but later they were heaved with the speed of
baseballs, much to the sorrow of many members of the Division.
Adults of the region believed that apples were intended only for
cider. Toward this end, they were gathered and pressed into a crude
cidre that grew in strength as it aged. Regrettably, most of the cider
within the Division area had no chance to grow old.

In regard to liquor, no mention of France is complete without refer-
ence to Calvados, This colorless liquid can be used to start fires, refill
lighters or induce internal warmth with considerable danger of an
attendant loss of equilibrium. For all three purposes it was used
frequently.

As contact with the local people increased, language difficulties
came to the fore. Copies of the little blue French Phrase Book pro-
vided by I&E Sections were faithfully studied and the discovery soon
was made that the French language is not composed entirely of the
phrases: tf Cigarette pour Papa/' "Avez-vous de bon-bon?" "Goom"
and redes oeufs." After a few sessions with the language guides, the
braver souls were ready to make small talk. It was far from unusual
to see an American soldier and a French civilian with their heads bent
over a Phrase Book while an interested crowd of spectators gave en-
couragement and advice. As time passed, the Americans learned a
little French and, in the process, the people of Brittany learned a little
"American. " From this point on, things proceeded much more
smoothly.

Among the more startling aspects of French life were the frontdoor
compost (manure) piles in the farming regions and the pissoires ever
present in city, town or village. To neither of these did the American
soldier take kindly, considering them unsanitary and indecent. But
they had been a part of French life for hundreds of years and change
among the peasants of Brittany is slow.

Farm implements of the Brittany peasants were a definite shock
to some of the rural members of the Division. Tractors were almost
unknown; the few that did exist were propelled by charcoal burners

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THE BRETONS

similar to those providing locomotion for the few trucks and omni-
buses that were still running. For the most part plowing was done
by means of horses or oxen, though at times even cows were harnessed
for this purpose. The custom of harnessing beasts of burden in tandem
also came in for considerable comment and there were those who set
about computing the loss in horsepower per beast employed.

The warm, crusty French bread which it was possible to buy without
coupons, proved a welcome change from GI issue bread and C ration
biscuits. It was frequently purchased; sometimes obtained by trading.
In regard to trade, despite language difficulties, the troops of the Divi-
sion did well. Best barter item was always cigarettes, with candy, sugar
and canned rations following in close order. Originally eggs could
be obtained on the basis of a cigarette for an oeuf. As time went on,
though, the hens became more exclusive and inflation set in all along
the front. One platoon of Company L, 302d, under Lieutenant Walter
F. Pier, holding the outskirts of St. Omer, solved the egg problem by
rounding up all the chickens in the deserted village and setting up a
"Platoon Poultry Farm" in a sheltered spot.

Late in September of 1944, the annual pilgrimage of the Catholic
faithful to the famed Shrine of Lourdes passed through the Division
area. Participation in the procession was a must for the devout. On
the day the entourage was scheduled to pass through a given village,
the townspeople would walk several miles into the country to meet
the approaching procession. The flotilla, portraying Christ carrying
the Cross to Calvary, was welcomed by every priest and brother in
the area. As the procession passed along, the clergy would sprinkle
the faithful with holy water and groups of children, under the direc-
tion of nuns, chanted hymns. From time to time, both the laity and
clergy joined in this singing. Most of the marchers trudged along
the rough roads barefooted, their shoes slung over their shoulders.
This, a chaplain explained, was done as a form of penance, but he
made the observation that it also saved shoe leather which was ex-
tremely scarce.

If the drams and ounces of perfume purchased by the men of the
Division during the stay in Brittany were to be totaled, it would be
discovered, in all probability, that hundreds of gallons of parfum had
been sent State-side. Lace work from Rennes and Nantes also made
large dents in unalloted pay. Exquisite Brittany dolls could be pur-
chased for sums ranging from twelve to twenty dollars, but these were
definitely collectors* items.

In the city of Nantes, which was used by the St. Nazaire sector as

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

a rest area and to which a man might earn a 24-hour pass, there was
some hostile feeling toward the Americans, caused by an unfortunate
incident in 1943 which led American planes, using the lead-bomber
method of releasing bombs, to strike Nantes on a marketing day.
Target for the raid was the docks and shipping along the river but
the bombs missed their mark, causing hundreds of casualties among
the civilians. After the attack, demolished buildings were plastered
with signs reading "Detruit par les liberateures" ("Destroyed by the
liberators"). These were still visible when the Division moved into
ine area. Rennes also felt some animosity because of misguided bombs,
and artillery fire used against the city prior to the German evacuation,
but American aid in the work of reconstruction, particularly in regard
to the repair of water facilities and the sewerage system, alleviated
this bitter feeling to some extent.

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Chapter 11: ADIEU

ALMOST A MONTH had passed after the Division entered the
P\ lines in September before the first rumor of a relief began to
l \ circulate through the command. In October the hot poop was
that the 94th would join the VIII Corps, which had finished refitting
after the reduction of Brest and was preparing to move to the Western
Front as part of the Ninth Army. However, both corps and army
moved east and the 94th continued its containing mission in front
of the pockets.

During October Colonel Bergquist undertook a trip to 12th Army
Group Headquarters. While there, he was informed that two plans
for the future employment of the Division were under consideration.
The first featured the relief of the 94th by the 102d Infantry Division,
to take place almost immediately, if approved; the second proposed
a relief by the 84th Division upon its arrival on the Continent. This
latter division was due to become operational on November 20, 1944.
If either of these plans were approved, the "Chief" was told, the
Division would join General Simpson's Ninth Army. Back at Division
this information caused considerable excitement; tentative plans were
laid for the anticipated movement. But, on October 25, 1944, Captain
Eugene B. Walsh, Division Liaison Officer, called from Luxembourg
with word that neither plan had been approved. The 94th would
not move.

Soon after this, Lieutenant Colonel Phillips, the Division G-4, re-
turning from a visit to General Bradley's headquarters, brought in-
formation to the effect that the army group commander had spoken
to General Eisenhower about the possibility of replacing the 94th
with a French division. No plans had been made to implement such
a relief, however. It was just something that was being considered
upstairs.

General Malony himself next made the trip to Luxembourg to
plead the cause of the Division. General Bradley told the CG he had
never intended to keep the Division on its containing mission for so
protracted a period of time, but military necessity had demanded such
action. The army group commander also added that at that time he
could see no prospect of an immediate change of mission. Things re-
mained at this pass until early in December. On the 5th of the month,
Brigadier General Grower, Chief of Brittany Base Section, arrived at
Division Headquarters with information that another division was to
take over the assignment in Brittany and entered into consultation with
G-4 in regard to movement plans.

Confirmation of General Grower's information was received from

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ADIEU

264th Infantry Regiments, was torpedoed by a German submarine
about six miles off Cherbourg, on the evening of the 24th at 1750
hours. This disaster, in which 784 enlisted men and 14 officers were
lost, vitally sapped the 66th's fighting strength. Whether or not the
division would have relieved the 94th if it had not been for this
unfortunate accident, will never be known. But, it is known that
General Bradley had long been anxious to get the 94th into the big
picture. Official word of the impending relief was received on the
21st of December. Three days later Major General Herman F. Kramer,
Commanding General of the 66th, arrived at Chateaubriant with his
advance party to plan the relief and to be oriented on the situation.

On the 26th the shaken-up 66th began occupying positions in the
line, but all troops did not arrive in the area until after the departure
of the 94th. The relief started in the Lorient sector, as plans originally
called for movement in the following order: CT 301, CT 302 and
CT 376. For the most part reliefs were effected during the hours of
darkness.

An interesting incident occurred in the relief of Company D of the
301st Infantry. The night the Panthers took over the company's mortar
positions, personnel of Company D assisted in setting up the weapons
of the incoming company, zeroed them in and listed the azimuths to
likely targets. About this time, the captain of the relieving force
appeared and ordered the weapons moved to the rear. A 94th sergeant
who had painstakingly supervised most of the work inquired the
reason for the move and was informed: "The first thing in the morn-
ing these men will get gun drill. Most of them have never seen a
mortar before."

The enemy welcomed the newcomers to the line with his versatile
88s and in some instances casualties were caused by carelessness on
the forward positions. To the tune of these same 88s, troops of the
94th turned their backs on Lorient and St. Nazaire. At 2107 hours,
New Year's Day 1945, control of the pockets passed to the 66th
Infantry Division. For the 94th the last battle indoctrination course
was finished; the Division was headed for the big time.

During the period of the Division's stay in Brittany, the men of the
94th successfully and completely contained a force of some 60,000
enemy troops. In addition, an estimated 2,700 casualties were inflicted
upon the Germans and 566 POWs were taken. To accomplish this
100 men of the Division gave their lives, 618 more were wounded
and one man was listed as missing in action as of December 31, 1944.
Material assistance was given the French forces in training, supply

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

the center of the metropolis. Time spent within Paris city limits was
no more than ten or fifteen minutes and some of the convoys passed
through in the rain which all but obscured the few landmarks which
might have been seen.

On the far side of Paris, the highways became a repetition of the
march from the Normandy beaches. The ditches along the roads were
littered with knocked-out guns, tanks and military vehicles, both Ger-
man and American, though by far the greater number belonged to
the enemy. Famous rivers were crossed on temporary bridges which
had replaced the historic stone structures knocked out by Allied air or
enemy demolitions.

As the 94th moved east, the Oise peasants were busy gathering the
last of their beet crop. Market places were bustling scenes of activity
where, for the first time, the troops of the Division saw the U-shaped
loaves of bread peculiar to this part of France. (The shape was de-
signed to facilitate carrying.)

Then on the signposts began to appear famous names from World
War I: The Marne, Chateau-Thierry, Meaux, Dormans, Epernay and
Soissons. Farther beyond was Reims, famous for its cathedral and
vintage champagnes. Most of the men of the Division caught a
glimpse of the church but only a few were fortunate enough to sample
the wine. Beyond Reims the journey ended — at least for the time
being. (Before the Division left Brittany it had been designated
SHAEF Reserve. This was changed to assignment to Third Army while
the unit was in transit.)

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

PART FOUR
GERMANY: THE SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE

A TRIBUTE: The highest honor that could
possibly be paid the artilleryman is respect and
gratitude from his infantry buddies, with
whom he works.

In February 1945, when troops of the 376th
Infantry were coming out of the line, they
marched in single file past the battery position
of Battery A, 356th Field Artillery Battalion.
They glanced over and saw the artillery guns
in position and the cannoneers standing by.

One by one, each Doughboy in the column
took off his helmet and brought it to his chest.

One Infantryman broke a smile across a mud
and ice-caked, bearded face and said simply:
"Thank your

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MAASTRICHT

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EXTENT OF VON RUNDSTEDTS
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Chapter 12: THE WESTERN FRONT

IN EARLY JANUARY 1945, when the combat teams of the 94th
Division began arriving at the assembly area in the vicinity of
Reims, the fury of Von Rundstedt's Ardennes offensive had spent
itself and the Battle of the Bulge had begun. Though the German
winter offensive had torn a 45-mile gap in the American lines from
Monschau on the north to Echternach on the south, and had pene-
trated to within four miles of the Meuse River in the vicinity of Celles,
Rundstedt had been unable either to cross the Meuse or to expand
the flanks of his penetration. On the 3d of January, the American
First Army attacked from the northwest with Houffalize, in the center
of the enemy's penetration, as its objective. To the south General
Patton's U. S. Third Army continued to exert strong pressure on the
Bastogne area until the 9th of the month, when it too launched a drive
toward the important road net at Houffalize. These operations were
designed to act as the claws of a huge pincer, thrusting into the flanks
of the Bulge to cut off as many of Rundstedt's troops as possible,
isolate them from the main German forces and secure their annihila-
tion or surrender.

The original plan for deployment of the Division called for move-
ment to the Meuse River where a secondary defensive position was to
be taken up along the west bank. In this operation, the 94th was to
join forces with the 28th Division, which had been badly mauled in
the opening days of the Ardennes offensive. Combat Team 302 was
en route to the Meuse, between Sedan and Verdun, when the plan was
changed. General Patton had decided to employ the 90th Infantry
Division, then in position in front of the Siegfried Switch Line, in
part of his attack against the southern flank of the Bulge. The 3d
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron immediately began the relief of
elements of the 90th Division, which then moved northward to the
area of III Corps, less one regiment which remained on line awaiting
the arrival of the leading elements of the 94th. Since the 28th Divi-
sion was too far under strength to fulfill its defensive mission along
the Meuse unaided, Combat Team 302 was temporarily attached to
this unit and continued en route.

The motor columns of Combat Team 301 closed at Reims late the
evening of January 5, and plans were immediately made to continue
movement the following morning. Third Army dispatched two truck
companies to the Division and on these the foot elements of CT 301
were loaded on the morning of the 6th. Before noon, the entire com-
bat team was heading east to join XX Corps.

Darkness fell as the motor columns approached Verdun, but there

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was no halt. Hours passed and the troop-carriers rolled into Metz —
still there was no halt. The columns turned north, paralleling the
Moselle River. About midnight, they reached Thionville; here the
vehicles crossed the river on a ponton bridge and the journey con-
tinued. There were temporary delays as trucks skidded and ditched
on the icy roads, and when exhausted drivers fell asleep at the wheel
and lost control. In the unheated organics and troop-carriers, the men
suffered horribly from the cold. The steel truck floors literally sucked
the warmth out of a man's feet and woolen gloves proved inadequate
in temperatures only a few degrees above zero. Cases of frostbite were
numerous, but unavoidable.

Unknown to the men and to most of the officers, the combat team
was under orders to effect the relief of the 358th Infantry, left behind
by the 90th Division, prior to 0800 hours on the morning of the 7th.
As the motor columns pulled up in rear of the 358th positions, the
relief began without delay. Guides were waiting and the half-frozen
men of the 301st were led forward into the lines. Although the relief
was not entirely accomplished until 1030 hours, most of the 301st
troops were in position by the time designated for the completion of
the relief.

The motor columns of Combat Team 376 arrived at Reims on the
6th and left the following morning to join the 301st Infantry. Through
the efforts of G-4, arrangements were made for the foot troops of this
regiment to remain on their 40-and-8s when they arrived and continue

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,A(.v.,. |"J; I

forward by; r 3 il The motor elements of the reetmem ■ were able to
ger off to an earU shut on the morning of the 7th\ and by 2100 hours
that same day had closed in their assembly are* ne,r Sierck, At 2300
boors on the 8th., the toot troops arrived -and f he 3 76tb completed
its relief of the 3d Cavalry RKanjiaissarice Squadron at 0710 hours

-ad ambofed the sooth flank of bis
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Late in November of 1944;. elements of the 1 Oth .Armored Division

man veaction for this was a- key patron ■'■ii* th* ddVme of the im

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Chapter 13: TETTINGEN-BUTZDORF

ALTHOUGH THE DIVISION was limited initially to a purely
/j\ defensive role in front of the Siegfried Switch Line, it was well
-ZTjjL understood that this restriction would not long continue. Con-
sequently, the 301st and 376th Infantry immediately began to probe
the enemy defenses with numerous reconnaissance patrols. When
ODs proved too conspicuous for the snow-covered landscape, white
patrol-suits were improvised from "liberated" sheets and tablecloths.

As XX Corps reserve, the 302d Infantry, on its return from attach-
ment to the 28th Division, reconnoitered the entire corps zone against
the possibility of employment as a counterattacking force. In addi-
tion, Colonel Johnson's command reconnoitered a series of five de-
fensive lines in rear of the 94th's battle position. As time permitted,
these lines were dug into the deeply frozen ground and made ready
for quick occupancy, should the enemy break through anywhere along
General Malony's extended front. Heavy minefields were laid across
likely tank approaches and all bridges in close proximity to the front
were mined, as were many defiles. Along wooded roads, in rear of
the 94th, the engineers strung necklaces of demolitions around the
larger trees, so that these roads could be blocked with little difficulty
in the event of an enemy penetration.

On the evening of January 12, 1945, the 1st Battalion, 376th, com-
manded by Lieutenant Colonel Russell M. Miner, received orders to
seize and hold the fortified town of Tettingen on the night of the
13th-l4th, and to be prepared to repel enemy counterattacks from any
direction. This was the first of a series of limited-objective attacks
ordered by XX Corps. The force to be employed in this and subse-
quent thrusts was not to exceed one reinforced battalion. On this
matter corps had been explicit. The object of these attacks was two-
fold: first, by continued aggressive action to draw German reserve
units from the hard pressed Bulge area; second, by the execution of a
carefully planned series of local actions to inflict heavy casualties on
the enemy units within The Triangle, gradually wearing them to
exhaustion.

Riding back to his command post in Perl, after receiving the attack
order, Lieutenant Colonel Miner took stock of the situation. The
terrain around Tettingen definitely favored the defense. Looking
northeast from Wochern, one was immediately impressed by the com-
manding position held by the Germans in Campholz Woods, directly
in front of the 2d Battalion, 376th, which was on the right of Lieu-
tenant Colonel Miner's outfit. This wood was situated on the upper
slope of a hill some four hundred feet high which dominated the ter-

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

mental outpost line from Besch to Wochern while Companies A and
C were organized and entrenched on the main line of resistance. Dur-
ing the afternoon and evening of the 13th, the 3d Battalion, 376th,
would relieve these positions. In addition to the support that could
be expected from the regimental combat team, Lieutenant Colonel
Miner had attached to his battalion for the attack, a platoon of Com-
pany B of the 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion and a platoon of Com-
pany C, 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion. Because of the disposition
of the battalion, Companies A and C would lead the attack. The bat-
talion commander knew that Company A had sent patrols through the
woods in front of Wochern as far as the dragon's teeth along the
southern edge of Tettingen. They had drawn no fire and had en-
countered no Germans. To the west of the Wochern-Sinz road was
a wooded area that extended nearly into Tettingen. This would pro-
vide a good assembly area and covered routes of approach for the
attack. The situation looked favorable despite the fact that the weather
was bitter cold and there was a twelve-inch covering of snow on the
ground.

Some two months earlier, the 10th Armored Division had encoun-
tered a good deal of trouble when it had taken Tettingen. After
holding the town for two days and capturing the pillboxes within it,
the tankers withdrew because of the fury of the enemy's counter-
attacks. Before abandoning Tettingen, the 10th had reduced the cap-
tured pillboxes to giant blocks of overturned concrete. But, the pill-
boxes on the hill to the east of town were still alive and intact. These
would cause trouble. Then, there were the antipersonnel mines and
booby traps the armored division had planted before it pulled back.
These would have to be located, marked and in many cases inactivated.
In all likelihood, taking Tettingen would be relatively simple. The
real task would be to hold the town once it had been won. Imme-
diate and violent counterattack was anticipated but it seemed certain
that such action could be made very costly for the Germans in fur-
therance of the Division Commander's policy of maximum attrition.
Hence, the proposed defense of Tettingen was worked out along with
the attack plan. Company C was to seize and be responsible for the
west side of Tettingen, facing the orchard; Company A, the north side
looking downhill to Butzdorf and the east side facing uphill to
Campholz Woods. Company B was to be held in reserve, ready for
deployment in any part of the town. On copies of a town plan of
Tettingen, each squad and platoon leader worked out exact locations
for his men and approximate locations for the automatic weapons.

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TETTINGEN-BUTZDORF

Opposing the 376th Infantry on the line between the Borg-Munzin-
gen highway and the Moselle was the I Battalion, 713th Grenadier
Regiment of the 4l6th Infantry Division, commanded by a
Major Becker, whose CP was located in a concrete shelter just north
of Sinz. Total strength of this unit, plus reinforcing elements from
the XLI Fortress Battalion, came to approximately five hundred men.
Between Nennig and Tettingen, the 2d Company of the battalion
manned the pillboxes and bunkers, behind the antitank barrier. From
Tettingen to the east boundary of the German battalion was the 1st
Company reinforced by the 4th (Heavy Weapons) Company and
twenty or thirty men of the fortress battalion. One platoon from the
1st Company and one squad of the antitank platoon were held in
reserve at Sinz. The 80mm mortars were in a draw just east of Butz-
dorf and additional fire support was available from the 13th Company
which had its 120mm mortars in position in Untersie Busch Woods,
west of Sinz. Also, there was a battery of dual-purpose 88s, which
could support these positions, on Munzingen ridge, east of Sinz. The
4l6th Division Artillery (105mm and 150mm howitzers) had wire
communication with observers in the various pillboxes and fire was
available on call. In regard to food, the situation was poor. Ammuni-
tion was low and the men had been in the line for a long time. Only
the thin but steady trickle of replacements and the warm comfortable
bunkers kept the German troops in prime fighting condition.

At 0500 hours on the morning of the 14th, Companies A, C and D
of the 376th, moved up to Wochern where they were joined by Com-
pany B following its relief by the 3d Battalion. Arrangements had
been made the previous night to locate the battalion command post in
a building on the north side of Wochern and wire was laid to the
battalion OP in Der Heidlich. At 0650 hours, as the first gray streaks
of dawn began to show behind Campholz Woods, the mortar and
machine-gun sections of the battalion assumed positions and the rifle
companies moved into their forward assembly areas. Despite the cold,
the troops carried only light packs; speed and ammunition were of far
greater importance than comfort.

H-hour was announced at 0710 hours by the rolling thunder of the
105s of the 919th Field Artillery Battalion softening up Tettingen.
After a twenty-minute preparation the attack jumped off. While the
4.2 chemical mortars raised fountains of white phosphorus along the
ridge east of Tettingen, Lieutenant Claude W. Baker's heavy ma-
chine-gun platoon chattered from the forward edge of Der Heidlich,

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

TETTINGEN-BUTZDORF

hand-grenaded, then stormed. Some twenty-three Germans routed
out of the cellars were quickly disarmed, searched and moved back to
Wochern.

By 0815 hours the town was completely occupied; organization of
the defenses began according to plan. Captain Edwin E. Duckworth
of Company C moved his men into position in the buildings and
trenches on the west of town, and posted six men in the houses in the
orchard. The 60mm mortars were set up in the ruins of the blown
pillbox on the southern edge of town where they were given rifle
protection by some men of the 1st Platoon.

At the same time Captain Carl J. Shetler, commanding Company A,
organized his men on their prearranged positions. The 1st Platoon
dug in on the north while the 2d and 3d prepared to defend the east
side of Tettingen. Concurrently, a patrol of one squad was sent to
reconnoiter the pillboxes three hundred yards east of town. This party
worked its way to the edge of the hill, locating four or five boxes.
These were so skillfully camouflaged that the scouts were on top
of one of the pillboxes before voices from inside gave away its posi-
tion. Since the patrol had no means of breaking into the fortifications,
it withdrew.

Back at Der Heidlich the progress of the operation was followed
by anxious eyes. The Assistant Division Commander, General Cheadle;
the Regimental Commander, Colonel McClune; Lieutenant Colonel
Robert L. Love, G-2; Lieutenant Colonel Rollin B. Durbin, G-3 and
the Division Engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Noel H. Ellis, were at the
battalion OP. They were enthusiastic about the success of the attack
and saw no reason why it could not be exploited. This resulted in the
decision to take Butzdorf, although this town had not been included
in the original attack plan. Orders were speedily issued that the bat-
talion would jump off again at 1000 hours.

When informed of this decision, Lieutenant Colonel Miner looked
at his watch. It was then 0820 hours. If the attack was to continue
as scheduled, he would have to move quickly. The battalion com-
mander directed Captain Larry A. Blakely, his artillery liaison officer,
to arrange for a ten-minute preparation on the new objective begin-
ning at 0950 hours. Then he and his command group headed for
Tettingen, closely followed by Lieutenant Baker and his machine-gun
platoon.

When Lieutenant Colonel Miner arrived in Tettingen he set up his
command post in the basement of the house across from the church,
in the southern part of town and sent for Captain Shetler. Very

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TETTINGEN-BUTZDORF

shortly thereafter, the CO of Company A reported; Lieutenant Colonel
Miner ordered him to attack Butzdorf at 1000 hours and to prepare
to hold the town against counterattack.

When Captain Shetler received this order his company and its
attachments were completely deployed on the north and east of Tet-
tingen preparing to defend the town. Immediately the CO sent a
runner to recall the reconnaissance patrol hunting pillboxes east of
town and moved forward to contact his platoon leaders. He informed
Lieutenant George L. Dumville that his platoon would act as support
during the new attack and instructed Lieutenant Tom Hodges to move
forward at 1000 hours to seize everything in Butzdorf on the east of
the Wochern-Sinz road. Captain Shetler next contacted Lieutenant
Claude W. Baker of Company D, and ordered him to reconnoiter for
positions from which to support the coming attack.

By this time enemy fire on Tettingen had increased greatly and 88s
east of Sinz were sniping at individuals as they moved among the
buildings in the northeastern part of town. So closely was the warning
whistle of incoming mail followed by a shell burst there was scarcely
time to flatten in the snow before screaming steel fragments were
ricocheting off the stone walls of the buildings. German 80mm mor-
tars, east of Butzdorf, were active and the explosion of their projectiles
added to the noise and confusion in town, as well as to the hazard of
moving from building to building.

After considering the report of the patrol recalled from the pillbox
area east of Tettingen, Captain Shetler returned to the battalion com-
mand post recommending that the attack on Butzdorf be postponed
until these pillboxes were reduced, since enfilading machine-gun fire
from these strongpoints could be brought on the assault platoons as
they advanced. Lieutenant Colonel Miner refused to delay the attack.
Company A was to advance at 1000 hours. It was then fifteen minutes
to the scheduled time of attack; Capain Shetler hurried back to finish
issuing his orders.

As the men of Company A crawled out of their cellars and captured
foxholes and down from their attics, the support platoon of Company
C, commanded by Lieutenant Ben R. Chalkley, moved from the south
of town and took over the defenses on the northeast. Lieutenant
Chalkley established the platoon command post almost on his MLR
and prepared an all-round defense. Sergeant Kornistan and Sergeant
Douglas, with six riflemen and four engineers carrying explosives,
moved out to see what could be done about reducing the pillboxes
nearest the position.

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

When Captain Shetler reached his 1st Platoon in the northern part
of Tettingen, they were busily engaged in strengthening their newly
won positions. The captain motioned Lieutenant Richard L. Creighton
to join him. It was then 0955 hours and the artillery preparation of
the 919th Field Artillery had been falling on Butzdorf for almost five
minutes. Captain Shetler spoke first: "Creighton, I want you to attack
Butzdorf at 1000. Take everything on the west of the road."

Lieutenant Creighton looked at his company commander in disbelief
and amazement. "You mean now?"

"Yes, now." Captain Shetler replied.

Since it was obvious that this made the 1st Platoon responsible for
most of Butzdorf, the CO of Company A ordered Lieutenant Hodges
to jump off first and seize the house halfway between Tettingen and
Butzdorf. Lieutenant Creighton would then follow and Lieutenant
Dumville would remain in the northern edge of Tettingen in support.
Lieutenant Baker, who was unable to find suitable positions for his
machine guns, was instructed to follow the support platoon when it
moved.

It was 1007 hours before Lieutenant Hodges was able to start his
platoon down the hill toward Butzdorf. Enemy artillery continued to
pound Tettingen, but the small-arms fire which had been coming from
Butzdorf was fairly well silenced by the artillery preparation on that
town. When Lieutenant Hodges had advanced some two hundred
yards, Lieutenant Creighton's platoon followed after experiencing
some difficulty in assembling. Slowly they worked their way down the
slope, which was entirely without cover, as mortar and 88 fire burst
among the trees and along the road. Captain Shetler followed Lieu-
tenant Hodges' support squad, accompanied by his messengers and
radio operator.

To the east, on the Borg-Munzingen ridge, enemy observers watched
this new development. Lieutenant Hodges' leading squads had passed
the halfway house, and the support squad and company command
group were just in front of it when a series of heavy explosions burst
among them. The men hit the dirt and the explosions continued.
Lieutenant Creighton's platoon, on the left, broke into a run as the
enemy concentration began and stormed into Butzdorf. Lieutenant
Hodges' support squad soon followed suit. During the confusion one
of the BAR men located a German mortar on the right flank near a
pillbox, and effectively silenced it with a few well placed bursts.
Some of the fire then ceased and the medics moved in to attend the
wounded. Captain Shetler was badly hit, his radio operator was killed

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TETTINGEN-BUTZDORF

and the radio destroyed. In all, there were about fifteen wounded who
had to be evacuated. These casualties were carried into the halfway
house. From there they were later evacuated up the hill to Tettingen,
on litters and doors.

Lieutenant David F. Stafford, the company executive officer, came
forward without delay to assume command. He had with him the
first sergeant and had picked up what was left of the command group,
but with the radio gone there was no means of communication with
battalion except by runner. Moreover, the artillery forward observer,
Lieutenant William C. Woodward, had remained in a house on the
forward edge of Tettingen, from which there was fair observation,
and Lieutenant Stafford had no means of direct contact with him.
However, the situation was not too bad as the leading platoons were
rapidly clearing Butzdorf.

By 1113 hours, the 1st and 2d Platoons had mopped up the town
taking prisoner a few bedraggled-looking individuals in long, floppy
overcoats. Preparations for a thorough defense began at once. As
planned, Lieutenant Creighton's men took over the west of Butzdorf
while Lieutenant Hodges' platoon prepared to defend the east. Lieu-
tenant Dumville's platoon was ordered to occupy the halfway house
and the row of buildings on the south of town, while Lieutenant Baker
was emplacing his machine guns to cover the likely avenues of ap-
proach for an enemy counterattack. Then everyone settled down to
await developments. Looking up at the ring of enemy-held hills sur-
rounding Butzdorf, the troops realized that the worst was yet to come.
A salient more than a mile deep had been thrust into the German
defenses. It had to be held, no matter what the enemy might do to
recover this valuable ground.

About 1300 hours, some fifty men were seen debouching from
Campholz Woods, in a column of twos. At first it was assumed that
they were prisoners being brought back by a patrol from Company C.
Presently it was observed that they were armed; closer scrutiny identi-
fied them definitely as Germans. A machine-gun was hurriedly dis-
placed to cover the group and Captain Larry A. Blakely, the artillery
liaison officer, cranked his telephone and shouted for fire direction
to prepare for a shoot. The files of Germans moved slowly forward
and, as they deployed, firing began. Artillery shells rattled overhead
and the ground at the feet of the enemy erupted. Rifles and automatic
weapons poured carefully aimed fire into the group. Among the
bursting shells, the enemy was seen to scatter. Some few raced for

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

the shelter of nearby pillboxes but most lay where they had fallen
in the snow.

A short time later, an enemy patrol in perfect V formation, led
by an officer in a light coat, emerged from Campholz Woods. Watch-
ful eyes in Tettingen followed the Germans as they moved down the
hill. A machine gun went into action and the mortar platoon back
in Wochern dropped an effective concentration. This ended the patrol.
At 1335 hours, the battalion commander ordered Company B forward
from its reserve position in Wochern. En route, the march was
periodically interrupted by enemy artillery and mortar fire, but the
1st Platoon moved into Butzdorf without incident while the remainder
of the company took positions in Tettingen to strengthen that gar-
rison. After this move, the remainder of the afternoon passed quietly
while the entire battalion improved the positions it had won. De-
fensive fires of the artillery, mortars and machine guns were coordi-
nated and the Antitank Platoon placed its guns in position outside
Wochern; the recommendation of the platoon leader not to move into
Tettingen had been accepted. Wire communications were laid and
relaid as fast as they were knocked out. Enemy shelling was inter-
mittent but intense throughout the afternoon and evening. An 88
ignited a building on the square in Tettingen and the fire, which no
one attempted to extinguish, sent a tall pillar of smoke rising into
the winter sky.

Unknown to the troops in Tettingen and Butzdorf, important de-
cisions were being made behind the enemy lines. The 11th Panzer
Division, nicknamed the Gespenster (Ghost) Division, one of the
finest German units on the Western Front, had been moving from
Trier to the Rhine when the 1st Battalion launched its attack. Hastily,
the 11th was rerouted. It headed west for the Saar-Moselle Triangle,
with orders to restore the original line regardless of cost. Also, the
714th Grenadier Regiment of the 4l6th Infantry Division was
ordered to leave its comfortable bunkers along the east bank of the
Saar and move to the aid of its brother regiment, the 712th. The
41 6th Division Replacement Battalion, complete with cadre and com-
manded by a Major Kraft, was hurried toward Tettingen with orders
to attack immediately.

As the night wore on, Tettingen seethed with activity. Casualties
were evacuated and all types of ammunition and ten-in-one rations
were brought from Wochern to Tettingen by hand. From there they
were hand-carried into Butzdorf. Company B sent a three-man con-
tact patrol along the road to Wochern while Company A sent four

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men. up the draw east of Butzdorf , to locate the German mortars which

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COUNTERATTACK OF THE 416th

REPLACEMENT BATTALION f~
JAN 15, 1945 v y^f

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TETTINGEN-BUTZDORF

machine guns stabbed the darkness, as final protective lines were laid.
Scores of the attackers fell, but the rest charged on. Through the
orchard and up the antitank ditch they raced. They assaulted the
house held by the six men from Company C; threw hand grenades
from room to room and into the cellar. In less time than it takes to
tell the place was filled with yelling Supermen. The half-dozen men
holding the house decided it was time to leave and, leaping from one
of the windows, dashed for the shelter of town. In Tettingen they
encountered Sergeant Templeton and requested mortar fire on the
building. Quickly the 81s were adjusted with telling effect. Screams
of the wounded and dying mingled with the crash of exploding shells
and crumbling walls. A tank destroyer edged into firing position and
delivered sufficient rounds to eliminate any Germans who remained
alive in the house.

But, still the Germans came. They surrounded Butzdorf and
crawled between the buildings in Tettingen. They encircled individual
houses and grenaded the rooms systematically. In several instances
enemy machine-gun crews set up their weapons within ten yards of a
building to pour streams of fire through the windows and doors. For
three hours the fighting continued as small groups on both sides fought
savage actions without knowledge of the fate of their comrades. Only
the volume of fire, in which friendly and enemy weapons were identi-
fied by characteristic sound, gave assurance to the attackers and the
attacked. The western half of Tettingen seemed to rock under the
intense mortar and artillery concentrations thrown against it. American
hand grenades and German potato mashers were exchanged freely
and the Mis did extra duty.

Toward the end of the second hour of the fighting, a hasty check
of the remaining machine-gun ammunition revealed that only about
four full boxes were left. More than 32,000 rounds had been ex-
pended. Someone would have to make the trip back to Wochern for
a hasty resupply and Corporal Donald W. Kreger, transportation
corporal of Company D, volunteered for the job. He worked his way
back to Wochern and returned with 64,000 rounds loaded on his
vehicle. This was the first vehicle to make the run into Tettingen;
presumably the road was free of mines.

With the coming of dawn, firing slackened and the mortars in
Wochern coughed up the final rounds of the 4,000 they fired in help-
ing to repel this attack. Apparently, the main effort of the German
thrust had been directed against Tettingen, but Butzdorf had received
a goodly share of attention. Then at 0755 hours all firing ceased.

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Northwest of Tettingen there were scattered bundles of human litter
dotting the snow, among the stubs of what had once been trees. The
air was filled with the odor of burnt cordite and there was evidence
of destruction everywhere.

Private Milton A. Welsch of the battalion medical detachment,
noticing some of the bodies beyond town slowly dragging themselves
through the snow, went forward to investigate. He found between
thirty and thirty-five Germans alive, but wounded and freezing to
death. These casualties were speedily evacuated and treated. Their
socks and gloves were frozen to their bodies and the skin peeled away
as they were removed. Later, other Germans were found hiding in
the surrounding woods and trenches. In all, some sixty prisoners were
rounded up and sent to the rear. Of the whole attacking force of
some four hundred men only about one hundred returned to the enemy
lines.

For the Americans the day then settled down to one of watchful
waiting. Continuous mortar and artillery fire discouraged movement
on the streets; only the boldest risked the trip into Butzdorf. The
troops dined on their first ten-in-one rations since crossing the Channel.
Water was a major problem and after the first man to visit the town
pump was shot by a sniper, it was generally decided that melted snow
would make an acceptable substitute. In Butzdorf, charges of nitro-
starch were used to breach holes in the walls of adjoining buildings.
These mouseholes eliminated the necessity for venturing into the fire-
swept streets and provided easy passage from house to house.

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Chapter 14: NENNIG-BERG-WIES

HILE ITS 1st Battalion was engaged at Tettingen and Butz-

V V afternoon of the 14th, the day Lieutenant Colonel Miner's
men took their objectives, orders were given Lieutenant Colonel
Benjamin E. Thurston, commanding the 3d Battalion, to seize and
hold the towns of Nennig, Berg and Wies the following morning.
Lieutenant Colonel Thurston had already received a warning order
for this operation and had formulated his attack plans.

Nennig was composed of about fifty stone buildings situated on
the extensive mudflats bordering the Moselle River in this vicinity.
West of the town two small streams flowed into the river. Immediately
east of Nennig was some high ground which overlooked it. To the
south and west the terrain was flat and level, devoid of vegetation
and broken only by a few small gullies. A double track, north-south
railroad servicing the towns in the Moselle valley passed between
Nennig and the river, some six hundred yards west of town. Midway
between the railroad and Nennig was a road leading north into Wies,
a small town approximately 1,500 yards to the northwest. Berg, the
last of the villages included in the battalion mission, was located
some six hundred yards north of Nennig. It was composed of about
twenty houses and a strongly fortified castle.

Fear of alerting the enemy to this new attack led to the decision
to dispense with much of the usual patrol reconnaissance. Available
maps and aerial photographs were studied exhaustively, then a visual
reconnaissance was conducted by the battalion commander and his
staff from an OP in Besch. This led to an important decision. It had
been suggested that the attack be launched from the east, but the
terrain and enemy defenses to be encountered in this approach caused
Lieutenant Colonel Thurston to question such action. Seven hundred
yards south of Nennig on the east of the Besch-Nennig road were
five manned enemy pillboxes and it was known that a previous Ameri-
can attack against these fortifications had been stopped in its tracks.
Moreover, the area around these boxes was reported to be heavily
mined. Considerable activity had been observed in the woods extend-
ing to the east and the strength of the enemy in these woods was an
unknown factor. Also, an attack from the east meant either a rush
down a steep hill, with consequent disorganization, or advancing along
a narrow gorge that could be held easily by a few determined riflemen
reinforced with automatic weapons. Lieutenant Colonel Thurston
decided to attack from the west.

In the Nennig area the terrain was such that, looking south from

Infantry was not idle. On the

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100

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

the fortified line in front of the town, all approaches were plainly
visible to the enemy. Hence it was evident that even an attack from
the west would have to be conducted so that the attacking force crossed
the open ground under the cover of darkness or smoke. If this was
not done the attackers would be picked off against the snow like so
many clay pigeons.

During the 1st Battalion's attack on Tettingen, Companies I and L
of the 376th had been held in reserve in the woods west of Wochern.
On the night of the l4th-15th, the entire battalion, plus Company A
of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion and a platoon from the 774th
Tank Destroyer Battalion which had been attached, assembled in
Besch. A section of mortars under Lieutenant Raymond J. King,
which had been giving direct support in the attack on Tettingen, was
withdrawn to aid in the coming push.

At 0300 hours the morning of the 15th, Lieutenant Charles R.
Palmer and a squad from the 319th Engineers swept a path for almost
two miles, from the northern edge of Besch to the railroad tracks west
of Nennig which had been designated as the line of departure. The
path to the LD was a torturous one. Initially it ran northwest, inter-
secting the Moselle opposite Nennig. It then followed the river north
for a quarter of a mile before it doubled back, south and east, to the
stretch of track west of town. This twisting lane through the mine-
fields was marked with phosphorescent tabs strung on wires. The
engineers also provided the leading companies with pole charges and
made available four flame throwers. To forestall any motorized coun-
teroffensive on the part of the enemy, a belt of antitank mines was
laid across the road leading into Besch.

Despite the harshness of the weather and the imposing German de-
fenses, the men of the 3d Battalion were very confident. Reports
coming out of Tettingen had been favorable and the troops were sure
they would fare as well as Lieutenant Colonel Miner's men.

Lieutenant Colonel Thurston decided to leave Company I in Besch as
his reserve. Formation prescribed for the remainder of the battalion
was a column of companies with men in single file. Captain Julian M.
Way of Company K led off with his unit stretched out behind him.
A platoon of heavy machine guns and a mortar section from Company
M followed; behind this group, by 500 yards, came Company L, com-
manded by Captain William A. Brightman. The remaining heavy
machine-gun platoon of the battalion brought up the rear of the
column.

The night was bitter cold and the ground covered with snow or ice.

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102

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

continued for an additional thirty minutes and this request was granted.
Concurrently, smoke was laid along the south and west of Nennig
to confuse the enemy as to the direction of the impending attack.

At 0745 hours Company K crossed the line of departure with the
1st Platoon on the right, the 2d on the left, and the 3d in support.
Smoke laid by the artillery obscured the objectives and the attack did
not go exactly as planned. Company K was to have taken Nennig
while Company L bypassed it to seize Wies. In the confusion, the
2d Platoon of Company K, commanded by Lieutenant Dwight M.
Morse; one platoon of machine guns under Technical Sergeant Leo P.
Philbin; a section of 81mm mortars under Lieutenant King and a light
machine gun section under Technical Sergeant Emmett R. Brown mis-
takenly advanced into Wies. Too late, this group realized their mis-
take. However, their absence did not minimize the sharpness of the
attack on Nennig.

When Captain Way emerged from the smoke he made two startling
discoveries. In leaving the LD he had veered to the north and was
now facing the open country between Nennig and Wies. Also, his
left assault platoon was missing. There was no time to attempt to
locate Lieutenant Morse and his men. The only solution was to replace
the left platoon with the support. This was done quickly and the
attack was launched, not from the west as planned but from the
north.

Imbued with a feeling of complete confidence and sure of success,
the men of Company K came into Nennig on the run, shouting at the
top of their lungs and shooting everything in sight. Despite the de-
layed start, surprise was complete. House after house was taken
against little opposition for the Germans seemed to be anticipating
an attack from the south. Twenty minutes after the leading infantry-
man dashed into Nennig, this objective was completely in American
hands. Initially there was little or no enemy artillery fire brought on
the town, though Besch, to the south, was being pounded heavily.
However, intense machine-gun fire was being received from the north.

Only three casualties were suffered in accomplishing this portion
of the battalion mission. Lieutenant James H. McCoy, leader of the
3d Platoon and the first man to cross the line of departure, was fatally
wounded before entering the town. Twenty-three prisoners were taken
and at least ninety-five casualties, both dead and wounded, were in-
flicted on the enemy. What remained of the enemy garrison withdrew
toward Sinz on the run, pursued by American fire.

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103

In Wies, Company K's 2d Platoon encountered stiff resistance from
a German force of approximately fifty men who were garrisoning the
town. Stubborn house to house fighting developed, in which the
platoon leader was wounded and about a squad lost. Enemy machine
guns emplaced in the row of buildings three hundred yards north of
the town and just south of the Sinz-Bubingen road, directed intense
and accurate fire against the attackers. During a lull in the firing,
elements of the 2d Platoon attempted to cross the open fields north
of Wies to silence these guns. When the leading scout was within
fifty yards of the nearest house, the German gunners opened up,
catching the attackers in a fire pattern of great intensity. The men hit
the ground and attempted to maneuver, but the slightest movement
drew increased fire which caused additional casualties.

Lieutenant King, who had set up his mortars in the center of Wies,
when informed of the situation attempted to cover a withdrawal
by smoking the area. This did not succeed as the wind so thinned the
smoke it failed to obscure the vision of the enemy gunners. The mor-
tars next resorted to HE despite the danger of possible shorts. Several
rounds were planted on the roofs of the houses, but only one machine
gun was knocked out in this manner. Other guns continued firing
from the lower floors where the 81s could not reach them. Ammuni-
tion was beginning to run low and Lieutenant King was anxious to
get into Nennig where he should have gone originally.

About this time, Captain Brightman arrived on the scene, attempting
to learn the situation before deploying his company. With him was
his leading platoon, commanded by Lieutenant William M. Golden-
sweig. When he learned of the predicament of the men pinned down
in front of Wies, the CO of Company L directed Lieutenant Golden-
sweig to use his platoon in an attempt to relieve pressure on this
group. Unfortunately, this proved impossible, as all approaches to
the position were exposed to the grazing fire of the enemy's automatic
weapons.

The Germans continued to fire whenever there was the slightest
movement among the troops silhouetted against the snow. A number
of men had been hit, but remained motionless despite their pain.
Finally, a German officer and a medic carrying a white flag approached
from the buildings and spoke to the men. He offered to allow the
removal of the litter cases if the others would surrender. If not, the
process of elimination would continue. Realizing the hopelessness of
the situation and fearing the wounded would soon die if unattended,
the men agreed. American medics carried off the seriously wounded

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

while the enemy led away the others. At 1530 hours, battalion received
word that part of the 2d Platoon of Company K had been captured.

Back in Nennig, the other platoons of Company K organized the de-
fenses of that town and set up a security outpost on the ridge to the
east, at the edge of the woods. Repeatedly, German infantry within
the woods probed this position. It was subjected to continuous mortar
and artillery fire in the days that followed, and small enemy groups
would infiltrate through it nightly to slip into Nennig. The possibility
of this undermanned position being overwhelmed by counterattack was
always present. However, the ridge had to be held or Nennig would
become practically untenable and the whole battalion position would
be jeopardized.

During the morning Lieutenant Raymond G. Fox's platoon of Com-
pany I was ordered forward from the battalion reserve position in
Besch and attached to Company K. At 1000 hours, Captain Way
ordered Lieutenant Fox to take a contact patrol to the 1st Battalion
on the right. Lieutenant Thomas A. Daly, whose platoon was in posi-
tion on the east of Nennig, decided to accompany the group as he
was anxious to see the terrain over which an enemy attack would
approach his position.

The patrol moved out in good order and crossed the high ground
east of town, following the stream line along the north edge of the
woods. After proceeding about eight hundred yards it discovered an
enemy infantry position in the woods. The patrol leader estimated the
German force at about fifty men and had his men open fire. This
fire was returned promptly. Two machine guns were being employed
against the patrol when Lieutenant Daly suggested that the rest of the
party cover him while he worked his way along a shallow ditch which
led toward the nearest gun. This was done and Lieutenant Daly
crawled to a position immediately in front of the machine gun. A
skillfully lobbed grenade killed two of the crew; Lieutenant Daly dis-
posed of the remaining Germans with his pistol. He then withdrew
under the covering fire of the patrol, bringing with him the German
machine gun. Contact was broken and the patrol pulled back. A mes-
senger sent to Captain Way with word of what had happened returned
with orders for the group to return to Nennig.

By the time this party arrived in Nennig, orders had been received
from battalion definitely specifying a time and place for contact with
the 1st Battalion by means of patrol. Consequently, that afternoon
Technical Sergeant Francis M. Fields led a second patrol whose mission

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105

was to make contact with a party from Lieutenant Colonel Miner's
battalion in the vicinity of a pillbox about midway between Nennig
and Tettingen. South of the woods but north of the contact point, this
group was engaged from the pillbox in question and the series of com-
munication trenches surrounding it. There was no sign of the 1st
Battalion patrol and Sergeant Fields led his men back to Nennig.

Upon his own suggestion, Lieutenant Fox took his platooa on this
same mission after dark. Advancing to the vicinity of the pillbox, the
platoon was engaged by automatic-weapons fire and hand grenades as
they ran into an antipersonnel minefield. For thirty minutes the platoon
fought without making any headway. Then, a runner dispatched to
Captain Way returned with word to abandon the attempt Lieutenant
Fox and his men withdrew to Nennig where they set up a defensive
position for the night.

When the men of Company L took over the assault of Wies, they
were repeatedly delayed by enemy machine guns emplaced in the north-
west section of town. Artillery fire brought to bear on the fortified
buildings housing these weapons greatly assisted the advance, but it
was not until late in the afternoon that the town was finally cleared.
Strong rifle and machine-gun positions were Hastily prepared covering
the approaches from the north, northeast and southeast, and antitank
mines were placed across the road facing the $nemy. Following these
preparations, a platoon from Company L moved on Berg, which fell
at about 1730 hours. This completed the attack phase of the battalion
mission.

For communication, reliance was placed on both wire and radio. The
latter performed extremely well, but the volume of traffic fell to the
field telephones. Lines between regiment and battalion were main-
tained effectively by teams from Colonel McClune's headquarters. For-
ward of Besch, the lines were a battalion responsibility; here difficulties
increased a hundredfold. These lines were constantly going out due
to heavy enemy shelling.

Early on the morning of the 15th, before the attack began, Lieuten-
ant Inman E. Mallard and Staff Sergeant Gladwin J. Flory, battalion
intelligence sergeant, crossed the Moselle into Luxembourg on the ferry
which the Division engineers were operating below Besch. They pro-
ceeded into Remich and there selected a site for an observation post
which Sergeant Flory was to man. The high ground on this side of the
river gave complete observation of the battle area from Thorn to Sinz

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107

and south from this line to Tettingen. Every move made by the enemy
in Nennig was visible from this OP. From this location numerous fire
missions were conducted and valuable G-2 information was obtained.
It had been planned to man the position for only one day, but due to
its importance the observation post was kept in operation until the 19th
of January.

Originally the Besch-Nennig road proved impracticable as a supply
route. Enemy artillery was accurately zeroed on it, it was known to be
mined and during daylight hours it was under direct observation and
fire from the pillboxes to the east. Hence, the route of the attacking
companies had to be used initially for the resupply of the 3d Battalion.
Lieutenant Colonel Thurston personally led the first forty-man carrying
party, composed of men from the A&P Platoon, Company M and the
regimental Antitank Company which brought up ammunition, medical
supplies, wire and some K rations the first night. These were dumped
at the railroad tracks, west of Nennig, where distribution was made to
details sent back by the rifle companies.

Because of the size of the town, Company K found it impossible to
garrison every house in Nennig. All night long, enemy patrols were
active and repeatedly they seized unoccupied buildings. Captain Way,
Lieutenant Ralph C. Brown, and Lieutenant Hodges, with the aid of
personnel from company headquarters were kept busy driving out
groups of Wehrmacht intruders.

At 2130 hours, the battalion reserve was ordered into Nennig; as
soon as it arrived, Company I took over positions in the southern and
western portions of town. This greatly strengthened the battalion's
defenses. The following morning Lieutenant Fox's platoon was re-
turned to the control of Company I.

During the early morning hours of January 16, 1945, enemy mortar
and artillery fire on Berg increased. Behind a barrage, estimated con-
servatively at two artillery battalions, came the first real counterattack.
A force of about one hundred infantrymen had worked up the wooded
draw east of the town, then deployed in the darkness. Yelling threats
and insults in English, they attempted to storm the Schloss. Severe
hand-to-hand fighting followed and the situation remained utterly con-
fused for almost two hours. During the fighting, one of the machine
guns attached to Lieutenant Dale E. Bowyer's platoon was lost and a
rifle squad captured. Later this squad escaped and returned unharmed.
Finally the enemy withdrew leaving behind some sixty of their dead.

An hour after the start of the enemy attack on Berg, heavy mortar
and artillery fire on Nennig ushered in the second counterattack of

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NENNIG-BERG-WIES

109

again increased. This heralded another attack in which about two pla-
toons were employed. It was spotted at about the same time by Staff
Sergeant Leroy McPherson's heavy machine guns on the ridge north
of town and the OP in Luxembourg. The HMGs broke up the attack
and the survivors took refuge in the woods east of Nennig. Before the
attack was repulsed however, a German machine-gun crew broke
through the defenses and set up their gun within fifty yards of the
battalion forward command post. Here they went into action firing
down the main street. Lieutenant Colonel Thurston, using an Ml,
killed the machine gunner and wounded a German bazookaman who
was working into position to knock out one of the tank destroyers in
the vicinity of the CP.

On the morning of January 16, 1945, the 2d Battalion, 376th, com-
manded by Lieutenant Colonel Olivius C. Martin, was directed to
launch an attack on the woods southwest of Tettingen. Object of this
thrust was to eliminate the enemy positions in rear of the inner flanks
of the two narrow salients driven into the Siegfried Switch Line by the
1st and 3d Battalions. This would consolidate the position and relieve
some of the pressure constantly being brought to bear on the captured
towns.

At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Thurston was directed to
extend his right flank to the east to establish contact with the left of
the 2d Battalion. Toward this end, Company I moved from Nennig at
1330 hours on the day of the attack, in column of platoons. The 2d,
1st and 4th Platoons took positions, in that order, in the communica-
tion trenches leading out of Nennig, while the 3d Platoon dug posi-
tions in the orchard midway between Nennig and Tettingen. To the
rear of the company were numerous pillboxes, bunkers and mortar
positions still manned by the enemy. From the latter Company I was
shelled constantly; as time passed casualties began to mount.

Lieutenant Colonel Martin's attack jumped off as scheduled with
Companies F and G in the assault. The ground was rough, heavily
wooded and infested with enemy positions, but by noon most of the
area had been cleared. From a pair of pillboxes southeast of Lieuten-
ant Fox's position in the orchard, Company F took fifty-two prisoners.
It was learned that these boxes were used as an aid station and rest
bunker, respectively. Also taken in this general mop-up was an am-
munition dump and several machine guns.

During the afternoon, the assault companies of the 2d Battalion
continued forward and Companies I and G established the desired

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111

contact when a rifleman of the former company crawled over to the
left flank of the 2d Battalion.

During this period, the heavy machine guns on the ridge north of
Nennig were receiving a good deal of attention from the enemy artil-
lery which attempted to soften up the area for its infantry. Six times
German combat patrols tried to overrun these positions; six times they
were beaten back.

On the night of the 16th, the forward echelon of the 3d Battalion
command post moved into Nennig. To provide wire communication
with regiment, a crew led by Staff Sergeant James L. Jennings laid a
line from Perl across the Moselle, south of Besch, and up the west bank
of the river. Opposite Nennig the wire team recrossed the ice-filled
river in an assault boat manned by engineers. The detail was shelled
roundly before it left the Luxembourg shore and while it was in mid-
stream. As the engineers paddled, weighted wire was paid out by the
wireman. When the crew reached the east bank of the river, it con-
tinued the line to the battalion CP. Here a telephone was connected
and a test call made. The line functioned.

At 0430 hours the morning of the 17th, the wire team started back
to Perl, after several postponements caused by the intense artillery
fire descending on the town. When the tired but satisfied crew finally
reported at regiment, they received the disheartening news that their
line had gone out while they were returning. The following day, the
problem of wire communications to the 3d Battalion was solved by
Technician Fourth Grade Mervin L. Moore and Staff Sergeant Delbert
A. Larson when they laid a line straight up the railroad tracks into
Nennig, using the rails to protect the wire from the constant artillery
and mortar fire. This line remained in service for a record length of
time.

Lieutenant Colonel Thurston next received orders to reduce the pill-
boxes in the area behind Company I. The 2d Platoon of that com-
pany was assigned the mission and Lieutenant Pablo Arenaz made a
detailed reconnaissance. He reported to the battalion commander that
he did not believe he could accomplish this mission with the force
available, as his platoon numbered only eighteen men.

Consequently, the assignment was given to Lieutenant Ravnel V.
Burgamy's 1st Platoon. The platoon was divided into two assault
groups and all available flame throwers, pole and satchel charges were
gathered. At 2030 hours this assault force moved out. The eight hun-
dred yards of open ground that lay between the attackers and the deep

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

draw one hundred yards in front of the first pillbox, were crossed
without incident. There they discovered that, despite the efforts of
the gunners, ice had formed in the light machine guns; the weapons
were useless. Only functioning automatic weapon was the one BAR
with the group.

Taking Private First Class John Mauro, Jr., with him, Lieutenant
Burgamy left the main party in the draw while he went forward. When
close to the pillbox, the two men encountered a number of trip wires
and halted. As previously planned, the BAR and rifles opened up.
This fire was returned by the enemy, not from the pillbox, but from
several positions around it. The pillbox sent up signal flares and
shortly thereafter both mortar and artillery fire landed on the platoon.
Private First Class Ray Sweeny, the BAR-man, was ordered to cover
a withdrawal and the platoon pulled back. Informed of the situation,
the battalion commander, after personally investigating, ordered Lieu-
tenant Burgamy to make no further attempt on the pillbox.

During the night of the 1 6th- 17th enemy patrols were active, prob-
ing the entire battalion front. Company L, with the assistance of the
artillery, broke up an enemy attack before midnight, inflicting some
twenty casualties. About 0500 hours, a large German patrol attempted
to enter Berg from the northeast but was stopped in its tracks by Lieu-
tenant Bowyer's platoon. In Wies, Private First Class James F. Johns-
ton of Company L was hit by a shell fragment while manning the
company OP. He refused to quit his post until relief arrived. The
following day he died of wounds.

Early on the morning of the 17th, one of Lieutenant Fox's men
reported enemy infantry in a column of twos approaching the position,
across the open ground in front of the orchard. The platoon was
alerted and instructions given to hold fire until the Germans were
within fifty yards. Apparently unaware of the presence of the Ameri-
cans, the column continued to advance, presumably heading for the
pillbox area to the southwest. At the designated time, fire was brought
to bear and a number of the enemy fell. The remainder of the group
withdrew in disorder to the woods where they re-formed. A frontal
assault followed which provided the 3d Platoon with even better tar-
gets. Subsequent attacks were launched from slightly different posi-
tions, in waves of twenty-five men. These thrusts continued until about
1100 hours the following morning; all attacks were beaten back before
the enemy was able to get within grenade range.

Being unable to take the position by storm, some of the Germans
infiltrated through the thin strip of woods between the 3d and 4th

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113

Platoons. They set up machine guns to the left front and rear of the
platoon position, preventing reinforcement or resupply and rendering
counterattack on the part of Lieutenant Fox's men out of the question.
Soon this developed into an all-around siege. The telephone wire was
cut, and one of the two men sent to repair it was killed while the
other returned without being able to splice the line.

Late in the afternoon, two figures were seen crawling toward the
platoon's rear. Between them, they alternately pushed and pulled a
wooden box. Uncertain of the identity of the pair, Lieutenant Fox's
men allowed them to advance but kept them under close observation.
Much to the surprise of the platoon, the pair turned out to be Lieu-
tenant Colonel Thurston and his driver, Technician Fifth Grade
Thomas M. Clausi. The box was a C ration crate which was half full;
a welcome addition to the larder. The battalion commander informed
the platoon that he had drawn no fire in coming forward and instructed
Lieutenant Fox that under no circumstances was the position to be
yielded to the enemy. Before leaving, the CO made the platoon leader
a present of the bandoleer of .30-caliber ammunition he was carrying.
After this, the position was attacked by several light combat patrols,
all of which were repulsed.

Meanwhile, living in the captured towns continued as uncomfortable
and dangerous as ever. Enemy machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire
was relentless, continuing night and day. Nightly enemy patrols man-
aged to infiltrate the position. In Wies, Captain Brightman ordered
all men of his command to remain indoors during the hours of dark-
ness and arranged to have time fire descend on the town periodically,
in an attempt to discourage German curiosity.

In Nennig, the number of enemy dead had become quite a problem.
As frequent combat patrols were driven out and infiltrating groups
were hunted down, the number of corpses increased. Since there was
no possible way of evacuating these bodies, they were collected and
laid out neatly in one of the houses. (Later the enemy retook this
building. Berlin Sally reported these German dead were prisoners of
war murdered in cold blood and dubbed the 94th "Roosevelt's
Butchers.")

On the 17th at approximately 1000 hours, Lieutenant Daly observed
twenty Germans approaching his positions along the draw to the east.
When the Germans had closed to within seventy-five yards, Lieutenant
Daly decided to test his limited knowledge of the German language.
From the shelter of a doorway he called, "Kommen sle hier" The
officer leading the patrol hesitated, but when his aide handed him a

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ing the murderous mortar and artillery fire that constantly pounded
their positions.

The following day an assault team from Company G, under Lieu-
tenant Edward G. Litka, attacked two of the pillboxes that had re-
pulsed Company Is offensive. About one hundred yards in front of
these boxes was a tank trap which afforded a covered route of approach.
The assault force advanced through the woods, entered the tank ditch
and moved up it to a point opposite their objective. There they mounted
two light machine guns plus a pair of BARs atop the ditch. The auto-
matic weapons, firing in conjunction with the tank destroyers in the
edge of the woods, kept the pillboxes buttoned-up and permitted two
riflemen carrying satchel charges to move forward. These men had
not advanced more than twenty-five yards though, when mortar shells
began exploding in their immediate vicinity. So well zeroed were the
mortars, they were able to walk up and down the antitank ditch in
addition to covering the area in front of the bunkers. This intense
and accurate fire forced the withdrawal of the detail. Of the eighteen-
man assault group, one man was killed and nine wounded.

During the day of the 18th, there were continued reports of German
tanks in the area. Enemy wire parties were observed laying new lines
from pillboxes to OPs and the observation post in Luxembourg
reported large-scale troop movements to the north. All indications
pointed to an early counterattack in strength.

At approximately 1430 hours, Berg and Wies were deluged with a
fifteen-minute barrage of enemy artillery conservatively estimated at
four battalions. When this fire lifted, the towns were hit from the
east and north by a battalion attack. All telephone lines were out and
the artillery observer's radio had been destroyed. Captain Brightman
conducted his artillery support by means of an SCR-300 channeled to
the OP in Luxembourg from whence messages were relayed to an
artillery liaison officer in Besch. This fire so effectively whittled down
the attacking force that the machine gunners and riflemen in these
towns were able to repel easily the survivors.

Lieutenant Colonel Thurston concluded his After Action Report on
this phase of the fighting with these words:

By 1700 the last living German had loped back across the ridges and the
attack had failed ... I judge that a full strength battalion attacked Berg and
Wies . . . some three hundred dead or wounded remained on the snow-covered
fields when the last shot had been fired. Moans and cries of the wounded were
plainly audible from both towns.

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The night *'A the 9th passed quietly Apparently d;e Germans

Chapter 13: TETTINGEN COUNTERATTACK

ON JANUARY 15, 1945, when Colonel McClune ordered his
1st and 3d Battalions to establish contact by patrols, at a pill-
box located about midway between Tettingen and Nennig, a
ten-man patrol from Company C was dispatched to contact the group
from the 3d Battalion, led by Technical Sergeant Francis M. Fields of
Company I. The Company C patrol proceeded west, through the woods,
to the vicinity of the Tettingen-Nennig road. Here they encountered
Schmeisser and rifle fire and detoured to the south. Again enemy auto-
matic weapons and rifle fire were encountered. By skillful maneuver,
the group finally worked its way to a point some fifty yards short of
the appointed box where they were subjected to an intense mortar
barrage. They remained in observation a short time; then withdrew.
At the same time, Sergeant Fields and his men, unaware of the presence
of the 1st Battalion patrol, were receiving similar treatment from the
enemy fifty yards to the north of this pillbox. Desired contact was
not made.

There were two small counterattacks on the evening of the 15th.
The first of these was directed against Company B and was soon beaten
back for in this attack not more than fifty Germans were involved.
Following this, Company C stopped an enemy infantry thrust, sup-
ported by four Mark IV tanks. Bazookas were employed effectively;
two of the armored vehicles retired, trailing smoke behind them. As
the bazooka teams warmed to their job, the remaining tanks elected
to withdraw for the greater number of their supporting infantry had
been either killed or wounded by the volume of fire brought to bear
from the battalion's rifles, automatic weapons, mortars and supporting
artillery.

This same night Lieutenant Chalkley sent a reconnaissance patrol
under Sergeant Soka to investigate the area to the east of the platoon's
position. This group reported the location of one pillbox whose sector
of fire was in the direction of Butzdorf. In the vicinity of this box
there were several concrete bunkers. Both these and the pillbox wrere
occupied, as voices had been heard from within.

In Wochern, Lieutenant William P. Springer decided to change the
position of his 81s as they were drawing too much fire. Scarcely had
the guns been moved when an artillery shell scored a direct hit on the
evacuated site. One man who had remained in the vicinity was
wounded. .

Wochern itself resembled a boom town; the streets of this village
hummed with activity. Tank destroyers, two-and-a-halfs, weapons car-
riers and jeeps passed through, milled around or jockeyed for position.

117

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Signalmen festooned the fronts of the buildings with wire while staff
and supply echelons went about their various duties indoors. The streets
swarmed with men and machines until the first whine of incoming
artillery or rocket fire was heard; then, in fractions of a second, they
became deserted except for the vehicles. In the rifleman's sense of the
term Wochern was rear-area, but nine men we|e killed and twenty-
four wounded in the town during the days immediately following the
attack of the 1st Battalion.

For Lieutenant Colonel Miner's men the 16th proved a quiet day.
Intermittent artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire fell on the towns
but there was no attempt on the part of the enemy to recoup losses.
To the west could be heard the noise of the 2d Battalion's attack in
the woods.

During the night, Lieutenant James W. Cornelius, accompanied by
Sergeant Jesse R. Tower of the 319th Engineers, led a patrol whose
mission was to blow the pillbox and bunkers located the previous
night. The box was found unoccupied and a thousand pounds of nitro-
starch were hauled forward and installed. At the touch of the engi-
neers, the dome blew clear and the sides crumbled. Of the bunkers
only one was found to be occupied; against its steel door, two of
Sergeant Tower's men laid a 150-pound satchel charge. When deto-
nated, this charge completely demolished the door, but the patrol's
activity brought down a mortar barrage and it was decided to wait
until morning to check the damage done.

With the coming of daylight, the doorless bunker was clearly visible
from the front line. A German medic, accompanied by another soldier,
entered town shortly after dawn, under a white flag, and requested per-
mission to remove the wounded from the bunker. This was granted,
but the soldier accompanying the aid man was detained. A short time
later, a German half-track approached over the hill; seven wounded
were carried out of the bunker and loaded into this vehicle.

About noon, Company B was withdrawn from Tettingen and went
into position in the woods west of the town. There they relieved Com-
pany F which had helped clear this sector the previous day. Captain
Henry C. Bowden placed his three rifle platoons on line, along the
1,000 yard front for which his company was responsible. Fifteen
hundred yards off the left flank of the company were the five pillboxes
still held by the enemy. To the northwest, in Nennig, was the 3d
Battalion with Lieutenant Fox's platoon of Company I holding its
right flank. Lieutenant Fox, in the orchard, was approximately five

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

hundred yards northwest of Company B's left. Contact was to be made
between the two battalions by these flank units.

German radio broadcasts from the Berlin station on the night of the
17th told of heavy fighting in the vicinity of Remich and intimated
that there was more to come. This was both a threat and a promise,
for the II Battalion of the 71 4th Grenadier Regiment, commanded by
Lieutenant Reudiger, had crossed the Saar and assumed a defensive
position along the ridge south of Sinz. In addition, General Wend
von Wietersheim's 11th Panzer Division was on the way. The 11th
had been out of contact since the middle of December while it was
being refitted in the vicinity of Bitburg. Its 15th Tank Regiment had
received a considerable number of new Panthers and Mark IVs, which
brought the unit's total strength in panzers to almost 100 vehicles.
A great number of replacements had been integrated into the 110th
Panzergrenadier Regiment, which suffered heavily in the battle for
Metz. Having sustained considerably fewer casualties, the 111th Pan-
zergrenadiers were given many less replacements. The Antitank Bat-
talion had been equipped with sixteen low-slung assault guns, while
the I Battalion of the 110th and the engineer companies of both
regiments had been mounted on half-tracks.

American tactical reconnaissance planes had picked up traces of the
11th Panzer's crossing north of Saarburg the previous day, and G-2
had alerted all elements of the Division against surprise by enemy
armor. On the 17th, overcast skies prevented continued aerial recon-
naissance; exact whereabouts of the Germans' Ghost Division was
unknown.

On the heels of this alert, the sound of track-laying vehicles was
heard along the front of the 376th Infantry. Extensive antitank pre-
cautions were taken and extra supplies of bazooka ammunition were
brought forward and issued. Lieutenant Palmer and his engineers laid
mines along the road leading into Butzdorf and strung a belt of mines
along the east side of Tettingen. Daisy chains, pole and satchel charges
were prepared and placed in readiness.

About midnight tanks were heard in the vicinity of Campholz
Woods; two or three track-laying vehicles seemed to be jockeying for
position just outside Butzdorf. The battalion waited, watched and
listened. Then at 0300 hours, a patrol from Company A returned with
two prisoners who were readily identified as members of the Ghost
Division.

At dawn of the 18th the storm broke. For twenty minutes 80mm,
88mm, 105mm, 120mm and 150mm shells deluged the towns of Butz-

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dorf, Tettingen and Wochern Geysers of dirt flew up from the -Streets
as snow, mud and jigged steel fragments ripped thnmgh' the a>.r. This
shelling rose to a deafening -crescendo ind seemed, to femaio there.
The already shattered town* ' wwe woticeJ over by past masters at the
art of destruction. Koof? fdf and waHs crumbled/.^ the towns were
beaten a bit 'closer to the earth.

sioy» Artdiery^ answer to the eoeiny barrage.

From the north and east came- a long \im oi men and vehicles;

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attempting to enter town, hit the engineers' minefield and stayed there.
Two half-tracks loaded with Germans tried to maneuver around the
gun and were knocked out by bazooka fire. One of Lieutenant Hodges'
men on the east side of town, disposed of a self-propelled gun whose
muzzle was thrust into the window of his house. When the crew of
this vehicle and their supporting infantry attempted to dismount, they
were made prisoners and herded into a cellar until things quieted
down. But, despite the efforts of the men of Company A, the Grena-
diers managed to occupy two lightly defended houses on the north
side of Butzdorf .

Meanwhile, the left flank of the attack hit Tettingen. The men of
Company C on the east of town had been watching the Germans roll
toward them and were ready for the Grenadiers when they came. Four
half-tracks, two tanks and a self-propelled gun swung into position
about one hundred yards from town. One of the half-tracks hit a
mine; its crew and infantry leaped to the ground for cover. Private
Thomas H. Goggins greeted one of the tanks with a bazooka round
into the bogie wheels. This halted the panzer, but the bazooka-man
was unable to silence its gun. Behind the church the remaining tank
maneuvered into position and secured a field of fire by blasting a hole
through the wall of this building. Time after time, bazooka rounds
were fired at the half-tracks but for some reason they failed to deto-
nate. In front of Lieutenant Chalkley's position, the half-tracks pulled
up broadside and the infantry began to dismount. Privates James C.
Hobbs and Charles F. Croan each seized a machine gun from its tri-
pod. They went to work on the alighting Grenadiers, most of whom
never managed to get very far from their vehicles.

When the disabled tank directed its fire into and through Lieu-
tenant Chalkley's platoon command post, the platoon leader decided
it was time to pick up and move. Across the street was a barn which
seemed a bit more habitable, and, at 0900 hours, Lieutenant Chalkley
and his messenger withdrew to this position, bringing their telephone
with them. The second panzer then began firing into the battalion
CP. This tank also scored a hit on one of Lieutenant Peters' prime
movers while his 57s were going into position. Immediately afterward
both Lieutenant Peters and his platoon sergeant, Joseph J. Quentz were
wounded by an 88 and had to be evacuated. Sergeant Charles Fox-
grover became convinced that if he put his 57 into position to the
south of town, on the east of the road, he might be able to knock out
the tank that was hammering away at the battalion command post.
A TD man standing nearby asked the sergeant, "What can you do

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

with a 57? Why it's suicide!" Nevertheless, Foxgrover decided to make
the attempt. His gun squad ran their weapon into position and opened
fire at three hundred yards. The tank was knocked out before it could
turn its turret and bring its own gun into firing position. As the crew
of the 57 struggled to take their gun out of action, a German mortar
round landed among them. Most of the crew were wounded and the
trails of the piece were jammed.

Meanwhile, the attacking Grenadiers had succeeded in taking the
halfway houses and three or four buildings on the northeast of Tet-
tingen. They secured Lieutenant Chalkley's old command post and
German machine-gun crews were soon sniping at all individuals who
attempted to cross the main street in Tettingen. In Butzdorf the tanks
had penetrated to the center of town and were firing their 88s point-
blank into the buildings still held by Company A. The situation
appeared desperate, but the company continued its determined resis-
tance. Individual panzers were buttoned up with small-arms fire; then,
bazookas and satchel charges were effectively employed.

Private First Class Richard J. Kamins of the 2d Platoon of Company
A continues the account.

I stood in the doorway and saw the first tank go by me. I fired at the second
and yelled, "I got the sonuvabitch !" Lindsay reloaded. The next tank came
down the street toward me. I hit him in the track. He saw me. I turned and
ran down the hall. A spray of machine-gun bullets chased me, ricocheting from
where I'd been standing at the door. After that I fired from a window.

A fourth came and a fifth. It was too dark to use my sights but I couldn't
miss. They were only fifty yards away. I hit them in the tracks but still they
kept coming. I hit one on the turret and the round bounced off like a tennis
ball. I set one on fire and he withdrew in a sheet of flame.

Pop Huston crouched in a doorway. Some concrete dust blasted from the
walls got in his eyes. Nevertheless, old Pop fired every rifle grenade he had.
He hit tank after tank and watched the rounds glance off. His language was
lovely to hear.

The 1st Squad was across the street. Jack Zebin and Wylie of the 3d Platoon
were attached to them as a bazooka team. Zebin had a tank graveyard in front
of his position. He got credit for five. Dick Schweig and Whiz Wicentowski
were to my left, and "The Reverend" Pillow and Howard Curler were down
to my right. We had a nice box formation. One tank that I'd hit in the tread
went down to be mouse-trapped by Pillow. Pillow scared him back to me. He
was in reverse swinging his gun toward the 1st Squad's building. Simultane-
ously, Zebin and I hit him. My round tore a three-by-four hole in the rear
armor. It was a long-range shot ... all of five yards. The driver and gunner
lay dead in the tank. A third was hanging out of the turret like a tablecloth.
A fourth started to run. Cross fire from three buildings hit him. With every
burst his body would jump, making us think he was still alive. Other bursts
followed. Mclntyre came running up with a satchel charge and dropped it in

"v Google

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the tank. The explosion was terrific. Later we examined the smoking hulk.
There was no sign of any bodies.

Then there was a short lull. Faber, Odell and Bridgeman had been looking
out the back window. They had seen no tanks, only artillery landing. Bridge-
man was leaning on a sink. Then a close one dropped. When the dust cleared
Faber asked where the sink was. Bridgeman couldn't answer but the sink had
disappeared.

Jim had the GIs that day. He was too busy to step to the gents* room during
the festivities and the worst happened. About seven of us gathered around in
a Mayo Clinic circle. Jim dropped his pants. Two men cut off his long drawers
with a trench knife. It looked like a major operation. Messy business.

Shortly after 0900 hours, the attack spent itself and the Grenadiers
withdrew to lick their wounds and reorganize. The 110th had great
trouble preparing for another attack as the fire of several battalions
of American artillery constantly pounded and harassed them. At 1045
hours, elements of the II Battalion of the 110th tried to attack and
were stopped dead in their tracks by artillery fire. The 7th Company
was so badly disorganized by the Division's 105s and 155s, it could
not be used all day. From their positions in the woods the men of
Company B could see the enemy some two hundred yards north of
them, across the clearing, attempting to form for these new attacks.
Against them they directed a steady and telling volume of fire.

Once the first attack was beaten back, Company A regained the
buildings it had lost while Company C took sixteen prisoners in and
around the halfway house. The POWs were promptly interrogated as
the higher-level G-2s were most anxious for information regarding
the 11th Panzer.

At 1130 hours the next attack came when General von Wietersheim
sent his 2d Tank Company from the direction of Sinz, against Tet-
tingen and Butzdorf. The company consisted of about ten Mark Vs
and these moved in a huge arc on the two towns. Four of the tanks
assumed a hull defilade position on the hill east of Tettingen, while
the others moved about among the trees and haystacks north of Butz-
dorf. When the tankers had reached the desired positions, they began
pounding the towns with both armor-piercing and high-explosive shells.
As the projectiles came crashing through the walls and exploded within
the buildings of Butzdorf, Company A crawled into the cellars leaving
one man in each building to watch for enemy infantry who might
attempt to advance under the protective fire of the tanks.

In Tettingen, Lieutenant Colonel Miner and his staff racked their
brains to devise some method of relieving the pressure on Butzdorf.
Division artillery continued its protective fires while Lieutenant Niel-

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black smoke and jagged splinters of steel. Through this holocaust
the Grenadiers continued to advance.

As the vehicles approached town, they paused and the infantry rid-
ing them, jumping off, took cover behind their mounts. Time and again
the Grenadiers attempted to storm Butzdorf only to be driven back
by murderous small-arms fire. After each repulse, the attackers would
re-form behind their vehicles. Tanks roamed up and down the streets
of the little town at will, firing through walls, windows and doors in
attempts to pulverize the buildings held by the defenders. Still the
resistance continued. All this was visible from Tettingen where the
remainder of the battalion was powerless to assist Company A.

Private First Class Richard J. Kamins picks up the story again:

We were lucky. Zimny and Craig had blasted holes in the walls of every
building in our block. We could withdraw without going into the open. One
Tiger fired two rounds at us. The living room became unfit to live in, but no
one was hurt. We ran across the street to the platoon CP. Joe DeLibero was
* the last man in. A piece of shrapnel tore his thigh. Two men dragged him
inside.

Two machine-gun squads set up in the barn. "The Reverend" Pillow was
giving the boys hell. Never have I seen more inspiring leadership. He talked
like a movie hero, only he meant it. Pillow's loader, Howard Curler, was pretty
comical. His glasses were broken and he was using binoculars in their stead.
He'd squint in myopic glory through the field glasses at tanks that were no
more than 150 yards away. To everybody but Curler their 88s looked like
telephone poles.

Over in the 1st Platoon, Tom Wilson was pretty comical, too. His squad
leader pointed to a tank about fifteen yards away with its gun leveled at their
building and asked, "What do you think of that?" Laconically Wilson replied,
"Dirty bore."

Then came an order for us to withdraw as best we could. Speaking as though
he were talking about the weather, Joe DeLibero asked Smith, our acting pla-
toon sergeant, if he was to be left behind. Smitty and Peck, the platoon runner,
were the last men to leave the building. They had Joe with them. We all took
off like birds.

At the company CP a machine gun was set up in each door. We counted
noses. In the 1st Squad only one man was uninjured. Klein was gone,
Walters gone, Derickson gone, Burdzy gone. Kovac was hit in the thigh, but
continued to laugh and hobble around. Fite got a nasty piece of shrapnel through
his hand. Joe DeLibero lay looking up at the ceiling. Some guys stepped on
him; he didn't say anything.

While this attack was in progress, Private First Class Virgil E. Ham-
ilton of Company D was bringing transportation corporal Bernie H.
Heck and Corporal Earl N. Vulgamore, Company D's mail clerk,
forward in his jeep. The three men had volunteered to get supplies

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and ammunition into Butzdorf. Midway between the two towns, they
spotted four enemy tanks and Hamilton whipped the jeep behind a
farmhouse before they were discovered by the armor. In the jeep was
a bazooka and ammunition for it destined for Company A. Although
none of the men had ever used the weapon they decided to put it into
action. It was hastily assembled and some rockets unpacked. Hamilton
shouldered the tube, while Vulgamore and Heck stood by as loaders.
When the leading tank had approached to within forty yards, Hamil-
ton opened fire. The panzer, hit squarely, burst into flames. Round
number two, directed against the second tank, was a bit high, but
it reached its mark just as the astonished tank commander raised his
hatch to discover the cause of the plight of the first Panther. Strik-
ing the inner surface of the hatch the bazooka round ricocheted into
the tank's interior, accounting for tank number two. With an expen-
diture of five rounds, the third German tank was disposed of while
its astonished crew attempted to locate their attackers. The fourth and
last tank started to retreat and was eliminated at a range of 150 yards. •

In Butzdorf, the fighting continued throughout the afternoon. Tech-
nical Sergeant William McQuade of Company D accounted for a tank
with one of the remaining pole charges, and when three armored
vehicles converged on the section of heavy machine guns in the west
of town, Instrument Corporal Earle F. Mousaw, though wounded, kept
the tanks at bay with a bazooka, that the guns might remain in action.

At 1700 hours, when Lieutenant Stafford took stock of the situation,
it looked far from good. He held some eight or nine buildings in the
southern section of town while an unknown number of the enemy
occupied the northern tip of Butzdorf. The enemy had set up a mortar
in their part of town and German tanks were roaming the streets. In
fact, one of the Panthers was parked just outside the window of the
command post. Company A was out of bazooka ammunition and the
supply of pole and satchel charges was exhausted. Of Lieutenant
Baker's platoon there was only one HMG remaining. Sole method of
communication was Lieutenant Morrison's artillery radio and this set,
while it seemed to be sending, would not receive. Perhaps messages
were getting through and perhaps not. In addition, there were thirty
wounded in the command post, along with several prisoners.

Back in Tettingen, it was assumed that at least a portion of Company
A was still holding out. The town was strangely silent, but enemy
tanks were still patrolling the streets and there was occasional firing.

About this time, word was received that the 2d Battalion, 376th,

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would effect a relief that night and Lieutenant Colonel Martin ap-
peared on the scene with Company F right behind him. As final plans
were made for the relief, Lieutenant Chalkley, assisted by men from
Company F, was instructed to clear the town of snipers. About 1700
hours, two squads, one under Sergeant Soca and the other led by Tech-
nical Sergeant Harold B. Price, assaulted the building previously used
as a platoon command post while two squads of Company F attacked
the building beside it. Sergeant Drury and several other men who had
been wounded and captured while defending these buildings were
freed and eighteen prisoners were taken.

Once the town was cleared of snipers, the tank destroyers, urged on
by their company commander, scored several hits on enemy vehicles.
A self-propelled gun parked beside Butzdorf was set afire and explod-
ing ammunition made a noisy and dangerous display of fireworks.
Hits also were scored on three Panthers as they attempted to cross the
antitank ditch east of town. Two tanks northeast of Butzdorf were
set on fire and at least one of the supporting tanks on the ridge was
damaged. As darkness fell, the area was lit by the glare of burning
armor. The constant artillery and mortar fire plus the noise of explod-
ing ammunition covered the sound of German recovery vehicles that
succeeded in towing off three of the damaged tanks before they could
be burned.

Then, on the orders of the CG, Division directed that Butzdorf be
abandoned since it could not readily be resupplied or relieved and since
it had served its purpose of bringing about great attrition on the
enemy's infantry. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Strafford independently ar-
rived at a similar conclusion. Lacking the strength or the ammunition
to counterattack and since the company's position was indefensible,
Lieutenant Strafford decided to withdraw before he was rushed in the
dark and overwhelmed.

On his one-way radio Lieutenant Morrison called for a covering
artillery barrage. The message got through and the 919th and 284th
Field Artillery Battalions obliged. Men pulled doors off their hinges
and loaded the litter cases on these while the walking wounded moved
up the hill to Tettingen. It had started to sleet and the night was so
black visibility was reduced to a matter of inches. Platoon leaders
counted their men by touch. Lieutenant Hodges, checking his platoon,
suddenly felt an odd shaped pack and an overcoat of peculiar texture.
Pulling the man out of line, he discovered that a fully armed German
infantryman had innocently wandered among his men. The intruder

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was quickly disarmed, informed of his PW status and escorted to the
rear with the platoon as it pulled out.

The 1st Battalion, less Company B, was relieved and back in Woch-
ern by 2200 hours on the 18th; Captain Henry C. Bowden, Jr.'s men
spent the night in the woods in the sleet and mud. During the hours
of darkness, a forty-man German patrol overran one of the platoon's
positions and took up residence in some of the company's foxholes.
At dawn the enemy was driven out by rifle fire, leaving behind some
fifteen dead. Company B was relieved the night of the 19th and
rejoined the battalion en route to the reserve position at Veckring.

Monkey Wrench Woods

On the 18th of January, the 302d Infantry was relieved from Corps
reserve and became Division reserve. The 1st Battalion, commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel Silas W. Hosea, moved to Perl the same day
following receipt of a warning order of the impending relief of the
376th Infantry by Colonel Johnson's regiment. Early on the afternoon
of the 19th, Company B, under Captain Altus L. Woods, Jr. moved to
assault the five pillboxes south of Nennig which commanded the
Besch-Nennig road. Initially the attack progressed favorably. One
box was taken and twelve prisoners had been captured when the tank
destroyer that was providing covering fire exhausted its ammunition
supply. The attack had to be abandoned then, as the supply of demo-
litions also proved insufficient and an attempt at resupply was futile.

On the 20th another attack was launched at this group of pillboxes
for Division was very much concerned over the matter. A counter-
attack in strength against Nennig seemed likely and these enemy forti-
fications effectively prevented traffic over the only existing supply road.
In this second attempt, the assault detachment was composed of Com-
panies A and B, an improvised section of .50-caliber machine guns,
two platoons from Company B of the 319th Engineers and a section
of TDs from the 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion. To assure an ade-
quate supply of ammunition, two platoons of Company A were
employed as carrying parties. The remaining rifle platoon of Company
A protected the right flank of the group.

At 0912 hours the attack jumped off with two of the pillboxes being
assaulted while the others were buttoned up by fire from the support-
ing weapons. Enemy mortar and artillery fire on the attackers was
intense. As the Germans were driven out of these first boxes by the
engineers' flame throwers, they were questioned on the spot by Private
First Class Morris H. Wasscrman of the Battalion Intelligence Section.

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These interrogations revealed the location of several enemy artillery em-
placements south of Thorn. Counterbattery fire was requested at once.

As soon as the first two boxes were taken, the carrying parties began
to load them with demolitions. Lieutenant Roger L. Guernsey's
machine-gun platoon was brought forward to give overhead support as
the attack continued. Enemy artillery fire continued heavy and inflicted
most of the casualties suffered. At 1405 hours the last of the pillboxes
was taken; the PW total for the operation came to 108.

With the reduction of the last of these boxes, the carrying parties
went to work in earnest. Despite heavy artillery fire the captured forti-
fications were loaded with explosives and turned over to the engineers
for demolition. As each in turn was blown, a deafening explosion
rent the air and a huge cloud of black smoke arose as the roof of a
pillbox puffed up and walls eight feet thick crumbled into rubble.

South of these pillboxes, the woods as shown on a map resembles
the head of a huge monkey wrench with open jaws. This fact, coupled
with the absence of any known name, soon brought the nickname,
Monkey Wrench Woods, into common use. While the engineers were
busy blowing the pillboxes, Company A, commanded by Captain
Robert L. Woodburn, cleared the upper jaw of the Monkey Wrench
while Company B tackled the lower. Having completed these tasks
they pulled back to Besch in compliance with instructions of battalion.

On the morning of January 21, 1945, Company B returned to the
woods to take up positions. As it approached the northwest edge of
the forest, the troops were met by a hail of rifle and machine-gun fire.
During the night, the enemy had infiltrated the position and set up
automatic weapons among the massive ruins of the pillboxes. This
fire was intense and sustained, causing heavy casualties. So badly was
the company cut up, it became necessary to withdraw it to the vicinity
of Besch. Company A then moved forward and seized positions in the
southwest corner of the upper jaw. Contact was established with Com-
pany C to the east by patrol but that night both flanks of Company
A were exposed to possible enemy thrusts.

The following morning, Company B moved forward to Company
A's positions and the latter company jumped off behind an artillery
concentration to clear the upper jaw. When this was done, Company
A assumed a defensive position along the northern edge of the woods.
Company B, in the southwest corner of the Monkey Wrench Woods,
received heavy shelling all during the night of January 22-23. Morning
disclosed that the German machine guns had withdrawn from the pill-
box ruins. That night Company A moved forward to the antitank ditch.

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Chapter 16: ORSHOLZ

THE INTRODUCTION of the 11th Panzer Division had pro-
duced a fierce battle along the western flank of the Siegfried
Switch Line. However, the rest of the German defense position,
from Borg east to the Saar, remained relatively quiet. Against this
quiet sector Division planned to launch the next limited objective
attack, and the 301st Infantry prepared to seize Orsholz.

General Malony's over-all plan for the reduction of the Switch
position called for a double envelopment. Capture of the Nennig-
Tettingen area had penetrated the right flank of the German line,
anchored on the Moselle. The capture of Orsholz would unhinge the
enemy's left, anchored on the Saar. Once this second breach was made,
further attacks could be launched until the claws of the pincer met
on Munzingen ridge. This action would completely surround the center
of the German defense line, which could be reduced at leisure. Also,
the Triangle itself would then be completely exposed and Trier would
be within reach.

Orsholz was situated on a hill some four hundred feet high and
was surrounded by massive pillboxes set in an arc roughly a quarter
of a mile in front of the town. A hairpin turn in the Saar, a thousand
yards to the east, brought the river practically to the door of the town.
Terrain in this vicinity was wild, broken and heavily wooded. At the
river, it fell off sharply in steep, rocky cliffs. This double line of river
front and the proximity of a town on dominant and easily defensible
terrain made the location an ideal one for the eastern terminus of the
Switch Line.

South and east of Orsholz the ground was open and sloped gradually
from the north; these naked slopes gave perfect fields of fire to the
numerous pillboxes the enemy had erected. The only cover to the
front of the German positions in which an attacker might conceal
direct-support weapons was too far distant for accurate fire to be
delivered against the German fortifications. The terrain offered only
one likely avenue of approach. Between Oberleuken and Orsholz was
the Foret de Saarburg, a heavily wooded area which extended from the
American to the German lines and then turned eastward to the out-
skirts of Orsholz. These woods made an ideal approach to the town.
However, they favored the defense as well as the attack and the Ger-
mans had not neglected to improve the position.

Prior to the decision to reduce Orsholz, American patrols had not
penetrated deeply into these woods. But, with this decision, the 1st
Battalion and the I&R Platoon of the 301st sent reconnaissance parties
to comb the Foret de Saarburg, searching for enemy positions and the

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ORSHOLZ

133

most favorable avenues of approach. A few small fire fights were
stirred up, but for the most part the patrols sighted no enemy. Several
times reconnaissance parties advanced to the antitank ditch in front of
the Orsholz-Oberleuken road without being detected. To lull the sus-
picions of the enemy, no patrols were sent beyond this ditch until two
days prior to the attack. Then, a small carefully selected group was
dispatched with instructions to proceed through the woods, to the rear
of Orsholz, to determine the approximate strength of the enemy gar-
rison. This patrol slipped into the deep forest and was never again
seen.

When the 1st Battalion 301st was chosen as the attacking battalion
for the 94th's third limited-objective operation, the troops comman-
deered sheets, curtains and tablecloths and fashioned them into crude
snow-suits. They constructed pole and satchel charges, and the engi-
neers made available mines and flame throwers.

On January 19, 1945, elements of the 3d Cavalry Group relieved the
3d Battalion 301st which shifted to the left, in turn relieving the 1st
Battalion. At the same time, the 2d Battalion made ready to protect
the left flank of the regiment. The 301st Field Artillery was to provide
the main fire support for the operation and Company A of the 319th
Engineers checked the trails through the woods for mines.

The night of the 19th, the weather was bitter cold and snow,
already a foot deep on the ground, was descending so thickly it was
hard to distinguish familiar landmarks. At 2400 hours, the 1st Battal-
ion left Ober-Tiinsdorf and began its march through the woods. Com-
pany B, commanded by Captain Herman C. Straub, moved out first
with Technical Sergeant Ernest W. Halle of the I&R Platoon acting
as guide. Captain Charles B. Colgan and Company A followed closely
while Captain Cleo B. Smith's Company C, which had been designated
as the battalion reserve, brought up the rear of the column. Lieutenant
Colonel George F. Miller and his battalion command group followed
the rear of Company A. The 1st Platoon of Company D, commanded
by Lieutenant Robert W. Jonscher, was attached to Captain Straub's
company while the 2d Platoon came under Company A's control.
Captain Gilbert S. Woodrill and the mortar platoon of the battalion
followed the battalion command group.

The 4,000-yard march to the line of departure proved an exhausting
grind. Though the cold was intense, the men were so loaded with
equipment and extra ammunition they were soon perspiring. Frequent
rest halts were made en route and battalion communications personnel

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

laid wire as the column advanced. At each halt, Lieutenant Colonel
Miller called the regimental command post to report personally to
Colonel Hagerty.

By 0330 hours, Sergeant Halle and the head of the column reached
the forward assembly area, a few hundred yards from the line of depar-
ture. H-hour had been set for 0600 hours. Patrols and listening posts
were sent out to protect the forward assembly area and Captains Straub
and Colgan made their way through the snow for a last-minute recon-
naissance.

The line of departure was a small stream named Merl Branch which
lay just beyond a series of dragon's teeth. Still farther beyond was a
small group of buildings thought to be camouflaged pillboxes. Com-
pany A had formed a special assault squad which was to precede the
company and eliminate any resistance that might develop from this
quarter. At the point where the Orsholz-Oberleuken road crossed Merl
Branch, the dragon's teeth gave way to an antitank ditch which ran
through the woods to the east, on the south side of the road. However,
in the blinding snowstorm little of this terrain was visible to the com-
pany commanders. In fact, they could barely see the dragon's teeth
to their front.

At 0500 hours the assault companies left the assembly area and
moved into position in rear of the line of departure. The heavy snow-
fall and the density of the woods caused them to lose contact with each
other and because of this Lieutenant Colonel Miller delayed the attack.
Before contact was reestablished, it was 0725 hours. The attack then
began; no artillery preparation was employed.

As the right of Company A slipped out of the woods and into the
band of dragon's teeth, the stillness was broken by a series of loud
explosions. Screaming in agony men fell among the concrete obstacles.
Hidden beneath the thick carpet of snow was a field of Schii mines,
S mines, and a tangle of barbed wire. Attempts to veer to the right
and left only gave testimony to the extent and density of the minefield,
though some few men were lucky enough to pass through the dragon's
teeth unscathed.

On the left, Company B along with Captain Colgan's two left pla-
toons, Lieutenant Jonscher's machine-gun platoon, a detachment from
the regimental Mine Platoon, and a Cannon Company forward obser-
ver group, having encountered no mines, moved forward rapidly.
Without opposition, they gained the Oberleuken-Orsholz road. Turn-
ing right, this group headed for the battalion objective, straight down
the highway leading into Orsholz from the west. As these elements

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of the 1st Battalion swept forward, the advance guard overran some
enemy machine-gun positions, killing several Germans and taking a
few prisoners. Confident that the rest of the battalion would break
through, Captain Straub continued his advance. Thus the company
and its accompanying elements swept silently to the edge of the woods
west of Orsholz without alerting the enemy garrison. There they
awaited the arrival of the rest of the battalion that a coordinated
attack might be launched against the town.

Still at the line of departure, the remainder of the battalion gave
way to the left to use Company B's route through the dragon's teeth.
When the leading elements of this group had passed through the
tank obstacle and were about half way across the open ground in the
bottom of the draw beyond, German machine guns opened fire from
the north. Instantly the attacking force was caught in a withering fire
pattern. The 1st Platoon of Company A, bringing up the rear of the
assault and about to move into the open, set up a base of fire from
the edge of the woods which succeeded in sufficiently reducing the
volume of enemy fire to allow the other platoons to withdraw. All
hope of surprise was now gone. The enemy could not be seen but the
shout of orders in German was clearly audible and the sound of move-
ment could be heard in hidden communication trenches somewhere to
the front.

The enemy had accomplished a superior job of camouflage in this
area. He had built pillboxes, bunkers and communication trenches in
the forest and then had felled trees to form a massive network of
criss-crossing logs above and around them. Through this tangle, fields
of fire had been cut carefully. It was almost impossible to detect a
German position unless one was in its immediate vicinity when fire was
delivered.

The 301st Field Artillery was called upon to blast a hole for the
infantry and a heavy barrage was laid. Following this, Company A
again attempted to advance. The troops worked their way to the middle
of the draw and there they were again stopped by murderous fire from
skillfully concealed enemy machine-gun positions. All the fire power
the battalion could bring to bear was not sufficient to silence these
weapons. Captain Colgan's men could neither advance nor withdraw as
the slightest movement brought a hail of enemy lead that swept the
area, chewing up the snow. German artillery also began to fall among
the troops, adding greatly to the carnage.

With this development, the battalion commander came forward to
pull together the remnants of his command and attempt to discover

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some means of breaking through to Company B. Just then, the Ger-
man artillery increased its range slightly to saturate the edge of the
woods used as the line of departure with fire. Lieutenant Colonel
Miller was caught in a concentration and killed almost immediately.
A short time later, within ten yards of where the battalion commander
fell, Lieutenant Adrian B. DePutron was killed by bursts of enemy
machine-gun fire.

Major Arthur W. Hodges, the battalion executive officer, immedi-
ately assumed command of the disorganized battalion. He withdrew
what remained of the outfit deeper into the woods and began prepara-
tions for a new attack. In conjunction with these preparations, Com-
pany I was attached to the 1st Battalion at 1000 hours and moved into
the Foret de Saarburg. A new attack was launched at 1500 hours,
preceded by a heavy artillery concentration. The assault units made
progress until again they encountered antipersonnel mines. As the
artillery support lifted, the Germans laid their final protective line
fires. Hidden machine guns raked the rifle platoons and casualties
began to mount. The troops were finally withdrawn.

During the afternoon, the regimental commander appointed his
executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Hardin, who had
formerly commanded the 1st Battalion, as temporary battalion com-
mander. A second time, deeper within the wood, the command was
reorganized and it was decided to launch the next attempt several
hundred yards farther to the left, in an effort to avoid the German
minefields. At 1755 hours, just before darkness fell, the final attack
jumped off. The story repeated itself: mines, booby traps, final-protec-
tive-line fire and accurate enemy artillery. The battalion could not
break through to Company B.

On the morning of the 20th with the beginning of the first attack
against Orsholz, the 2d Battalion, 301st, on the left of the regiment,
had swung its right flank north, through the woods, in the direction
of the attack. This action prevented the enemy from sending any forces
from Oberleuken to counterattack the 1st Battalion. Company A of
the 748th Tank Battalion had also moved forward into the woods and
was prepared to assist in the assault on Orsholz, as soon as the antitank
ditch could be cleared and bridged. Unfortunately this was never
accomplished.

As the 20th progressed and the rest of the battalion failed to come
abreast, Captain Straub and his men began to receive a good deal of
attention from the enemy. Company B and those elements of Com-

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

On the 21st, after a conference with Lieutenant Colonel Samuel L.
Morrow of the 301st Field Artillery, it was decided to smoke the area
between Orsholz and the Foret de Saarburg in an attempt to cover the
withdrawal of Company B. Captain Straub's radio was still in con-
tact with the battalion's forward observation posts and Colonel Hagerty
came forward personally to brief Company B on this plan.

When radio contact was established, Captain Straub informed the
regimental commander the plan could not be executed. Company B
had almost exhausted its ammunition, the men were exhausted and
freezing to death. Moreover, the area through which they would have
to withdraw was heavily mined and their exact location was known
to the enemy. For the sake of his remaining men, Captain Straub
decided to surrender.

During the early afternoon, the remnants of the 1st Battalion with-
drew from the woods. Under the cover of smoke, as many as possible
of the wounded and dead were evacuated. The 2d Battalion covered
the withdrawal and the original lines were resumed. To reorganize
and recuperate, the shattered 1st Battalion was placed in reserve. Major
Hodges was made battalion commander and Major William E.
McBride was assigned to the battalion as executive officer. Upon the
recommendation of the Division Commander, Lieutenant Joseph E.
Cancilla was appointed company commander of Company B and
charged with the responsibility of constructing and training a new
company.

Higher headquarters decided to make no further attempt at taking
Orsholz for the present. Later, when the Division was freed of its one
battalion restriction, the score would be settled.

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Chapter 17: THE 302D MOVES UP

IEUTENANT COLONEL OTTO B. CLOUDT, Jr., commanding

the 3d Battalion, 302d, received orders on January 19, 1945 to

II A relieve the 3d Battalion, 376th, in the Nennig-Wies-Berg area.
The battalion commander, accompanied by Captain James E. Cook,
Battalion S-3; Lieutenant Harold C. Nelson, Battalion S-2; the com-
pany commanders of the battalion and all the platoon leaders, pro-
ceeded to Nennig on reconnaissance. The party moved by jeep to a
point midway between Besch and Nennig before dismounting. From
there, they walked and crawled the remaining distance into town. As
they approached the railroad, several mortar rounds and some machine-
gun fire was directed at them. No casualties resulted as they were well
dispersed.

At the command post of the 3d Battalion, 376th, the party was
oriented on the situation and Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt gave the vari-
ous company commanders their assignments. Company I, commanded
by Captain Allan R. Williams, was to move into Wies and Berg.
Company K, under Lieutenant Carl W. Seeby, would take over the
defense of Nennig. The 1st Platoon of Company L, under command
of Lieutenant John R. Travers, was attached to Company K and was
to relieve Lieutenant Fox in the orchard. Captain John N. Smith of
Company L was directed to deploy the remainder of his unit between
the orchard and Tettingen, a distance of more than fifteen hundred
yards. As usual, Captain Francis M. Hurst's heavy weapons company
was divided. The mortar platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Douglas
I. Smith, was to provide support from the commanding ground on the
Luxembourg side of the river while one machine-gun platoon sup-
ported Company I and the other Company K.

Late in the afternoon, the battalion executive officer, Major Earl
L. Meyers, moved the battalion from Sierck to the woods north of
Perl. At dark, Major Meyers directed Lieutenant Robert A. Edwards,
Company I's executive officer, to lead Companies I, K and the 1st
Platoon of Company L into Besch. There they were met by a guide
from Lieutenant Colonel Thurston's battalion, who conducted them
into the Nennig area. At the railroad tracks west of town, the com-
manders met their units and led them into position. It was a cold,
clear night and the relief was completed without incident or inter-
ruption.

Company I was in position prior to midnight. Captain Williams'
unit, less the 2d Platoon, moved into Wies while Lieutenant William
J. Doherty and his men took over Berg. The company commander
kept one section of heavy machine guns with him and sent the other

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two guns with the 2d Platoon. In Berg, Lieutenant Doherty put two
of his squads and the section of HMGs in Schloss Berg and the remain-
ing riflemen in a house overlooking the draw east of town. After the
completion of the relief, Lieutenant Peter Somfeld led a carrying party
back to Nennig while the remainder of the company improved its
defensive positions. To the north of Wies the Germans still held
Schloss Bubingen.

In Nennig, Lieutenant Seeby used the 1st and part of the 2d Pla-
toons to defend the town itself while the 3d Platoon, under Technical
Sergeant Frank A. O'Hara, took positions in the communication
trenches at the edge of the woods, on the ridge overlooking Nennig.
Also on the ridge was the heavy machine-gun platoon attached to the
company and a forward observer from the 356th Field Artillery.

The 1st Platoon of Company L moved into position with elements
of Company K and the 2d Squad of Lieutenant Travers' platoon was
employed to reinforce the right of Sergeant O'Hara's position. It took
over the communication trenches in the woods east of the platoon of
Company K. The remainder of Lieutenant Travers' platoon continued
eastward, through the woods to the orchard. There they slipped into
the open emplacements and foxholes as Lieutenant Fox and his men
moved off into the darkness, carrying their dead with them.

At the same time the rest of Company L moved west from Tettingen
to assume positions along its vastly extended front. The 3d Platoon,
commanded by Technical Sergeant Chester E. Markowski, was em-
ployed north of the Nennig-Tettingen road, off to the right of Lieu-
tenant Travers' men; Technical Sergeant John Karl's 2d Platoon held
the right of the company line between Tettingen and the 3d Platoon,
in a series of communication trenches south of the road; the Weapons
Platoon was divided between the 2d and 3d Platoons.

Prior to the completion of the relief at midnight on the 19th, Cap-
tain Bowden of Company B, 376th, asked Captain Smith how long
he expected to remain on the ridge. Captain Smith replied, "About
seven days." The CO of Company B then commented, "Somebody
may be up here seven days from now, but it won't be you."

In the orchard Lieutenant Travers' men made contact with the enemy
before dawn. At about 0400 hours, a three-man patrol approached
from the direction of Nennig. Because of the fog and the darkness,
visibility among the trees was greatly reduced and the leading German
was within five feet of the nearest foxhole before he was identified
and shot. The two remaining members of the hostile patrol broke into
a run, but were brought down by rifle fire. Two hours later a forty-

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141

man German patrol approached the position in a column of twos.
When within fifty yards of the 1st Platoon, they stopped for a break.
The men in the orchard opened fire, killing or wounding half the
group on the initial volley; the survivors scattered.

Sergeant O'Hara's platoon and the squad of Company L on its right
were fiercely attacked soon after assuming their positions. Under this
pressure they withdrew to Nennig where Lieutenant Seeby ordered
them back to the ridge, on the right of Lieutenant Henry J. Fink's 2d
Platoon which occupied the east of town. When a patrol went out
to determine whether or not the Germans had occupied the 1st Pla-
toon's positions it was driven back by enemy fire. Throughout the
remainder of the night small groups of Germans came to the ridge
positions where they were cut down by rifle and automatic fire.

Meanwhile, there was a good deal of enemy activity around Lieu-
tenant T ravers' position in the orchard and enemy troop movements
in the woods to the north increased. During the course of the morning
it became apparent that the platoon was gradually being surrounded.

To the right of the men in the orchard, the rest of Company L was
also encountering trouble. As a security measure, Captain Smith had
posted four men on either side of the wooden bunker he was using
for a command post. Just at dawn, two shots rang out and First
Sergeant John J. Stracelsky, who was standing in the doorway, fell
mortally wounded. Fearing the command group would be trapped in
the bunker, Captain Smith ordered it evacuated before the light im-
proved or the sniper was reinforced. One by one, the men dashed
from the shelter for the trench where the 60mm mortars were emplaced.

After daylight, a heavy artillery concentration ushered in an enemy
attack which thrust between Sergeant Markowski's platoon on the left
and Sergeant Karl's men on the right. This attack which hit the left
of the 2d Platoon, drove Sergeant Karl's men back to the firing trench
in the rear of their position. The 3d Platoon held fast, but the with-
drawal of the 2d on its right meant that both flanks were exposed and
they too were in danger of being surrounded. Lieutenant William
Burke, forward observer from the 356th Field Artillery, had joined
Company L during the night and was in position with the 3d Platoon
when it was attacked. For fire support Lieutenant Burke contacted fire
direction center via an SCR-300 radio borrowed from Captain Smith.
This radio was in contact with the 2d Battalion CP in Wochern where
his fire missions were relayed to Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Whitely's
356th Field Artillery. Captain Smith himself had to rely on runners

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for communication with Wochern. From there contact with 3d
Battalion Headquarters in Besch was made by telephone.

In an effort to cover Sergeant Markowski's exposed right flank, Cap-
tain Smith ordered the 2d Platoon to attack immediately to regain their
old positions. This was attempted but heavy rifle, machine-gun and
Schtneisser fire was encountered and the understrength platoon was
forced back to the cover of the communication trench. Later five men
who had been on the flank of the 3d Platoon worked their way back
and joined forces with the 2d. They reported killing about twenty-five
Germans before they ran out of ammunition but knew nothing of the
fate of the rest of their unit.

Captain Smith next sent a messenger to Wochern to report the situa-
tion, request reinforcements and to bring forward another radio. This
messenger returned shortly, accompanied by a patrol from Company F,
led by Lieutenant Joe D. Alvarado, whose mission was to contact the
1st Battalion troops working on the pillboxes south of the Nennig-
Tettingen road. Later Lieutenant Anthony Cerboskas of Company L
was sent into Wochern to emphasize the gravity of the situation.
Capain Smith had under his command only forty men. He was receiv-
ing heavy rocket and artillery fire all along his front and feared he
would be overwhelmed momentarily.

As the afternoon wore on, the sound of firing to the flanks of Lieu-
tenant Travers' position in the orchard became more and more remote.
It was obvious that the fighting had by-passed the orchard and that
the enemy was in their rear. There was no radio with the platoon, so
if battalion was to be informed that the position had not been over-
whelmed, someone would have to work through the enemy forces and
report to Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt. Lieutenant Travers, accompanied
by two volunteers, left on this dangerous mission.

Since his destination was Besch and his desire was to get there as
quickly as possible, the platoon leader headed his party south. By
stealthy maneuvering the group managed to avoid the enemy mine-
fields and evade interception. Upon reaching the Nennig-Tettingen
road the patrol was greatly surprised to encounter the Regimental
Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel John W. Gaddis, at the northern
edge of Monkey Wrench Woods. When informed of the situation,
Lieutenant Colonel Gaddis had Lieutenant Travers and his men accom-
pany him to the battalion CP in Besch and then to the regimental com-
mand post in Perl. At both places Lieutenant Travers repeated his
story. But, with the whole of the regimental front under attack and

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a gap in the center of the line, there were no reserves available to
rescue the isolated group.

On the afternoon of January 19, 1945, while Colonel Cloudt and
his party were on reconnaissance in the Nennig area, the 2d Battalion,
302d Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frank P. Norman,
moved into Wochern and began the relief of the 1st Battalion, 376th.
Company E, under Captain James W. Butler set up in Borg; Company
G, commanded by Captain James W. Griffin, took over Tettingen; and
Company F, commanded by Captain Herman Kops, Jr. was designated
battalion reserve. The latter company was divided between Wochern
and Der Heidlich. Captain Orville M. Owings of Company H sent
one machine-gun platoon to Wochern and the other to Borg, while
the 81mm mortars assumed positions in the cemetery west of Wochern.
The following day at approximately 2000 hours, Company G in Tet-
tingen, was attacked from three sides by an enemy force estimated as
a reinforced company. Savage fighting continued for three hours. Un-
able to beat their way into town, the Germans finally withdrew.

Also on the 20th, Company C of the 302d Infantry moved into
Wochern as regimental reserve while the rest of the 1st Battalion was
busy clearing the western portions of Monkey Wrench Woods. While
the troops began preparing positions around the town, Captain Norbert
C. Marek and his platoon leaders moved forward on reconnaissance
and, at 1600 hours, joined Captain Smith at his command post request-
ing that he orient them on his situation. While the CO of Company
L was explaining matters, a radio message was received from Lieuten-
ant Colonel Norman. It was addressed to Captain Marek, who had
just been attached to the 2d Battalion, and read: "You are committed
with Captain Smith/' (Those elements of Company L still under
Captain Smith's control were also attached to Lieutenant Colonel Nor-
man's battalion whose left boundary had been pushed eastward follow-
ing the enemy's penetration of the regimental front.) The CO of
Company C promptly dispatched a runner to lead his troops forward,
and then went into conference with Captain Smith. To restore the
original line of Company L and regain contact with the 3d Platoon,
the company commanders agreed to counterattack at once.

Company C moved forward into the woods behind Tettingen and
there the platoon leaders joined their men. The troops dropped their
packs and moved to the firing trench occupied by the 2d Platoon of
Company L. As they came into position, they were greeted by a fierce
artillery concentration. When this fire lifted, the 2d and 3d Platoons

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145

of Captain Marek's company took positions on the flanks of Sergeant
Karl's platoon. Captain Smith then appointed Sergeant Karl First
Sergeant and Staff Sergeant Anthony S. Ewasko took over the platoon.

Lieutenant John A. Wilson, the 356th Field Artillery forward obser-
ver with Company C, arranged a five-minute preparation on the woods
to the immediate front. As this friendly artillery fire lifted, the troops
moved forward to the antitank ditch and slid down its sides. The thin
film of ice in the bottom of the ditch broke beneath the weight of the
men, immersing them almost hip-deep in the frigid water. In the ditch,
Lieutenant Donald L. Renck's platoon was momentarily delayed. To
the right, Sergeant Ewasko's platoon, and beyond it the right flank
platoon under Lieutenant Carl D. Richards, moved forward. A burst
of machine-gun fire from the wooden bunker that had been used by
Company L as a command post, killed Lieutenant Renck and injured
several others as they emerged from the ditch. The rest of the platoon
overwhelmed the defenders of this bunker, taking twelve prisoners and
two machine guns. Simultaneously, rocket and artillery fire plus auto-
matic-weapons fire from pillboxes north of the Nennig-Tettingen road
proved so intense, only the right flank elements of the attacking force
were able to regain the old positions.

Captains Smith and Marek, moving forward in rear of the assault
platoons, encountered several Germans of whom they killed two and
captured eight. Observing that the Americans were taking prisoners,
several more enemy infantrymen stood up with their hands raised in
surrender. Since the area was apparently far from cleared, Captain
Smith dispatched a runner to contact the left platoon. In a short time,
the man returned saying he could find neither Lieutenant Renck nor
his men. The CO of Company L then took up a search himself locat-
ing the platoon in the vicinity of the antitank ditch where they had
been stopped by the volume of enemy fire and thrown into confusion.
The platoon leader was dead and Technical Sergeant George E. Fossal,
the Platoon Sergeant, was missing. So quickly had events transpired,
Staff Sergeant Francis J. Kelly, the platoon guide, did not realize that
he was in command. While the platoon reorganized Captain Marek
with a small force hunted down and eliminated the German machine-
gun crew causing most of the trouble.

The entire counterattacking force then dug positions facing the
Nennig-Tettingen road and a pair of pillboxes which had halted the
advance, with the left of the line curving off to the southwest to reduce
the danger of being outflanked. In the drive forward nothing had been
seen of Sergeant Markowski or his platoon.

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Throughout the night this new position was subject to almost con-
stant artillery and rocket fire. Tree bursts multiplied the hazard and
casualties were numerous. Several times during the hours of darkness,
Lieutenant Richards inspected the position and recommended that the
line be pulled back to the firing trench, as the position was only thinly
held and the left flank was badly exposed. This suggestion was finally
accepted. Litters were improvised and the slow process of evacuating
the more seriously wounded began. Its completion took most of the
night While it was in progress the line had to be held despite the
fact that the enemy had emplaced machine guns on the flank of the
group and the whole area was constantly being raked by fire.

Throughout this fighting on the 20th and 21st, Technician Third
Grade John F. Riskey, an aid man attached to Company L, repeatedly
distinguished himself. Time and again he disregarded the intensity
of the enemy's machine-gun and artillery fire while crawling to the
assistance of wounded riflemen. On one occasion part of his coat was
ripped to shreds by enemy fire. Twice when portions of the company
were temporarily forced to withdraw, he remained behind to care for
the wounded. His heroic actions were responsible for saving the lives
of more than one member of Company L.

The intense cold experienced during the night in the woods, follow-
ing the dip in the antitank ditch during the attack, greatly increased
the number of non-battle casualties in both companies. By morning,
fifteen men had to be evacuated because of a combination of trench
foot and frozen feet. At 1000 hours, when Lieutenant Colonel Nor-
man visited Company L, permission was requested to withdraw the
company, which now numbered only eighteen men. Captain Smith
explained to the battalion commander that he had not been evacuating
men with uncomplicated cases of trench foot, but because of overlong
exposure his men's hands were beginning to freeze. Lieutenant Colonel
Norman ordered the remnants of Company L into Wochern.

During the afternoon a patrol from Company A worked its way
east through the upper jaw of Monkey Wrench Woods and made
contact with the left flank of Captain Marek's company. Due to the
confused situation and the vastly extended front, it was impossible for
the two units to extend their flanks and reestablish a continuous line
of resistance that night.

On the 22d, eighteen B-24s were seen flying north. They bombed
the towns of Buren and Kreuzweiler where the enemy had 120mm
mortar and artillery positions. This air mission was officially reported
as having been executed "with good effect" The following day, three

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

this did not in the least throw the enemy off guard. As the attackers
moved forward, they were met with a heavy barrage of rockets and
artillery, in addition to intense automatic weapons fire. The 1st Pla-
toon of Company C gained only about three hundred yards before it
was pinned down by heavy and accurate machine-gun fire directed
against its flank. Casualties were inflicted almost immediately and
began to mount alarmingly. Technical Sergeant Nicholas Oresko, act-
ing as platoon leader, completely disregarded the intensity of this fire
and moved against the nearest machine gun, emplaced in a bunker.
As he advanced, he was hit but continued forward without a halt.
The sergeant lobbed a grenade, then charged the position, killing its
occupants with his Ml. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Oresko was hit
in the right hip and knocked to the ground. He regained his feet,
refused aid, and continued to lead his platoon. When fierce and accu-
rate rifle and machine-gun fire from a second bunker again stalled the
advance, Sergeant Oresko repeated his daring single handed asault.
By use of a grenade and his Ml, he annihilated the second machine-
gun crew. Only then did the sergeant consent to proceed to the aid
station as a walking casualty.

During this same action, Private James F. Cousineau displayed a
similar disregard for the intensity of the enemy's small-arms and
automatic-weapons fire. He charged a German machine-gun position,
knocked it out with grenades and then cut down eleven of the enemy
with the fire of his Ml. Later in the day, while attempting to evacuate
wounded comrades from positions in advance of the firing line, Private
Cousineau and another soldier were surrounded by an enemy patrol.
Together they fiercely engaged the Germans and fought their way back
to the company.

Throughout this assault German artillery and rocket fire continued
at terrible intensity; many men were thrown into a state of temporary
paralysis by the terrific blast effect of the Screaming Meemies. One of
the flame throwers was lost in the waters of the antitank ditch and
the .50-calibers could not be gotten across this obstacle. At 1730 hours,
Lieutenant Colonel Norman called off the attack and sent Company
F back into Wochern.

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Chapter 18: NENNIG COUNTERATTACK

THOSE ELEMENTS of the 3d Battalion, 302d, in the Nennig-
Berg-Wies area, also received quite a bit of attention from the
11th Panzer Division in the days immediately following the
relief of Lieutenant Colonel Thurston's battalion. At approximately
1000 hours on January 20, 1945, five German tanks loaded with infan-
try tried to storm Nennig from the north. Intense small-arms fire and
artillery broke the back of the attack and scattered the Grenadiers. A
few of the attackers managed to gain a foothold in the northern edge
of town, but were soon eliminated.

At 2045 hours that same evening, tanks were heard again in the
vicinity of Nennig and shortly thereafter an attack was launched from
the hill east of town. As the Panzergrenadiers charged down the slope,
illuminating shells were fired from the 60mm mortars. They burst high
above the attackers and the men of Company K saw hordes of infantry,
supported by four tanks, sweeping toward town. As final protective
line fires were laid, the darkness was pierced by livid streaks of crossing
tracers while the mortars and artillery filled the gaps in the line of
fire of the automatic weapons. Into this screaming hell the Grenadiers
advanced. Most of the attackers never made the edge of town. Those
few who did were soon eliminated.

For the most part the following day passed quietly and without
major incident. Artillery, rocket, mortar and machine-gun fire fell con-
stantly all through the battalion area. The cold was intense and added
to the discomfort of holding the three towns. Looking toward the
enemy lines, the men of the 3d Battalion waited and wondered where
the next blow would fall. It was apparent that the 11th Panzer Divi-
sion was under orders to eliminate the American penetrations into the
very marrow of the Siegfried Switch position. Past German failures
only prophesied future attacks.

At about 2100 hours on the 21st, the northern half of Nennig was
hit by a barrage that rocked the town as the enemy artillery laid its
preparation for another attack by the Ghost Division. German bat-
teries fired at a terrific rate and the sky above Nennig grew bright with
the glare of bursting shells. As quickly as it had begun, the artillery
fire lifted and shifted to Wies and Besch. German infantry and tanks
pushed down the hill to the east of Nennig and again made a wild
attempt to take the town by storm.

Within minutes of the start of this fearful barrage, the guns of the
356th Field Artillery Battalion took up the German challenge. Gradu-
ally the other American artillery battalions within range added the
weight of their fire. Across the Moselle, Company M's mortars regis-

149

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tered on the draw east of Nennig and there the enemy dead were

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152

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

greater force than* that available would be necessary to complete the
mission. This fact was reported to the company commander.

By morning the enemy had worked three tanks into town and had
forced Company K into the southern half of Nennig. At 0800 hours
the company launched a bitter counterattack which gained some
ground. But, the nearly exhausted infantrymen were unable to get
close enough to the tanks to knock them out. Realizing that the new
position could not be held, orders were issued for a withdrawal to the
small creek that ran through town from east to west. There a new
defensive line was established.

The panzers and Panzergrenadiers were also giving the troops in
Berg a rough time. During daylight hours at least, the only contact
Lieutenant Doherty and his men had with the rest of Company I in
Wies was by radio as the ground between the two towns was in full
view of the enemy and constantly swept by fire. After dark on the
20th, Private First Class James V. Collins, a 2d Platoon runner, made
his way from Schloss Berg to Wies after several narrow escapes. He
reported to Captain Williams that the platoon was in bad shape. The
enemy had attacked with infantry and tanks; the tanks, using point-
blank fire, had blasted holes in the walls of the castle through which
they continued to fire in attempts to knock out American resistance.
Occasionally the platoon was able to make radio contact and obtain
artillery support, but for the most part Lieutenant Doherty's men relied
on their bazookas to keep the panzers at bay. Ammunition for these
weapons was nearly exhausted and the 2d Platoon urgently requested
a resupply.

A carrying party was quickly formed and Private First Class Collins
led it back toward the Schloss. Repeatedly this group was brought
under fire and was unable to reach the castle. Following this a six-
man combat patrol was organized and set off to fight through to the
2d Platoon. It encountered heavy enemy machine-gun fire. When four
of the patrol had been killed the survivors returned to Wies.

Meanwhile the Germans persisted in their attempts to take Schloss
Berg and eventually the two squads of the 2d Platoon and the section
of HMGs in the castle were lost to the enemy. There was no further
word from this group and subsequently an American machine gun was
employed against the 3d Battalion. The remaining squad of the pla-
toon, under the command of Staff Sergeant Thomas W. Fontaine, then
found themselves out of contact with both platoon and company. With
them they had only their rifles and they could see and hear numerous

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NENNIG COUNTERATTACK

153

enemy tanks from their position. Certain that the rest of the platoon
had been capured by the Germans and unaware of the fate of the
company itself, the squad leader decided to withdraw. By a circuitous
route he led his men back to Besch and from there rejoined Company
I in Wies.

The initial enemy thrust into Nennig isolated elements of the 1st
Platoon, under Lieutenant Carpenter, in a house in the northeastern
corner of the town. A German tank approaching this building, as close
as the narrow, rubble-filled street would permit, opened fire. After
he had pumped several rounds into the building, the tank commander
called on the Americans to surrender. Lieutenant Carpenter told him
to "blow it . . ." and the action continued. When the Germans found
they were unable either to reduce the position or talk the Americans
into surrender, they placed machine guns to cover all exits from the
position and laid siege.

During the day of the 22d, the Germans began to infiltrate the
southern half of Nennig. Again and again Lieutenant Seeby's men
drove them back, but the depleted company did not have sufficient
strength to stave off the invaders completely. Therefore, Company A
of the 7th Armored Infantry Battalion, part of CCA of the 8th
Armored Division which had come under Division control for a short
period of battle indoctrination, was committed. One platoon of Com-
pany A assisted Lieutenant Seeby's men in completely clearing the
southern half of Nennig. That night other elements of Company A
relieved the positions on the ridge and a portion of the relieved troops
were then sent forward to strengthen the line in the center of town.
Despite this reinforcement, an enemy attack during the night succeeded
in driving back those elements of Company K and Company A of the
7th AIB holding the east-west line through Nennig. The Germans
retook the church and several houses in its vicinity.

At about this same time, Lieutenant Edwards of Company I led a
sixteen-man carrying party from Wies to Nennig. His route was south
along the railroad tracks to a point below Nennig. There he crossed
the tracks, entered town and proceeded up the main street to the bat-
talion CP. Upon his arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt questioned him
as to his route into Nennig. The battalion commander then informed
Company I's executive officer that an enemy machine gun periodically
swept the street he had used. Needless to say, the carrying party left
town by an alternate route.

During this fighting on the 22d of January, the III Battalion of the

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

110th Panzergrenadiers was so badly cut up the unit was dissolved
and its surviving personnel distributed among the other battalions of
the regiment. The I Battalion of the 71 4th Regiment, redesignated
the 774th, arrived from east of the Saar and was immediately com-
mitted.

To halt the German gains in Nennig, the 2d Battalion, 376th, was
brought forward from its reserve position at Monneren on the morning
of the 23d. Company E moved north along the Moselle to the railroad
tracks west of Nennig, which were again used as a line of departure.
At 0700 hours under a heavy artillery preparation, the attack began
with the 1st Platoon moving against Nennig and the 2d against Berg.

Commanded by Lieutenant Gus E. Wilkins, the 1st Platoon and
Staff Sergeant David H. Godfrey's 60mm mortar squad pushed into
the northwestern part of Nennig against slight resistance. They had
taken four houses and twenty-seven prisoners when three Mark IVs
appeared on the scene. The advance halted. Technical Sergeant
Nathaniel Isaacman, the Platoon Sergeant, and Private John F. Pietr-
zah made their way to the roof of the nearest building and worked
forward over the roof tops while enemy machine guns in Berg sniped
at them. When they gained a position above the leading tank, Private
Pietrzah put his bazooka into action. With the second round a perfect
hit was scored and the vehicle burst into flame. This second-story
bazooka team next directed its fire against the last Mark IV, setting
it afire with a single round; thus trapping the middle tank which was
knocked out with a rifle grenade by Private Albert J. Beardsley. Enemy
tankers who attempted to escape from their burning vehicles were cut
down by rifle fire.

Meanwhile, from the south, Company A of the 7th AIB and ele-
ments of Company K were again attacking north. Company A took
the left of the town; Lieutenant Seeby's men the right. This attack
moved forward successfully, overrunning seven machine guns, includ-
ing one lost by Company M earlier in the Nennig fight.

By noon the 1st Platoon of Company E was holding several houses
in Nennig and the 2d was halted about three hundred yards beyond
its line of departure by heavy machine-gun fire which was being re-
ceived from three directions. All but one of the tanks being supported
by the 3d Platoon had been knocked out leaving Lieutenant Bernard
F. Simuro's men without a task. Consequently, Captain Simon D.
Darrah decided to commit them between the other two platoons with

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

the mission of silencing the machine guns in the cemetery midway
between Nennig and Wies. A squad under Staff Sergeant Anthony S.
Rao succeeded in knocking out these weapons, but accurate mortar and
artillery fire drove them from the cemetery.

Company G of the 376th, commanded by Captain John D. Heath,
moved through Wies and pushed to the northeast, advancing as far
as the antitank ditch where they were stopped by machine-gun fire
from Schloss Berg and forced to withdraw. To prevent any enemy
infiltration, Company F was then committed between Companies E and
G. Late in the afternoon Captain Darrah worked his way from Wies
into Nennig to contact his 1st Platoon. At 2000 hours the remainder
of Company E was withdrawn and brought into Nennig to reinforce
its defenses.

Well after dark Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt and Lieutenant Fink
worked their way into position some twenty-five yards from the house
in which Lieutenant Carpenter and his men were isolated. Enemy
machine guns still covered all approaches to the building. The battal-
ion commander called to Lieutenant Carpenter and told him to hold
fast as he would be relieved shortly.

While the fighting had been particularly bitter all during the day
of the 23rd, it was infinitely more costly to the enemy than to the de-
fenders of Nennig. As the 2d Battalion, 376th, moved to the assistance
of Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's men, the attackers were reinforced by
the I and II Battalions of the 111th Panzergrenadiers. During the day
five Mark IVs were knocked out in the streets of Nennig but still the
Germans were unable to force a decision. In a final desperate attempt,
the I Battalion of the 110th was thrown into the fray with orders to
take the town at all costs. It failed. Both the 110th and 111th had
by now lost fifty percent of the personnel they brought into The
Triangle.

On the morning of the 24th at 0700 hours, the 1st Platoon of Com-
pany E and a composite platoon from the 3d Battalion attacked to
clear the houses in Nennig still held by the enemy. Three and a half
hours later the town was once again entirely in American hands.

The next problem was the reduction of Schloss Berg which com-
manded all the terrain in the vicinity of Wies and Nennig. This castle
and the town of Berg constituted a salient into the American lines.
As long as they were held by the enemy, the western flank of the
Division line was unsafe. Hence, this ground had to be retaken. An
attack was planned which called for Company G to drive southeast
from Wies while Company E moved north from Nennig. At 1330

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158

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

thereafter four German machine guns opened fire, their bullets grazing
the lip of the ditch showered the men with snow. The ice at the bottom
of the tank trap was not thick enough to support the weight of a
man and the troops were soon soaked from the hips down. Recon-
naissance parties explored the ditch but there was no escape. In one
direction it became impassable; in the other it led deep into the Ger-
man lines. Upon learning that there was no possibility of maneuver-
ing, a message was radioed to the company commander explaining the
situation. As a result, the 1st Platoon was committed on the right in
an attempt to break into Berg itself. The platoon reached the outskirts
of town only to be stopped by machine-gun and artillery fire. Again
and again American tank destroyers and the artillery pounded the
castle without apparent results. The German machine guns continued
to fire.

In the antitank ditch, the wet clothing on the men froze in a matter
of minutes. Then the canteens froze and later the radio did likewise.
About dark, the aid man decided to attempt the evacuation of one of
the wounded and started toward Wies with his patient. An hour later
he returned with word that a smoke screen would be laid to cover the
platoon's withdrawal. As the smoke descended, the platoon took off
pell-mell for Wies.

That evening General Cheadle and the CO of Combat Command
A of the 8th Armored Division visited the command post of the 2d
Battalion, 376th in Wies. "I have orders that your battalion will attack
at 0300 to establish a bridgehead for the armor which will then pass
through you and continue the attack," said General Cheadle. Lieuten-
ant Colonel Martin replied that his men were exhausted and that the
battalion was so far understrength it could not possibly accomplish
the task. While ready to obey the order if so directed, he suggested
a night attack by a fresh battalion. The situation was discussed at
length and permission was finally obtained from Division to have the
7th Armored Infantry Battalion attack at 0600 hours. The armored
infantry moved out on schedule to their first fire fight. Observed by
General Malony and their own CG, they advanced across the open
ground and closed on Berg. Relentlessly the battle continued through-
out the day with the enemy contending bitterly for this valuable piece
of terrain. By 1630 hours on the 25th, all of Berg was cleared by
the 7th AIB which suffered extremely severe casualties.

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Chapter 19: SINZ

AT 1030 HOURS on the 24th, Major General John M. Devine, CG
r\ 8th Armored Division, and his chief of staff arrived at the
-Z~j\. command post of the 2d Battalion, 302d, in Wochern. Accom-
panied by Captain Hodges they went forward to Tettingen on recon-
naissance. At noon, other staff officers from the armored division put
in an appearance. Something was definitely in the wind.

During the morning, Company L was relieved of attachment to
the 2d Battalion and a platoon from Company F took over the position
in Der Heidlich while the other platoons of the company moved into
the line west of Company C. Company C then reverted to the control
of the 1st Battalion, but remained in position. Following this, Com-
panies A and B shifted to the right, relieving the two platoons of
Company F, on the left of Captain Marek's men. These platoons of
Company F then reverted to battalion reserve in Wochern. Object of
these shifts was to facilitate the relief of the 1st Battalion, 302d, by
the 1st Battalion, 376th, the night of the 25th, and the relief of the
2d Battalion, 302d, by the 1st Battalion, 302d, during the early morn-
ing hours of the 26th.

On the morning of the 25th, General Malony dictated his order for
the attack on Sinz, located approximately one mile north of Butzdorf.
It was imperative that something be done to relieve pressure on the
Division west flank in the Nennig-Berg area and seizing Sinz and
Munzingen ridge to the east would accomplish this end. The 301st
Infantry, less the 3d Battalion, was to support this operation from its
position on the right of the Division sector. Colonel Hagerty's regi-
ment was to maintain contact with the 3d Cavalry Group on the
right and with the 1st Battalion, 302d, on the left, which unit was
placed under division control and charged with giving direct support
to the main effort from its battle position. The 376th Infantry would
make the main effort. Its mission was to seize and hold the objective
while maintaining contact with the 1st Battalion, 302d, on the right
subsequent to its relief of Lieutenant Colonel Norman's men, and
the rest of Colonel Johnson's command, on the left. In conjunction
with the attack of the 376th, the 302d was to launch an attack on
the Division left flank to clear a bridgehead through which CCA of
the 8th Armored Division, attached for only forty-eight hours, might
pass. In addition, Colonel Johnson's men were to protect the Division
flank from the Moselle to Sinz while maintaining contact with the
376th on the right and the 2d Cavalry Group of XII Corps across
the Moselle River. The mission assigned to the armor was a passage
through the sector of the 302d to destroy all enemy tanks and installa-

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tions in its path of advance to Sinz from the west. It was also to be
prepared to repel counterattacks from the north and east. The 3d
Battalion, 301st, was to be motorized and held in Division reserve for
use as a counterattacking force.

Colonel McClune had at his disposal the 1st and 3d Battalions of
his own regiment and was to receive the 2d Battalion, 302d, after
its relief on the night of the 25th-26th, by the 1st Battalion, 302d.
Following the unit commanders' meeting, Colonel McClune called
a conference of his battalion commanders and their operations officers
to explain his plan. The regiment's attack would push through the
clearing and woods to the northwest of Butzdorf, with the 2d Battal-
ion, 302d, on the right, the 3d Battalion, 376th, on the left, and the
1st Battalion in reserve in Monkey Wrench Woods. Lieutenant
Colonel Norman's battalion was to take Sinz while the 3d crossed the
Sinz-Bubingen road to secure Untersie Busch and the high ground
beyond.

Following this meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Miner, CO of the 1st
Battalion, 376th, took his company commanders into Monkey Wrench
Woods for a personal reconnaissance of the AT ditch, just north of
the upper jaw, in which Companies B and C were to take positions
that night while Company A set up in the southwest corner of the
lower jaw. Shortly after dark the 1st Battalion Executive Officer,
Major Benjamin S. Roper, brought the troops forward into Besch by
truck. From there the companies moved into the woods. Subsequently,
the assault battalions, 2d Battalion, 302d and 3d Battalion, 376th,
assembled in the upper jaw of Monkey Wrench Woods behind
Companies B and C

Shoepacs had at last been issued to the men and it was hoped the
toll of frostbite and trench foot casualties would drop off sharply.
Ever since the Division had reached the Western Front, lack of proper
footgear for work in the snow, during the dead of a very cold winter,
had caused an excessive number of non-battle casualties.

During the day of the 25th while the assault units were preparing
for the coming operation, the attack order was somewhat modified.
Following the jumpoff, the assault companies were to push to the edge
of the woods south of the Sinz-Bubingen road and hold there. Division
headquarters would issue orders for movement into Sinz.

At daybreak of the 26th the attack jumped off. A platoon of the
81st Chemical Mortar Battalion laid smoke on Sinz, Campholz Woods
and the road leading north from Butzdorf. These concentrations were
fired in a blizzard that added inches to the knee-deep snow.

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

The 2d Battalion, 302d, attacked with Company E on the right and
Company F on the left while Company G, which was in reserve,
followed the assault units at 600 yards. Using marching fire, Company
E was the first to reach Phase Line A. Although the company was
slowed down by machine-gun and rifle fire from the woods to its front,
it continued forward. Company F encountered the right edge of the
minefield that had trapped the 3d Battalion. Several men had already
been injured when Lieutenant Maurice S. Dodge, the company execu-
tive officer, came forward to see what was slowing the advance. Lieu-
tenant Dodge stepped on a mine and became a casualty himself. Just
then, Private Jennings B. Pettry approached with a prisoner. In at-
tempting to lift Lieutenant Dodge and move him to the rear, another
mine was detonated. Private Pettry was temporarily blinded, the
German instantly killed, and Lieutenant Dodge mortally wounded.

Primacord was brought forward by the engineers and with this a
path was blasted through the antipersonnel minefield. After the com-
pany reorganized, it moved forward to come abreast of Company E
which had already reached the far edge of the woods.

By this time mortar, artillery and small-arms fire was being directed
against the 2d Battalion from both Sinz and Butzdorf. The regimental
Cannon Company was ordered to place concentrations, one every five
minutes, on the pillboxes northwest of Campholz, as these boxes were
delivering long-range automatic fire on the attacking troops as well
as directing the artillery fire.

When Company E reached the second phase line, it was ordered
to dig in and await the rest of the battalion. Dead Germans strewn
throughout the woods attested to the effectiveness of the overhead
machine-gun fire and the marching fire employed by the riflemen in
their advance. Lieutenant Colonel Norman attempted to learn the
whereabouts of CCA but was unable to contact it by radio. Companies
F and G soon reached the edge of the woods and also began digging
positions in the frozen ground.

The delay of the 3d Battalion, 376th, in the minefield dangerously
exposed the left flank of the 2d Battalion. To eliminate this threat,
Lieutenant Colonel Miner's 1st Battalion was ordered to continue the
attack, passing through or around the stalled 3d Battalion. As the
1st Battalion approached the vicinity of the minefield it was subjected
to a heavy artillery concentration, whereupon it veered to the right
and followed the 2d Battalion's route of advance.

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In the meantime, Companies E and F of the 302d had fanned out
through the woods toward Sinz where they awaited the arrival of the
1st Battalion. When three tanks were seen approaching the battalion's
position, they were assumed to be American. Visibility was obscured by
the snow and heavy brush, so the armored vehicles were almost upon
the troops before they discovered them to be German. As the tanks
opened fire, the troops spotted German infantry advancing behind
them. Thereupon, they pulled back to the rear slope of the hill to
avoid the direct fire of the tanks and assumed new positions. During
this withdrawal Sergeant Gilbert E. Kinyon, of Company F, remained
behind, firing his carbine at the leading tank. This caused the panzer
to button up, thus reducing its scope of vision. Private First Class
Laverne Sinclair, of Company E, picked up a bazooka and a single
round of ammunition, exclaiming: 'Til stop one of them!" When the
nearest German tank was within twenty-five yards, he opened fire and
blew off a tread. Captain James W. Griffin running to the head of
Company G found his men slowly withdrawing. He ordered the com-
pany to hold and sent for his bazooka teams. Upon their arrival, the
captain directed bazooka fire against the two undamaged tanks until
one of these was set afire and the other withdrew. Artillery support
which had been requested helped disperse the German infantry and
the counterattack was repulsed. The companies then reorganized and
dug positions on the northern edge of the woods. Enemy artillery fire
began to pour into the area and casualties mounted as the effectiveness
of the German fire was greatly increased by the number of tree bursts.
There were no blankets and with the coming of night the weather
turned colder.

At dusk word was relayed to battalion headquarters that tanks had
been seen in Sinz. Major Maixner received this information in Wochern
while General Cheadle was in the command post. The general in-
formed the battalion executive officer that there were no American
tanks in Sinz and the weight of the Division artillery was hurled
against the town.

As a part of the attack, General Malony had ordered the 1st Bat-
talion, 302d, under Division control, to take the town of Butzdorf.
Company A, supported by tank destroyers, launched this offensive
from the woods southwest of Tettingen. The advance across the clear-
ing surrounding Butzdorf was costly, for the men were in full view
of the German pillboxes on the high ground east of town. They also
received fire from the Halfway House until it was hit with concentra-

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tions of HE and white phosphorus which caused the Germans garrison-
ing the building to flee in confusion. Soon the town was cleared and
in American hands, but use of the road leading from Tettingen into
Butzdorf was still denied by enemy positions to the east. During this
advance, Lieutenant Samuel G. Norquist, acting company executive
officer, continuously exposed himself while leading the company for-
ward. His outstanding behavior did much toward carrying the assault
rapidly forward. Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Love, G-2 of the Divi-
sion, and Captain Luis J. Flanagan, Battalion S-3, who had accom-
panied the troops into Butzdorf, were both wounded in front of the
Company CP.

That night three-man patrols from Company A went out to contact
the elements of the 302d on the left. Supply and evacuation were
accomplished by means of a Weasel through the orchard west of Butz-
dorf. Company B, in Borg, ran contact patrols to Tettingen to guard
against the possibility of a German surprise thrust from Campholz
Woods.

During the afternoon, the 3d Battalion, 376th, was withdrawn from
in front of the minefield, which had stopped its advance, to Monkey
Wrench Woods, where it spent the night. Contact between companies
was maintained during lulls in the enemy's artillery concentrations.

When the 1st Battalion, 376th, passed through Lieutenant Colonel
Thurston's troops, it had orders to coordinate with the 2d Battalion
302d. Company B soon made contact with Company F and tied in
on the left flank of the latter unit while Company C went into posi-
tion farther to the left. Captain Chester B. Dadisman, commanding
Company A of the 376th, remained in reserve in the antitank ditch
in Monkey Wrench Woods. Interested in discovering a satisfactory
route of supply and evacuation for the rest of the battalion, he sent
Sergeant Joseph Sanniec and four men to check the Nennig-Tettingen
road for mines. While on this mission, Sergeant Sanniec observed
several figures in GI overcoats north of the road. He sent Private First
Class K. O. Kettler across a gully and into the clearing beyond to
investigate. As Kettler worked his way forward he called out: "Who
is it?" The men yelled back, "L Company! Get out — Germans are
on three sides!"

Company A's patrol withdrew and the incident was reported to
Captain Frank Malinski, the battalion S-3. A stronger patrol was
organized and Captain Edwin Brehio accompanied the group that

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returned to the position in question. Using his glasses, the captain
verified the fact that the men were Americans and four BAR men
went forward to cover the withdrawal of Technical Sergeant Petry's
men from the orchard. Four of the Company L men had to be carried
to the rear. At the antitank ditch in which Company A was located,
they were fed and from there were sent to the aid station in Besch.

At the clearing station, Technical Sergeant Arnold A. Petry, the
platoon sergeant who only six years earlier had been a member of the
Hitler Youth in Germany, recounted the activities of the two squads
in the orchard after Lieutenant Travers and his patrol left for Besch
to obtain aid on the 20th. Food had been an immediate problem as
each of the men had carried only one can of C ration. During a lull
in the artillery fire, the two dead Germans closest to the position were
searched; their haversacks yielded one thick slice of black bread, a bag
of biscuits and a can of meat. When one of the men remembered that
he had left a can of C rations in a foxhole occupied earlier in the day,
Staff Sergeant Victor J. Carnaghi of the 3d Squad crawled back to
retrieve the precious food. This hole was almost fifty yards away,
over the crest and down the reverse slope. The sergeant made the
trip safely only to discover the enemy's artillery had felled a large
tree across the foxhole in question. The food was definitely beyond
reach.

As the afternoon progressed the sounds of battle east and west of
the orchard grew ever fainter. When the sun began to set and there
was still no word from the platoon leader or sign of a relief force,
the troops resigned themselves to the fact that the patrol had not
gotten through. Guard shifts were arranged and the squads settled
down to wait out the long, cold night. With the coming of dawn there
was still no sign of relief from battalion; spirits ebbed but the isolated
infantrymen resolved not to surrender under any circumstances. Day
followed day and as the food gave out, the cold bit to the very marrow.

On the third night of the siege, the men held a council of war and
agreed to attempt a break for the American lines that night, striking
directly east toward Nennig. Private First Class John A. Dresser and
Private First Class James E. Meneses, acting as scouts, again and again
ran into German outposts. In despair the squads pulled back to the
foxholes in the orchard and the siege continued. Nightly, thereafter,
three-man patrols were sent out to seek a route through the enemy
cordon, but without success.

Only slightly less annoying than the pangs of hunger was the throat-
parching thirst the men suffered despite the cold. They soon discovered

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that eating snow was unsatisfactory. For the most part they obtained
water either by sitting on a helmet full of snow until it melted or by
moving in small groups, after dark, to a brook located in a small draw
near the orchard. On the fifth night Private First Class Earl Freeman
was killed instantly by a shell fragment while on a water detail.

With each passing day the outlook became blacker, but Sergeant
Petry's men were still determined not to surrender. Thus, they held
their isolated and surrounded position for seven days until relieved
by the rescue party from Company A.

The 302d Infantry, less its 1st and 2d Battalions, and with the 2d
Battalion, 376th, attached, also attacked at dawn on the 26th. It was
to expand the small bridgehead established by the armored infantry
battalion at Berg, so that the tanks of CCA of the 8th Armored Divi-
sion might be committed. The 2d Battalion, 376th, was placed on the
left, to drive northeast from Wies and Berg to the Sinz-Bubingen road;
while the 3d Battalion, 302d, was to push east from Berg and Nennig,
to clear the ridge leading to Sinz and make contact with the 376th
Infantry in the vicinity of Untersie Busch Woods. This attack jumped
off at 0700 hours. Company G of the 376th, on the extreme left, was
stopped cold by fire from Bubingen and withdrew to Wies where it
continued to secure the left flank of the advance. Company E, on
the battalion right, advanced about one hundred yards and struck a
Schii-mine field. As his men hesitated, Lieutenant Dodson called on
them to follow him and led them through safely. The company then
moved rapidly forward for several hundred yards. As they approached
an open hill, several German machine guns opened fire; the company
halted with both flanks exposed. To the right rear Sergeant Gerald
W. Jende spotted two Germans setting up another automatic weapon
to engage his unit from behind; with two well placed rifle shots he
eliminated the enemy gunners. However, the company was still unable
to advance.

The 3d Battalion, 302d, which also moved to the attack at 0700
hours, encountered heavy resistance east of Nennig and was held up
most of the morning just beyond the line of departure. About noon
with the assistance of the artillery it was able to push forward. As
the battalion came abreast of Company E, it encountered fire from the
same machine guns delaying that company. Seeing the gap on the
right was about to be closed, the troops of Company E rushed the
German position. This attack was costly, but it netted two machine
guns and twenty-nine prisoners.

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As Company E reached the Sinz-Bubingen road, three German
tanks appeared on the right and the company fell back approximately
150 yards to join flanks with the 3d Battalion. Artillery support was
requested, but through an error the concentration fell not on the tanks
but upon the 3d Battalion and Company E. Resulting casualties were
heavy and when the fire lifted both units were instructed to dig posi-
tions for the night. Throughout the day, the 7th Armored Infantry
Battalion and Company A of the 18th Tank Battalion had assisted
the two infantry battalions in their attack. When the advance stalled,
these units were withdrawn to prepare for a renewal of the offensive
the following morning.

The next morning, in Colonel McClune's sector, the 1st Battalion,
376th, attacked to seize Untersie Busch Woods and the high ground
surrounding it, in conjunction with the advance of the 2d Battalion.
302d. As Companies B and C jumped off, Company A moved forward
to the positions held by the other companies during the night, to pro-
tect the left flank of the advance. Companies E and G bypassed Com-
pany F and continued to the most forward positions within the woods.
There they were instructed to hold until further orders. While they
occupied these positions enemy sniper and artillery fire took a heavy
toll.

With the resumption of the attack, the 3d Battalion, 376th, came
forward to an alert position in the rear of the 1st Battalion. In moving
up, the men of Lieutenant Colonel Thurston's battalion gained some
idea of the fury of the fighting on the previous day. The woods were
littered with German and American dead and the air was heavy with
the stench of charred flesh, emanating from burned-out tanks.

Meanwhile, Companies B and C of the 376th advanced to some
barbed-wire entanglements 200 yards south of the Sinz-Bubingen road.
There Lieutenant Colonel Miner noticed that the assault companies
of the 2d Battalion, 302d, were not in sight. This meant that his right
flank was exposed. Therefore, he instructed Captain Dadisman to bring
Company A into position to the right rear of the battalion, as protec-
tion against the possibiliy of a counterattack launched from the east.
During this shifting of the reserve, the assault companies continued
their advance, mopping up as they went.

When Companies B and C reached the road, they each sent one
squad into Untersie Busch. To this intrusion the enemy responded
promptly with a vicious counterattack launched from the edge of the
woods. In this thrust, three camouflaged tanks, one of which was a

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170 THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Tiger, and an undetermined number of infantry were employed.
Intense automatic-weapons fire of very large caliber was also thrown
against the 1st Battalion; Lieutenant William Bendure of Company
B and Sergeant Ackerman of Company C were hit on the initial bursts.
One of the squads in Untersie Busch came so close to a skillfully
camouflaged enemy tank, at the start of the counterattack, that its crew
could not sufficiently depress the muzzzle of their gun to hit the infan-
trymen. Lieutenant William Ring, who had come across the road,
fired six rounds from a bazooka at the panzers. All were deflected
by the heavy bush covering the armor. As the German attack gained
momentum, the troops withdrew to a position approximately one
hundred yards south of the Sinz-Bubingen road where a rise in the
ground gave some shelter from the enemy's direct-fire weapons. This
was only scant protection, however, as all companies were receiving
heavy mortar, rocket and artillery fire. While the troops remained
in this position, waiting for the tanks of CCA to break through the
302d bridgehead, Captain Duckworth was hit and Lieutenant James
W. Cornelius took command of Company C.

To the west in the vicinity of Nennig, there was a good deal of
activity behind the American lines. From Division reserve the 3d
Battalion, 301st, was rushed forward on the night of the 26th and
sent into Nennig. The 7th AIB and the 18th Tank Battalion continued
their preparations for the support of the attack the following day.

At 0915 hours on the 27th, the 3d Battalion, 301st, passed through
the 3d Battalion, 302d, and pushed the attack vigorously, supported by
a fresh company of tanks. Again the machine guns and panzers that
had stopped the American attack the preceding day went into action
for the Germans were aware that as soon as the forces striking from
the south and west joined, all would be lost. They fought desperately,
but one by one the machine guns were eliminated and the tanks
destroyed. The advance of Lieutenant Colonel McNulty's battalion
progressed favorably and continued to pick up momentum. By noon,
the Sinz-Bubingen road had been crossed and the enemy temporarily
routed. Through the infantry and down the newly won axis of advance,
the tanks of the 18th Tank Battalion moved east toward Sinz.

At about 1300 hours, the leading tank of CCA was seen approach-
ing over the open ground south of the Sinz-Bubingen road by an
OP of the 1st Battalion, 376th, in the woods southwest of Sinz. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Miner was informed and without delay the battalion

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

order came through from regiment for an attack against Sinz from
the eastern edge of Untersie Busch Woods, in conjunction with an
assault from the south by the 2d Battalion, 302d. Lieutenant Colonel
Miner promptly informed his company commanders that the battalion
would move out with Company A on the right and Company B on
the left. The former unit was to advance along the road leading into
Sinz in the cover of the ditch. Company C would remain in reserve
in Untersie Busch. While the companies were moving into position for
this new operation, the battalion commander climbed into one of the
tanks to coordinate his attack with the armor by radio. Several of the
tanks were low on ammunition and had to return for a resupply; more-
over, in attempting to cross the antitank ditch across the road at the
east edge of Untersie Busch, one of the tanks was trapped. Three
others succeeded in negotiating this obstacle, but were slowed down
when the leading vehicle was knocked out by an 88.

Accompanied by Lieutenant King of Company B, the battalion com-
mander took off on a personal reconnaissance after the conference with
the tankers. On the edge of the woods, the two officers ran into a
German counterattacking force. At the same time, Company C ob-
served the attackers who were supported by armor. Company A was
alerted and Company B moved back into the antitank ditch with them.
American tanks on the Sinz-Bubingen road lent their support and in
conjunction with the rifle companies, laid down such intense fire the
enemy attack was halted. Having suffered heavy casualties, the German
counterattacking force slowly withdrew.

Following this, orders were received to comb Untersie Busch Woods.
Just before dark the battalion moved forward with Company B on
the right, Company A in the center, and Company C on the left. They
completed the task without difficulty and reestablished contact with the
3d Battalion, 301st, on the left. Information was then received from
regiment that the 3d Battalion, 376th, was to effect a relief prior to
midnight. Accordingly, each of the 1st Battalion rifle companies sent
guides to the woods east of Nennig, to lead forward the relieving
troops. By 2100 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Thurston's men were in
position. As the 1st Battalion moved to the rear and regimental reserve,
German artillery harassed the area, adding to the battalion's heavy toll
of casualties.

Into Sinz

Prior to the counterattack that was launched against the 1st Battal-
ion, 376th, as it was preparing to attack Sinz, an elaborate artillery
fire support plan had been arranged by the Division artillery to sup-

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173

port the coordinated assault of the 1st Battalion, 376th, from the west
and the 2d Battalion, 302d, from the south. A ten-minute barrage
was to be placed on Sinz and the pillboxes southeast of town, just prior
to the attack, while the high ground to the north of the objective was
smoked. After this initial barrage one battery would fire on the boxes
every two minutes. As the 2d Battalion jumped off, the German
counterattack caught the 1st Battalion, 376th, at the line of departure,
and Lieutenant Colonel Norman's men moved toward Sinz alone.
Debouching from the woods they moved into the open against a steady
volume of enemy artillery and small-arms fire. Captain Griffin of Com-
pany G was hit by a shell fragment as he started from the woods and
the company executive officer, Lieutenant Peter R. Kelly, took com-
mand. Ten minutes later he was killed by a burst of machine-gun
fire. A few minutes later, the battalion commander was wounded and
Major Maixner came forward to assume command. Doggedly the
troops advanced in the face of the enemy's accurate fire. At the tank
trap running south across the Sinz-Bubingen road, west of town, the
leading elements of each company halted, waiting for the rest of the
company to arrive. From there the infantry pushed on using marching
fire. It was rough going and the troops began to tire as they alternately
ran and crawled towards Sinz.

An American tank which had been shooting up the streets of Sinz
mistook the men of Company G for Germans as it pulled out of town.
A large number of casualties had been inflicted before Technical Ser-
geant Edward P. Regan succeeded in working his way to the side of
the tank. He pounded on the turret with his rifle butt and, yelling
above the din, managed to make the tankers understand their mistake.

Company E, on the left, advanced to the Sinz-Bubingen road and,
taking advantage of the cover of the ditch along the road, proceeded
to positions from which they could fire on the nearest house in Sinz.
When German sniper fire from a barn temporarily held up the advance,
Private James Guerrier picked up a light machine gun and fired it from
his hip. His tracers set fire to the hay in the barn, which began to
burn rapidly; Private Guerrier continued to spray the building until
his ammunition supply was exhausted. He then turned back to the
nearest tank and borrowed two more belts of cartridges. With these,
he picked off the Germans as they ran from the burning barn.

In front of Company G an enemy tank concealed in a hay stack
stalled the unit's advance. Private First Class Edward D. Yewell, a
bazooka man, worked his way to within easy firing range and set the
stack afire with his first round. As the tankers attempted to escape

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175

from their burning vehicle, they were cut down by the supporting
riflemen.

Private Clifford R. Macumber was the first man to enter Sinz. He
tossed a grenade into the nearest house, rushed it and came out with
eleven prisoners. Staff Sergeant Michael Wichic ran up the road to
the second house and, while completely exposed to enemy fire, heaved
a white phosphorus grenade into a second-story window. This killed
one sniper and wounded another. The sergeant then led his squad into
town. As he was advancing against another house, he was killed by
machine-gun fire.

Company G, in gaining its toe-hold in Sinz, had lost its company
commander, company executive officer, and one platoon leader. In
Sinz, Technical Sergeant Fred A. Drye of the 1st Platoon initially
took charge of the newly won area. Riflemen collected the wounded
and carried them to one of the four houses in American hands, where
they were given first aid. As evening approached, it was decided to
withdraw from one of the houses which was approximately three
hundred yards in advance of the other three. Before this building was
abandoned, it was set on fire to deny it to the enemy and to provide
light in the event of an enemy counterattack during the night.

Lieutenant Harry J. Lewies of Company E took charge of activities
in Sinz when he entered town. Before dark he asked for two volunteers
to cross the one thousand yards of open ground that separated Sinz
from the nearest elements of the battalion as there was neither radio
nor wire communications and it was vital that battalion know the
existing situation inside the town. Private First Class Mark D. Atchin-
son and Private First Class Orleane A. Jacobson accepted the task and
were given snowsuits taken from two of the captured Germans. They
made the trip safely, noting where the wounded lay as they made their
way back. After reporting to the command post, both men led litter
squads back to the wounded and helped in their evacuation. Private
First Class Jacobson became a casualty himself while engaged in this
work.

When Major Maixner took stock of the situation, he found that
the two companies in Sinz had a combined strength of less than a
single full-strength unit. Moreover, Company F, the battalion reserve,
was down to sixty effectives. This information was relayed to Colonel
McClune and the regimental commander of the 376th instructed the
2d Battalion to hold what it had and reorganize. Eighty men from
the 376th's Antitank Company were armed as riflemen and attached to
Major Maixner. Also, half-tracks were provided for the evacuation of

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

thirty seriously wounded in Sinz. Colonel McClune next instructed the
CO of the 7th Armored Infantry Battalion which had come under his
command to proceed to the 2d Battalion forward CP to confer with
Major Maixner. Together the battalion commanders planned a new
attack for the following day.

At 0200 hours, Lieutenant James W. O'Keefe, commanding Com-
pany E, was called to the battalion command post and given instruc-
tions for the offensive that was to be launched the following day to
clear Sinz. Major Maixner's men and the 7th AIB were to attack
together, with the armored infantrymen taking the left of town and
the 2d Battalion the right. No sooner had Lieutenant O'Keefe departed
for Sinz with the attack plan than orders were received to the effect
that the Division had lost the use of CCA whose forty-eight hours of
battle indoctrination had elapsed. Regardless of the tactical situation
the tanks were to be withdrawn. In view of this development, the
Division Commander issued instructions to pull back from Sinz, since
it could not be held without armored support. This was done and a
new defensive position was organized in the woods to the southwest
prior to daylight.

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Chapter 20: INTERIM

^r^TTITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF CCA of the 8th Armored
Division, General Malony perforce abandoned plans for ex-
V v ploiting with armor a breach through the Switch position.
Unit commanders were informed that the Division was to hold and
consolidate what it had gained, but in the meantime the terrain was
to be studied with a view to a continuation of the offensive after the
newly arrived reinforcements had been integrated. G-3 was instructed
to issue orders for the regrouping of the regiments and the untangling
of their scrambled battalions. Subsequently, the 1st Battalion, 301st,
relieved the 2d Battalion, 376th, which had been operating under the
command of Colonel Johnson, on the extreme left flank of the division.
In turn, the latter battalion relieved the 2d Battalion, 302d, in its
positions in the woods southwest of Sinz. Upon completion of this
phase of the relief the concerned battalions reverted to the control
of their respective regimental commanders. The 3d Battalion, 301st,
remained in position along the south edge of the Sinz-Bubingen road,
northeast of Nennig, as Colonel Hagerty's regiment was in process
of taking over the left of the Division line. The 302d Infantry was
to hold the Division right flank and the 376th to move into reserve.
Second Battalion, 301st, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Francis
Dohs, remained on the Division's right flank, in the vicinity of Busch-
dorf and Hellendorf, temporarily attached to the 302d. Early on the
morning of the 29th, this battalion was relieved by elements of the
2d and 3d Battalions of the 302d and returned to Colonel Hagerty's
control the same evening. By 0100 hours the following morning, the
2d Battalion, 301st, had relieved the 2d Battalion, 376th, and Com-
panies A and C of the 302d. Lieutenant Colonel Martin's battalion
of the 376th joined the rest of the regiment at the Division reserve
area in Veckring while Company C went into battalion reserve and
Company A took positions to the east of Campholz Woods, on the
right of the other rifle company of the 1st Battalion of the 302d. Thus
by the 30th, all elements of Colonel McClune's regiment were out of
the line and the Division front from west to east was held as follows:
1st Battalion, 301st; 3d Battalion, 301st; 2d Battalion, 301st, in Colonel
Hagerty's sector; and 1st Battalion, 302d; 3d Battalion, 302d; 2d Bat-
talion, 302d, in Colonel Johnson's area. Scarcely had the Division
completed the relief of the 376th Infantry when orders were received
from the CG of XX Corps for a resumption of limited-objective attacks.
The only restriction imposed by higher headquarters was that the forces
employed were not to exceed one regimental combat team.

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INTERIM

179

SCHLOSS BUBINGEN

In the fighting that had followed the original seizure of Nennig,
Berg and Wies ground had been taken, lost and retaken. Just to the
north of the village of Wies, across the Sinz-Bubingen road, was a
large castle known as Schloss Bubingen. During previous attacks by
the Division in this sector, intense mortar and artillery fire had been
received from the area north of this Schloss and there were strong
indications that the enemy was using the building as an OP. Further-
more, it was well known that the castle was an assembly point for
numerous counterattacks that had been launched at Nennig. There-
fore, it was decided that the Schloss should be taken and the task
was assigned to the reconstituted 1st Battalion, 301st, which had
suffered so heavily at Orsholz.

Company A was designated to make the attack and an artillery
preparation arranged. One self-propelled 155mm gun from XX Corps'
558th Field Artillery Battalion was to lend close support. About mid-
morning of the 28th, the company, led by Lieutenant Harrison H.
Walker, moved from its reserve position toward the northern edge of
Wies. The self-propelled gun advanced to within 150 yards of the
castle, then opened fire against the thick stone walls. Meanwhile,
under cover of a heavy artillery concentration the 2d Platoon, closely
followed by the 1st, moved straight toward their objective. After about
a dozen rounds had been thrown against the castle by the 155, its crew
shifted fire to adjoining buildings. Swinging to the right, the 2d Pla-
toon moved against the castle from the flank, while the 1st Platoon,
under Technical Sergeant George Montgomery, pushed to the left.

Lieutenant Walker and his men moved in fast. Attempting to rush
the front door of the castle the platoon leader was met by a hail of
automatic-weapons fire. The lieutenant was wounded and most of the
platoon held up. Five men did manage to storm into the Schloss on
this rush, but were soon bottled up in one room by the enemy inside
the building.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Montgomery and the 2d Platoon had encoun-
tered heavy machine-gun fire and taken shelter against a blank wall
of the castle. Each time the men attempted to round the corner of
the building, they were stopped by enemy fire. It was, therefore,
decided to breach the wall of the Schloss and word was sent to battal-
ion requesting three hundred pounds of demolition materiel. While
these were being brought forward, the platoon employed the means it
had at its disposal against the wall of the castle. A satchel charge

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182

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

search but found no trace of other enemy groups. Security was posted
and the platoons prepared to resist any counterattack that might
develop. A short time later, a large German patrol was observed
advancing toward the castle. The machine gunners opened fire, pinning
the Germans to the ground, and mortar fire was brought to bear. Thus,
the counterattack was eliminated before it actually began.

In the area of the 1st Battalion, 302d, prior to the relief by Lieu-
tenant Colonel Dohs' men on the morning of the 30th, Lieutenant
Colen C. Robinson, commanding Company C, had organized a peri-
meter defense in Tettingen while Company A, reinforced by the 1st
Platoon of Company C, held the battered town of Butzdorf. Company
B under Captain Woods was outposting the town of Borg. The weather
was at its worst. Freezing temperatures and constant enemy shelling
made life both miserable and hazardous. Heavy shell fire constantly
interrupted communications and caused frequent casualties among the
wire-repair teams. After dark each night, the one hot meal of the
day was brought forward to the rifle companies. On the 29th, Captain
Woods received orders to seize the southeast tip of Campholz Woods
which was in his sector. This mission was assigned to Lieutenant
Edwin R. Bloom's 2d Platoon, which moved out after dark that night
and secured the objective without difficulty.

When the 2d Battalion, 301st Infantry, took over the positions in
the Tettingen-Butzdorf area, Company E, commanded by Captain
Walter J. Stokstad, went into a defensive position in Untersie Busch
and the woods southwest of Sinz supported by the heavy machine guns
of Lieutenant Walter J. Mulhall, Jr. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Com-
pany G plus a section of LMGs moved into Butzdorf and the remain-
der of the company took over Tettingen. Company F was designated
as battalion reserve and remained in Wochern where the battalion CP
was located.

The area between Tettingen and Butzdorf was still hazardous during
daylight hours as the enemy had unobstructed observation over this
ground and his weapons were perfectly zeroed on it. Plans were laid
almost immediately after the completion of the relief for the reduction
of the pillboxes northeast of Tettingen from which a good deal of
the mortar fire descending on the two towns was being received.

Lieutenant Richard H. Meyers' 1st Platoon was withdrawn from
Butzdorf and charged with knocking out these boxes. An attempt
was made after dark the first night but in the utter blackness the

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

platoon stumbled into an extensive minefield. After the platoon leader
and four men became casualties the group was forced to withdraw
because of loss of control. The following day the platoon sergeant
Technical Sergeant Tom R. Parkinson, led a successful assault on these
same bunkers. With the assistance of men of Company A, 319th
Engineers, the assault group approached the main box from its blind
side. As the infantry came within striking distance, mortar fire which
had been keeping the pillbox buttoned up was lifted and automatic-
weapons fire was employed to keep the vision slits of the bunker closed.
The engineers moved a sixty-foot bangalore torpedo into position and
with this breached a lane through the minefield. Then the assault
group rushed forward, reducing the position with satchel charges and
grenades.

Frost bite and trench foot which, in spite of every precaution, dogged
the 94th from its initial day on the Western Front, continued to take
their toll of casualities. In the section of the line held by the 3d
Battalion, 301st, the water level was only four inches below the surface
of the ground. As a consequence, it was almost impossible far the men
to keep dry. Within a matter of three or four hours an unbailed fox-
hole would fill to within several inches of the rim. Moreover, the
constantly alternating pattern of snow and bitter cold, rain and mud
sapped the vitality of the troops. To increase the efficiency of the
riflemen and make life a bit more bearable, regiment issued orders
that each company in this battalion would maintain a rest-house in
the town of Nennig. Through these houses, so far as possible, the
men of the rifle companies were rotated. At the "hash houses" there
were dry shoes and socks, hot food and coffee and comfortable mat-
tresses in a deep cellar. This system assured each infantryman in the
line at least one hot meal a day and the opportunity for a few hours
of warmth and comfort.

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Chapter 21: CAMPHOLZ WOODS

AT PILLINGERHOF, the battalion reserve position, the men and
P\ officers of Company C of the 302d relaxed and sweated out
jljSl their next assignment. During their stay in Tettingen, they
had heard and observed enemy patrols and security outposts in the
northern edge of Campholz Woods about one thousand yards to the
east. Frequently mortar and artillery fire had been placed on the woods
with gratifying results. Because of its position it was obvious that
this patch of woods would have to be reduced; the grape-vine carried
rumors that Company C was to be handed the job.

Early on the evening of the 31st, Captain Robert L. Woodburn,
battalion S-3, appeared at the company command post and gave Lieu-
tenant Robinson a warning order for an attack the following morning.
The S-3 said he would return at about 2100 hours with details. Though
no objective had been mentioned, as soon as Captain Woodburn de-
parted, the officers began to study aerial photographs of Campholz.
When the captain returned later in the evening, rumor had become
fact.

At battalion headquarters information concerning the location of
enemy minefields in Campholz Woods was urgently needed. Accord-
ingly, on the night of the 31st, Lieutenant Joseph E. Glover of the
I&R Platoon was ordered to reconnoiter the antitank ditch in the
woods. With a party of eleven men the platoon leader passed through
Lieutenant Bloom's position at the southern edge of Campholz shortly
after midnight and worked his way through the pitch-black woods to
the tank trap. After an extensive search failed to reveal the presence
of mines, the I&R men began their return. As the patrol moved south
toward Company B's position at the base of the woods, an enemy
outpost discovered it. One I&R man, Technician Fifth Grade John J.
Centrello, was killed and four others captured before the remainder
of the group was able to disengage and infiltrate to Lieutenant Bloom's
lines. Lieutenant Glover promptly reported the results of his recon-
naissance to the CO of Company C.

After a hot breakfast, the troops of Company C moved from Pillin-
gerhof at 0400 hours, on February 1, 1945. They marched up the icy
road to Borg where demolitions were stacked and waiting. These
were distributed amofig the men and the unit moved through town
led by the company commander and First Sergeant Jerome Eisler.
Beyond Borg Company C, in single file with plenty of interval between
men, turned west and moved toward the woods. The company crossed
the open ground without incident and quickly deployed along the south
edge of Campholz. The formation prescribed placed the 3d Platoon

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

there was the slightest opportunity to take cover. Throughout the rest
of the day and all night long, the Germans continued to pound the
woods. Casualties were heavy because of the number of tree bursts,
though four men were killed by direct hits. During the night, Com-
pany B moved forward and assumed responsibility for the eastern half
of the woods as far north as the communication trench. The fire break
that ran north and south through the center of Campholz was used as
the boundary between companies.

Plans called for a resumption of the attack the following morning
to take the north half of the woods. Lieutenant Charles F. Ehrenberg
of the 301st Field Artillery arranged for a ten-minute preparation on
the antitank ditch which in some places was only fifty yards from the
communication trench. At 0850 hours, the artillery came in on the
nose. In the communication trench the riflemen crouched and waited.
While their supporting artillery crashed in front of the company line,
German mortar and artillery shells fell on and behind them.

At 0900 hours, the companies rose and moved forward. Light and
heavy machine guns, BARs, Schmeissers and MG42s added their clatter
to the noise of the artillery. The troops struggled forward and into
the antitank ditch which proved a considerable obstacle. This ditch was
twelve feet across and twenty feet deep with a muddy, slippery bottom.
As Staff Sergeant Jack Cox scrambled out of the tank trap, he came
face to face with one of the four hastily emplaced German machine
guns that had been delivering fire against the company as it advanced.
Without a wasted motion, the sergeant killed one of the gunners,
wounded a second and took the third prisoner.

The 3d Platoon of Company B which had swung to the right to take
a huge six-room pillbox, stalled after the NCO leading the unit was
killed by sniper fire. When Captain Woods came to the platoon it
was deployed around the pillbox but making no headway. Under the
direction of the company commander the attack was resumed. Firing
ports of the box were buttoned up and a beehive charge detonated on
one of the apertures. Into the resulting hole a white phosphorus gre-
nade was tossed. Shortly thereafter, a German captain and the fifteen
men manning the position surrendered. The pillbox was then employed
as the Company CP. The attack continued and when the 1st and 3d
Platoons of Company B reached the northern edge of the woods, the
2d Platoon, under Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Kurek, was brought forward
to fill the gap which had developed between the assault echelons.

Company C, charged with clearing the woods in its zone, seized two

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CAMPHOLZ WOODS

189

pillboxes on the northwestern edge of the woods as it moved north
from the antitank ditch. The advance was slowed by the presence of
numerous antipersonnel mines but by noon of the 2d, the woods were
entirely cleared. Company C had rounded up some seventy-five pris-
oners and Captain Wood's men accounted for an additional fifty. These
PWs were used effectively as litter bearers as they filed to the rear.

Shortly after dark, Company A moved from reserve to relieve Lieu-
tenant Robinson's men. Darkness, mines and enemy artillery so slowed
the relief it was not completed until 0400 hours the following morn-
ing. Due to an oversight, Company A was not guided to a captured
concrete bunker northwest of the woods which the Germans had used
as an OP. Reduction of this fortification by Company C had been a
costly affair and preparations for blowing it were started, but not
completed, prior to the relief. Unfortunately, it was not manned
by the relieving troops. By daylight of the 3d, the enemy had re-
occupied it.

On the right of the line, Company B held its positions and patiently
waited its turn for relief. The area surrounding the pillbox used by
Captain Woods as a CP was heavily mined and on the night of the
3d a report was received that there was a wounded man in a minefield
in the vicinity of the antitank ditch. One man was sent from the
command post to assist the medics in his evacuation. As this soldier
approached the ditch, he stepped on a Schii mine which detonated and
killed him. This same mine again wounded the injured man and
three others, knocking them into the antitank ditch. Technician Third
Grade John Asmussen, a medic, summoned more assistance and moved
all four of the wounded into the pillbox. There by candle light he
administered first aid which was instrumental in saving the lives of
the two more seriously wounded.

Evacuation of these wounded was the next problem. The Germans
had a mortar position so close to the pillbox they could hear the open-
ing and closing of the steel door of the bunker, and their weapon
was zeroed on Company B's command post. Once during the preced-
ing day, they had actually lobbed a shell inside the door which faced
their position. To facilitate the evacuation, it was decided to employ
artillery fire on the mortar position, which had been accurately located
by observing its flash. This fire proved effective and Chaplain Edward
H. Harrison and Sergeant Asmussen, with the assistance of several
riflemen, removed the wounded to the rear.

On the morning of the 4th, Company C moved into the lines again,
taking over Company B's positions, and Captain Woods' men returned
to battalion reserve.

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

To Lieutenant Joseph F. Concannon, battalion supply officer, and his
assistant, Sergeant Robert H. Fluch, fell the difficult task of resupply-
ing the companies in Campholz Woods. Halftracks were borrowed
from the 465th AAA Battalion and with these the dangerous run from
Borg to the woods was made during daylight hours. Time and again
these vehicles ran the gantlet of fire under direct observation of the
enemy with nothing but luck and speed for protection. At night a
Weasel was used and in this vehicle the hot food for the line
companies was brought forward.

On the morning of the 3d, Lieutenant Carl J. Baumgaertner and a
patrol of four men tackled the German bunker three hundred yards
west of Campholz Woods. Because of the darkness and fog they
experienced some difficulty in finding the box. Finally, German voices
were heard and the bunker thus located. When the men had been
deployed, a hand grenade was thrown and Lieutenant Baumgaertner,
who speaks fluent German, informed the enemy they were surrounded
and must surrender or a flame thrower would be used. (The patrol
had no flame thrower.) Thirteen prisoners meekly filed out of the
emplacement.

At 2300 hours on the night of the 4th, Lieutenant Baumgaertner
led another group against the OP bunker that the enemy had reoccu-
pied. This concrete box had sweeping observation over the terrain
from Tettingen to Pillingerhof and it was so situated, it was almost
impossible for the attackers to approach the emplacement without ex-
posing themselves. With little difficulty the enemy drove back the
Company A patrol. When Lieutenant Baumgaertner and his men
returned from this unsuccessful attempt, they were informed that a
second effort would have to be made at 0400 hours, using the whole
platoon. This meant the platoon had to remain behind when Company
A was relieved during the night.

To assist the second attempt, plans were made for a heavy artillery
preparation. This supporting fire fell on schedule, chewing up the
ground around the bunker, and as it lifted the platoon rushed forward
to within ten yards of the position. A vicious grenade battle followed,
but the platoon was repulsed. They withdrew carrying off their
wounded; the dead had to be abandoned.

On the 4th of February, Major Warren F. Stanion assumed command
of the 1st Battalion; Captain Woods became battalion executive officer;
and Lieutenant Joseph Wancio took Company B. The following after-

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CAMPHOLZ WOODS 191

noon Company C received orders to exchange positions with Company
B and to be prepared to jump off against the OP bunker. After some
difficulty this shift was made, following which the scheduled attack
was launched preceded by a fifteen minute artillery preparation fired
by the 301st Field Artillery Battalion. At one point the preparation
had to be lifted after five minutes as it was so powerful, confined to
such a small area, and brought so close to the American lines that it
began to affect the troops waiting to attack. At approximately 1700
hours Company C moved forward supported by engineers from Com-
pany B of the 319th. Again enemy resistance was fierce and stubborn.
Newly laid Schii mines were plentiful contributing greatly to the num-
ber of casualties. With the coming of nightfall it was evident that the
attack would not succeed. The troops were pulled back into the woods.

During the night of the 5th-6th, the 2d Battalion, 302d, moved from
the east flank of the Division line and relieved Major Stanion's ex-
hausted companies. After the ill-fated attempt on Sinz, Major Maix-
ner's battalion had been relieved on the 29th by the 2d Battalion,
376, and as the depleted companies began the long march to the rear
they were repeatedly shelled, suffering additional casualties. Many
of the men were so crippled with trench foot that walking was sheer
agony. The battalion command post had been set up at Wehingen
.and the companies moved in Nohn and Unter Tiinsdorf where they
rested and reinforced. In Company G there remained only forty-five
of the 156 men who had moved against Sinz on the 25th. While in
this area the battalion patrolled actively and maintained contact with
the 3d Cavalry on the Division's right. Two unsuccessful attempts
were made by Companies E and G to capture pillboxes in front of
the fortified town of Orsholz. Both of these attacks resulted in addi-
tional casualties. Also, the troops continued to suffer from the extreme
cold. In one of the above attacks rifles actually froze and refused to
function.

When the 2d Battalion, 302d, completed its relief in Campholz
Woods, Company E held the western half of the woods with Com-
pany G on its right, holding the eastern section. Company H's heavy
machine guns moved into the woods to support the infantry while
the 81s went into position to defend Butzdorf. Through Campholz
Woods, the engineers cleared additional paths and these were marked
with white tape to serve as guides.

The first and most important task that faced Major Maixner was
the reduction of the OP bunker, that had withstood the repeated attacks

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193

prisoners were taken and these were sent to the rear under guard.
Leaving two men to garrison the bunker, the remainder of the assault
group pushed forward, only to meet heavy and accurate artillery fire.
When a shell killed two and wounded four of the small group they
decided to pull back. As they returned with the wounded, a second
bunker was located and taken. It netted thirteen more prisoners.

When the progress of this thrust was reported to Major Maixner,
who had come to Tettingen with Captain Clair H. Stevens, his artillery
liaison officer, he ordered elements of Company E to withdraw from
Campholz Woods and join him. Lieutenant Lewies and Lieutenant
James W. Butler brought their platoons into Wochern by kitchen
trucks and from there marched into Tettingen. Both platoons were
then worked forward to the boxes that had been taken by Lieutenant
Hunter's men. The artillery fire that was to support this new assault
failed to materialize and since the day was well spent it was decided
to jump off without benefit of a preparation. Against sustained small-
arms and mortar fire the troops attacked and by darkness had taken
one more bunker. Continuation of the advance then was delayed till
the next morning; a patrol was sent back to bring wire communications
to the new positions. When contact with battalion was established,
the platoons of Company E were informed they would be relieved by
Company F and were instructed to return to Borg subsequent to this
relief.

Five days had now elapsed since the enemy reoccupied the OP
bunker. Its position and the observation available to the Germans
from it made it clear that it had to be re-taken at all cost. Higher
headquarters was emphatic on this point. Major Maixner decided to
use Company G in the next attempt. Lieutenant Lewies' platoon along
with the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon of the Battalion Head-
quarters Company, armed as riflemen, moved into Campholz and took
over Company Gs positions. Following the relief, Captain James W.
Griffin assembled his company in the southern end of the woods in
preparation for the attack. Total strength of the unit came to only
thirty-four men. The engineers provided flame throwers, operators and
demolition men which added slightly to the strength of the assault
group.

The first Platoon of Company G, commanded by Lieutenant Ralph
E. Ginsburg, was to circle the objective and attack from the north.
At the same time, elements of the 2d Platoon under Staff Sergeant
Arthur Ernst were to approach the box from the southeast, using the
communication trench that led from the woods to the OP bunker. The

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195

Company G's attack moved out on schedule and proceeded accord-
ing to plan. Sergeant James E. Clark with the 1st Platoon, led the
final rush which overwhelmed the objective. While the box yielded
only four uninjured prisoners, the enemy lost a highly valuable point
of observation. From the bunker, the men looked toward Tettingen
and Campholz in amazement. Both town and woods lay below them
completely visible. The accuracy and intensity of the enemy artillery
fire were then understandable. That Tettingen had ever been taken
and held seemed incredible.

Meanwhile, the rest of the 2d Platoon and the 3d were busy farther
to the west. One pjllbox was secured without a fight and the 3d
Platoon's objective, which looked formidable on an aerial photograph,
proved to be only an unoccupied gun position. A patrol led by Lieu-
tenant Oliver K. Smith was sent to reconnoiter the entire area and the
draw to the north of the newly won positions. This group made no
contact with the enemy. Concurrently, Company G occupied the cap-
tured fortifications and supporting positions were dug surrounding
them.

Late on the afternoon of the 8th, Lieutenant James W. Porter of
Company B of the 319th Engineers led forward a demolition and carry-
ing party to destroy the newly captured pillboxes and bunkers. This
group stumbled into a Schii mine field and tripped one of the mines
which wounded three of the engineers. A rescue party led by Tech-
nician Fifth Grade Robert Cole went to their assistance. As they were
placing one of the wounded on a litter, a second mine was detonated.
This explosion temporarily blinded Corporal Cole. Private First Class
Curi and an aid man with the group were also wounded. The men
called for help and a second party led by Lieutenant Porter came to
their aid. Three of the wounded, including Corporal Cole, were re-
moved from the minefield without further accident. Lieutenant Porter,
Private First Class Weldon J. McCormack and an aid man then returned
to the minefield. It was almost dark and visibility was extremely poor.
As they placed another wounded man on the litter, the aid man deto-
nated a third mine. This explosion killed the medic, wounded Lieu-
tenant Porter and an infantryman who had volunteered his services.
Despite the darkness, Private First Class McCormack carried the officer
and the infantryman to safety. Though nearly exhausted, McCormack
returned into the minefield, made his way to Private First Class Curi
and moved him some fifty yards to a cleared path where litter bearers
were waiting.

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Chapter 22: SINZ-BANNHOLZ ATTACK

SINCE THE 31st of January when XX Corps had issued instruc-
tions to General Malony to resume limited-objective attacks
employing not more than one regimental combat team, the G-3
section had been drafting and redrafting plans for a new offensive.
When finally completed, these plans called for a drive by the 301st
Infantry to seize Sinz and Bannholz Woods. With this accomplished,
the 376th Infantry was to move from the Division reserve position to
assembly areas in Bannholz and attack to the east to seize Munzingen
Ridge and the towns of Munzingen and Faha. On Division order, the
302d Infantry was to be prepared to move from Campholz Woods
and capture Oberleuken. Lieutenant Colonel Noel H. Ellis, the Divi-
sion Engineer, made plans for the construction of a road from Bann-
holz Woods over Munzingen Ridge to be used as a supply route once
the troops had gained their objectives. This plan was incorporated
into Division Field Order No. 10 which set February 7, 1945 as the
day of attack. On the 6th, the provisions of this plan were discussed
at length at a conference called by the CG and attended by General
Fortier, General Cheadle, the regimental commanders and their staffs.

For seven days the three battalions of the 301st had held the Divi-
sion line from Schloss Bubingen to the Tettingen-Butzdorf area. These
were days of relative inactivity which gave both men and officers a
chance to study the terrain in front of their positions. Colonel
Hagerty's plan of attack called for a forward thrust by all three
battalions. Major Hodge's 1st Battalion on the left of the line was
to advance and seize the high ground some seven hundred yards to
its front. The 3d Battalion, in the center, was to cross the Sinz-
Bubingen road and push to the north, to secure this route as a lateral
artery for supply and evacuation from Sinz. Lieutenant Colonel Dohs'
battalion was given the lion's share of the regimental mission. The
2d Battalion was to seize Sinz, push beyond the town and take Bann-
holz Woods.

The CO of the 2d Battalion decided to use Companies F and G in
the assault and keep Company E in reserve. Each of the attacking
companies was to be supported by a platoon of heavy machine guns.
Company F's HMGs were to be prepared to displace to Bannholz
Woods on order and Company G's support would enter Sinz when
summoned. The 81mm mortars of the entire regiment were to assist
the assault companies. In addition, the battalion Antitank Platoon,
commanded by Lieutenant William W. Schofield, was to be prepared
to move into Bannholz to repel any possible counterattack by armor.
A special combat and reconnaissance platoon, referred to as com-

196

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prepared to .1^1,,^ <:uhct nl rhe dttatkmg cowpjnic* on order ftjf

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199

The terrain over which the 2d Battalion would attack was formid-
able. From Untersie Busch, a narrow strip of dense pine forest about
seven hundred yards west of Sinz and located north of the Sinz-
Bubingen road, nearly one thousand yards of open ground extended
northeast to Bannholz Woods. To the north of Bannholz was a pine-
topped hill known as Geisbusch Woods. Between the latter and the
northwest edge of Bannholz a deep ravine curved south between Bann-
holz and Untersie Busch and then ran east. The bottom of this draw
was marshy; covered with occasional clumps of shrub. Aside from this
it offered no cover. From the northeast side of Untersie Busch to the
bottom of the draw was three hundred yards of gentle downhill slope,
covered with dense undergrowth which offered fairly good concealment.
From the draw, to the south edge of Bannholz the gradual uphill slope
provided neither cover nor concealment. The terrain definitely favored
the defense.

Sinz was a village of less than a hundred buildings. It was situated
in the center of a saucer-like piece of terrain dominated on three sides
by high ground. To the north lay Bannholz Woods and to the east
Munzingen Ridge. Liberally sprinkled over the slopes of the ridge
were pillboxes and bunkers of the Switch line.

On the night of the 5th of February, Company F of the 302d relieved
Company G of the 301st in Tettingen and Butzdorf, and the latter
moved to Wochern for a brief rest. At the same time, Company E of
the 301st relieved the remaining company of the 2d Battalion, 301st,
in the woods west of Sinz. Company F also moved into Wochern.
The following day was spent in reconnaissance and in making last-
minute preparations for the attack. While so engaged, Lieutenant
Mulhall of Company H was seriously wounded and Technical Ser-
geant Parobeck assumed command of the HMGs which were to sup-
port Company G. For the 2d Battalion, 301st, this was to be the first
real test. The unit was confident as the plan had been worked out to
the last detail and was bound to click. Early on the morning of the
7th the companies entrucked, moved to Besch and then north into
Nennig. There the men dismounted and the assault companies pro-
ceeded to their forward assembly areas. The night was inky black
as Company F under Captain Charles H. Sinclair made its way slowly
into Untersie Busch. Company G, under Lieutenant Knox L. Scales,
and a portion of Headquarters Company moved east from Nennig
along a muddy trail in column of twos. Through the darkness and
the knee-deep mud, each man kept contact by holding fast to the

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN'

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it, found sr unoccupied and moved fo the .next building. About seventy
hvc yards from town the- 1 if- Platoon' was- hied upon They \xere

Following the eypioMoos iin- survivors came .an on the double.

With the silencing ot the machine <um>. the iMaux-r. resumed
its advanced As the noons moved un the te/r sale of the .street, two

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202

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

before the company commander arrived with Lieutenant Sylvester
Beyer, forward observer from the 356th Field Artillery. A concentra-
tion was placed on the building and with assistance from Lieutenant
Christiansen's platoon, the house was stormed and taken. About thirty
prisoners were rounded up in this building after which Lieutenant
Scales established his command post in its cellar. Shortly thereafter,
the 2d Platoon cleared its section of town taking about forty prisoners
in doing so.

Captain Sinclair's men, on the left of Company G, had arrived at
their line of departure at H minus 30 and deployed for the attack.
Sharply at 0700 hours, they moved against Bannholz Woods which
they were to seize in order to prevent the enemy from reinforcing Sinz
from that direction. As the 1st and 2d Platoons, which were in the
assault, approached the woods an enemy artillery concentration began
to land to their front. Shifting to the west, the platoons skirted the
artillery and entered Bannholz. The 2d Platoon and its attached
machine-gun section took positions in the western corner of the woods.
The 1st Platoon moved east while the 3d drove forward to seize the
northern portion of the company objective and clear the woods of
enemy infantry.

Lieutenant Henry J. Smythe, a forward observer from the 356th
Field Artillery, and Sergeant Homer Prewitt were with Captain Sinclair
as he followed the 3d Platoon. As the troops advanced Lieutenant
Smythe radioed the 356th and told them to "lift Vinegar" which was
the code designation for the second phase line. Abruptly he was
informed that the American artillery was not firing it. Obviously, the
enemy figured the American attack into Bannholz was an attempt to
flank Sinz and take it from the north, since it was they who were
responsible for the shelling.

Visibility within the woods was greatly reduced by the smoke which
was drifting down from Munzingen Ridge. As the riflemen of the
3d Platoon continued into Bannholz they encountered two camouflaged
enemy tanks concealed in the underbrush. A bazooka team composed
of Private First Class Curtis C. Darnell and Private First Class Ernest
Atencio worked its way to within thirty yards of one of these vehicles
and opened fire. Their first round was a hit; the tank began to with-
draw. A second round was fired and a puff of smoke on the hull-line
marked the point of impact. Still the tank continued to move. Machine-
gun fire from the second panzer raked the area. Atencio was wounded
in the neck and Private First Class Stanley Bock took his place as

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SINZ-BANNHOLZ ATTACK

203

loader. As Darnell took aim at this second tank, the muzzle of its
88 swung in his direction and lowered. Both the bazooka and the 88
fired together. The tree behind which the bazookamen huddled was
shattered, and fragments of wood and steel splattered about the little
group. With three hits to their credit and no damage done to the
tanks the men pulled back.

In the western edge of the woods, the 2d Platoon was engaged in
digging positions when the smoke lifted momentarily. Through this
break in the haze, a German tank was observed moving through the
woods to the northwest. As the men watched, a second tank hove
into view and both vehicles moved into the open field in front of the
platoon to spray the edge of the woods with machine-gun fire. Artil-
lery support was requested but there was no fire on call. It had been
shifted to help Company G in Sinz. Following this, the platoon and
the machine gunners withdrew deeper into the woods.

Panzergrenadiers supporting the tanks of the 4th Panzer Company
began to appear all along Captain Sinclair's front and the tanks them-
selves continued to advance slowly, firing their 88s. The company was
unable to stop them with their bazookas. Lieutenant Smythe feared
to place artillery fire on the woods as it would be more harmful to
Company F than to the enemy armor. Therefore the company com-
mander informed Lieutenant Colonel Dohs of his plight and ordered a
general withdrawal to the line of departure.

As the men of Company F filtered back through the woods toward
the southern tip of Bannholz, the situation became more and more
confused. The machine gunners and the 2d Platoon in the western
portion of the woods failed to receive word of the withdrawal and
remained in place.

Lieutenant John G. Truels of the Weapons Platoon, who had been
wounded, observed German infantry coming down the road from the
northwest of Bannholz. He, his machine gunners and about thirteen
infantrymen prepared for a last-ditch fight. However, the enemy infan-
try did not enter the woods. They turned and moved northeast along
a trail on the western edge of the timber.

Meanwhile the rest of the company had made its way back to Unter-
sie Busch. They reported that the only Americans remaining in the
woods were dead. Consequently, Division artillery savagely pounded
Bannholz with heavy concentrations. The twenty-one Americans in the
western portion of the woods, three of whom were wounded, lay in
the mud and icy water not daring to move for fear of discovery. Ger-
man tanks and infantry milled about their position. At one time the

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

enemy held a conference within fifty feet of them. The cold, the wet
and the presence of the enemy made minutes pass like hours. Worst
of ill, though, was the artillery which rained on the woods and the
knowledge that it was being fired from American guns.

The battalion commander and his S-3, Captain John Flanagan, had
watched the progress of the attack from the battalion OP at the edge
of Untersie Busch Woods. As soon as Company G had forced its way
into the center of Sinz, the command post which had been temporarily
set up in the woods behind the line of departure moved into town. It
was installed in one of the cellars and from there the future operations
of the 2d Battalion were directed.

When Lieutenant Colonel Dohs was informed of Company F's
encounter with the tanks and their subsequent withdrawal from Bann-
holz, he ordered his antitank guns brought forward as quickly as
possible. Lieutenant Schofield put his platoon into position in the
woods south of the Sinz-Bubingen road while Lieutenant James E.
Prior's 2d Platoon of the Antitank Company prepared to move into
Sinz as soon as the engineers succeeded in bridging the antitank ditch.
Following his instructions to the antitank platoons, the battalion com-
mander ordered Captain Walter J. Stockstad, commanding Company
E, to move to the east, contact Company G and then attack toward
Bannholz. Battalion had no wire contact with regiment, but kept
Colonel Hagerty posted on the situation via radio.

To the west of the 2d Battalion, the attacks of the 1st and 3d
Battalions of the 301st, which were to secure the lateral route of supply
by advancing north of the Sinz-Bubingen road, jumped off on schedule.
Lieutenant Colonel William A. McNulty's 3d Battalion moved for-
ward at 0700 hours with Company I on the left and Company K on
the right. The assault units pushed across the road and north through
the woods. Captain Charles W. Donovan's company ran into a mine-
field where it suffered casualties and was somewhat delayed, but by
0945 hours Company I joined Captain Warren's men on the objective.

Farther west, the 1st Battalion had attacked with Companies A and
B in the assault and secured their objective, some seven hundred yards
from the line of departure, by 0802 hours. These advances gave the
regiment a firm grip on the east-west read leading into Sinz, insuring
speedy supply and evacuation for all three battalions.

Back in Butzdorf where Company F of the 302d had relieved Corn-

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205

pany G of the 301st, orders had been issued to furnish protection to an
engineer mine sweeping party which was to clear the road from Butz-
dorf north into Sinz. This was to be accomplished on the morning
of the attack, to provide the Division with a safe route over which
to commit any armor that might be needed in the Sinz area. Lieutenant
Alvarado was chosen to lead the security detachment, composed pri-
marily of men of the 1st Squad of the 2d Platoon, which was to
protect the six engineers under the command of Lieutenant T. J.
Wellom who were to make the sweep. The stretch of road to be
cleared was under direct observation of several enemy OPs. Three
times the party attempted to move out on the morning of the 7th,
but well directed enemy artillery fire made it impossible for the engi-
neers to stand erect on the road and live. As a result, it was agreed
to wait until late afternoon when approaching darkness would hamper
the vision of the enemy. As planned the task was begun and success-
fully completed just after nightfall.

On order, Company E left its positions on the line of departure.
Using the cover of the draw that curves between Sinz and Bannholz
Woods, it approached to a point where the first buildings in the north-
ern half of town were on its right flank. There the troops were brought
under intense mortar and artillery fire from the north. Far to the
right, on the high ground overlooking the town four enemy tanks could
be seen firing into Sinz. The company was to attack toward Bannholz,
but shortly after it had been halted by the enemy artillery there was a
change in orders. Company G was having trouble clearing the northern
half of the town and the battalion commander had decided to assist
Lieutenant Scales' company with the platoons of Company E. After
considerable difficulty, Captain Stockstad made his way to the battalion
CP to coordinate his attack. There he conferred with both Captain
Flanagan and Lieutenant Scales and formulated a hasty plan. Com-
pany E was to attack immediately. The time was then almost 1100
hours.

The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company E moved toward the buildings
on their right flank, quickly eliminating some light opposition in the
nearest houses, and taking twenty-two prisoners. Then the company
attempted to clear the houses toward the north end of town. At this
point artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire became intense; the ad-
vance halted. Casualties had been heavy and both platoon leaders,
Lieutenant Edmund G. Reuter and Lieutenant John S. Fisher, had
been hit.

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SINZ-BANNHOLZ ATTACK

207

forward. Battalion denied this request and the attack was pushed to
the northeast, to clear the remaining buildings in Sinz.

Company E moved out with the 1st Platoon on the left and the 2d
Platoon on the right of the street. The lead scout of the latter platoon
was killed by rifle fire from one of the last buildings in town and at
the same time four enemy machine guns opened fire from the outskirts
of Sinz. This automatic fire was deadly and intense. The leading ele-
ments of both platoons pressed themselves against the stone walls on
either side of the street and began to back up. A squad of the 1st
Platoon, under Staff Sergeant J. W. Green, took refuge behind a house
on the right of the street, but were unable to enter the building because
they were against a blank wall. Technical Sergeant Raymond E. Col-
lins, acting as platoon leader, observed this and sent one squad, rein-
forced with a bazooka, to aid Green. Taking advantage of some slight
defilade, other bazookas were worked into positions from which the
last house on the right of the street might be brought under fire.
About twenty rounds then were launched against this building. A
LMG was put into action and sprayed the objective. With this support,
the two rifle squads rushed the house, firing as they advanced. They
stormed into the building only to find that the German machine
gunners had withdrawn. On the left, the 2d Platoon under Technical
Sergeant Elmer W. Grifford, had taken all but the last house on its
side of the street.

After a token resistance the enemy facing Company G surrendered
when the men of Company E had cleared all but the last house on the
north of Sinz. Lieutenant Scales' men then outposted their portion
of the town, prepared to repel any counterattack the enemy might
launch. Seizure of Sinz netted the 2d Battalion a total of 208 prisoners.

Throughout this heavy fighting in Sinz, the survivors of Company
F in Bannholz huddled in the snow as if dead and prayed that they
might live until darkness fell. In whispers, plan after plan was pro-
posed and rejected. If the men were to get back to Untersie Busch,
it would have to be done under cover of darkness. Until then there
was nothing to do but sweat it out. When darkness finally settled, the
group moved silently and slowly through the woods. En route the
men abandoned their equipment and crawled past an enemy outpost.
Finally the entire party reached the safety of Untersie Busch.

The 1st Platoon of Company E in the house opposite the last Ger-
man foothold in Sinz, thoroughly searched their building and then

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

orders had been received to' rake jchk \m buildup jmn>ed».itcfy. The,
pi j toon planned to rbron all available fir? p^vrer ti^zum rhfc budding
then junI) the pos*tioru NoLselesslv the men. in verted tuil dips into

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SINZ-BANNHOLZ ATTACK

209

geant Green had been leaving, all had been killed; six others in the
house had been knocked unconscious by the explosion of the Panzer-
jaust.

Late in the afternoon, Lieutenant Prior's antitank platoon man-
handled its guns into positon and prepared to repel any enemy armor
that might attempt to push into the northern portion of Sinz. Enemy
artillery knocked out one of the platoon's prime movers and caused
some casualties. At about 1800 hours, the battalion Antitank Platoon
arrived in Sinz. The men dug positions for their weapons and assumed
responsibility for the antitank protection of the southern half of town.

During the afternoon Company L of the 301st was attached to the
2d Battalion and moved into Sinz to take positions abreast of Company
G. Company F, a platoon of the 774th TD Battalion, and the remain-
der of the 2d Battalion also moved forward. Company F was charged
with the protection of the left of the town and the 1st and 2d Platoons
of the company deployed in the cellars of the first three houses while
the 3d took positions in the woods to the west of Sinz. North of them,
the 3d Platoon of Company E had assumed positions along the high
ground near the draw west of town.

By midnight Sinz quieted as the artillery, mortar and rocket fire
slackened. For the following two and a half hours enemy fire con-
tinued only intermittently, but at 0230 hours the tempo increased.
From then until 0400 hours Sinz was pounded with everything the
German artillery could bring to bear. What few roofs remained intact
were soon riddled. Fires broke out and the sky above Sinz reddened.
Most of the battalion deep in the cellars weathered the storm fairly
well. However, the 3d Platoon of Company E on the high ground to
the west took heavy casualties.

Lieutenant Reynolds and his machine-gun crew stuck grimly to their
posts in the cellar. About the time the artillery fire on Sinz slackened,
orders were received to take the last house held by the enemy at all
costs. Time set for this attack was 0500 hours; prior to H-hour a tank
destroyer from the 704th TD Battalion was to approach the enemy
position and fire several rounds into the building. Following this
brief preparation, the 1st Platoon of Company E was to rush the posi-
tion and overwhelm its defenders. To cover the noise of the approach-
ing TD, Lieutenant Reynolds' machine gunners and the 1st Platoon
were to engage the enemy by fire.

Staff Sergeant Green, who was now leading the 1st Platoon, counted
his men. The task was quickly completed as the platoon numbered
exactly six effectives. All of the men had armed themselves with BARs

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SINZ-BANNHOLZ ATTACK

211

and shortly before the time set for the attack reentered the building
held by Lieutenant Reynolds and the machine gunners. To increase
the strength of the attacking group, Lieutenant Reynolds attached five
of his men and a bazooka team. The attack proceeded according to
plan. At point-blank range the TD fired its mission and the infantry-
men stormed the building. There was no opposition; the enemy had
withdrawn from the house. The BAR men protecting the north flank
of the attack reported that ten minutes earlier fifteen Germans had
been seen moving from the building. They had withheld their fire,
fearing to disrupt the attack plan.

With the town now completely in American hands, Lieutenant
Colonel Dohs set about improving his position. To the east of Sinz,
on the high ground, were a group of pillboxes that had proved ex-
tremely troublesome during the attack. The battalion commander
decided to eliminate these prior to dawn and assigned the task to
Captain Paul E. Frierson of Company L. Shortly after midnight on
the morning of the 8th, small reconnaissance patrols were sent to
investigate the pillbox area. At the battalion CP, Captain Frierson and
Lieutenant Glenn H. Gass, commanding the 1st Platoon, studied the
available aerial photographs and laid their plans while Lieutenant
Carl Schaefer of the 356th Field Artillery made arrangements to place
time fire on the bunkers to assist the assault.

At 0800 hours, Lieutenant Gass and Lieutenant John R. Fraboni
moved their platoons through the eastern outskirts of Sinz. Lieutenant
Fraboni's task was the more difficult as his platoon had to eliminate
two machine-gun positions before it could get to the assigned bunkers.
While the time fire kept the German machine gunners under cover,
the platoon approached to within striking distance over a defiladed
route. A BAR directed its fire against the first machine-gun nest as
Private First Class Eugene Crenshaw circled the position and sur-
prised the enemy gunners. At the same time, Private First Class Warren
Dunn effectively silenced the second machine gun by killing its crew.
An enemy Panzerfaust team and supporting infantry in positions
between the two machine guns were also eliminated.

Lieutenant Gass' platoon, accompanied by Lieutenant Schaefer, first
checked a suspected bunker location. When this proved to be only a
rockpile, the platoon continued toward its main objective. The time
fire gave perfect support and as the troops were in position to assault
their first bunker, Lieutenant Schaefer shifted fire to two other known
enemy positions.

Lieutenant Fraboni's men approached their bunker and called on

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

the enemy to surrender. Without more ado, thirteen Germans came
out. They were badly frightened and began to mill about. Before the
group could be moved to the rear one of the PWs was killed by time
fire. A second position was overrun and one of the infantrymen dropped
a hand grenade down the bunker's stove pipe. This action destroyed
the stove inside and the bunker began to smoke. Upon seeing this,
the two engineers with the platoon dashed forward placing a satchel
charge against the door of the position. As the door blew in, eighteen
more Supermen decided to surrender.

The remaining bunker was taken by Lieutenant Gass' men who
approached this objective unopposed. Given an opportunity to sur-
render, the enemy refused. Persuasion in the form of a flame thrower
was then applied and a German officer and about ten enlisted men
gave up. In less than thirty minutes the entire operation was com-
pleted. Following this the two platoons secured the high ground to
the north and east and organized the position. The bunker that had
been taken by Lieutenant Gass' platoon was converted into a command
post and occupied without further delay. While the platoons were
engaged in digging foxholes around the newly won area, the German
telephone in the CP rang. There was no one present who could speak
German so the phone was not answered. Shortly after, very accurate
artillery fire began to fall on the area as Company L's positions were
visible from the higher ground on Munzingen Ridge. This enemy
fire continued inflicting numerous casualties.

When the riflemen's foxholes were only about a foot deep the cry
of 'Tanks!" was passed down the line. There was only one enemy
vehicle in sight but this had worked its way to within two hundred
yards of the platoons before being discovered. Lieutenant Schaefer
called for artillery fire as the panzer lumbered forward. When the tank
was within twenty yards of the incompleted foxhole of one of Com-
pany L's sergeants, the NCO engaged it with a bazooka, firing from
the kneeling position. His projectile struck the turret without causing
any damage. This blow attracted the attention of the tankers who fired
directly into the sergeant's position. Two of the company's machine
gunners sprayed the tank to keep it buttoned up. Meanwhile, Lieu-
enant Schaefer continued to call for artillery fire and smoke, though
he and the troops were endangered by their own artillery. Despite
this fire, the tank soon silenced both machine guns. Gradually though,
smoke shells began to limit the visibility of the tankers and they with-
drew to the east of Das Lee Woods where earlier in the attack other
tanks and infantry had been seen. These had been engaged promptly

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SINZ-BANNHOLZ ATTACK

213

by the Division artillery and did not come to the assistance of the
lone attacking tank.

At about 1400 hours, under cover of friendly artillery fire, the
dozen or so men who had been wounded prior to the tank attack and
the casualties suffered fighting the lone panzer were evacuated. The
remaining men dug deep into the hillside and prepared for the night
which proved so dark the 700-yard trip into Sinz took several hours.

By noon on the 8th of February, all units engaged in the Sinz area
were operating at greatly reduced strength. In addition to the losses
in dead and wounded, the constant artillery and mortar fire on the
town, which was averaging two to three rounds a minute, produced
numerous cases of combat exhaustion. Company F was moved deeper
into town and its personnel were used to fill the gaps in Company
G's defenses. The location of any concentration of enemy troops or
tanks was immediately reported to Captain Bruhl at the battalion com-
mand post and artillery fire adjusted, for the TDs of the 704th Tank
Destroyer Battalion found themselves virtually helpless. They were
outgunned and outranged by the enemy tanks. As a result, from the
high ground in the vicinity of Das Lee Woods, German panzers
covered the road leading into Sinz with their 88s. They fired into the
town and beyond it into Untersie Busch at will.

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Chapter 23: SECOND BANNHOLZ

IF THE OVERALL PLAN of the Division Commander was to be
realized, Bannholz Woods had to be taken. Lieutenant Colonel
Dohs therefore, laid plans for a second attack. Four groups of
twenty-five men were to leave Sinz shortly after midnight on the 8th
of February and enter Bannholz. They were to destroy any enemy tanks
they might encounter, then dig positions from which they could sup-
port the advance of other elements of the battalion later in the day.
Once the 25-man groups had secured their positions in the woods,
guides were to be sent to Sinz to lead forward tank destroyers and
the TDs were to take concealed positions in Bannholz prior to day-
light. These twenty-five-man groups were to be drawn from the 3d
Platoons of Companies E and G and from the commandos. Lieutenant
Reynolds was to take the Company E group while Lieutenant William
S. Sollenberger and Lieutenant Christiansen were to lead the groups
from Company G. Sergeant Poynter would continue to lead the com-
mandos. These leaders and the TD commander were oriented on their
mission, after which the infantry leaders returned to gather their men.
None of the designated groups was able to muster full strength and
Sergeant Poynter could gather only seventeen effectives. The men
chosen for this new and difficult assignment were already tired and
battle weary, as were all other elements of the command.

Though orders were that the groups move out immediately after
midnight, unavoidable delays postponed their departure until 0200
hours. It took another hour and a half to reach the edge of Bannholz
Woods; en route the strength of Sergeant Poynter's party was further
reduced. When the commando group reached its assigned area there
were only ten men left, including the sergeant. Lieutenant Reynolds'
group moved into position on the right of the commandos and still
farther to the right, Lieutenant Sollenberger's men entered the woods.
At the same time, Lieutenant Christiansen and his party pushed to the
northern portion of Bannholz Woods.

As the commando group began digging positions a German flare
lit the area. The men froze until the flare died, and they escaped detec-
tion. Deeper in the woods, the enemy could be heard shouting to
one another. According to plan, the guides returned to Sinz and the
tank destroyers were led into position prior to daylight. One of the
TDs was placed in the edge of the woods facing northwest and the
second was echeloned about fifty yards to the rear, deeper in the woods.

Before dawn enemy artillery and Screaming Meemies began to fall
in the area and occasional small-arms and automatic-weapons fire in-
dicated the presence of enemy infantry in the woods. Sergeant Poynter

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sent a small patrol to the right to contact Lieutenant Reynolds, but this
group encountered enemy riflemen and was forced to return. With the
coming of daylight, the radio began to fail. Only occasionally would
it either send or receive. The TD men were nervous about the vulner-
ability of their position and to add to their misgivings a mortar shell
hit the rearmost tank destroyer, wounding one of the crew and jam-
ming the turret. Two of the TD men took their wounded comrade
back to Sinz while the crew chief of the crippled tank destroyer joined
the men manning the remaining vehicle. Not long after this, three
German tanks were observed in the area between Adenholz and Geis-
busch Woods. Artillery was requested but no fire materialized. The
tanks appeared to be moving slowly south.

Sergeant Poynter attempted to repair his radio as it was of vital im-
portance that he maintain contact with the other groups in the woods.
As he worked on the instrument which he held between his legs, there
was a sudden burst of Schtneisser fire, and the radio was beyond all
repair. The German who had fired the burp-gun was in position in
the crippled tank destroyer, to the sergeant's rear. Then, to make mat-
ters worse, the NCO in charge of the manned TD yelled that German
tanks were moving south to encircle the position and cut them off.
With five of Sergeant Poynter's infantrymen clinging to the side of
the TD, this vehicle roared out of the woods with its .50-caliber blazing
away at the underbrush. Of the six tank destroyers that entered the
woods, this was the only one to return to Sinz.

With his radio destroyed, enemy infantry infiltrating his rear, Ger-
man tanks roaming to the front and only four men remaining under
his command, Sergeant Poynter decided his position was hopeless.
He and his four men therefore withdrew to the comparative safety
of the Sinz-Bubingen road, nine hundred yards south of the woods.

Lieutenant Sollenberger's men experienced no difficulty entering
Bannholz during the early morning hours. They pushed forward to
their assigned area and investigated it as well as they could in the
dark. Fearing tree bursts, Lieutenant Sollenberger decided to dig in
on the outskirts of the eastern edge of the woods, though it was almost
daylight before the men began to prepare positions.

The two TDs that were to support Lieutenant Christiansen's men
just to the north of Lieutenant Sollenberger, did not arrive until after
daylight. They had barely passed the 2d Platoon when the report of
an 88 was heard and a burst of flame followed. A German tank-
concealed within the woods had allowed these TDs to come within

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

easy range, then proceeded to knock them out. Following this, the
German tank moved boldly through the northern edge of the woods.

At about this time, Lieutenant Christiansen radioed battalion that
his position was becoming untenable and that a tank was firing into
the foxholes of his men. Artillery fire was brought to bear and the
tank withdrew. It returned shortly, however, reinforced by a second
panzer. Then firing was heard to the north by Lieutenant Sollen-
berger's men who were unable to see Lieutenant Christiansen's posi-
tions through the woods. Again Lieutenant Christiansen radioed bat-
talion and asked for permission to withdraw. He was told to side-slip
to avoid the tanks, but to stay in the northern portion of the woods.

It was well along in the morning when the enemy tanks moved in
against the two northern groups for the kill. They advanced slowly,
one on either side of the line of foxholes. Their machine guns fired
steadily and their 88s alternated in raising and lowering. The high-
velocity antitank weapons fired directly into the foxholes, methodically
killing the American infantrymen. A few of the exhausted, nerve-
shattered men bolted into the woods. One soldier employing a bazooka
was killed instantly by return fire from the tanks. A squad leader bur-
rowed deep in his foxhole and escaped. Lieutenant Sollenberger's
runner was killed as he dashed for the woods and the platoon's radio
which he was carrying was destroyed. The 3d Squad holding the
southern end of the 2d Platoon's line was cut down as the men at-
tempted to break for the rear. Sergeant Babcock was wounded in
the legs and side by fragments of an 88 that struck directly in front
of his foxhole. Somehow he managed to escape. By noon the whole
bloody business was over.

The Company E group under Lieutenant Reynolds entered the woods
with the other parties and searched their area. There were plenty of
dead Germans in the vicinity but nothing more. Their tank destroyers
were brought forward without incident and the group settled down to
await the coming of morning. No tanks had been located in the first
search of the woods, so after daylight patrols were sent out to locate
any hidden enemy armor. Firing was heard both to the north where
Lieutenant Christiansen was in position and to the south. Shortly
before 0900 hours, German infantry approached the right flank of
the position. The enemy advanced in what appeared to be a platoon
column formation. Lieutenant Reynolds and Staff Sergeant Robert G.
Lehman ordered their men to open fire. As the enemy infantry began
to outflank the position a withdrawal was ordered. The TDs were

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abandoned and the group eventually made their way back to Sinz.
Upon arriving at the battalion CP and learning that Lieutenant Chris-
tiansen and his party were still in the woods, Lieutenant Reynolds
prepared to return to their aid. Before this could be done, a radio
message was received from the beleaguered group: "The tanks are
moving down the line, with infantry, firing into each foxhole." This
was the last transmission from Lieutenant Christiansen's platoon.

Survivors of the four groups that had gone into the woods were
physically and mentally strained from hours of close fighting, constant
artillery pounding and front-line existence. They were exhausted,
thoroughly and completely. Many of the men were on the verge ot
cracking and some could not even remember their own names.

The attack of the 4th Panzer Company and its supporting infantry
had been highly successful. Twenty American prisoners had been
taken, five TDs had been knocked out or destroyed and all of Bann-
holz Woods had been cleared. Also, relief from this costly and bitter
fighting was in sight for the men of the 11th Panzer. Reconnaissance
parties from the 256th Volksgrenadier Division were already in the
Triangle and the main body of the incoming unit was scheduled to
arrive that night.

Later it was learned from interrogation of prisoners that the 256th
was assigned a zone extending west from Sinz since it was in this
sector that the 94th was making its greatest inroads. Plans called for
the 15th Tank Regiment of the 11th to remain behind for forty-eight
hours to act as a counterattacking force in the event of an American
breakthrough. Meanwhile the Volksgrenadiers relieved those elements
of the 11th and 4l6th in their zone. This relief was not entirely com-
pleted until about the 15th of February. Moving back across the Saar,
the 11th Panzer Division passed to the control of the German First
Army.

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Chapter 24: BANNHOLZ-ADENHOLZ

BY LATE AFTERNOON of February 9, 1945, the 301st Infantry
was spread dangerously thin. The line of the 1st and 3d Bat-
talions from the Moselle to Untersie Busch was only loosely
held. For the most part, the reserve strength of these two units had
been siphoned off during the 7th and 8th to help Lieutenant Colonel
Dohs' troops. Moreover, the CO of the 2d Battalion, his staff and
men were bordering on exhaustion. Their supporting artillery was also
beginning to tire; in seventy-two hours of fighting, the 356th Field
Artillery alone had expended 6,965 rounds of 105mm ammunition.
Also, it was clearly apparent that the 2d Battalion would not be able
to take Bannholz Woods. Consequently, it was decided to use the 2d
Battalion, 376th, in an attack to be launched the following morning.
This was a change in the original plan but General Malony hoped
that after Lieutenant Colonel Martin's battalion had seized Bannholz
it might become regimental reserve when the remaining battalions of
the 376th had been committed through it to attack east to seize Munz-
ingen Ridge and the towns of Munzingen and Faha. The capture
of Sinz meant the Division was in a fair way to break the Switch Line.
One more strong thrust would carry the 94th through these fortifica-
tions and the Division could "roll them from the rear."

The plan of attack called for a frontal assault by Companies F and

G. Company F commanded by Captain George P. Whitman, would
advance on the right, seize the eastern section of the woods and push
to its northern edge. Captain John D. Heath's men would attack on
the left of Company F and were charged with securing the western
portion of Bannholz. The heavy machine-gun platoons from Company

H, which was commanded by Captain Robert Q. Smith, would be
attached to the assault companies when they entered the woods. Once
the attack on Bannholz was well under way, Lieutenant Colonel
McNulty's battalion of the 301st, farther to the left, would seize Aden-
holz Woods and so protect the flank of the 2d Battalion, 376th, from
counterattack from the west.

Shortly before darkness a reconnaissance party from the 2d Battalion
proceeded to Untersie Busch where enemy artillery and mortar fire
coupled with the approaching nightfall impeded observation. On this
reconnaissance, Lieutenant Richard A. Hawley, executive officer of
Company F, and Sergeant Otto H. Fikejs, the company's communica-
tion sergeant, were both wounded. The party returned to Perl and
Lieutenant George Desmaris, Weapons Platoon leader of Company F,
accurately summed up the result of endeavor at the company command
post: "We couldn't see a thing. We couldn't see a goddam thing!"

218

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ATTACK OF THE 2d BATTALION
376th, IN BANNHOLZ WOODS

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221

As darkness faded these platoons made their way into the southern
portion of Bannholz Woods. There they encountered small-arms fire,
but continued to advance by employing marching fire. When Sergeant
Johnston was wounded, Staff Sergeant Henry Johnson assumed com-
mand of the 3d Platoon. After driving back the enemy outpost, the
platoons dug positions in the western part of the woods.

At 0800 hours, Lieutenant Janulis radioed the company commander
that he was worried about his exposed flank. Staff Sergeant William
B. Malloy, commanding the 1st Platoon, was therefore instructed to
move his men into the woods immediately to take positions on the
left of the 2d Platoon. It was now full daylight and tanks could be
seen in Geisbusch Woods. Machine-gun fire periodically raked the area
southwest of Bannholz.

Company F moved out with Lieutenant Gordon A. Weston's 2d
Platoon on the left and Lieutenant Stanley C. Mason's 3d Platoon on
the right. The former platoon was initially slowed by the heavy, tan-
gled undergrowth through which it advanced. This platoon was respon-
sible for contact with Company G on the left and in endeavoring to
keep in touch with Captain Heath's men, veered to the west. As a
result, they entered the woods in Company Gs zone.

When Lieutenant Mason's platoon was about one hundred yards
from Bannholz, an enemy machine gun opened fire. Fearing to be
caught in the open the infantrymen sprinted for the woods. Technical
Sergeant Mariano Scopoli and two squads of the 3d Platoon entered
the woods left of the platoon leader and the remaining squad. Con-
tact was immediately lost as artillery and mortar fire began to descend
on Bannholz.

For Company F the attack developed badly, Lieutenant Weston's
platoon was with Company G, in the western section of the woods;
Lieutenant Mason's platoon was split and out of contact; the support
platoon under Lieutenant George B. Wilson was caught in the open
south of Bannholz suffering casualties. Two enemy tanks which had
been concealed in the southeast corner of the woods added the fire
of their 88s to the tree bursts already raining upon the company. As
these tanks went into action, Lieutenant Mason and the bazooka teams
which were with him moved forward to engage the enemy armor.

Private First Class Leonard L. Neff, one of the bazooka men, and
his loader, Private First Class Otis L. King, picked a Tiger as their
first target and inched their way toward the squat nose of the huge
tank. Overhead, the blast of the tank's turret gun was instantly echoed

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

by the crash of the exploding shell. Private First Class Neff rose to
his elbows and fired his first round. Smoke wreathed the Tiger as
the bazookaman nervously reloaded. Again and again they fired at
the Tiger and another tank supporting it. Finally the panzers, undam-
aged by many bazooka hits, decided to withdraw. Just at that time
a mortar round landed practically on top of the bazooka team. Private
First Class King bent over Neff and saw that there was little he could
do for the mortally wounded man. Refusing to leave his comrade, he
picked up the bazooka and continued firing at the retreating tanks
until his friend died. Dismayed at the failure of the bazookas, Lieu-
tenant Mason opened fire with his carbine to keep the tanks buttoned
up. He succeeded in accomplishing this until seriously wounded by
a close burst from the panzers* guns.

One of the retreating tanks maneuvered around the corner of the
woods and engaged the 1st Platoon which was still halted in the
open ground between the line of departure and Bannholz. The heavy
machine-gun platoon, the 60mm mortar section, most of the command
group and two litter teams were with the platoon. All of these groups
suffered heavily from enemy mortar fire and from the tanks.

Captain Whitman, his radio operator and a runner had entered the
woods at 0745, despite the intensity of the mortar fire through which
they made their way. Thirty minutes later, they located Technical
Sergeant Scopoli and the two squads of Lieutenant Mason's platoon
that had entered the woods with him. The CO ordered this group
to sweep through the woods to the north, along the eastern edge of
Bannholz. As the group moved out to accomplish this mission, the
enemy artillery fire slackened.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Malloy of Company G prepared to move into
Bannholz and take over the western edge of Company G's zone. The
platoon moved forward in defilade from the fire of the tanks in Geis-
busch until suddenly bursts of machine-gun cross-fire began beating
the ground around them. As the platoon hit the dirt, Sergeant Malloy
yelled for his men to run for the woods. Part of the platoon followed
the sergeant, but others hugged the ground and were hit where they
lay. In the woods, the remnants of the platoon assembled. Only
seventeen of the forty men were left. Sergeant Malloy deployed them
along the western edge of the woods, where they quickly dug in. By
1000 hours when Captain Heath arrived the men were well entrenched.
Lieutenant Weston had joined Company G after losing contact with
his own unit and was placed on the right flank.

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Captain Blakely of the 919th and his radio operator, Technician
Fourth Grade Adolph Singer, entered Bannholz on their own and set
up among the 2d and 3d Platoons of Company G. From this position,
there was observation to the north and west. Shortly after the arrival
of the artillerymen, a tank appeared on the outer edge of Geisbusch
Woods. It was presently joined by a second panzer and artillery fire
was adjusted on both. HE shells bursting around the tanks kept them
buttoned up, but could not knock them out. They repeatedly pulled
back into the woods, changed position and reappeared. When the
bazooka teams attempted to hit the enemy armor with long-range fire,
the characteristic blast of the weapons revealed their positions and
brought speedy return fire from the panzers.

After Sergeant Scopoli and the two squads of the 3d Platoon of
Company F moved out, Captain Whitman took stock of the situation.
He was out of contact with Lieutenants Wilson, Mason and Weston.
In addition, he did not know the whereabouts of most of his bazooka
teams. He reasoned that Lieutenant Weston had pushed forward in
the left of the company zone, and, with this in mind, decided to move
to the site he had selected for a company CP. There he encountered
Lieutenant Robert C. Pierce, the platoon leader of the heavy machine
guns attached to his company. Convinced that Lieutenant Weston
was on or near the company objective, the CO of Company F and
Lieutenant Pierce moved northeast almost parallel^ to the course of
Sergeant Scopoli, who was advancing on the right. As the company
commander and his group approached the northeastern edge of Bann-
holz they encountered Sergeant Scopoli's party. Tanks had been heard
to the east and the men were busily engaged in digging positions.
Sergeant Scopoli reported that he had seen nothing of Lieutenant
Weston in his advance. Captain Whitman then ordered the group
forward again, still convinced the 2d Platoon was farther to the north.
As the two squads of the 3d Platoon moved across the trail that
paralleled the northern edge of Bannholz about 150 yards south of it,
they encountered German infantry in well prepared positions. The
enemy was armed with BARs and Mis which they employed with tell-
ing effect. Sergeant Scopoli's men returned this fire, but it soon devel-
oped that the enemy was too strong for this small group. They pulled
back slowly covering their own withdrawal.

Prior to this encounter Captain Whitman, Lieutenant Pierce and the
small command group had started back to Company G where they
arrived at 1000 hours. En route the party ran into Gecman mortar fire.
All were wounded. At the CP Captain Whitman learned the where-

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

abouts of Lieutenant Weston and ordered him forward at once to
reinforce Sergeant Scopoli's men. As the 2d Platoon moved out, it
encountered the remnants of the two squads of the 3d Platoon filter-
ing back through the woods. In addition to the enemy infantry, a
German tank had appeared and added its fire power to the encounter.

Captain Whitman next moved Lieutenant Weston's platoon to the
right, into what was properly the zone of Company F. There was still
no word from Lieutenants Mason or Wilson. The number of men
available to the company commander at this time did not exceed forty,
and many of these were wounded.

The battalion commander had followed the progress of this attack
as closely as possible, and the first few, scattered reports coming out
of Bannholz had been favorable. At 0800 hours, Lieutenant Colonel
Martin had seen three tanks along the edge of Geisbusch. He also
observed the tanks at the southeast edge of Bannholz that had so
effectively split the attack of his right assault company. From then on,
the news was bad.

At about 1000 hours, one of the tank destroyers of the 704th TD
Battalion went into action from Untersie Busch but scored no hits on
the enemy armor south of Bannholz. A short time later, the TD men
bore-sighted their 76mm and got a glancing hit which caused the
enemy to move about one hundred yards east to a hull-defilade position.
Throughout this fight, the TDs experienced difficulty in maneuvering
because of the soft ground in which they quickly bogged.

After the first two hours radio contact between battalion and the
troops in the woods failed completely. Five times the battalion com-
munications officer, Lieutenant James C McCullough, Jr., attempted
to get wire crews into Bannholz from Untersie Busch. None of these
teams was able to move more than two hundred yards from the woods
before enemy fire pinned them down, inflicting casualties. As the morn-
ing progressed, it became necessary to rely more and more on informa-
tion gleaned from the wounded filtering back from Bannholz.

By 0930 hours, medical evacuation had become an acute problem.
Lieutenant Perry Heidelberger, MAC, with the 2d Battalion, learned
that both the assault companies had lost two of their aid men before
they entered the woods. Realizing there were many wounded in Bann-
holz and that help would be needed in caring for them, Lieutenant
Heidelberger jeeped into Sinz and made his way on foot to a point
about three hundred yards from the German tanks in position south-
east of the woods. From there he signaled the panzers by waving

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into town, l-o route it way occasionally d el a fed by rnottar fire, -but
suffered no further casual ties,

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

long-range bazooka fire merely increased the accuracy of the return
fire delivered by the enemy tankers.

Later it was learned that the German tanks had been equipped with
"bazooka skirts' ' which consisted of a thin outer sheet of metal plate
guarding the vital spots on the hull. This outer skin was separated
from the hull itself by an area of dead space. Bazooka rounds would
penetrate the skirt and explode harmlessly on the hull without pene-
trating to the tank's interior.

By noon all hope of accomplishing the assigned mission in Bannholz
Woods had been abandoned and the fight developed into a struggle
for survival. Radios had been destroyed by enemy fire or had ceased
to function, and most of the communication personnel were casualties.
As the day progressed, contact between platoon leaders and their com-
pany commanders became almost nonexistent for it was impossible for
patrols to move from one isolated group to another. To the troops it
was a day of terror. There seemed to be no defense against the Ger-
man armor which roamed the area at will. Inside the woods, attackers
and defenders sniped at each other from trees only a few yards apart.
Prisoners were taken and then lost again as captor and captured, taking
cover from the furious shelling, lost each other in the confusion.
The German tanks soon became aware that their bazooka skirts ade-
quately protected them from the American bazooka fire. With this
they became bolder. They left the shelter of Geisbusch Woods and
sallied to within seventy-five yards of Company G's position. Their
machine guns raked the trees and they fired their 88s directly into the
company area.

Doggedly Captain Blakely clung to his position in the edge of the
woods in Company G's zone. At his direction the 919th and 284th
Field Artillery Battalions fired almost continuously. Fire from the 390th
Field Artillery's 155s was also brought to bear, but the enemy tanks
were cautious enough to keep moving constantly. During the after-
noon, Captain Blakely estimated conservatively that there were twelve
German tanks maneuvering in front and on the flanks of his position.
White phosphorus shells were employed from time to time and with
these two panzers were damaged. Both of them moved to the rear
trailing smoke.

In the afternoon rain began to fall steadily. Untersie Busch was soon
a quagmire and it became absolutely impossible for the TDs to find
firm standing. One of the vehicles of the 704th fired from the asphalt
road south of the woods against the tanks near Geisbusch but without
result. Another TD in Sinz was worked into position to engage the

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tanks southeast of Bannholz. After several rounds one enemy tank
was hit and thereupon the other withdrew.

Within the woods, Captains Heath and Whitman discussed their
situation as they crouched in a mud hole. Casualties had been extremely
heavy, the bazooka ammunition was almost expended and the tanks
were becoming bolder by the minute. To the right, German infantry
was infiltrating the position. The only contact with battalion was by
way of Captain Blakely's SCR-600 and over it at 1330 hours, Captain
Whitman requested smoke to cover a withdrawal. This was refused;
the captain was informed that reinforcements were coming. As the
afternoon wore on, the situation became worse. Lieutenant Edward
G. Litka, Weapons Platoon leader of Company G, volunteered to
return to the battalion command post to emphasize the seriousness of
the situation. Shortly after he left the woods he was wounded and
crawled back into Bannholz. Eventually he made his way into Untersie
Busch.

At 1530 hours, Captain Whitman again radioed battalion on the
seriousness of the situation. Tank activity had increased. At least ten
tanks were engaging the company from the high ground to the north.
Moreover, the enemy had accurately zeroed 120mm mortars on the
area. A second time, the captain was informed that reinforcements
were on the way.

Meanwhile in Bannholz, the threat of a counterattack increased.
Enemy tanks were within twenty-five yards of the edge of the woods.
With perfect impunity, the panzers lumbered up and down the road
that bordered the woods searching for occupied foxholes. At these
they would blast away with direct fire from their 88s. Private Bernard
F. Moan became so enraged at this slaughter, he seized the one
machine gun remaining in Company G and, selecting a tank that was
approaching the woods for a strafing run, blazed away at it. Surprised,
the tank halted, buttoned up and then withdrew.

At 1615 hours, Captain Whitman informed Captain Heath he was
going back to meet Company E which was moving forward to rein-
force the position. Captain Whitman had been wounded more than
seven hours earlier and was now scarcely able to walk. The remainder
of Company F was therefore attached to Captain Heath's command.
About this time, Sergeant Manuel M. Delagoes of the 1st Platoon
arrived bringing a wire from Untersie Busch. This was the first contact
the CO had with any member of this platoon all day. From the ser-
geant he learned how the platoon and the bazooka teams attached
to it had been trapped in the open. The NCO related that some of

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

the group managed to work their way back to the protection of a crest
to their rear, but the rest of the platoon and the bazooka teams were
either killed or wounded with the coming of full daylight.

By telephone Captain Whitman made arrangements to meet Captain
Darrah and informed Major Dossenbach, the battalion executive offi-
cer, of the exact situation in the woods.

As Captain Whitman made his way to the rear, the enemy counter-
attacked with tanks and infantry from the north. Company Gs forward
positions were overrun and Sergeant Malloy, on the left flank, could
see enemy infantry massing in the woods to his front. As Captain
Whitman and Sergeant Scopoli hobbled to the rear, some of the
American infantry falling back through the woods passed them. Resis-
tance was beginning to crumble.

At 1655 hours Company E, led by the battalion commander, was en
route from Untersie Busch through the draw to Bannholz when it met
the remnants of Companies F and G filtering back. It was a pitifully
small group to be called two companies. Many of the men had lost
their weapons and equipment. They were all mud-covered, stunned,
hollow-eyed and exhausted after hours in a hell of flying steel, impotent
against the repeated close-in attacks of the German armor.

Further advance by Company E was halted, for the withdrawal from
the woods necessitated a quick change in plans. By 1745 hours a new
line had been established by Companies E and H north of the Sinz-
Bubingen road in Untersie Busch Woods. The plan for taking Bann-
holz was abandoned and Companies F and G moved into Wies to
reorganize.

The attack had proved a costly failure. In Company F, of the two
platoons and the light-machine-gun section that managed to get into
Bannholz, only thirty-five effectives remained. Lieutenant George Des-
mans and Lieutenant Wilson had been killed. Captain Whitman and
Lieutenants Hawley and Mason had been seriously wounded. Com-
pany G also suffered heavily. Of the 124 men that entered the attack,
only seventy-eight returned to Untersie Busch.

At 1147 hours on the morning of this unsuccessful attack on Bann-
holz Woods, Companies I and K of the 301st moved forward as
planned, to protect the left flank of Lieutenant Colonel Martin's bat-
talion from counterattack. Only light resistance was encountered dur-
ing the advance and, without difficulty, Captain William C. Warren's
company placed a roadblock across the trail that led from Adenholz
Woods to Bannholz. Antitank mines were also emplaced and the

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Hagerty's regiment were in reserve at Veckring. Colonel McClune's
men held the left flank of the Division assisted by Major Stanion's
1st Battalion, 302d, which occupied the regiment's left boundary north
of Wies. Colonel Thurston's 3d Battalion of the 376th held the center
of the regimental front with the 1st Battalion on their right in Sinz.

Three times the Division had attempted to take Bannholz Woods
and three times the enemy had repelled the American thrusts. Each
of these ventures cost dearly in men and equipment. They gained no
ground for the Division, but they did further weaken the Germans'
ebbing strength.

Shortly after the 301st Infantry had settled in Division reserve at
Veckring, Major Samuel H. Hayes, Assistant G-3, while returning
from a tour of the front lines, stopped and examined an abandoned
German Mark IV in the town of Nennig. Apparently the tank was
in operating condition. Personnel of the 94th Ordnance Company were
sent to inspect the vehicle and found that it could be moved under
its own power. It was driven back to Veckring where it was utilized
as a training aid by the 301st Infantry. The problems and mistakes
met and made in Bannholz Woods were critiqued at length, and ex-
periments conducted with the tank in which all infantry weapons
were used against it. In addition to the stress laid on tank training,
General Malony held a conference on the 14th of February which was
attended by the three regimental commanders; Lieutenant Colonel Bid-
well, CO of the 704th TD Battalion; and some of his company com-
manders. Infantry-TD coordination was discussed and the need for a
better understanding of the basic principles underlying the employment
of each arm was made clear.

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Chapter 25: PILLBOXES 151, 152, 153

FAILURE OF THE 2d Battalion, 376th, to hold Bannholz Woods
called for a modification of the basic plan set forth in Division
Field Order No. 10. The CG estimated that since the bulk of
the fighting had been on the Division left and center, many German
units had been shifted to that side of the line from the east. Moreover,
it was apparent that Corps would soon release the 94th for use as a
unit against the Siegfried Switch. The time was now ripe for an attack
against the group of pillboxes and bunkers east of Campholz Woods,
which formed the strongest part of the well sited enemy line of defen-
sive positions, for in all likelihood the garrisons of these fortifications
had been considerably weakened to reinforce the German right. This
last limited-objective was assigned to the 302d whose 2d Battalion was
to attack the morning of the 15th.

Between the 9th and the 14th of February, the activities of the 302d
in Campholz Woods had been confined to minor skirmishes brought
on by patrol activity, and holding the woods itself. Company B of
the 319th Engineers destroyed the pillboxes west of Campholz which
the 2d Battalion, 302d, had taken, by detonating 1,000-lb. charges
inside the concrete structures.

During this period the enemy continued to deluge Campholz with
perfectly adjusted artillery and mortar fire; mines and booby traps
which were thickly strewn throughout the area inflicted occasional
casualties. The weather remained cold and wet. Mud in the woods
was knee-deep in places and holding the position was a dirty, dangerous
task.

On February 9, the 5th Ranger Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Richard P. Sullivan, was attached to the Division for use in
a defensive mission. The same day this battalion was placed under
Colonel Johnson's control and relieved the 1st and 3d Battalions, 302d,
assuming responsibility for approximately ten thousand yards of front-
age on the right flank of the Division. To deceive the enemy as to
the strength of force holding this extended position, Lieutenant Colonel
Sullivan immediately began active patrolling, harassing the enemy
positions to his front.

Upon being relieved by the Rangers, the 3d Battalion, 302d was
placed in regimental reserve and the 1st Battalion reverted to Division
reserve. The following day, February 10, 1945, the latter battalion
was attached to the 301st Infantry and moved to Apach. On the 11th,
Company F of the 302d was relieved in the Tettingen-Butzdorf area
and moved to some farm houses in the vicinity of Borg. The following
day the 3d Battalion, 302d, relieved the remainder of the 2d Battalion

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of the pillbox area to rbe east arid northeast of Girophols Woods.
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PILLBOXES 151, 152, 153

233

Joseph F. Cody's HMG platoon backing Company Es assault. Diver-
sionary attacks were to be launched by the 376th to the west and the
5th Ranger Battalion to the east; during the attack, the 3d Battalion,
302d, was to continue holding Campholz Woods. The 301st Field
Artillery and Company C of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion were
to support the operation. H-hour was designated for 0600 hours on
the 15th.

At midnight on the 14th, Company F moved by truck to Borg; from
there Captain Kops' men marched into Campholz Woods. By 0300
hours they were in their forward assembly area. Companies E and
H had followed Company F. Just prior to H-hour, the silence and
darkness were shattered. To the east there was mortar fire and to
the west heavy artillery fell. Obviously, the demonstrations that were
to be launched by the flank units had jumped the gun. In the dozen-
or-so minutes that remained before the men were to leave the shelter
of Campholz Woods, the assault groups under Lieutenant Alvarado
huddled in the communication trenches that were their line of depar-
ture. Many of the men were reinforcements who had just recently joined
the battalion. As they waited for the order to move forward, an intense
German mortar and artillery concentration hit the eastern edge of
Campholz. At the same time, heavy machine-gun fire poured into the
woods from their front. Under this unnerving fire, many of the new
men scattered into the woods and among the tributaries of the com-
munication trenches. The unit was thoroughly disorganized and be-
cause of this intense fire, which continued throughout the day causing
many wound and concussion casualties, it was midafternoon before the
company was able to reorganize and push out of the woods toward
its objective. Later it was learned from a captured German artillery-
man that the enemy's fire plan for Campholz Woods called for six box
concentrations. These covered the northeastern and northwestern por-
tions of the woods. They were fired on the least noise or suspicion of
American movement.

Company E met with much better success. Just prior to daylight,
the 3d Platoon moved east and took the occupants of pillbox 152 by
complete surprise. A phosphorus grenade was thrown into the box
and this set fire to some ammunition. Quickly the defenders capitulated
and twenty-five prisoners were taken. Lieutenant Butler's men, who
had been following the 3d Platoon, moved forward rapidly and seized
their objectives with little trouble, following which, Lieutenant Smith's
platoon reduced pillbox 94. At 0730 hours, Colonel Johnson was

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four bunker? had been won from the enemy.

Thetompauy C P was eitahiisherd w H2 anil Lieutenant 'Lewies sent
one m 'i'-j- se-uadv ia the Hi Platoon to assist • Lieutenant Butler's
in -arns^mip tht pillboxes and bunkers .they had c

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN .

PILLBOXES 151, 152, 153

235

leave the woods. They slowly worked their way along a series of
communication trenches to a point southeast of 151- From here they
met with nothing but failure. There was no cover and both 151 and
153 were alerted for an American attack following the reduction of
152 and its supporting installations to the south. Lieutenant Alvarado's
men managed to direct bazooka fire against 153 but this ricocheted
harmlessly off the pillbox. Tank destroyer support that had been ex-
pected did not materialize and the enemy constantly swept the pre-
carious positions in the communication trench wih fire. Late in the
afternoon, word was received that battalion was preparing a night
attack. As best they could, the men dug positions in the eighteen-inch
deep communication trench and waited for nightfall. About 2000 hours
enemy tanks were heard to the front. As the panzers moved in the
assault group pulled back to the woods. En route, Lieutenant Charles
P. Davis was wounded and lost in the darkness.

At the same time, Company E became aware of the enemy armor.
Thirty minutes later this unit informed battalion that the panzers were
directly in front of the company position. Lieutenant Meyer requested
artillery support as Company E's only antitank defense was one flame
thrower and some Panzerfausts which no one knew how to operate.
The 301st Field Artillery replied promptly and accurately with fire
which drove the tanks back.

The bunkers taken by Company E had formerly been held by the
2d Company of the 713th Grenadier Regiment and the commanding
officer of that unit was made personally responsible for regaining these
positions. Shortly after midnight on the 16th, following a short mortar
and artillery barrage, the Germans attacked. Using a small draw as
an avenue of approach, approximately one hundred infantry supported
by ten tanks and self-propelled guns, moved south along the east side
of the Borg-Kirf road. When abreast of Company E's position they
turned west and launched their assault against Lieutenant Butler's posi-
tion. At the time the attack struck, Lieutenant Butler was at the
company command post in 152.

Moving up to the bunkers and pillboxes, the armored vehicles
employed their 88s with telling effect. As flares lit the scene, from
152 enemy armor could be seen roaming the entire area. Frantically,
Lieutenant Meyer called for artillery fire upon and around the com-
mand post. To the east Lieutenant Smith withdrew his men from the
bunker they were holding. Subsequently he was ordered to reoccupy
this position and did so.

Private First Class Wayne N. Woolman managed to load one of

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236

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

the Panzerfausts and with it in his hand, he dashed into the open to
fire at a German tank between Pillboxes 152 and 10, scoring a hit
which knocked out the vehicle. Technical Sergeant Tommy Nettles and
the men with him in one of the captured bunkers were forced to sur-
render when the muzzle of an 88 was thrust directly into the bunker
they were occupying.

To the east of the German attack, on the outskirts of Oberleuken,
Lieutenant Joseph P. Castor, III, of Company G, had been maintaining
a listening post to warn of any enemy attack coming from the direction
of Kirf. This outpost early heard and reported the movement of the
German tanks and a patrol dispatched from this point provided the
artillery with exact information regarding the panzers. Protective bar-
rages laid by the 301st Field Artillery proved particularly effective.
Several self-propelled guns were knocked out and heavy casualties were
inflicted on the attacking infantry. But, despite this support the German
attack retook one small pillbox and three bunkers that had been seized
by Lieutenant Butler's men the previous morning.

About 0200 hours, the enemy tanks and infantry attacked a second
time. Artillery was fired around pillbox 152 and the men of Company
E employed every weapon they could muster. After a fierce encounter
the Germans were driven back with heavy losses.

Inside 152 there remained only eleven effectives after this second
attack. There had been no word or sign of reinforcement. Lieutenant
Anderson informed battalion that he was going to evacuate the posi-
tion and withdraw to the woods. Shortly thereafter, carrying their five
wounded with them, these men of Company E made their way back to
Campholz Woods.

Lieutenant Alvarado and the officers of Company F had with some
difficulty reassembled the company and taken positions in the northern
part of Campholz Woods. Technical Sergeant Howard J. Morten of
the 2d Platoon and Technician Fourth Grade Oscar E. Summerford,
a medic, searched the edge of the woods, in the inky blackness, for
Lieutenant Davis. They finally found the wounded officer and assisted
him to the aid station.

During the early morning hours, Staff Sergeant William R. Moon
led a patrol from Lieutenant Castor's listening post to destroy a 120mm
mortar position that had been particularly bothersome. The enemy's
habit of leaving their mortars unguarded while they took shelter in
their pillboxes and bunkers worked in the patrol's favor. They slipped
up to the installation in question, destroying the mortar without inter-
ference from its crew. On its way back to the listening post, the

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As ^ result of their sticks the Germans haJ retaken tw't; pillboxes
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238

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

holz Woods, Kirf, and the woods east of Kreuzweiler. Following this
they strafed Kreuzweiler, Dilmar, Orsholz and Bannholz Woods. Two
enemy tanks were damaged, and fires started in Kreuzweiler, Beuren
and Kirf. Das Lee Woods and Oberleuken were bombed on the 16th
and 17th and in addition, on the latter day Kirf, Munzingen, Mosch-
holz Woods and Der Langen Woods were strafed.

To summarize, during the period from January 7, 1945, when the
Division took over positions in the Triangle, to February 15, 1945,
the men of the 94th had practically destroyed the 4l6th Infantry
Division, reduced the infantry and tank strength of the 11th Panzer
Division by one-half, prevented the disengagement of sizable portions
of enemy armor for employment elsewhere, and compelled the diver-
sion of badly needed German infantry replacements to the Siegfried
Switch. All arms and services of the 94th contributed to these results.
In particular, as was consistently revealed by PW statements, the artil-
lery had proved itself a tremendously effective supporting weapon.

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Chapter 26: SHOOT THE WORKS!

N FEBRUARY 15, while the 2d Battalion, 302d, was fighting

in and east of Campholz Woods, the CG of XX Corps visited

the battalion command post in Borg. While there, General
Walker informed General Malony, who was also present, that all
restrictions as to the force the Division might commit had been lifted.
The CG of the 94th was free to ,fshoot the works." For the first time
since arriving in Third Army, General Malony had the entire combat
strength of the Division free for offensive operations.

That night at Sierck the Division Commander called the Chief of
Staff, Colonel Bergquist, and his G-3 into conference. Previously they
had discussed the general form of a coordinated division attack — the
logical culmination of the attrition policy. Now the time had come
to make the minor changes necessary to fit the overall plan to the exist-
ing situation and to prepare a directive for the General Staff sections,
based upon which the latter would draw coordinated orders.

Confronting the Division at this time were the remnants of the 41 6th
Infantry Division and the 256th Volksgrenadier Division. There had
been no contact with the 11th Panzer Division since the 9th of February
and higher headquarters insisted it was no longer in the Triangle.
Major Carl S. Schofield, who had taken over as G-2 when Colonel Love
was wounded at Butzdorf, maintained that since the 11th had not been
identified elsewhere, it might still be right behind the Switch Line and
the possibility of its commitment against the 94th must be considered.

The plan of attack, when completely developed and produced as
Field Order No. 11, dated February 16, 1945, called for a coordinated
Division attack, three regiments abreast, on a relatively narrow front
at 0400 hours on the morning of the 19th. To accomplish the massing
of forces, the 94th Reconnaissance Troop with the Defense Platoon
of the Division Headquarters Company and a platoon of the 465th
AAA Battalion attached, was to relieve the 2d Battalion, 376th, on
the Division's west flank in front of Thorn and Kreuzweiler. The 5th
Ranger Battalion was to be responsible for that portion of the front
extending from Borg east to Nohn.

The 301st Infantry, which was in Division reserve, was to make the
main effort. It was to drive east from Sinz, Butzdorf and Tettingen,
storm the heights of Munzingen Ridge and sweep on to seize Faha
and Munzingen. The 302d Infantry was to push from Campholz
Woods, reducing the pillbox area to the east between the woods and
Oberleuken. Colonel Johnson's men would then continue east and settle
accounts with the enemy in Orsholz. Bannholz Woods was to be taken
by the 376th Infantry. The regiment would then drive eastward up

239

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241

Munzingen Ridge to seize Der Langen Woods southwest of Kirf.
Throughout this operation, Colonel McClune's men were to protect
the left or north flank of the Division during the coordinated drive
to the east. The 376th was to motorize one battalion and place it in
regimental reserve to be committed only on Division order. This was
to be the all-out effort to penetrate and roll up the Switch Line.

While the infantry attack was being planned at Sierck, far to the
rear Brigadier General Julius E. Slack, the CG of XX Corps Artillery;
General Fortier, the Division Artillery Commander; and their staffs
were formulating a fire-support plan. An arbitrary line, approximately
five thousand yards in advance of the Division front, was drawn on
the map. Corps artillery undertook to engage all targets beyond this
line while Division artillery was to fire on targets short of it. It was
directed that in the interest of preserving the element of surprise, no
firing should be done prior to H-hour. Initially, Corps' fire was to be
placed on all known enemy command posts, to disrupt hostile com-
munications and command. After fifteen minutes of such fire, hostile
battery positions were to be engaged for thirty minutes with a maxi-
mum volume of fire. Thereafter, neutralization of enemy battery posi-
tions was to be continued for another hour. For the next ten hours fire
was to be placed on main routes of approach to the battle area. These
last eleven hours of fire were planned with sufficient elasticity to pro-
vide on-call fire for targets of opportunity.

That portion of the fire plan calling for ten hours of fire on
probable routes of enemy approach was in the nature of an experi-
ment. Due to the fact that the attack was to be delivered into a
corridor less than ten miles wide, between the Saar and Moselle
Rivers, it seemed practical to attempt the isolation of the battlefield
by interdiction fire placed at focal points on all roads leading into
the enemy's main battle position. The bulk of this fire was to be
delivered on towns and road intersections. It was felt that if this
fire could be maintained for a sufficient length of time the enemy
would not only be prevented from reinforcing and resupplying his
front-line positions, but in the event of a general retreat would be
forced to abandon the majority of his wheeled vehicles and heavy
weapons.

The fire plan within the Division, based on the hard-won experi-
ence of the preceding weeks of fighting, called for an integration
of all artillery means available. For this purpose the cannon com-
panies of the 301st and 302d were attached to Division Artillery.
Organic infantry antitank guns were to fire initially as field artillery

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242

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

and the 774th Tank Destroyer Battalion was to be placed in an artil-
lery general-support role. For the first thirty minutes after H-hour,
all these units were to fire at the maximum sustained rate on enemy
front-line positions, command posts, routes of approach, assembly areas,
mortar and machine-gun positions and known strongpoints. Continued
neutralization of the more critical of these targets was to be provided,
subject to interruption in favor of on-call fires requested by forward
observers or from ground or air observation posts.

All infantry units were instructed to increase their patrol activity.
Reconnaissance was pushed to the utmost, to gain maximum informa-
tion concerning enemy defenses. Nightly two and three-man patrols
moved out along the entire front probing the enemy line. In particular,
information was vitally needed on enemy strength in Bannholz Woods
and on the presence of enemy armor in the Triangle. The pillbox area
east of Campholz Woods, assigned to the 302d, and the Bannholz-
Adenholz Woods area, assigned to the 376th, had already been thor-
oughly explored in previous attacks. But Munzingen Ridge, assigned to
the 301st, had never been investigated. As this was the objective of
the main thrust, it was most important that intelligence as to German
strength and installations in this region be gathered quickly. The 1st
and 3d Battalions, 301st, which had been assigned the initial objectives,
patrolled east from Sinz and Butzdorf aggressively. They made a
thorough search of the approaches to the ridge, accurately locating
many of the enemy's minefields, barbed-wire entanglements and out-
post positions. One patrol penetrated to Das Lee Woods atop the
ridge. Working their way along the edge of a minefield, some fifty
yards in front of the woods, the patrol members were able to chart
exactly the position of a majority of the German strong points within
the woods.

On the night before the attack, Sergeant Frederick J. Ramondini, of
the 301st's I&R Platoon, led a small reconnaissance patrol out of Sinz.
This group worked north up the draw that leads out of town to a
point where they had outflanked the defenses of Das Lee Woods. Then
they turned east and cautiously proceeded up Munzingen Ridge. Crawl-
ing on their bellies, they worked their way over the crest between Das
Lee and Der Langen Woods. From there the patrol advanced down
the far slope, across the Borg-Kirf highway and slipped into Munz-
ingen. In town, they moved from building to building in the deeper
shadows. Behind the darkened windows, German voices could be
clearly heard. Once a door opened noisily and the patrol froze until
the German who came from the house walked up the street away from

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SHOOT THE WORKS!

243

the I&R men. The troops then continued on their mission. Between
two of the buildings loomed a huge black hulk. Farther down the
street, between other buildings, were more massive shapes. The patrol
had the information it sought. There were tanks in Munzingen. With
this valuable information they withdrew from town and cautiously
began to tread the three thousand yards back to Sinz. They returned
safely with their vital knowledge.

XX Corps had been exerting strong pressure to launch the coming
attack on the 18th, but on the persistent recommendations of the Divi-
sion Commander the following day was designated. Time available
for ground reconnaissance was used by all units to the greatest advan-
tage. Relief maps were prepared for each headquarters down to and
including battalions. Plans of every town along the Division front were
secured and passed out. Patrol information was plotted on sandtables
and every platoon commander had a chance to orient his men to a
point where they knew exactly where they were to go and what to do.
Meanwhile, there was a careful reshuffling o£* troops. Command posts
were moved as close to the line of departure as practicable and patrol-
ling continued. The detailed planning and exhaustive preparations
instilled a spirit of confidence in all ranks. As a unit the Division was
facing its greatest test. This time the Siegfried Switch Line would be
breached. There would be no more opportunity for the Germans to
concentrate every piece of artillery, every mortar and every tank against
a small portion of the Division in the attack. This time the 94th was
to show what it could do working as a unit. The so-called offensive-
defense was ended.

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Chapter 27: FEBRUARY 19: INITIAL OBJECTIVES

SOON AFTER DARK on the evening of February 18, 1945, the
Division rear area became a moving mass of men and equipment.
All elements gravitated toward the front. By midnight the infan-
try units were in position to move to their forward assembly areas and
the lines of departure. The artillery was poised; ready for its most
important shoot to date — the now famous 15,000-round artillery prepa-
ration for a single division attack.

301st Infantry

Making the main effort for the regiment, the 3d Battalion, 301st,
left Sinz at 0200 hours and began the long climb up the ridge to its
line of departure. Das Lee Woods which surmounted Munzingen Ridge
was the initial objective of the battalion. Company L led the way,
closely followed by Company K. En route some of the men of the lead-
ing company noticed a mortar position to their flank, and as the com-
pany spread out on the line of departure, Lieutenant John R. Fraboni
asked Captain Paul E. Frierson if the battalion's mortars had moved
forward during the night. Upon receiving a negative answer, the lieu-
tenant instructed the rear platoon to investigate the situation. A sur-
prised group of Germans was quickly rounded up.

The designated line of departure was along the military crest of
the ridge. In the darkness Company L took position on the left and
Company K on the right. Meanwhile, the reserve company sent one
platoon to protect the battalion's flank. Silhouetted against the top of
the ridge some six hundred yards to the front was Das Lee Woods,
through which the enemy had set up his new defense line. The line
of departure was quickly outposted and the assault companies waited
for H-hour.

At 0400 hours the attack's artillery preparation crashed into Das Lee
Woods and with the opening rounds the infantry began their advance
up the steep slope. Firing into the darkness, the companies moved
forward. Company L, upon reaching the minefield in front of the
woods, discovered a cleared lane used by enemy tanks. Treading the
tanks tracks they passed through safely while Company K blasted its
path through this obstacle with primacord. Enemy resistance along the
edge of the woods was extremely feeble. The infantry moved into Das
Lee and without halting swept to its eastern edge. Units then dug
positions and dispatched patrols to the rear to comb the woods thor-
oughly for any lurking Germans. In this manner twenty-six prisoners
were rounded up. By 0730 hours, the woods had been completely
searched. The assault companies established contact and consolidated

244

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FEBRUARY 19: INITIAL OBJECTIVES

245

the position as enemy artillery, mortars, and rockets began to rain upon
them.

The 1st Battalion, 301st, assigned to take that portion of the ridge
south of Das Lee Wods, moved north out of Butzdorf in a column of
companies, up the Butzdorf-Sinz road. Just south of Sinz the battalion
turned east at a small draw. Company C, which had been leading,
deployed north of the draw while Company B formed south of it.

As Company C moved forward to the attack at 0400 hours it encoun-
tered mines and was subjected to heavy mortar fire. Many casualties
were caused particularly in the 1st Platoon; Lieutenant Walter M.
Stempak, commanding the platoon, was among those wounded. There-
fore, Captain Drenzek withdrew the company and circled the minefield
to the north. Then the company pushed forward rapidly, fearing to
be caught on the slope in full view of the enemy with the coming of
daylight. Upon reaching the top of the ridge, the company commander
discovered he had veered to the north in avoiding the minefield. Com-
pany C therefore swung to the right and proceeded south, sweeping
the top of the ridge. As soon as it reached its assigned objective,
Company C prepared defensive positions. Captain Drenzek had been
wounded in coming up the slope and Lieutenant Howard Johnson
assumed command. To the company's front were some trenches that
had not been searched. Accompanied by Private First Class Albert
Dionne, the acting company commander went forward to investigate.
It was soon obvious that these trenches were occupied and that the
Germans in them did not intend to surrender. Both men withdrew
and mortar fire was brought to bear. As this fire lifted, the enemy
troops thought better of their original decision.

Company B deployed in its zone with the 1st Platoon on the left, the
2d on the right and the 3d in reserve. At 0400 hours it moved forward
with Company C. Commanded by Lieutenant Arthur A. Shocksnyder,
the 2d Platoon suffered fifteen casualties in as many minutes from
American mortar fire which fell short. At about the same time, the
1st Platoon encountered trouble. Staff Sergeant John R. Koellhopper of
the latter unit continues the story:

Suddenly a mine went off killing the scout, and the platoon leader set two
men to probing for the edge of the field. No sooner had they started than
they were blown up. The explosions alerted the Krauts in a bunker not fifty
yards away and their machine gun opened up at point-blank range. Men hit
the ground setting off more mines as they landed. Legs and feet were blown
away. Men began screaming. Others cried, "Medic! Medic!" The men were
trapped. They couldn't move a hand or foot for fear of hitting a Scbii mine.

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246 THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

The enemy was throwing mortars and 88s and that machine gun was adding
to the hell. The lieutenant was badly wounded. One of the men who had
lost both legs was crying, "Get me out of here. God! Oh God! Get me out
of here!" The platoon sergeant [Technical Sergeant Henry E. Crandall] was
desperately trying to make a path through the minefield. Another man trying
to move set off another mine. As this man looked down at what was left of
his two feet he started crying like a baby — not screaming, but crying. He
didn't seem to be in pain, the shock must have been too much just then.
Another Yank lay there, his bottom half a hell of a shape. All he kept doing
was begging his buddy to shoot him. "Shoot me. Please shoot me. Damn it,
can't you see I'm no good any more?" Still another man who was badly
wounded was begging his buddy for his overcoat. "I'm cold. Damn, I'm cold!
Give me your overcoat, won't you? Oh please . . . please give me your coat?"
"The bastards! The dirty bastards! Won't they ever stop?" cried another voice
as more and more mortar shells came pouring in. The machine gun firing from
the bunker had stopped and the Krauts were shouting something in German.
One Yank could understand them. They were hollering, "It hurts, doesn't it?
It hurts!" The platoon sergeant had heroically blasted a path through the mine-
field and was leading the platoon to the far edge of the field. More men were
lost by the time the platoon had cleared the field. Now they were able to get
at those bunkers. But, no ! As the platoon moved up on the bunkers, the Krauts
quit. The objective had been reached and there were sixteen men left."

Meanwhile, the 2d Platoon on the right began the encirclement of
an enemy bunker in its zone. One German was killed as he bolted
from the position and the rest of the enemy decided to surrender. They
moved toward the 1st Platoon to give themselves up. In doing so they
ran into their own minefield. Mines were detonated and casualties
caused among the prisoners.

As Staff Sergeant Robert J. Cook and Private First Class John M.
Lawton approached a bunker surrounded by trenches, two Germans
manning the position came out to surrender. Just then an artillery shell
began its descent. The Germans immediately took cover in one of the
trenches. After the shell burst, they again attempted to surrender only
to have the artillery interrupt the proceedings a second time. This
scene was repeated much to the annoyance of Private First Class Law-
ton. To convince the POWs-to-be that the artillery was not their only
threat, he fired a shot in their direction. This still did not have the
desired effect. The frightened enemy quickly seized their discarded
weapons and returned fire. Lawton was wounded in the thumb and
as he attempted to fire a second round his weapon jammed. In disgust,
he threw the useless rifle at the Germans who then dropped their
weapons and surrendered.

As dawn began to break, the tanks of the 778th Tank Battalion
attached to the 1st Battalion moved forward along the Tettingen-Sinz

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road. At Sinz they swung east and began to climb the ridge. To the
rear of Company B, one of the tanks struck a mine and another bogged
down attempting to bypass the stalled vehicle. By maneuvering the
rest of the armor found firm standing and assisted the company in
clearing the ridge.

Company A, in battalion reserve, was given the mission of clearing
the pillboxes in the battalion zone south of the Sinz-Oberleuken road
and of maintaining contact with the 302d Infantry on the right. To
accomplish the latter task, the 1st Platoon took positions on the hill
between Butzdorf and Campholz Woods. The remaining platoons of
the company were organized into assault teams under Lieutenant Robert
H. Wolf to carry out the company's principal mission. This force
headed up the draw that led east from Butzdorf. As the platoons
moved into the open, two enemy machine guns caught them in a vicious
crossfire. With daylight approaching, Staff Sergant Ichiro Matsuzawa
crawled unnoticed toward the nearest machine gun, lobbed a grenade
and then charged the position. Two of the machine-gun crew were
killed by the grenade and the remaining three who were wounded
surrendered. Then the sergeant boldly advanced against the second
position capturing its defenders. Following this, the 2d Platoon pushed
on and cleared the bunkers that comprised the company objective. In
this operation they were supported by the 3d Platoon. Both platoons
next made their way to the top of the ridge against only sporadic
resistance.

302d Infantry

Shortly after midnight on the 19th, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 302d,
moved from Perl and Eft, respectively, to their assembly areas in Camp-
holz Woods. As the assault companies advanced into the woods they
picked up flame throwers, pole and satchel charges, bangalore tor-
pedoes and other demolitions from stock piles set up by the Ammuni-
tion and Pioneer Platoons. The night was extremely dark and thaws
had turned the area into a quagmire.

Initial objective for the regiment was the pillbox area on the south-
ern nose of Munzingen Ridge, east and northeast of Campholz Woods.
Hence, the direction of attack was eastward. The 3d Battalion, which
was assigned the left or northern flank of the attack, moved into the
northeastern portion of the woods; 1st Battalion, responsible for the
right of the regimental zone, took positions just south of Lieutenant
Colonel Cloudt's men. As these two battalions assumed position, the
2d Battalion, 302d, which had been holding the woods, moved back

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

to Eft where it became Division reserve. Holding the right flank of
the Division, the 5th Ranger Battalion had requested that it be included
in this attack and Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan's troops were assigned
the mission of taking Oberleuken.

At 0400 hours, the assault companies of the 1st and 3d Battalions
lay huddled on their line of departure at the eastern edge of the woods.
Their artillery preparation on the pillbox area landed on schedule and
was fierce in its intensity. Under this cover, the infantry moved for-
ward.

As Company I left the woods, the entire scene was suddenly lit by
dozens of German flares. Enemy small arms and automatic weapons
raked the area and the position was deluged with mortar fire. The
intensity of this fire forced the assault platoons to seek what little
cover was available east of the woods. To prevent any surprise or
flanking movement, the enemy continued to send up flares until day-
light. To make the situation worse, the 2d Platoon encountered an
enemy minefield and here casualties were inflicted. Several attempts
were made by rescue parties to remove the wounded, but enemy fire
drove them back. Despite this heavy fire, just before dawn, Technical
Sergeant James E. Hudson managed to work his assault group through
the mined area. They stormed and took the first bunker to fall to
Company Fs attack.

With the coming of daylight, Company B, 778th Tank Battalion,
moved out of Tettingen along the road that led to the northern edge
of Campholz Woods. This route had been cleared during the night
by the 319th Engineers and the tanks moved to the flank of the pillbox
area without incident. There the tankers were briefed as to the most
troublesome pillboxes and the armor moved into the fray. They de-
ployed and by the direct fire of their 75s soon buttoned up individual
boxes. This lifted a good deal of the automatic-weapons fire, in addi-
tion to denying the observation of the Germans directing the mortar
fire falling on the area.

As the tanks supporting Company I arrived, Sergeant Hudson's
assault group pushed to the next bunker assisted by the fire of the
armor. Under this cover, demolition charges were detonated on the
apertures of the second pillbox. Lieutenant Edwards, who had assumed
command of the company shortly before the attack began, left Private
First Class Ernest L. Buffalini and five men to flush out the Germans
manning the position while the rest of the company continued forward.

One of the most important of the pillboxes in Company Fs zone
was 153. From this box, enemy artillery observers had been directing

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fire against the 94th ever since its arrival in the Triangle. The position
was also a command post from which the activities of the German
troops in the vicinity were directed and controlled by an underground
telephone communication system. Within the box, a German artillery
observer, Lieutenant Beikert, was making frantic efforts to get his bat-
teries to bring additional fire on Company I as it advanced.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Edwards and Technical Sergeant Edward
Cardell, taking advantage of the fire support of the tanks, advanced
their assault groups for the reduction of this important pillbox. Private
First Class Alvin Cohen and Private First Class Joseph J. Truss worked
their way to the entrance of 153 and there Truss rigged a demolition
charge which blew the door. Private First Class Cohen emptied his
BAR into the doorway while Sergeant Cardell and Private First Class
Truss heaved fragmentation and white phosphorus grenades into the
pillbox. This persuaded the Germans manning the position to sur-
render. Several prisoners had already emerged when German artillery
fire, previously requested, descended. Both Germans and Americans
took cover in 153 until the concentration was completed.

After Company I had reduced all the pillboxes and bunkers in its
zone, a machine gun was emplaced to cover the left flank of the com-
pany. In the ditch to the north of this position, a German machine gun
was located. For several hours the Company I gunner kept the enemy
weapon neutralized. Later in the day the advance of the 301st on the
north overran this ditch; thirty-eight prisoners were taken from it.

Company K, which had debouched from the woods on the right of
Lieutenant Edward's company, was also delayed by the intensity of the
enemy's mortar, artillery and automatic-weapons fire. Moreover, anti-
personnel mines were encountered and little progress was made until
the arrival of the tanks shortly after dawn. The tankers mistook some
of Company K's personnel for Germans until Private First Class Ernest
E. Climes stood up in full view of the enemy to identify himself and
his companions. Then, under the covering fire of the tanks, the assault
groups pushed forward reducing box after box. Teams under Sergeant
Roy G. Watson and Sergeant Clarence Raffesberger took the last two
boxes on the initial objective and the company advanced to the Borg-
Munzingen road.

To the south of the 3d Battalion, Major Stanion's 1st Battalion
initially encountered similar difficulties. Before the tanks arrived the
advance was slowed by the accuracy and intensity of the enemy's fire.
However, with the coming of the armor, infantry-tank cooperation
permitted the advance to continue and by 0900 hours, Companies A

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and B had reached their initial objectives along the Borg-Munzingen
road.

In the wake of Company A's attack, Private First Class James Line-
rich and Private First Class Tyrone Tywoneck stopped to investigate
one of the pillboxes. To their astonishment they discovered the posi-
tion was still manned and proceeded to reduce it. Their efforts netted
eleven prisoners. Much the same thing happened to Sergeant James A.
Graham of Company B. The bunker he tackled yielded five PWs.
Shortly after the start of the attack Captain Jack P. Haggart of Com-
pany A was wounded and Lieutenant Norquist assumed command.

As the 302d Infantry closed up to the Borg-Munzingen road, the
key defenses of the Siegfried Switch position passed from German to
American hands. With Colonel Hagerty's men holding the northern
portion of Munzingen Ridge and Colonel Johnson's men commanding
its southern tip, the backbone of the enemy defense was cracked. The
94th was through the vaunted Siegfried Switch.

376th Infantry

On the night of the 18th, the company commander of one of the
German antitank companies opposing the Division became lost and
drove down the Kreuzweiler-Sinz road. Outside the latter town his
vehicle struck an American mine and caught fire. This proved con-
clusively that the enemy had not mined their portion of the road and
it could be used for the commitment of American armor should the
1st Battalion, 376th, need such assistance in the attack on Bannholz.
This battalion, less the 3d Platoon of Company C which was to remain
in Sinz to hold the town, moved to the line of departure at 0350 hours.
Ten minutes later the artillery preparation on Bannholz Woods began.
As the fire lifted from the edge of the woods and worked north, the
infantry moved forward with Company A on the left of the battalion
zone and Company B the right.

Because of known minefields Company A advanced on a relatively
narrow front. In the inky darkness, the troops pushed through the
heavy underbrush and swept forward to their objective. As they began
organizing a perimeter defense, 20mm fire from the direction of Geis-
busch Woods raked the area and artillery fire came in from the direc-
tion of Kreuzweiler. At dawn, groups of enemy within mnnholz who
had been bypassed during the advance began to surrender.

On the right Company B, commanded by Captain Bowden, pushed
into Bannholz. Resistance was light and the company speedily reached

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

its objective. After daylight, patrols were sent through the woods to
conduct a thorough search. One patrol moving along the east edge
of Bannholz discovered a knocked out tank; inside were two enemy
artillery observers using the vehicle for an OP. Once these artillery-
men had been taken prisoner, the volume of fire on the woods decreased
materially.

At 0430 hours, Company C under Lieutenant Cornelius crossed its
line of departure. Using marching fire, the company advanced to the
northern edge of the woods where it was hit by an intense mortar
concentration. Private First Class Thomas H. Goggins located several
of the German 20mm positions in Geisbusch and the fire of the TDs
supporting the company was employed against these weapons. By
0815 hours, Bannholz Woods was completely secured.

With the start of the attack on the morning of the 19th, the 3d
Battalion, 376th, was situated midway between Sinz and Nennig, about
two hundred yards north of the Sinz-Bubingen road. To the left, the
94th Reconnaissance Troop extended west to the Moselle. At 0400
hours, as the 919th threw a fifteen-minute concentration on Adenholz
and Geisbusch Woods, this battalion lunged forward with the rest of
the Division. Company K advanced on the left against Adenholz and
Company L on the right against Geisbusch. About 400 yards from
the LD in the zone of the former unit was a known enemy minefield,
through which a narrow path had been cleared. As the company was
traversing this lane, the enemy unleashed a terrific artillery concentra-
tion. Instinctively the men scattered, detonating mines and causing
extremely heavy casualties. When the fire lifted, Lieutenant Daly, who
was commanding the company, removed the wounded and withdrew
the company to reorganize. Lieutenant Daly had been wounded him-
self, but continued to lead his troops until late in the afternoon.

To avoid this minefield, Lieutenant Colonel Thurston decided to
attach the 1st Platoon of Company I to Company K and renew the
advance through the zone of the right assault company. This was done
and Lieutenant Daly's men struck at Adenholz Woods from the south.
Supported by tanks, the company advanced as skirmishers. With little
difficulty it cleared the western half of the woods. Following this,
Lieutenant Daly turned his supporting tanks over to Lieutenant Cecil
G. Dansby's platoon of Company I which was to clear that portion of
Adenholz to the north of the Sinz-Kreuzweiler road. Tanks and infan-
try moved into the woods firing as they advanced. Opposition was light

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and in short order the remaining portion of Adenholz Woods was
reduced. This operation netted the platoon eighty prisoners.

On the right, Company L under Captain Brightman received a por-
tion of the same fire that had scattered Lieutenant Daly's men in the
minefield. As this fire lifted, the company moved forward rapidly,
having no enemy mines to slow its advance. The men crossed the one
thousand yards of open ground between Untersie Busch and Geisbusch
on the double, firing into the woods as they advanced. Geisbusch was
soon reduced and the 3d Battalion was on all its objectives. Speedily,
the new positions were consolidated and the flank company contacted
the 1st Battalion on the right.

With the exception of Oberleuken the Division then held all the
assigned initial objectives specified in Field Order No. 11. The 5th
Rangers, who were to have taken the town, had encountered extensive
electrically controlled minefields and suffered heavily. Several attempts
to force a passage proved unsuccessful and the venture was finally
abandoned.

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Chapter 28: FEBRUARY 19: SECOND OBJECTIVES

T 1000 HOURS on the morning of the 19th, the Division Com-

mander informed all units that the attack would be continued

X j\. at 1230 hours to seize the final objectives specified in Field
Order No. 11. A fifteen-minute artillery preparation, from 1215 to
1230 hours was arranged and this set the stage for a continuation of
the advance. The days and weeks in which the Division had slowly
worn down the enemy facing it from behind the mines, dragon's teeth
and pillboxes were about to pay dividends.

At Division headquarters, General Malony was certain that the time
had come for corps to capitalize on the breach the 94th had made in
the Siegfried Switch Line. Consequently, the CG called XX Corps
and in conversation with General Walker urged that an armored force
be committed. (The 10th Armored Division was then in reserve in the
vicinity of Metz.) The 94th had penetrated the enemy line, but armor
would be needed to knife through the battered and disorganized re-
mains of the mauled German divisions within the Triangle to prevent
their crossing the Saar, reorganizing and manning the fortifications of
the main Siegfried Line, which paralleled the east bank of the river,
for should the enemy succeed in crossing the river in force the bloody
fighting of the previous month would have to be repeated beyond the
Saar. At 1223 hours on the 19th, while the might of the Division artil-
lery was falling on Kreuzweiler, Thorn, Munzingen, Faha, Keblingen
and Oberleuken in preparation for the continuation of the advance.
General Walker called the 94th CP and informed Colonel Bergquist
that the 10th Armored Division "ought to be on the way in two hours/'

The 1st Battalion, 301st, had suffered heavily in taking its initial
objectives. As a result, when Colonel Hagerty received word for the
continuation of the attack he ordered the 2d Battalion to pass through
the 1st and continue the assault to Faha. At 1035 hours, Lieutenant
Colonel Dohs moved his command out of Wochern, through Tet-
tingen and on to Munzingen Ridge.

On the left of the regimental zone, the 3d Battalion prepared to
move against Munzingen and the hill to the northeast which com-
manded the Borg-Munzingen highway. Once the series of hills to the
east of this road were taken by the 301st and 302d Infantry, the Divi-
sion would have a protected axis of advance deep into the Triangle,
over which the 10th Armored could drive against the crumbling Ger-
man resistance.

As the artillery preparation lifted in front of the 3d Battalion, four

301st Infantry

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American tanks and three TDs raced from the cover of Das Lee
Woods. They drove down the ridge and swung to the east. The
tracked vehicles crossed the Borg-Kirf highway, north of Munzingen,
and climbed the slopes of the hill to the northeast that was the
battalion's next objective.

Company L moved out behind the tanks and endeavored to keep up
with their rate of advance. This proved impossible, but the infantry
did eliminate several groups of enemy attempting to employ Panzer-
fausts against the American armor. At the same time, Company K
moved down the ridge and swung to the south, bypassing the town of
Munzingen. Circling north, it pushed forward to join the armor. In
less than an hour, the hill northeast of Munzingen was completely
cleared.

This lightning advance swept around Munzingen but did nothing
toward reducing the town. Company I came forward after the artillery
preparation had lifted and forced its way into the southeast corner of
Munzingen. A furious battle followed in which the defenders of the
town were reinforced by the tanks inside Munzingen. Relentlessly,
Captain Donovan's company pressed forward from house to house;
gradually the Germans were forced into one small area of town. From
the south, Company I continued its assault while the remainder of
the 3d Battalion, on the hill to the northeast, prevented the enemy from
withdrawing toward Kirf to the north. On the hill, the tanks and TDs
had been withdrawn to the reverse slope and turned their turrets
toward Munzingen, once the infantry had consolidated the position.
Before the town was completely cleared, a German tank attempted to
shoot its way out. One of the TDs fired at the panzer and the tank
replied in kind. The German shell passed through a bedding roll
lashed to the hull of the tank destroyer, setting it afire. Another TD
then opened up and knocked out the enemy vehicle. When the bedding
roll was extinguished events settled back to normal. By 1620 hours
all resistance in Munzingen had ended and the 3d battalion was in
possession of its second objective.

After Companies K and L had secured the hill northeast of Munz-
ingen, Germans could be heard in the woods to the east; Technical
Sergeant Elmer H. Kinateder took the 3d Platoon of Company L for-
ward to investigate. This platoon returned shortly with thirty prisoners
who had been forming to launch a counterattack against the hill.

Prior to this second attack, the 2d Battalion, 301st, moved to posi-
tions in rear of the 1st. There, on the reverse slope of the ridge, Corn-

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

panies E and F, the assault units, formed their skirmish lines. Promptly
at 1230 hours, the two companies swept over the ridge and through the
1st Battalion. Approximately 2,500 yards of open ground separated
the troops from their objective and as they pushed forward German
artillery fire began to fall among them. Unhesitatingly, the seasoned
troops continued their advance. The assault waves swept into Faha and
the fight for the town began. By 1430 hours half of the town had been
cleared and its complete occupation was assured. Consequently, Com-
pany G was sent to seize the hill to the northeast that overlooks Faha.
For the remainder of the afternoon the battalion made slow but steady
progress. At 1830 hours the town was won completely and Company
G had tied in with the 3d Battalion to the north. This put all of the
301st objectives in American hands.

302d Infantry

To the right of the 301st, Colonel Johnson's men were also ready to
continue the attack. With the failure of the 5th Ranger Battalion to
take Oberleuken, plans within the regiment were altered slightly. The
1st Battalion, which had originally been scheduled to attack Keblingen,
was assigned the mission of taking Oberleuken and the attack on Keb-
lingen then was given to Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's 3d Battalion.

Before the 1st Battalion could get to Oberleuken, Hill 388 west of
the town had to be taken. Keblingen was also protected by high ground
in the path of the 3d Battalion's advance. These promontories had
been used extensively by the Germans as OPs, since they gave excellent
observation of the terrain beyond the Switch position. Both were well
fortified.

As the artillery preparation lifted, Companies A and B with their
supporting tanks moved across the Borg-Munzingen road and advanced
against Hill 388. The attack moved forward rapidly, as the troops
advanced up the western slope, reducing pillboxes and bunkers in quick
succession. Enemy artillery and mortar fire fell on the hill, but the
assault platoons suffered only slight casualties as most of the fire was
to their rear among the support and weapons platoons. As the crest
was reached, fire from the pillboxes around Oberleuken raked the area;
enemy mortar and artillery fire increased. Since Hill 388 was a bald
slope, devoid of cover, it was decided to withdraw most of the troops
to the communication trenches on the west slope to gain some protec-
tion from the enemy fire. A few men were left on the crest to give
the alert in the event a German counterattack developed.

Meanwhile, Company C, commanded by Lieutenant Robinson, had

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moved out of Borg to take Keblingen. As the company arrived at
Hill 388, the CO was informed that the objective had been changed
and his unit was to assault Oberleuken immediately. After a hasty
glance at the town, the company commander issued a new set of orders
to his platoon leaders.

The platoon of tanks that was to support Lieutenant Robinson's
company was already in position on the forward or east slope of the
hill, prepared to move against Keblingen. Through heavy enemy fire
Private First Class Bernard Piotrzkowski, a company runner, made his
way over the crest to the tanks. Upon reaching the nearest vehicle,
he banged against its hull with his rifle butt and when the tank com-
mander unbuttoned, informed him of the change in plans. This infor-
mation then was radioed to the other tanks. The armor changed
direction and began to pound Oberleuken. In short order they located
the major pillboxes defending the town, buttoning them up with the
fire of their 75s.

Company C moved over the ridge and advanced on Oberleuken as
the fire of the 302d's Cannon Company and the 301st Field Artillery
hit the town. Private First Class Edward C. Burnshaw, a member of
one of the forward observation teams of the former unit, was seriously
wounded by an exploding mine. Although suffering intense pain and
weakened by additional wounds, he maintained constant contact with
his company by radio adjusting accurate fire on the enemy positions.
At the same time, the artillerymen literally walked their fire up and
down the streets. As it lifted, the infantry entered town. Staff Sergeant
Frederick R. Darby, firing a light machine gun from the hip, led the
rush to the first group of houses. Once a foothold had been gained
in the town, two of the supporting tanks came roaring into Oberleuken.
They charged up the main street with their guns blazing while the
other two supporting tanks remained on the outskirts of town covering
the advance. Rapidly the infantry moved forward seizing house after
house. Occasionally snipers delayed the advance, but the tanks soon
eliminated such resistance. By 1630 hours the town was cleared com-
pletely. One hundred and ten prisoners were taken along with seven
120mm mortars.

The attack of the 3d Battalion was much the same story. Companies
I and K stormed forward some two thousand yards to the hill north-
west of Keblingen. Resistance encountered was for the most part light,
but mortar and artillery fire caused some damage. The hill was quickly

secured.

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259

From Oberhardt Woods to the north of the hill, enemy fire was
directed against the tanks supporting the attack of Lieutenant Colonel
Cloudt's battalion. This fire was returned by the tankers, and four
BARmen from Company I — Private First Class Alvin Cohen, Private
First Class James Bender, Private First Class Kyle Thompson and
Private Edward Mayfield — were sent to investigate. Circling the woods,
they entered it from the north. The patrol swept through Oberhardt
and as they reached its southern edge, they encountered two German
women who had been manning an antitank gun.

Following the capture of the hill, Company L, which had been in
reserve, was brought forward and assigned the task of completing the
battalion mission by capturing Keblingen. Lieutenant Travis, com-
manding the company, hurriedly laid plans for this attack. An artillery
preparation was placed on the town and the 2d Platoon, led by Lieu-
tenant Charles C. Misner, moved down the hill directly supported by
the fire of the attached tanks. Against heavy resistance, the platoon
entered Keblingen. In short order a furious battle was in progress.
Technical Sergeant Francis E. Kelly, the platoon sergeant, received a
nasty neck wound when an enemy mine was detonated in his vicinity
but refused to be evacuated. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Misner had re-
turned to the hill alone, and guided the tankers into town. He then
rejoined his platoon, inspiring them by his leadership, while Sergeant
Kelly, despite his injury, directed the fire of the tanks at the more
stubborn points of enemy resistance. Fighting raged for several hours;
it was 1730 hours before the objective was taken. Then, both platoon
leader and platoon sergeant, ignoring the volume of German mortar
and artillery fire falling on Keblingen, organized litter squads and
supervised the evacuation of the numerous wounded.

The 319th Engineers were also having a big day. Demolition parties
with the infantry blew captured pillboxes as soon as they could be
loaded and fuzed. Roads in the area were swept clear of mines, and
treadway bridges were placed across the antitank ditches on the Borg-
Munzingen and Borg-Oberleuken roads.

With the coming of darkness, Company B of the 302d moved from
Hill 388 into the woods between Keblingen and Oberleuken, linking
the newly won positions of the 1st and 3d Battalions. Technician Fifth
Grade Robert Hoots and Private First Class William B. McElwee of
the above company were sent to the junction of the road running south
from Keblingen and the Oberleuken-Orsholz road to set up their

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261

machine gun and form a roadblock. As they approached this position,
they found an enemy machine-gun crew already emplaced at the site.
With little adcs they captured the Germans and took over the position.
On the following morning three more Germans, the relief for this
outpost, appeared. They also were taken into custody.

During the night, both the 301st and 302d Infantry Regiments pre-
pared and improved their hasty defensive positions while awaiting the
coming of daylight and new orders.

376th Infantry

Far to the north, the 1st Battalion, 376th, had not been idle. At
1100 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Miner was called back to Sinz and given
final instructions for the seizure of Der Langen Woods and Hill 398
just north of the woods. The six TDs of Company A, 708th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, assisting Lieutenant Colonel Miner's men, took
positions on the northeastern edge of Bannholz Woods to deliver over-
head fire. All the HMGs of Company D were also emplaced within
the woods to support this attack. Company E was ordered into Bann-
holz to take over the 1st Battalion's zone, while the 3d Platoon of
Company C, located in Sinz, was returned to company control. These
preparations took longer than anticipated and it was 1300 hours before
the 1st Battalion moved to the attack.

As the fire of the artillery, the TDs and the machine guns burst
along Munzingen Ridge the assault companies moved forward. Com-
pany A took the right of the battalion zone; Company B the left. They
advanced in squad columns under supporting fire which did not lift
until the assault units were within two hundred yards of their objectives.
As this overhead fire ceased, the squad columns broke and formed
skirmish lines. In a blaze of marching fire, the troops pushed to the
crest of the ridge. During this advance, enemy observation from the
north was effectively screened by the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion
which dropped a curtain of white phosphorus shells from Munzingen
Ridge to Moscholz Woods.

As Company B approached Der Langen Woods, it was hit by a
terrific concentration. Mortar, artillery and 20mm projectiles rained
on the company. For almost an hour this fire completely halted the
advance of the 1st Platoon. However, the remainder of the company
broke loose and entered the woods. Staff Sergeant Charles H. Nichols
and Staff Sergeant Robert F. Burnett led their squads through a series
of communication trenches that circled the woods, eliminating the
Germans defending these positions.

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

After the infantry reached their objective, the TDs moved forward
to join them; in quick succession three of tj^e tank destroyers were
knocked out by an 88 in Moscholz Woods. *The remaining vehicles
then took shelter behind a small knoll and from there made their
way toward Der Langen by a more deflated route. As the leading
TD approached the woods, another 88 concealed in the southeast
corner of Der Langen opened fire knocking out the tank destroyer.
With this, the infantry moved against the German antitank gun which
they captured shortly. The two remaining TDs reached their objective
safely. Staff Sergeant Brewster of the 919th Field Artillery, acting as
a forward observer, called for fire on the 20mm guns which were
engaging the 1st Platoon from Moscholz Woods. After several con-
centrations he silenced these weapons.

To the south of Der Langen Woods, Company A discovered a net-
work of trenches and firing pits. In mopping up the area Private First
Class Richard J. Kamins found a German sitting in a hole crying.
Without talking the prisoner pointed to a nearby position from which
Private First Class Kamins flushed fifteen more Germans. By 1400
hours, the woods and hill were completely cleared. Company C then
moved forward to strengthen the defense of the new area and that
evening the battalion was informed that it would revert to reserve as
soon as the 10th Armored Division passed through its position the
following morning.

As a result of the day's operations, seven square miles of dominating
terrain had been overrun, five pillboxes and twenty-three bunkers re-
duced, four enemy tanks destroyed and 872 prisoners captured. More-
over, Munzingen Ridge was in the hands of the 94th from Borg to
Der Langen Woods. All the hills east of the Borg-Munzingen road
along this line were also in American hands. The vital axis, deep into
the Triangle, over which an armored division could be committed, had
been completely secured. To the south, the vaunted Siegfried Switch
Line lay shattered forever. The 94th had completed the bloody busi-
ness of cracking the enemy's defense and had provided corps with a
vital bridgehead.

At about the time the Division was moving toward the final objec-
tives set forth in Field Order No. 11 word was received at the com-
mand post of the 10th Armored Division in Metz to move into the
Triangle immediately. Soon mobile loud speakers were moving through
the streets of Metz informing the men of the 10th Armored to report
to their units at once. Many of these troops arrived at their bivouac

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FEBRUARY 19: SECOND OBJECTIVES

263

areas barely in time to catch their vehicles as they pulled out. Others
were less fortunate and had to hitch rides with units following their
own.

All through the night of the 19th-20th the vehicles and tanks of the
10th Armored rolled toward the rear areas of the 94th. As the columns
reached the German border, they began to split. By daylight there
were tanks parked in Borg, Wochern, Besch, Perl, Sierck and many
of the surrounding towns and villages. The attack would continue
with two divisions abreast, the 94th on the right.

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Chapter 29: REDUCTION OF THE TRIANGLE

FOR THE 94th DIVISION the night of February 19-20 proved
another busy one. The 10th Armored Division had been assigned
as its zone within the Triangle the area from the Moselle River
east to the Borg-Munzingen Ridge; as a result, most of the installations
of the 94th had to be moved eastward. At the same time, plans were
laid for a continuation of the attack in the right half of the Triangle.

The 10th Armored Division was charged with the mission of clear-
ing the main portion of the area between the Moselle and Saar Rivers
and of attempting to capture intact the river bridges in its zone. To
assist the armor in this task, the complete 376th Combat Team was
attached. The 94th Reconnaissance Troop and the Division Head-
quarters Defense Platoon were under Colonel McClune's control at
this time and these attachments were temporarily allowed to remain
in effect. The 94th, less the above elements, which reduced the division
to something less than two-thirds strength, was to clear the eastern
portion of the Triangle between Lenk Branch and the Saar River, from
Orsholz on the south to Saarburg on the north. This area was hilly
and completely unsuited for the deployment of armor.

To further prepare the way for the armored division, the 376th was
charged with the capture of the towns of Kreuzweiler and Thorn,
which would provide the armor with the second breach in the German
defenses. Following the reduction of these towns, the 376th was to
be passed through by the tanks; the regiment would then proceed north
on a wide front, mopping up in the wake of the armor. The 2d Bat-
talion was designated for the reduction of Kreuzweiler and the recon-
naissance troop and defense platoon were to take Thorn.

The 301st Infantry was assigned the mission of taking Kollesleuken,
Freudenburg, Kastel and Staadt. In addition, the regiment was to main-
tain contact with the 10th Armored Division until the 94th Reconnais-
sance Troop was released to take over the zone between the 301st and
the armor. To accomplish these tasks, the 3d Battalion was given the
left of the regimental zone and the 2d Battalion the right.

To the 302d Infantry fell the task of cleaning up all enemy resistance
south of the 301st's zone. To assist Colonel Johnson's men, the 1st
Battalion, 301st, was attached to the regiment and, along with the 2d
Battalion, 302d, was formed into a task force under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Gaddis. Task Force Gaddis was to seize the heavily
fortified town of Orsholz which earlier had dealt so severely with the
1st Battalion, 301st. Old scores were to be settled. To the 5th Ranger
Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 302d, fell the task of reducing the

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266 THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

woods between Oberleuken and Orsholz, while the 3d Battalion was
to seize the towns of Weiten, Rodt, Taben and Hamm.

301st Infantry

At 0715 hours on the 20th the 2d Battalion, 301st, began its march
to Freudenburg. The battalion moved forward to Lenk Branch, crossed
the stream and gained a firm hold on the east bank. Since the bridges
over the stream had been destroyed, the supporting tanks and TDs
were prevented from crossing. But, as the advance continued, the
engineers set about constructing a bridge.

From the stream, the assault groups began the steep climb toward
their objective, advancing rapidly against slight resistance. Outside of
Freudenburg, a battery of Russian 7.62cm guns was encountered. The
enemy was thoroughly surprised but put up enough resistance to win
time to destroy his field pieces. Soon the German artillerymen were
overwhelmed and the survivors of the encounter made prisoners.

Shortly before noon, Company F fought its way into the southwest
corner of town. Resistance was not heavy, but the houses had to be
searched methodically and a few troublesome snipers eliminated. As
Company E joined the battle, the tempo of the advance quickened.
However, by mid-afternoon it was apparent that the town was too
large to be cleared rapidly by the forces already committed. As a result.
Company G was thrown into the fray from the northwest. Before dark
Freudenburg was cleared completely.

The 3d Battalion did not attack until 0800 hours on the morning of
the 20th; it moved out in a column of companies with Company L in
the lead. In Das Bruch Woods part of the unit lost direction and
headed southeast. As the men emerged from the woods, they encoun-
tered elements of the 2d Battalion and were informed that they were
out of their sector. Returning through the woods the troops met some
of the supporting tanks attached to the battalion. These they mounted
and moved down the open ridge to the east. When they reached the
crest overlooking Kollesleuken, the advance stopped abruptly. Enemy
fire from the high ground to the east began to land about them and
one of the tank commanders thrust his head from the turret of his
vehicle just as a Panzerfaust burst alongside. The infantry who had
been riding the tanks hit the ground, taking advantage of what little
cover existed. As quickly as possible, the group pulled back to reor-
ganize after discovering the reason for the volume of fire directed
against them. Enemy forces were retreating from Kirf, moving along
the valley road to Kollesleuken, while covered by fire from the east.

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The sst Platoon of Company L was sent to outflank- pars of this
retreating column. As it moved up i hedgerow toward the woods, an '

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268

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

were advancing against Eider Berg. The tracked vehicles swept by the
infantry swarming up the hill against light opposition. Four pillboxes
on the southern nose of the promontory which had watched the
methodical reduction of Freudenburg quickly surrendered.

The following morning the advance continued eastward. Lieutenant
Colonel Dohs* troops pushed through the woods along the regimental
right boundary in column of companies. No resistance was encoun-
tered and by 1100 hours Company F, in the lead, was overlooking the
Saar River.

Also in a column of companies, the 3d Battalion crossed its line of
departure at 0830 hours the same morning. Company K, in the lead,
met some resistance in Kastel, but by 1025 hours had secured the town.
Company L then passed through the assault unit and moved out on
the bluff overlooking the Saar River and the town of Serrig on the far
bank.

302d Infantry

From Keblingen the 3d Battalion, 302d, jumped off at 0700 hours
on the 20th headed for Weiten. Company I was on the left, Company
L on the right and Company K in reserve. Halfway to their objective
the assault companies were slowed down by enemy machine-gun fire
from the hill to their front. Private First Class Peter Maculawicz and
two other men flanked the hill to the right and, carefully working
their way forward, rushed the nearest gun. They quickly overpowered
the crew taking them prisoner. Then the remaining machine gun drew
the concentrated fire of both companies and was neutralized.

As the battalion continued across the hill and down into the valley,
the bridge over the stream below them was observed to be intact. At
about this time, a lone German raced from the woods toward the
stream. This man was pinned down by rifle fire while the leading
elements of Company K made a rush for the bridge. It was taken
intact and upon examination was found to be prepared for demolition.
The wires were cut, following which the company crossed with dry
feet. Company I on the left was not as fortunate. There was no bridge
in their zone of advance so the troops waded the stream.

In the woods west of Weiten, the battalion halted to await the arri-
val of its tanks. Battery A of the 465th AAA Battalion moved its quad-
ruple-mounted .50-caliber machine guns into position and raked the
town with fire. Then the tanks arrived and started down the road into
Weiten. As they moved into the open, they were engaged by German
antitank fire which forced them back into the woods. Lieutenant Car-

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270

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

On the morning of the 21st, Companies K and L pressed farther
east. By this time the bulk of the routed German forces had been
captured or had surrendered, though some elements made good their
escape across the Saar. The companies pushed forward rapidly and
by the middle of the afternoon Taben, Rodt and Hamm had been taken.

Simultaneous with the attack of the 3d Battalion, 302d, on the morn-
ing of the 20th, Major Stanion's 1st Battalion jumped off to the east
from its positions around Oberleuken. After reducing a series of six
enemy-held pillboxes, the troops continued their drive into the woods
extending westward from Orsholz. This advance was continued on
the 21st when the battalion cleared the Oberleuken-Orsholz road and
the woods southeast of the former town.

Task Force Gaddis

On the night of the 19th, Task Force Gaddis, composed of the 2d
Battalion of the 302d and the 1st Battalion of the 301st, moved into
Keblingen. The following morning as the 3d Battalion of the 302d
moved to attack Weiten, the 2d Battalion of the 302d followed at
about four hundred yards. To the rear of Major Maixner's men, by
about the same distance, came the 1st Battalion, 301st. En route to
Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's objective, Task Force Gaddis swung south-
east along a second-grade road that ran into the woods northwest of
Orsholz.

As his forward assembly area Lieutenant Colonel Gaddis had chosen
a position in the woods about five hundred yards northwest of Orsholz.
In the approach march Company G led, followed by Companies E, F
and the 1st Battalion, 301st. The point was in charge of Private First
Class Robert S. Karlix whose quick action in the vicinity of the assem-
bly area netted nineteen prisoners and three horse-drawn carts. By
1150 hours both battalions had closed in the assembly area.

Plan of attack called for a drive on Orsholz from the north. The
Orsholz-Weiten road was to serve as the boundary between battalions
with the 1st Battalion taking the west of town; the 2d Battalion the
east. In direct support of the operation was the 301st Field Artillery
which had forward observers with all the assault units. Company H's
mortars were brought forward from Keblingen to the assembly area
since they could support the attack more readily from the latter posi-
tion. Attached to the task force was one platoon of light tanks and a
platoon of mediums. These vehicles had difficulty in crossing Lenk

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REDUCTION OF THE TRIANGLE

271

Branch and for this reason the attack was postponed until they came
into position.

Meanwhile, a patrol led by Sergeant Simond J. Sendric was sent
toward Weiten to determine whether or not there was anything in
rear of the task force and to establish contact with the 3d Battalion,
302d. This group accomplished its mission, returning without incident
to report that no enemy activity was noted en route. While this was
happening, Company E, which had been designated the 2d Battalion
reserve, dug defensive positions in the woods north of town to foil
any enemy attempt at counterattack.

At 1400 hours the east wing of the task force (2d Battalion, 302d)
launched its attack with Company F, deployed with all three rifle pla-
toons abreast, on the left; and Company G on the right. Because of
the delayed arrival of the armor there had not been time to arrange
an artillery preparation.

As Company F moved into the open, supported by the direct fire
of the tanks and the overhead fire of Sergeant Joseph A. Romanowski's
section of machine guns, they were engaged by enemy automatic wea-
pons firing from Orsholz. Ignoring this machine-gun fire, Captain
Kop's platoons rushed forward, entering town on the double.

Company G, after negotiating the minefields north of the objective,
advanced in its zone with little difficulty. The leading platoons entered
Orsholz and had the task of clearing the company's section well under
way before the supporting tanks arrived in town. Captain Griffin who
led the company in the assault kept his troops pressing forward rapidly.

Once within the town, Private First Class James Heard of Company
H set his machine gun in position in the middle of the main street to
keep the enemy from crossing back and forth. Sniper fire was directed
against this weapon and one of its crew hit. As the American infantry-
men closed in on the sniper, he threw down his rifle and surrendered.
By 1800 hours the 2d Battalion had taken all of its objective, rounding
up over one hundred prisoners. The command post was established in
Orsholz and plans were laid for a continuation of the attack to the
south the following day.

Simultaneous with the attack of the 2d Battalion of the 302d, the
1st Battalion of the 301st struck at the western half of Orsholz. Forma-
tion prescribed for the assault was column of companies, Company A
leading the attack, followed by Companies B and C. The latter units
were so disposed because they had suffered heavily in their attack on
Munzingen Ridge the previous day, and were seriously understrength.
Under the protective fire of the armor supporting the operation, Corn-

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bombed horn the air,
.it, tht 'iouchlv searched
few defenders bypassed by

REDUCTION OF THE TRIANGLE

273

of the area where his company had been isolated a month earlier.
Sergeant Kelley found several pieces of clothing bearing serial numbers
which he recognized. Also the patrol located the graves of several men
of the first Company B. After the ill-fated attack, the enemy had buried
these Americans south of the town.

Companies E and G of the 302d also moved south of Orsholz on
the morning of the 21st to seize that portion of the pillbox area in the
zone of the 2d Battalion. A roadblock at the south end of town had
to be blown to allow the tanks to accompany the infantry troops. As
the first bunker was approached, the point of the advance guard
observed a lone German sitting on a chair near the entrance to the
bunker quietly reading a newspaper. He made no attempt at resistance
and readily informed the party that practically all the Germans who
had been manning the position had fled east during the night. A
careful search of the area proved the truth of this statement; only
two prisoners were taken.

As Lieutenant Butler of Company E led his men to the last bunker,
which was in the vicinity of Nohn, contact was made with the 5th
Rangers. Company E then swung east into the woods bordering the
Saar River. To the right, Company G searched its assigned area and
sent a contact patrol to Ober Tiinsdorf which was also held by the
Rangers. By evening the mission of Task Force Gaddis, and of the
302d Infantry to which it belonged, was completed.

First Sergeant Thomas F. Hudgins and Technical Sergeant Howard
J. Morton of Company F arrived in Orsholz following its fall, after
an interesting tour of the Triangle. They had been picked up at the
Division rest camp in Cattenon, France, by a jeep driver who assured
them he knew the whereabouts of their company. The party proceeded
up the Borg-Munzingen road and continued north until they encoun-
tered elements of the 10th Armored Division. After receiving direc-
tions from the tankers, they started a search for their unit. In due
course, the men arrived in Orsholz only to learn that they had been
traveling a good deal of the time over roads as yet unswept by the
engineers.

On the evening of the 21st a combat patrol under Lieutenant Hunter
left Orsholz to seize Keuchingen, which lies to the east along the Saar
River opposite Mettlach. The party consisted of the 1st Platoon of
Company F, one light and two medium tanks, a machine-gun section
and a mortar squad. At 21 40 hours this patrol arrived on the high

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the

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REDUCTION OF THE TRIANGLE

275

withdrawn from Bannholz Woods during the night, was placed in
battalion reserve.

Following a five-minute artillery preparation, the assault companies
jumped off at 0700 hours. As they moved across the open ground and
were approaching the woods, Company G was engaged by several
enemy machine guns. Maneuver to the right was restricted by a Schii
minefield so the assault elements, employing marching fire, rushed the
enemy weapons. This fire silenced the German guns. The position was
overwhelmed and the advance continued. Once within the woods, both
companies fanned out and continued forward. When another machine
gun opened up on the left of the company, Sergeant Harold L. Crosley
and his squad moved against it. Darting from cover to cover among
the trees, the men made poor targets for the German gunners. Soon
the infantrymen closed on the enemy position and destroyed it.

Unknowingly, Company G had bypassed one German machine gun
and as Captain Dodson, the company commander, and his runner en-
tered the woods, the crew of this weapon was preparing to put their
weapon in action. In short order this threat was eliminated. Mean-
while, the battalion swept through the remainder of the woods un-
opposed.

On the edge of the woods south of Kreuzweiler, Lieutenant Colonel
Martin's battalion stopped and reorganized. Then, at 0805 hours the
attack on the town itself was launched. The leading elements of the
battalion had dashed across the open ground and gained the shelter
of the first houses when a heavy mortar concentration fell. Through
this and intense small-arms fire, the remainder of the assault waves
rushed for the cover of the southmost buildings in Kreuzweiler. Enemy
fire on the town continued heavy but the attack was pressed sharply.
By 1000 hours, half the town had been cleared and ninety-six prisoners
taken. To maintain a steady pressure upon the German defenders
platoons were passed one through the other. Every house had to be
assaulted. As the attack continued, the Germans were forced into an
ever smaller area. Two-thirds of the town was in American hands by
1300 hours; resistance grew stiff er all the time. One of the prisoners
taken in Kreuzweiler turned out to be a Jap, the first taken by the 94th.

About this time a German counterattacking force of four tanks
and one hundred infantry was moving south from Dilmar on the
Kreuzweiler-Dilmar road. Previously the 919th Field Artillery Bat-
talion had registered on the road junction midway between these towns
and when the Germans reached the artillery check point, they moved

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276

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

squarely into a deadly artillery concentration. This stopped the counter-
attack cold and the enemy never managed to form for another.

At 1335 hours Combat Command R of the 10th Armored Division
rolled into town. After checking the front-line positions of the two
assault companies, the tanks took off with their guns blazing. They
swept through the enemy-held portion of town and north to Dilmar.
In the face of this display of force, the last German resistance melted.
Thirty minutes later the town had been mopped up and was completely
cleared. Prisoner tally for the operation passed the hundred mark.

Company E, the battalion reserve, had meanwhile been assigned
several additional missions. The 1st Platoon swung west of Kreuz-
weiler and took positions from which it could protect the left flank
of the battalion. During the afternoon a patrol investigated Thorner
Woods where it captured an enemy machine gun and crew. The 2d
Platoon of the company had the task of completely clearing the woods
south of Kreuzweiler. It speedily completed this assignment; then
assumed positions below the town along the northern edge of the
woods.

On the morning of the 20th prior to attacking Thorn the 94th Recon-
naissance Troop and the Division Headquarters Defense Platoon,
which had requested action, assembled at the crossroads in Wies.
This force, organized in two platoons, proceeded north toward their
objective. Their line of departure was the draw just south of Thorn
which was reached via the communication trench running parallel to
the Bubingen-Thorn road. In support of the operation were two
light and two medium tanks; arrangements had also been made for
a five-minute artillery preparation.

At 0700 hours the platoon commanded by Lieutenant Frank A.
Penn cleared the line of departure and moved forward, but the remain-
ing platoon of the provisional force was stopped almost immediately
by heavy mortar and artillery fire. Surrounding the town were thou-
sands of mines most of which were of the antipersonnel variety. These
delayed the attack somewhat. One of the supporting tanks was dis-
abled outside of Thorn by an AT mine and as the crew dismounted
to continue fighting as infantry, the tank commander and a corporal
were killed by enemy fire.

The defenses of Thorn were built around a chateau which was the
largest building in the town. Two of the remaining tanks assisted
the assaulting troops while the third was sent to the Moselle to act
as flank security. In town the tankers poured shells into the chateau

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REDUCTION OF THE TRIANGLE

277

and the surrounding buildings. As the fighting continued, one of the
armored vehicles approached to within twenty feet of the chateau and
fired two rounds through a window. Bazookamen added their fire and
behind this support the Recon and Defense Platoon men stormed the
fortress. This building netted twenty-five prisoners. Soon the entire
town was cleared and the 1st Platoon of the 94th Reconnaissance
Troop outposted the area. At 2200 hours, the Germans deluged Thorn
with a 120mm mortar barrage which caused the heaviest casualties of
the entire operation, wounding fourteen men of the Recon Troop.

As the armor passed through this composite force, it reverted to
94th control. However, movement proved impossible until the follow-
ing day as the tankers had exclusive road priority. When Captain
Ashton's men returned to the Division zone, they passed through Com-
pany I of the 301st and continued to push toward Saarburg. Their
new mission was to clear the northern half of the Division sector, at
the same time maintaining contact with the 10th Armored Division.

Plan of attack of the 10th Armored called for an assault along three
axes of advance. The major thrust was aimed up the Borg-Munzingen
road along Munzingen Ridge, now wide open in the path of the pene-
tration of the 94th. To the west another thrust was pushed up the
road leading northwest from Sinz, cleared by the 301st and 376th.
Still farther west, the third drive was parallel to the Moselle over
ground opened up by the 376th, the 94th Reconnaissance Troop and
DHQ Defense Platoon. All three armored columns were slowed down
the morning of the 20th by hasty defenses which the enemy had thrown
up during the night. German antitank guns in and around Kirf proved
particularly troublesome. A blown bridge beyond Thorn also impeded
the advance initially, but during the afternoon all enemy resistance
was swept aside and the armor raced north. Despite the coming of
darkness, the attack was pressed and at midnight the apex of the
Triangle reached. None of the bridges over the Saar or the Moselle
was taken intact; all that then remained was to mop up the scattered
pockets of resistance that had been left in the wake of the advancing
tanks.

This clean-up mission fell to the 376th Infantry. At 0900 hours on
the 21st, the 2d Battalion, which had been assigned the left of the
regimental zone for the mopping-up operation, advanced north from
Kreuzweiler. The battalion moved out with all three companies in
line: Company F on the left, Company E in the center, Company G
on the right, to sweep the area from the Moselle on the left to a

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HEADQUARTERS 94th INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 94 U.S. Army

21 February 1945

AG 201.22 (2lFeb45) CG
SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : Soldiers of the 94th Inf Division & Attached Units.

1. Today marks the victorious end of a series of operations to
capture the triangle of German territory between the Saar and the
Moselle Rivers.

2. Your courage, endurance, and skill in fighting have made this
possible.

3. I congratulate every one of you on a magnificent battlefield
performance.

4. The combats in tettingen-butzdorf, nennig, wies, berg,
and later the captures of keblingen, freudenburg, weiten,
ORSHOLZ, and kollesleuken all showed your military qualities
and these fights \)vill live long in this Division's history.

5. Your successes have had a great effect upon the War. You
have practically annihilated two German divisions and have reduced
the combat efficiency of a third (Panzer Division) to a small frac-
tion of its original efficiency. You have captured 2,851 prisoners
and wrested from the enemy more than 65 square miles of wealthy,
productive country.

6. Your efforts are understood and appreciated by your com-
manders and by your country.

HARRY J. MALONY
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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280

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

its uninterruped advance and was just closing into Bilzingen at 1830
hours when orders were received to proceed to Mannebach without
delay. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 376th, which had been
motorized and placed in regimental reserve prior to the beginning of
the attack on the 19th, was also ordered forward to Mannebach.

By the close of the 21st, the Saar-Moselle Triangle was completely
American — the attrition policy had paid off. All objectives had been
taken. The 94th held the area from Orsholz north to Staadt and east
to the Saar River, while CT 376 and the 10th Armored Division
controlled the rest of the Triangle. In three days the Division had
captured five times as much ground as had been won in all of the
preceding month and had added 1,469 PWs to an ever-mounting total.

A great victory had been won but the price had been high. On
the 19th, 611 wounded passed through the clearing station. The fol-
lowing day casualties totalled 344 and the toll on the 21st came to
173 wounded. To treat and evacuate these men speedily, the 319th
Medical Battalion was pressed to the utmost. Four treatment sections
were set up and worked at top speed. Non transportable cases were
passed to the 30th General Hospital while the transportable cases were
moved to the 100th Evacuation Hospital in Luxembourg. Many of
the casualties were from Schii mines which characteristically blew off
one or both feet or mangled them to the point where amputation was
necessary. Removal of the wounded and dead from these antipersonnel
minefields was always difficult and dangerous; Captain Donald M.
Stewart, the graves registration officer of the 301st Infantry, was killed
while engaged in just such work. Mines, mortars and artillery fire
accounted for the greatest share of the total casualties for only twelve
per cent of the wounds inflicted were the result of small-arms fire. Of
the wounded received at the clearing company only one-tenth of one
per cent died. During the three-day operation the 319th Medical
Battalion used forty cases of blood plasma.

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PART FIVE
GERMANY: ACROSS THE SAAR

Go forward with everything you've got. Speed
and power . . .

MA J. GEN. WALTON H. WALKER
CG, XX CORPS, FEBRUARY 21, 1945

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Chapter 30: THE BRIDGEHEAD

DURING THE AFTERNOON of February 21, 1945, as the
spearheads of the Division closed up to the Saar River, feeling
among the troops ran high. The drive through the Triangle
had been spectacular and the corps commander himself had indicated
that with the clearing of this area, the Division would belly-up to the
Saar, outpost the river and enjoy a well earned rest. Such was not the
case. At about 1400 hours Lieutenant Harold J. Donkers, one of the
Division liaison officers, called Division Headquarters in Freudenburg
from the Corps CP. "Back here they're talking about a river crossing/'
Lieutenant Donkers reported, "and if it's made, we'll be making it."
Although the idea of an immediate crossing seemed fantastic, General
Malony instructed Colonel Bergquist to alert the regimental com-
manders and Lieutenant Colonel Ellis of the engineers. Preliminary
preparations for an assault crossing of the Saar River were to be
initiated at once.

Time available for reconnaissance and planning was extremely short.
Furthermore, it seemed almost impossible that the necessary materials
and supplies for such an operation could be gathered on short notice.
As best they could, the various commanders began their preparations
for orders they hoped would not be issued. An aerial reconnaissance
along the Saar River from Merzig to Trier was ordered by General
Fortier, and this assignment fell to Lieutenant George F. Shaw, a
liaison pilot of Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 94th Division
Artillery. Colonel Hagerty and Colonel Johnson, meanwhile, dis-
patched patrols to investigate the west bank of the river for possible
crossing sites and likely OPs. The engineers, who had exactly fourteen
assault boats on hand, contacted corps to learn what further river-
crossing equipment could be supplied.

At 1804 hours Lieutenant Donkers arrived at Division Headquarters
with XX Corps Field Order No. 11:

The XX Corps attacks 22 February to exploit their breakthrough, seize Trier,
and expand the bridgehead to the line Pfalzel to Hamm and will be prepared
to continue the attack to the northeast or north on Army Order . . . The 10th
Armored Division (attached 376th Combat Team) attacks to the northeast to
seize Trier . . . The 94th Infantry Division attacks across the Saar between
Saarburg and Hamm on the night of the 21st-22d of February to establish the
line Geizenburg south to the river bend at Hamm, and will be prepared to
continue the attack to the northeast on Corps order.

This order also indicated certain attachments to the Division for this
operation: the 778th Tank Battalion, less Company C; the 704th TD
Battalion, less Company C; the 465th AAA Battalion; the 774th TD

283

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Battalion; and Company C of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion.

There was no longer any doubt. Before dawn the 94th would begin
an assault crossing of the Saar River. Meanwhile, there was much
to be done. Detailed plans had to be formulated and coordinated,
crossing sites selected, infantry and artillery units moved into new
positions, additional engineers and river-crossing equipment obtained
and brought to the crossing sites. Food, ammunition and gasoline had
to be hauled forward from supply installations which, in some in-
stances, had been left forty and more miles to the rear by the rapid
advance of the past three days. It was going to be a busy night.

The two hours immediately following the arrival of the corps order
were a period of concentrated action in the Division command post.
By 2000 hours plans were made and approved and a Division field
order formulated. In the G-3 section, the regimental liaison officers,
Lieutenant William G. Vincent of the 301st Infantry and Lieutenant
Laurence G. Byrnes of the 302d Infantry, received copies of the Divi-
sion order and rushed them to their respective regiments. There re-
mained only eight hours before the crossing was to begin.

The 301st Infantry was ordered to cross at 0400 hours and establish
a bridgehead from Serrig north to a point opposite Krutweiler, con-
tinue the advance and gain its assigned portion of the Division's
initial objective which was a chain of hills some six thousand yards
east of Serrig. Also, the regiment was to maintain contact with the
10th Armored Division on the left and the 302d on the right.

The 302d Infantry was likewise scheduled to cross at 0400 hours.
It was to secure a bridgehead from Serrig south to the river bend at
Hamm, push to the east and seize that part of the Division's initial
objective in its zone. Colonel Johnson's men were charged further with
protecting the right flank of the 301st and maintaining contact with
the 5th Ranger Battalion to the south, on the west bank of the river.

Earlier in the day, upon the receipt of the alert, Colonel Hagerty
had instructed Lieutenant Colonel McNulty, commanding his 3d Bat-
talion, to send a strong reconnaissance patrol to investigate Staadt.
At the same time, Colonel Dohs, commanding the 2d Battalion, had
been instructed to send a reconnaissance party into Krutweiler. These
two towns were the only possible crossing sites within the regimental
zone. Through them passed the two roads that led down to the river,
from the cliffs and steep hills along the west bank. The regimental
I&R Platoon was directed to reconnoiter all roads and trails leading
into Krutweiler and, in addition, to locate and man observation posts
from which the far bank of the river could be watched and studied.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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285

Prior to the arrival of the Division field order, the I&R Platoon
reported that the enemy still held Krutweiler. Contact had been made
with the 94th Reconnaissance Troop outside the village and the cavalry
reported that the enemy were numerically their superior. A short time
later, Lieutenant Colonel Dohs and his reconnaissance party corrobo-
rated this information. Thus, it became apparent that if the crossing
were to be launched at the time designated, it would have to be made
at Staadt; the 3d Battalion, 301st, which was garrisoning both Kastel
and Staadt, became the logical choice for the assault operation.

The 302d Infantry was also having difficulty finding a crossing site.
A possible location at Hamm was discarded because there was no road
leading to the river; moreover, enemy snipers were already emplaced
among the rocky heights on the far shore in this vicinity. Farther
south, outside the assigned bridgehead area, was the town of Taben
and there it was decided the regiment would cross for the road leading
into town was good and continued to the river. Below the town, it was
winding and steep leading to an old bridge completely demolished
by the Germans in their retreat across the Saar. The near bank was
found to be only a fair launching area while the east or enemy bank
was worse, since it consisted of a twelve-foot, vertical retaining wall
on which scaling ladders had been located at various intervals. Imme-
diately beyond the wall, and paralleling the river, were a highway and
railroad. Beyond these the terrain rose in a vertical rock cliff some
four hundred feet high. This escarpment was crowned by Hocker Hill.

Taben was practically everything that a good crossing site should
not be, but it was the only one available to Colonel Johnson. It was
free of snipers and in all likelihood the enemy would not expect an
American crossing at this point. Further, it was obvious that Hocker
Hill, because of its dominating position, would have to be secured
if the 302d was to protect the south flank of the proposed bridgehead
area. The 1st Battalion, 302d, which was located in Oberleuken, was
instructed to cross at Taben at 0400 hours on the morning of the 22d.

Concerning the disposition of enemy forces across the Saar, G-2
could supply little information. No patrols had yet crossed the river,
but it was logically assumed that the Germans were confused and
disorganized by the Division's drive of the past three days. It was a
known fact that the main defenses of the Siegfried Line or Westwall,
paralleling the east bank of the Saar, were perfectly sited to cover
the river and well constructed. The enemy had observation, prepared
fields of fire, ideal artillery positions, underground communications
and massive pillboxes, all protected by minefields and wire. The ter-

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t 919th Field Artillery Battalion was with the 3?(3tii Coi

Cavalry fur the corning operation,
: XX, Cor ps Hngi.neer< infarmed the .division that the 1 1 59r.h Engineer

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able only about sixty assault boats and five motorboats. These were
to be dispatched to Lieutenant Colonel Ellis at once.

When the corps boats had not arrived in the Division area by 2230
hours, Major Albert R. Hoffman, S-3 of the 319th Engineers, started
a search for the promised equipment. Two miles outside of Freuden-
burg, the boat convoy was located. The drivers of these vehicles had
pulled off the road and made themselves comfortable for the night,
but it was not long before the major had the trucks rolling again.
After some road difficulties and several delays, the sixty-four boats
arrived at Freudenburg where the convoy was split and half the assault
boats sent to each of the crossing sites.

At 2200 hours on the night of the 21st, Major Stanion in Oberleuken
received the regimental order directing the 1st Battalion to cross the
Saar at 0400 hours the following morning. It was well after dark and
there was no opportunity for detailed reconnaissance. Within a short
period of time, the battalion commander assembled his troops, loaded
them on trucks and started toward the bridge site. Company C, which
had been designated to lead the crossing, arrived in Taben first and
detrucked. At this time there was little enemy fire falling on the town
and from the engineers it was learned that the corps boats had not
yet arrived. Time passed — still the necessary river-crossing equipment
did not put in an appearance. At about 0500 hours, or one hour after
the designated time of crossing, the corps boats arrived at Taben. The
leading engineer vehicle was quickly unloaded and six assault boats,
each of which weighed one thousand pounds, were started down the
steep, twisting road to the river, manhandled by the infantrymen who
were to make the assault crossing. In the river valley the fog was as
thick as milk. Chemical smoke could not have provided better con-
cealment, but it was noticed that sound traveled extremely well in the
damp air. After an hour and five minutes of back-breaking work, the
first boat reached the water's edge. The men who had sweated and
strained to get it into position were utterly exhausted.

The time consumed in getting these first assault boats into position
led Lieutenant Colonel Ellis to make a risky decision. He ordered the
drivers of the unloaded boat trucks to cut their motors and coast down
hill to a point about three hundred yards from the river bank. This
was done and the remainder of the boats was soon at the crossing
site. These craft, of wooden construction, flat-bottomed, and about
twenty feet long, were each capable of accommodating twelve men plus

Taben Crossing

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

their personal equipment. Hence, the normal load for a single boat
during the crossing operations was its crew of two engineers and ten
infantrymen. Each of the occupants of a boat manned a paddle while
one of the engineers steered the craft from the stern.

At the water's edge, the troops discovered it was impossible to see
the far bank through the fog. From recent thaws, the river was swollen
and turbulent and the rush of the stream tended to cover the little
noise made by the men of Company C as they prepared to cross. Staff
Sergeant John F. Smith loaded his squad into the first boat along with
the engineers who were to man the craft, and at 0650 hours on Wash-
ington's Birthday, 1945, the crossing began. The seven-mile-an-hour
current made paddling difficult, but the far shore was reached without
incident. There, the twelve-foot retaining wall at the water's edge
was encountered, but the squad was fortunate in that it found a ladder
which the Germans had left in place.

Mounting the ladder, Sergeant Smith's squad gained the top of the
wall where they surprised two Germans standing outside a pillbox
and took them prisoner. Seven more PWs were taken from this same
box without a struggle. By this time, most of the 2d Platoon had
arrived and started forward to protect the crossing of the rest of the
battalion. The 1st Squad of the 1st Platoon followed and began a
search of the area to the left of the landing site. Fifty yards from
the first pillbox, a German soldier was spotted walking around a
second fortification. He was shot and the squad pushed farther north.
Soon the men encountered sniper fire which halted them until they
were able to outflank the opposition and push on downstream, where
they encountered a third box and took its occupants prisoner. It was
then decided to return to the crossing site. En route the four snipers
who had been by-passed were rounded up.

Back at the crossing, the squad leader reported to Major Stanion
who instructed him to move south next and eliminate any enemy in
position to the right of the slender bridgehead. Two hundred and
fifty yards up the river, eighteen more prisoners were captured from
another pillbox. Sergeant William Wollenberg, who speaks German,
took one of the prisoners with him to assist in clearing the other
fortifications in the vicinity. The sergeant persuaded his prisoner to
call to his comrades, telling them they were surrounded by a force of
four hundred fully armed Americans. This ruse netted another forty-
seven Germans. Private First Class James Stephenson was left to guard
these prisoners while the rest of the squad continued up the river.
Several more pillboxes were located and searched.

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To reinforce the bridgehead with their HMGs, the 1st Platoon of
Company D followed the rifle platoons of the assault company. In
turn, they were followed by Companies A and B each of which had a
section of machine guns from the 2d Platoon of Company D attached.
Enemy resistance consisted exclusively of sporadic sniper fire. The
only mishap in the operation occurred when one of the assault boats
capsized and four men were drowned.

Major Stanion's plan of advance called for Companies A and B
to pass through Lieutenant Robinson's men, who had scaled and cap-
tured the sheer heights of Hocker Hill, move down stream and secure
the battalion's assigned objectives in the town of Serrig. Upon being
passed through, Company C was to bring up the rear of the battalion
column. Prior to the jump-off of the leading companies, Lieutenant
Robinson sent a patrol down the trail that led from west of the sum-
mit of Hocker Hill to the road into Serrig. The patrol encountered
no Germans and after proceeding a short distance it returned. About
noon Companies A and B moved out as planned.

At the point where the above-mentioned trail joined the road into
Serrig, the Germans had built a pillbox in the semblance of a small
brick house. To the left, the terrain fell away sharply to the river
far below, while to the right, the ground rose still higher. Company
A, in the lead and marching in single file, passed this point unopposed.
As Company B reached the junction, enemy bunkers to the east opened
fire. However, by using infiltration tactics the company passed the
danger area. With the arrival of Company C, this enemy fire increased
in intensity.

Lieutenant Richards took a squad of the 3d Platoon up the hill
to silence some snipers who were engaging the company; at the same
time Technical Sergeant James Cousineau was instructed by radio to
lead the 1st Platoon over Hocker Hill and outflank the enemy posi-
tions. This maneuver proved successful, for the enemy withdrew as
Sergeant Cousineau's men advanced against their left flank. En route,
the 1st Platoon seized three unmanned artillery pieces of small caliber
on the trail that crossed the summit of Hocker Hill.

While this was taking place, Companies A and B were moving west-
ward along the heights above the river. To their front, across the open
ground in the valley, was Serrig. It was planned that Companies A
and B should attack the town while Company C held the high ground
to the east.

With Company A as they prepared for this attack toward Serrig
was Captain Bruhl of the 356th Field Artillery. When a group of

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tween the two battalions. Meanwhile, Company C of Major Stanion's
battalion, less one platoon, was emplaced on the high ground east of
town. Just after dark, the 3d Platoon of this company repulsed a
violent enemy counterattack. The night then passed quietly, but with
the coming of dawn there was another German assault which was
driven back only after an hour of sharp fighting.

Because of the fluid situation existing during the night of the 22d
and the morning of the 23d, it became impossible for the artillery to
learn definitely the front line positions of both battalions. Fearing that
fire missions requested by one of the infantry battalions might land
upon the other, Lieutenant Colonel Brimmer established a "No Fire
Line" east of Serrig. The infantrymen then proceeded with their task
of clearing Serrig without artillery support or assistance from the tanks
and TDs which had assumed positions on the ridge south of Staadt,
on the west bank of the Saar.

While the initial battalions of the 301st and 302d were crossing
at Taben and Staadt, other elements of the Division were busy com-
pleting former assignments or preparing to follow the assault units
into the newly won bridgehead areas. Along the river, in the towns
of Taben, Rodt and Hamm, the men of the 3d Battalion, 302d, had
watched and heard the troops of the 1st Battalion move down to the
Saar. The fog and later the smoke prevented their observing the actual
crossing, but they knew by the small volume of fire directed against
Major Stanion's men that things were going fairly well and that soon
they would be moving to the crossing site.

At about noon, elements of the 5th Ranger Battalion relieved Lieu-
tenant Colonel Cloudt's men and an hour later the battalion assembled
in Taben. Enemy artillery fire on the town had increased in intensity
and some machine-gun fire was being received from the cliffs across
the river. However, it was still little more than harassing fire. This
continued throughout the afternoon.

With Company L leading, the 3d Battalion began its crossing. The
boat carrying the mortar section of Company K capsized and all its
equipment was lost. By 2200 hours all elements of Lieutenant Colonel
Cloudt's command had crossed the river and started the long haul to
the top of Hocker Hill. The cliff was almost sheer and climbing the
steep trails that led up its face was exhausting work. Once they had
gained the summit, the three rifle companies organized a perimeter

defense.

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293

Early on the morning of the 22d the 94th Reconnaissance Troop
had been assigned the task of entering Saarburg to clear the town of
snipers. The 1st Platoon, led by Lieutenant Jack J. Hubbell, accom-
plished this mission with little difficulty. At the same time, the other
platoons of the troop cleared the woods and the pillboxes outside of
town.

The same morning, the 1st Battalion, 301st, moved by truck from
Orsholz to Trassem, preparatory to crossing the river at Staadt. The
2d Battalion, 302d, in Keuchingen, was alerted to follow Lieutenant
Colonel Cloudt's men across the Saar at Taben. Once over the river,
it would be their task to clear completely the river road leading into
Serrig and the cliffs paralleling it which were harboring many snipers.

Staadt Crossing

Shortly after midnight on the 21st, it became evident that the 301st
Infantry was going to have trouble making its crossing at 0400 hours.
Since the Company I patrol dispatched at 1 500 hours had not returned,
Lieutenant Colonel McNulty organized a second patrol and accom-
panied it to Staadt. It was decided to leave the battalion in Kastel
until the arrival of the assault boats which would have to pass through
the town en route to Staadt. Once the engineer convoy had cleared
Kastel, the battalion would start down to the river and, immediately
upon the arrival of the leading elements, initiate the crossing. Com-
panies I and K were to cross abreast of each other, in an attempt to
surprise the enemy and quickly capture the numerous pillboxes on the
flat, open east bank.

At 0500 hours a motor convoy was heard approaching Kastel, and
the battalion staff breathed a sigh of relief. Unfortunately, it was not
the long-awaited assault boats. One of the battalion motor trains of
the 302d Infantry had taken the wrong road out of Freudenburg.
There was no turn-about in town, so each of the vehicles had to be
wheeled around on the narrow main street and returned over the route
by which the column had entered town. As this was taking place, the
engineer convoy arrived and their passage through town was blocked
by the battalion train. Finally, the assault-boat convoy worked past
the infantry trucks; in the process, one of the engineer trailers ditched
and over-turned. As a result, it was 0615 hours before the trucks
carrying the assault boats cleared the town and the foot troops were
on their way to Staadt.

As the companies arrived at the crossing site, boats were unloaded
and carried toward the river bank. When all seemed ready, it was

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296

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

The BAR man with the group pinned down the enemy while the
scouts closed in for the kill.

This American fire attracted attention and several enemy machine
guns began to search the area. The company commander and his
party, which numbered only fifteen men, moved back to the river's
edge passing under the abutments of the old bridge. Taking advantage
of the cover of an embankment and a ditch, the party then worked
forward toward the first few houses in Serrig.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the company was spread up and down
the east bank of the river, in groups of one- and two-boat loads. At
the northern edge of Serrig, a group about the size of a squad had
taken shelter in an antitank ditch. Further advance was hindered by
enemy fire until Private First Class Robert L. Chapman leaped from
the ditch with his BAR blazing and charged a pillbox facing the AT
ditch. He worked his way to the rear of the box and there took his
first prisoner. With a little persuasion, this German talked the other
occupants of the box into surrendering. Then the rest of the squad
was brought forward and prepared to defend the pillbox.

As time passed and the rest of the company failed to advance, the
enemy began to close in on three sides of the newly won position.
Fearing capture, the squad elected to return to the antitank ditch.
Covered by the fire of Private First Class Chapman's BAR, the group
rushed for the ditch and made it safely. As Chapman moved to join
them, a grenade was thrown by one of two Germans who had worked
into position to flank the BAR man. Concussion blew Chapman into
the ditch, after which the enemy riflemen rushed forward wounding
him in the shoulder. Chapman killed both of the Germans, then took
position on the edge of the ditch until the squad had re-organized.

At Staadt, on the west bank of the Saar, the situation was also far
from desirable. Of the sixteen boats that made the first crossing only
six returned and none of these had sufficient paddles. It was later
discovered that in the excitement of landing many of the inexperienced
troops had carried their paddles ashore with them. Captain Horner
of the 319th Engineers sent a detail to salvage the boats and paddles
on the overturned trailer in Kastel and dispatched an urgent request
for outboard-motor boats to speed crossing operations. At 0825 hours,
word was received that the motors were on the way.

Although the enemy could not see the crossing site through the fog,
he sprayed the general area with incessant machine-gun fire. Snipers
who had been bypassed the previous day in the rugged terrain on the
American side of the river, soon began harassing the steep road from

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297

Kastel to Staadt and a patrol from Company L was dispatched to clear
them out. By 0930 hours, German artillery and mortar fire began to
land on Staadt and this added to the confusion.

As the sun's rays fell into the valley, the fog dispelled and enemy
observation improved. To counteract this, Company B of the 81st
Chemical Mortar Battalion dropped white phosphorus shells across
the river to screen the vision of the German gunners and OPs. Smoke
pots were also brought forward and ignited.

The mortar and artillery fire, which at first had been sporadic, began
to quicken. It increased in tempo and some of the few remaining
assault boats were hit; because of the shortage of craft, it was impos-
sible to send Company K over in a single wave. At 1140 hours, the
1st and 3d Platoons were loaded and moved across the Saar with in-
structions to contact Captain Donovan at the old bridge site. A ter-
rific artillery concentration sank two of the boats and punctured several
more. By noon when the outboard motors arrived there was only one
of the original assault boats still undamaged.

When the storm boats and their 22-horsepower motors were un-
loaded, spirits began to rise. With the outboards it would be possible to
quickly negotiate the river and deploy the rest of the battalion on the
east bank. As the motors were unpacked, it was discovered they were
new and had never been serviced. Hastily the engineers began this
task, but the noise drew additional and more accurate enemy fire. Two
of the storm boats and three of the operators were hit. Following this,
the servicing of the motors was continued in the basements of nearby
buildings where the outboards were tested in barrels of water. Since
there were no replacements available for the wounded boat operators,
it became necessary to draft inexperienced men to take over their jobs.
While this was going on additional assault boats arrived.

At 1455 hours, the remainder of Company K, commanded by Cap-
tain Warren, embarked and crossed the river. Lieutenant Colonel
McNulty, accompanied by his artillery liaison officer, Captain Donald
M. Aschermann; a Cannon Company observer, Lieutenant Rodney A.
Goodling; the CO of Company M, Captain Emanuel P. Snyder; radio
operators and runners, crossed with Captain Warren.

On the far shore as Lieutenant Colonel McNulty and his party
approached the bridge site, they found Captain Donovan waiting to
lead them forward to the shelter of the first few houses which had
been taken in Serrig. Most of Company K was concentrated in the
immediate area and constituted a large enough force to start pushing
into the town proper. However, before the advance could begin it

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

was necessary to eliminate some of the enemy machine guns whose
fire was whipping down the streets and between the buildings. To
locate these guns, Lieutenant Colonel McNulty decided it would be
necessary to lift the smoke screening the crossing. This was done and
the infantrymen had their first good look at the defenses of the main
Siegfried Line.

As the smoke lifted the Germans gained unobstructed observation
of the crossing site. The boats along the river's edge were accurately
engaged by the enemy's artillery and automatic weapons. A radio
jeep which was parked on the main street in Staadt was ripped and
riddled by a ten-minute machine-gun concentration and a 20mm gun
on the high ground east of Serrig blasted away at the hotel that was
being used as a command post and general assembly area. This fire
made it suicidal for the occupants of this building to step out of doors.
Attempts were made to move forward a tank destroyer to engage
these enemy weapons, but each time the motor was started the Ger-
mans threw over a terrific artillery concentration. At 1700 hours,
Lieutenant Colonel Hardin, the executive officer, was wounded by a
shell fragment from a round that landed in the doorway of the hotel
and had to be evacuated. It became obvious that any further attempt
at crossing the river before the coming of darkness would prove abor-
tive. Activity at the river was therefore halted and when darkness
settled on the valley, the terrible intensity of the enemy fire began to
slacken. But, even after nightfall, any noise in the vicinity of the
crossing site brought instant and accurate reaction from the German
batteries.

Across the river, Companies I and K proceeded with the task of
clearing the northern portion of Serrig; Company L crossed early in
the evening with only minor casualties. As the moon rose, a steady
volume of well directed small-arms fire was employed against all com-
panies. Request was made for smoke, and because it was not known
exactly how far the 1st Battalion, 302d, had penetrated into town, the
Chemical Mortar Company decided to place their white phosphorus
rounds between the railroad tracks and the river. This would provide
the desired smoke without endangering either of the attacking forces.

For the battalion the day had been one of close, hard fighting. On
one occasion, Captain Donovan, his radio operator, Private First Class
Early Corey and Private First Class Carl M. Flaherty formed a bazooka
team to knock out a German machine gun holding up the advance.
Late in the afternoon when ammunition began to run low it became

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299

necessary to collect rounds from the wounded. Three radio operators
in Company I were hit during the day, but miraculously the radio
escaped unharmed. One of the mortar observers had the sight shot off
his Ml by a German in the next building, while a machine gunner
from Company M had a box of ammunition disintegrate in his hand
as it was hit by a. burst of enemy fire.

It had taken all day and most of the night to get the battalion across
the Saar and punch a hole through the outer crust of the Siegfried
Line. But, by 0400 hours on the 23d the river front had been cleared,
nineteen houses in Serrig taken and the battalion was pushing south.

Technician Fifth Grade Petri of Company K, who speaks fairly good
German, found a resident of Serrig among the prisoners taken during
the day who professed to know the location of all pillboxes in the
vicinity. Using a telephone in one of the captured pillboxes, he made
contact with an occupied bunker and arranged for its surrender. The
agreement was for both parties to meet midway between the respective
boxes. Corporal Petri, his squad and the prisoner took off for the
rendezvous. They arrived at the designated point where they waited
for quite some time. When a surrender party from the enemy box
failed to appear, it was then decided to proceed to the German-held
bunker. As the Americans approached this position, a machine gun
opened fire. Corporal Petri had his bazooka team near the head of
the squad and immediately it engaged the pillbox. This first round
killed the German gunner and destroyed his weapon. The remaining
men in the bunker then surrendered. Encouraged by this success, the
squad repeated the operation. By daylight eleven pillboxes had been
cleared and 247 prisoners taken.

Private First Class Thomas A. Sudberry, a medic, made the crossing
with Company K. As soon as his boat hit the far shore, he dashed
across the fire-swept beach and worked forward to help some of Com-
pany Ys wounded. Thirty minutes later he returned to assist the
casualties inflicted on Companies K and M at the edge of the river.
While working on one of the wounded, a shell burst not more than
ten yards away. One man was killed and Private First Class Sudberry
and five others were wounded. With shrapnel in both legs and scarcely
able to move, the aid man refused to be evacuated. He moved about
the area administering to the wounded until about nightfall when his
supplies gave out. The following morning more medical supplies
arrived, but Private First Class Sudberry's legs had stiffened and he
could no longer walk. He persuaded two men to carry him around the

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beachhead and continued to administer first aid and plasma until addi-
tional medics were brought across the river.

A statement made by a German officer, Lieutenant Colonel Albrecht
Roeschen, subsequent to his capture in Trier is quoted in part below:

The defenses were far from completely occupied when the 301st and 302d
Infantry struck across the Saar. The river and hills were blanketed under a
thick morning fog which hung on the river till nearly 1000. Artillery and
mortar concentrations thundered down on Serrig, the noise echoing around the
hills many times magnified by the fog. Men in the pillboxes seemed so isolated,
unable to see anything or know what was going on. Then the men in Serrig
could hear the splashing of paddles and voices out on the river and the sputter
of an outboard engine. Nervously they opened up, firing wildly at the sounds,
hoping they could hit what they couldn't see. At Taben the first indication of
the American attack were men banging on the doors of the pillboxes and the
sight of a long file of men struggling up the hill and across the plateau west
of Hocker Hill. No one could have expected that the Americans would attack
across this steep country, but they did. By afternoon the Germans in Serrig
who had lost some houses west of the railroad tracks to the attack of the 3d
Battalion, 301st Infantry, were dazed by the sight of Americans attacking down
the hill from the east, from their rear. The 1st Battalion, 302d, swept down
into Serrig, seizing part of the town, before dark slowed down the operations.
At Ayl the defenders were amazed at mid-afternoon to see the 376th Infantry
advance across the open meadows toward the river and push their boats out
into the water in the very face of artillery and mortar fire adjusted from the
hilltops and machine-gun fire from the pillboxes along the base of the hill.
If there was any doubt about the American intention to cross the river, it was
dissipated by dark. They were coming across in force. The main crossing site
seemed to be at Serrig, Taben, and Ayl. At Serrig the 94th Division had a
foothold, but the crossing site was dominated by the observation on the hills
around the town. The Ayl crossing had been repulsed, but the crossing at
Taben, deep down in the river gorge, couldn't be reached by flat-trajectory
weapons. The best that could be done was to try to interdict and harass the
road leading to the crossing.

On the 22d some reinforcements were becoming available. General Pflieger
had been given command of the elements of the 11th Panzer Division, which
had not yet entrained for another sector; i.e., the II Battalion of the 111th
Panazer Grenadiers. This unit he pushed into an attack to seize and hold the
critical defile between Taben and Serrig through which the 1st Battalion, 302d,
had attacked.

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Chapter 31: THE SECOND DAY

BY 0655 HOURS on the morning of the 23d, the 2d Battalion,
302d, was completely across the Saar. Movement had begun
shortly after midnight and was harassed only by occasional artil-
lery fire which caused little damage. As elements of Company E
reached the far side of the river and scaled the retaining wall, they ran
into a twelve-man German patrol which had slipped through the
beachhead defenses in the darkness. The enemy seemed as completely
surprised as the Americans they encountered, and a small fire fight
developed which resulted in a speedy surrender by the Germans. Fol-
lowing this, a thorough search of the area was made and the perime-
ter strengthened. Crossing operations were soon back in full swing
and the remainder of the battalion was brought across without further
interruption.

To accomplish the battalion's mission of clearing the river road,
it was necessary to eliminate those enemy forces em placed in the
rugged cliffs paralleling the road and river. Major Maixner decided
to scale these heights and move the battalion along the ridge road.
A strong patrol was to be left at the base of the escarpment, to move
up the river road abreast of the remainder of the battalion above. The
former group would take care of any resistance that might be found
from the base of the cliffs to the river's edge.

Such a patrol started downstream toward Serrig, moving forward
slowly. The men checked the numerous pillboxes embedded beneath
the railroad tracks which paralleled the river road at a slightly higher
level. Most of these were empty and the patrol advanced to the south
side of the hairpin bend opposite Hamm. Here, late in the afternoon,
they met a party from the 1st Battalion, 302d, which had worked its
way upstream from Serrig. The road was clear of enemy and the only
obstacle to the passage of wheeled vehicles was a huge crater in the
vicinity of the Hamm bend. Once this had been filled by the engineers
the road would be passable.

Meanwhile, the rest of the battalion had moved up Hocker Hill and
along a trail behind it, to a point on the ridge road approaching the
vineyards which terraced the cliff opposite Hamm. Suddenly, Com-
pany F, which was leading the battalion, was hit by a hail of machine-
gun fire which forced the advance elements to fall back to better cover.
Several attempts were made to renew the advance but these were
stopped cold. With each successive thrust, the fire of the machine
gunners and riflemen of the II Battalion of the 111th Panzergrenadiers,
emplaced in the cliff on the north side of the hairpin turn, increased
in intensity and accuracy.

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Obviously, the battalion had hit a bottle-neck. On the left of the
road, the terrain fell away in an almost vertical cliff some four hundred
feet to the Saar River. To the right was another almost vertical cliff
which rose to terminate in an overhanging ledge. Looking straight
down the road to the positions now held by the enemy, the terrain was
completely exposed and swept by fire from the rocky cliffs on the
northern side of the bend. There was no room for maneuver. At-
tempts to push forward along the rock wall on the right of the road
were stalled by volleys of grenades which the Germans dropped from
above. A wire-mesh fence along the left of the road provided the
enemy above with a perfect backboard for bouncing grenades under
the overhanging ledge. Fortunately, the Germans seemed to possess
only concussion grenades. Potato-mashers, employed in the same way,
would have made the position absolutely untenable.

In short order, the enemy on the heights learned that the rest of the
2d Battalion was stretched along the road behind Company F. As
there was no overhanging ledge topping the cliff above the other com-
panies, the Germans employed their mortars. Enemy shells bursting
up and down the road tightened the bottleneck. Frantically the troops
attempted to dig in among the rocks. One of the HMGs of Company
H went into action on a small ledge to the left of the road and the
gunner sprayed the cliff on the far side of the hairpin bend in an
effort to neutralize some of the fire being directed against the battalion.
Time and again enemy mortar barrages were thrown over the hill in
an effort to knock out this weapon. The gun remained in action, but
throughout the day the battalion was unable to advance. With the
coming of darkness, patrols were sent forward to attempt to break
the stalemate. All were unsuccessful. Unknown to Major Maixner
and his staff, German troops had been pouring into this area for the
past twenty-four hours.

In Serrig the 3d Battalion, 301st, had cleared the area betweenthe
railroad and the river, after fighting most of the night. Patrols were
then sent to contact the 1st Battalion, 302d, which held most of the
town. The first 302d man encountered was Chaplain Harrison, and
soon thereafter, Lieutenant Colonel McNulty and Major Stanion were
comparing notes and making plans for the continuation of the assault.
House by house, the town was searched methodically and the enemy
snipers eliminated. Constant artillery and mortar fire fell on the two
battalions, but by 1820 hours the town was cleared. Both battalions
then assumed defensive positions for the night.

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303

At the Staadt crossing, the operation was progressing not too favor-
ably. The previous night the site had been cleared of enemy small-
arms fire, but artillery fire increased in intensity throughout the day
until it became more deadly than the direct fire had been. Company
C of the 319th Engineers replaced Company A and stretched a rope
across the river to facilitate ferrying. As the first boatload of men
attempted to haul their craft to the far shore by means of this rope,
it parted. The back-breaking job of paddling across the stream was
resumed.

In an attempt to cross the 2d Battalion before daylight, Colonel
Hagerty had issued orders to revert to the use of the storm boats and
take the resulting casualties. Mortor boats moved the first two pla-
toons of Company G to the far shore before the Germans were able
to react; but, soon mortar and artillery fire was pouring into the area.
By comparison, the concentrations of the previous day seem light.
Throughout the latter hours of darkness and the early morning, the
2d Battalion and the engineers took heavy losses.

Shortly after daylight crossing operations had all but reached a
standstill and Lieutenant Colonel Dohs came forward personally to
take charge. As the boats were about to push into the stream again, a
tremendous concentration hit the launching site. Casualties were ex-
tremely heavy. The battalion commander was killed instantly by an
almost direct hit from one of the enemy shells. Captain Sinclair of
Company F, who was forward on reconnaissance, was hit and mortally
wounded. Just before he died, he remarked calmly: "It took a big
one to get me." Captain Flanagan, battalion S-3, was knocked out by
concussion and had to be evacuated. On the beach, many of the bat-
talion and the engineers lay wounded, dead and dying. Not one of
the boats had escaped the weight of the murderous barrage, and more
assault craft had to be obtained before there could be any continuation
of the operation.

Undoubtedly, one of the greatest problems of the engineers during
this period was the supply of assault boats. The enemy shot up boats
almost as quickly as they were brought forward. Better than two
hundred were used during the entire operation and by the time the
infantry elements were across the Saar, there were only twenty-seven
craft still in operation.

Major George W. Brumley, regimental S-3, was given command
of the 2d Battalion following the loss of Lieutenant Colonel Dohs.
He arrived in Staadt at 1100 hours and by that time a limited number
of additional assault boats had been obtained. Fifty minutes later, the

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\d Battalion on the far side, When tins craft mad*' H>e round trip
wiily, '.'Major Brumley decided to ..attempt eroding the remainder of

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

....

The CO of the 30Ut Infantry inspecti som* of the fifty thousand hoUl*i t>? chGhipogtr* fn *h*
vettef of his CP at Serrio. V^onunately^ mpfit of liW srai tfifl $h**K

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After d&jffc this |&fie jijghr a platoon ot Company K jiioveu from

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306

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

observed in the vicinity of this aperture. Soon the figures were posi-
tively identified as German soldiers. Deduction was that the rear en-
trance to a pillbox had been discovered. The men of the platoon
crawled down a ditch to a sand pit on the side of the road opposite
this opening. Here the platoon assembled while a bazooka team went
into position to cover their further advance. In the attack which fol-
lowed, the enemy was completely surprised and quickly surrendered.
Fifty-four enlisted men and three officers were taken from the posi-
tion, which proved to be the German artillery fire-direction center for
the Serrig area.

Because of the difficulties which the 301st Infantry had experienced
from the very outset at Staadt and the comparative ease with which
the 302d was crossing at Taben, at 0900 hours on the morning of the
23d, Colonel Hagerty had recommended that his 1st Battalion be
attached to Colonel Johnson's command. This was approved. Al-
though the enemy fire in the vicinity of the 302d's crossing increased
with the coming of daylight most of the artillery fire was directed
against the town of Taben and a point on the river bank several hun-
dred yards from where the crossing was being made. For the most
part, the heights of Hocker Hill protected Colonel Johnson's crossing
from enemy fire.

Major Hodges, commanding the 1st Battalion, 301st, reported to
the 302d CP in Taben and was instructed to cross as soon as possible.
On gaining the far shore, he was to report to Lieutenant Colonel
Gaddis, the regimental executive officer, for definite orders. Instruc-
tions were so phrased because it was estimated it would take at least
six hours to move the battalion to Taben and complete crossing. By
this time, it would be impossible to say what the situation on the east
shore might be, and the executive officer of the 302d, who was on the
spot, would be better able to issue specific orders for the employment
of the attached unit.

While Major McBride, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 301st,
brought the command forward from Trassem by motor, Major Hodges
crossed the Saar to contact Lieutenant Colonel Gaddis. The order of
crossing was indicated as: Companies B, A and C, with a heavy-
machine-gun platoon attached to the two leading companies. These
units detrucked west of Taben and proceeded to the crossing over a
concealed route. Company A missed the road guide in town and, on
the sharp bend leading down to the river, was halted by enemy ma-
chine-gun fire from the high ground above Saarhausen. Lieutenant

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307

Wolf, who was leading the column, sent Staff Sergeant John T. Szy-
manski and Technician Fifth Grade John Lewis to the graveyard south
of the road in an attempt to neutralize the enemy fire. However, the
German position was too cleverly concealed for the two men to pick
up its location. About this time, Lieutenant Wolf was wounded by
the explosion of an 88, fired against an ambulance coming up from
the river. Both this ambulance and an engineer truck which was fol-
lowing were then brought under fire by the German machine gun and
the driver of the truck wounded. Following this, the company pulled
back into Taben from whence it proceeded to the river over the trail
used by the rest of the battalion.

At the river, Major McBride consulted with Major Hoffman of the
engineers who was using all available assault boats for the construction
of a footbridge. To hasten this operation, Company B helped the
engineers move the boats into position. At 1730 hours work was
completed and the companies started across. The ammunition bearers
of the mortar platoon were used to carry extra machine-gun ammuni-
tion and remained with the HMGs to act as a security force.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Gaddis had decided to relieve the
3d Battalion, 302d, holding the defenses of Hocker Hill, with the in-
coming battalion after dark that night. In the interval, Lieutenant
Colonel Cloudt's men were to attack north reducing a series of pill-
boxes included in the regimental objective. As planned, the relief by
Major Hodges troops was completed on the night of the 23d. Coming
down from Hocker Hill, the 3d Battalion, 302d moved north toward
Serrig via the river road.

The same evening the 5th Ranger Battalion was relieved of its patrol
mission along the west bank of the Saar and ordered across the river
at 1800 hours. Once across, Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan was to move
forward and establish a roadblock across the Saarbtfrg-Irsch-Zerf
road. Without incident the Rangers crossed and climbed Hocker Hill.
From here they headed off into the night on a ten-degree azimuth
to accomplish their mission, deep in enemy-held territory. To replace
this battalion on the west bank of the Saar, the 3d Battalion of the
101st Infantry Regiment, 26th Infantry Division, was attached to the
94th.

On the morning of the 23d the 94th Reconnaissance Troop was
assigned the mission of clearing Krutweiler on the west side of the
river. Company B of the 778th Tank Battalion and a platoon of Com-

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

pany B of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion were attached for the
operation. To secure the town, Captain Ashton decided to use his 1st
and 3d Platoons while the remaining platoon of the troop was to
occupy it once it had been captured. At 1600 hours the assault units
moved to the attack, following a preparation by the 4.2-inch chemical
mortars. Forty-five minutes later, after passing through an antiperson-
nel minefield, the troops took the town with little difficulty. During
the operation a good deal of enemy fire was placed on Krutweiler
from German positions across the Saar.

Throughout the day, the artillery experienced extreme difficulty in
executing counterbattery fire. Repeatedly, infantry elements would
report incoming mail and request that the enemy guns be neutralized
without supplying the artillerymen with accurate fixes on the German
batteries. As the day wore on, liaison planes spotted more and more
of the enemy gun locations and the artillery brought its weight to
bear. Enemy rocket batteries, which were highly mobile, caused a
good deal of trouble. They moved frequently, making it difficult for
the Division Artillery to catch them with their trails down.

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Chapter 52: THE THIRD DAY

THE 2d BATTALION, 301st, which had been withdrawn from
the Staadt crossing and designated Division reserve on the after-
noon of the 23d, began movement to the Taben crossing at 0300
hours the following day. The remnants of Companies F and G were
joined and placed under the command of Captain Otto P. Steinen.
For the rest of the operation, they were referred to as Captain Steinen's
Company. This composite unit, numbering in all about seventy men,
led the way to the river, followed by Company E which was reduced
to approximately fifty effectives. Prior to the crossing, the HMG
platoons of Company H were attached to the two rifle companies.
Moving to the bridge site, some of the men of this battalion passed
out from sheer exhaustion and had to be evacuated; in Rodt, the
medics of the 5th Ranger Battalion insisted that Captain Stokstad,
commanding Company E, be left in their care as he was on the point
of collapse. This was done and Lieutenant Edmund G. Reuter assumed
command.

At 0400 hours Captain Steinen's Company crossed, followed by
Major Brumley, the command group of the battalion, and Company E.
Lieutenant Reuter was without maps and had no definite idea of the
company's mission except that it was to cross the Saar. At the bridge,
he was informed by the engineers that the leading element of the bat-
talion had crossed just in front of him. Company E followed and
climbed Hocker Hill.

Initially Captain Steinen's Company moved to the high ground on
the right of the 1st Battalion, 301st. As the company came into the
open, the platoon commanded by Staff Sergeant Carl W. Hager, which
numbered about twelve men, was engaged by several enemy machine
guns. A firing line was established and Sergeant Hager prepared to
attack. Before this assault could be executed, the acting platoon leader
was knocked unconscious by concussion and Sergeant James C. Hul-
lender took command. About this time, Captain Steinen ordered a
withdrawal as the under-strength company had encountered an enemy
strongpoint. Farther along the line, a patrol led by Lieutenant Kenneth
E. Kearns moved against a German 88 position but was forced to
withdraw by the fire of an enemy machine gun protecting the artillery
emplacement. Shortly thereafter the 356th Field Artillery deluged this
position.

While Captain Steinen's Company was engaged to the right of
Hocker Hill, Company E was preparing to come up on his left. From
the company CP, a patrol under Lieutenant Reuter worked south to
study the terrain and determine the best location for a defensive posi-

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tion. While on this mission, a patrol from Battalion Headquarters
Company, led by Staff Sergeant John H. Kinnan, was met. As the
patrol leaders discussed the situation an enemy sniper opened fire.
Both groups moved against the sniper. As they neared his position,
several German riflemen engaged them and it soon became clearly
apparent that they had encountered an enemy strongpoint. The patrols
pulled back and a complete report of the situation was made to Major
Brumley. Since Company E now numbered only thirty-eight men, the
battalion commander directed that the twenty-two men of the battalion
Antitank Platoon be armed as riflemen and attached to the unit. When
this was done, Staff Sergeant George F. Fell took command of the
reinforcements. After a short artillery concentration, called by Lieu-
tenant Robert E. Trinkline, the company assaulted the enemy strong-
point at 1430 hours taking the position along with twenty-five pris-
oners. These PWs were found to be in a dazed condition from con-
tinual pounding by the American artillery. This accounted for the
ease with which their seemingly impregnable position was taken.
Following this, Company E established a defensive line and tied in
with Captain Steinen's men.

On the 24th of February the 1258th Engineer Combat Battalion was
attached to the 94th, relieving the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry which
reverted to corps control. At 1100 hours the same day, several other
changes were made within the Division. As dictated by the existing
tactical situation, several of the infantry battalions were temporarily
detached from their parent organizations and assigned to the other
regiment in the bridgehead. Thus, the 301st Infantry consisted of its
own 3d Battalion plus the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 302d, while
Colonel Johnson's command was composed of the 2d Battalion, 302d,
and the 1st and 2d Battalions of Colonel Hagerty's regiment. The
latter unit was less the two platoons of Company G which had crossed
at Staadt and were attached to the 3d Battalion, 301st.

This same morning the 3d Battalion, 301st, launched the first coor-
dinated attack since the crossing of the Saar. Object of the assault
was to seize the high ground north of Serrig overlooking the town.
On the battalion right, Company K was delayed by machine-gun fire
until Company I outflanked the enemy positions. Both companies were
then able to continue their advance. On the extreme left, the operation
did not fare as well. Company L, with two platoons of Company G
attached, was responsible for the west of the battalion zone. While
the Company G group was moving north between the river and the

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railroad tracks, Company L took the frontage from the railroad to the
road leading through the woods into Beurig. All efforts of the two
platoons of Company G to advance in the face of the numerous enemy
pillboxes were stopped cold. To their right, Company L met with
better success and soon outflanked these positions. Assault groups from
the latter company then dashed across the railroad tracks in rear of
the first box. After a short tussle the men of Company L took the
bunker. Following this, they advanced north along the tracks against
a second pillbox. Suddenly, there was machine-gun fire from the rear
and Lieutenant Glenn H. Gass fell mortally wounded. No guard had
been left on the captured bunker and German troops had hastily
reoccupied it. The Americans withdrew across the railroad tracks,
re-formed, and again assaulted the first box. It was reduced a second
time and two men were left to man the position as the rest of the
group moved forward. In short order the second box was taken.

Throughout the rest of the day the battalion advanced steadily.
Progress was slow on the left flank in the fortified area through which
Company L and the platoons of Company G were fighting their way.
Here pillboxes were cleared one after the other and by late in the
afternoon the high ground north of Serrig was occupied. The battalion
command post was set up in Saarstein Castle and a defensive line
established.

At Staadt ferrying operations progressed favorably throughout the
night of the 23d, but shortly after daylight enemy artillery again began
to land on the crossing site. A direct hit was made on a raft which
was ferrying a jeep, 57mm gun and a Weasel across the river. Before
it sank the raft was brought to shore and the gun and vehicles landed.
A second raft was then constructed. As this craft made its initial
trip across the river, another artillery concentration crashed on the
ferry site. Shortly thereafter movement was noticed on the cliff above
the crossing. A .50-caliber machine gun was put into action and its
crew ordered to rake the cliff at periodic intervals. Several hours later
three Germans who had been manning a radio surrendered. They
admitted that they had been in a concealed position on the cliffs, direct-
ing a portion of the enemy artillery fire which had fallen on the
crossing site since the morning of the 22d.

About noon of the 24th Colonel Hagerty arrived at Staadt and was
ferried across the Saar. The CO of the 301st was now in command of
all troops in the Serrig area. While his forward command post was
being set up in town, the colonel contacted the various battalion
commanders to gain first-hand information on the situation.

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Following the relief of the 3d Battalion, 302d, on the night of the
23d by the 1st Battalion, 301st, Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt had hoped
to use the ridge road into Serrig. However, the 2d Battalion, 302d
had not yet been able to force the bottleneck at the Hamm bend. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Cloudt therefore decided to attempt reaching Serrig by
way of the river road. This meant a passage below the 2d Battalion,
302d, and the Germans who were holding up the advance of Major
Maixner's men at the hairpin turn. In broad daylight, the entire 3d
Battalion marched around the Hamm bend on the river road without
having a single shot fired at it from the cliffs overhead. At 1130 hours
the battalion arrived in Serrig and shortly thereafter the battalion com-
mander made contact with Colonel Hagerty to whom his unit was then
attached.

To this point, corps had been able to supply the Division only one
M2 treadway bridge and barely enough floats to span the river. It had
been planned originally to put this first vehicular bridge at Staadt, but
due to the amount of enemy fire directed against this location, the
Division Commander directed the engineers to begin construction at
Taben. While the latter location was far from favorable, the heights
of Hocker Hill partially protected this crossing from the fire of the
German artillery. Construction was accomplished by the 135th Combat
Engineers assisted by Company A of the 319th. Operations began at
0230 hours on the 24th and were not completed until 1350 hours the
same day. Construction difficulties offered by the nature of the site and
the enemy situation alone were responsible for the excessive time con-
sumed in erecting the structure. The Brockway trucks could move to
the crossing only one at a time and had to run a 200-yard gantlet of
long-range German machine-gun fire to reach the river. Many of these
vehicles arrived at the banks of the Saar peppered with holes, but
fortunately none of the drivers was hit during the operation and not
a single vehicle stalled to block the narrow road. On the east shore,
the engineers had to breach the twelve-foot retaining wall along the
river with explosives. Moreover, a great deal of work on the approach
to the far bank was necessary. This was begun by hand and once the
bridge was completed, finished by an angledozer. An armored cater-
pillar was sent over the treadway bridge soon after its construction,
and along the river road to fill the crater in the vicinity of the Hamm
bend. As the cat worked on the huge hole, sniper fire ricocheted in
all directions from the steel-plated sides of the vehicle.

The first tank to cross this bridge settled one of the inshore pontons

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on some sharp rocks on the river bed. This punctured the ponton and
repairs were necessary before any further traffic could cross. To pro-
vide additional flotation, the west approach was heightened and the
remainder of the 778th column crossed. With the passage of the tanks,
enemy artillery fire increased, continuing into the night. Many times
pontons were punctured, but fortunately the bridge received no direct
hits. Engineers maintaining the structure repaired damaged floats im-
mediately and there was no interruption to the flow of traffic.

At 1800 hours the armored column arrived in Serrig where it was
met by the Division Commander. Following this, the 3d Battalion,
302d, pushed out to the high ground northeast of town. With little
difficulty, it cleared the ridge in its zone until the troops hit the last
pillbox. There the ridge top was perfectly flat and this box had its
automatic weapons sited for grazing fire. After several attempts had
been repulsed, a tank was brought into position. It was now only a
short while before daylight and, under the direct support of the armor,
the infantry closed on the position and reduced it.

This same night, Staff Sergeant James A. Graham led twenty infan-
trymen of Company B and four tanks to the hill east of Serrig where
the armor assumed positions. To lend local security, the infantry
remained with the tanks. It was hoped this movement might assist the
2d Battalion, 302d, to round the hairpin turn on the ridge road by
putting armor in rear of the Germans defending the cliffs. At the
same time Company A left Serrig and assumed positions on the left
of Company C. A composite detail from Companies B and C con-
tinued to occupy Chateau Wursberg, southeast of Serrig close to the
river.

While the 1st and 3d Battalions, 302d, were in process of securing
the high ground northeast, east and southeast of town, the 3d Battal-
ion, 301st, which had moved north of Serrig during the day, was
ordered to press forward another one thousand yards to the next stream
line. Toward this end Companies I and K organized a group of patrols
to sweep through the woods. A roadblock was also placed on the road
leading through the woods into Beurig, at the point where it crossed
the east-west stream. Company L and the two platoons of Company
G were to continue their task of clearing the pillboxes imbedded
beneath the railroad tracks at the base of the cliff. To get at these
boxes, the company climbed the hill and descended upon the enemy
positions from above and to their rear. It was slow work, but the only
reasonable method of tackling the problem. During the night the

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UNIVERSITY OF-'MICHIGAN

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

As they moved to Serrig by the river road during the afternoon, the
tanks that crossed at Taben were observed by the 2d Battalion. Plans
were then laid for a night attack to force the bottleneck. It was in
conjunction with this operation that the four tanks supported by an
infantry detail moved out of Serrig during the night. In the moonlight,
the battalion advanced once again and found itself able to move for-
ward with surprising ease. Most of the enemy had withdrawn and the
battalion pushed around the hairpin against only slight resistance. A
short distance farther, troops of the 1st Battalion, 302d, were encoun-
tered. Major Maixner's battalion then closed in the area of the 1st
Battalion. It was then that Company G discovered its 2d Platoon was
missing. This group had been protecting the flank of the battalion
when the platoon leader and platoon sergeant became casualties. The
rest of the platoon, not knowing the battalion was moving forward,
remained on their defensive position. On the following morning Ger-
man forces located the isolated platoon and drove it from position.
Also the enemy retook the pillbox at the Y-shaped junction where the
road from Serrig split at the Hamm bend. This severed the ridge road.
To rejoin the battalion, the 2d Platoon descended to the river road and
proceeded to Serrig via that route.

Prior to dawn a thirty-man patrol from Company A, 301st, cleaned
out this troublesome pillbox, killing seven Germans and taking twenty-
three prisoners before being driven back by a strong hostile counter-
attack.

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Chapter 33: THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DAYS

BEFORE DAWN of February 25, Company B, 301st, was in-
structed to maintain contact between the 1st Battalion, 301st,
on Hocker Hill and the 2d Battalion, 302d, in position east of
Serrig. Between the two units were three thousand yards of rugged
terrain. Lieutenant Cancilla put his company on the ridge road and
started over the route traversed by Major Maixner's men. The 3d
Platoon of the company was in the lead; as it reached the road and
trail junction, in the vicinity of the camouflaged pillbox, at the Hamm
bend, which had caused the 2d Battalion, 302d, so much trouble,
enemy machine-gun fire began to rake the area.

Lieutenant Richard E. Eckstrom, the platoon leader, ordered his
men to positions in and around the pillbox until some method could
be devised for eliminating the enemy or flanking his position. To the
left of the area were the vertical cliffs that fell away to the Saar far
below. To the front were occupied enemy positions. After a hasty
reconnaissance, Lieutenant Eckstrom returned to the pillbox just as it
was grenaded by two Germans. Several of the platoon were injured
and it was decided to evacuate the box.

Later, thinking the pillbox had been reoccupied by the enemy, a tank
of the 778th Tank Battalion pulled up and fired directly into the posi-
tion. Unknown to the tankers, two men of Company B and three men
from the 301st Field Artillery Battalion were still inside.

Five rounds were fired against the position and following this the
tankers brought forward a satchel charge to blow the door of the em-
placement. From within, a vision slit popped open and the tankers
were informed in no uncertain terms that the inhabitants were Ameri-
can. Luckily, the pillbox had withstood the assault of the tank's gun;
none of the men was hurt.

That afternoon Lieutenant Eckstrom and Technical Sergeant Robert
O'Hara planned a coordinated attack using both their platoons. Lieu-
tenant Paul Boland of the 301st Field Artillery arranged a preparatory
concentration and following this, the attack swept the objective. Hav-
ing lost this position, the enemy lashed out savagely with mortar, sniper
and machine-gun fire. At about this time orders were received for the
platoons to rejoin the company on Hocker Hill.

Immediately upon completion of the treadway bridge at Taben,
plans were made for a similar construction at Staadt since another M2
bridge had become available and there was little enemy fire then fall-
ing in that area. In addition, the ground dominating the Staadt crossing
site was entirely in American hands and the continued expansion of the

317

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318

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

bridgehead had forced the displacement of the German batteries which
had formerly shelled the area. The construction mission was assigned
to Company A of the 319th Engineers, which began work at 0800
hours on the 25th. By 1515 hours the same day this second bridge was

At 1030 hours on the morning of the 25th, XX Corps informed
the Division Commander that the 94th was to attack north from its
bridgehead. At the same time, the 376th Infantry, which was still
attached to the 10th Armored Division and had crossed at Ayl, was
to attack south to link the two bridgeheads. In addition the 94th was
to clear the road from the Taben site to Beurig and uncover the Saar-
burg-Irsch road so that armor could be committed to the east. The
10th Armored had been unable to put a bridge over the Saar at its
crossing site; as a result, its tanks were to move south and cross on the
bridges in General Malony's zone.

Traffic control had proved a major problem at the Taben bridge
during the early phases of the crossing. To prevent the recurrence of
such a situation, the Division staff produced a detailed traffic-control
plan which was to be supervised rigidly by the military police. This
plan established a series of control posts at Staadt, Kastel, Freuden-
burg, Weiten, Rodt, Taben and various points along the main roads
leading into the area. The 94th Signal Company connected these by
telephones, with the circuit so arranged that all posts could hear
instructions given other stations. Two MPs were placed at each posi-
tion: one manned the phone while the other controlled the flow of
traffic. A central control station was established by Lieutenant Colonel
Phillips, the G-4, in his office at Freudenburg.

Before a convoy was permitted to enter the road net of the controlled
area, its commander was obliged to call Traffic Control and report the
number and type of vehicles. The G-4 Section then indicated the exact
time at which the convoy might proceed and informed the various
numbered posts within the area of the approach of the column. Each
control post would alert the next by announcing the approach of a
column, and once it had passed would inform Traffic Control that it
had cleared. This extensive communications system also permitted
columns to be halted quickly in the event of enemy artillery fire on
any particular sector of the controlled area. Columns travelled well
dispersed and moved freely through the critical zone. Effective execu-
tion of this plan moved all organic transportation of the Division and
its attached units, along with most of the vehicles of the 10th Armored
Division, across the Saar in record time.

completed and ready for traffic.

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THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DAYS

319

To clear the area north to Beurig and secure the lateral route from
Saarburg to Irsch before the arrival of the armor in the Division bridge-
head presented a big problem. Since the 3d Battalion, 301st, and the
3d Battalion, 302d, were in the best positions to make the sweep north,
orders were speedily issued to them. Simultaneous thrusts were to be
made by Lieutenant Colonel McNulty's men, on the left, aiming at
Beurig and Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's battalion pushing to Irsch.

In front of the 3d Battalion, 301st, lay approximately 1,500 yards
of heavy forest and beyond this the fortified town of Beurig. Through
these woods the rifle companies moved, routing out snipers and re-
ducing machine-gun nests. Finally they reached edge of the woods
and looked down into Beurig. The ground was wide open, studded
with pillboxes and bunkers, wire entanglements and tank traps, com-
munication trenches and minefields.

On the edge of the woods Company I holed up in some houses and
waited for dawn. As the troops settled down to rest, mortar shells
began falling on and around the buildings they occupied. While the
shells were not of a heavy caliber, the concentrations were intense.
It was soon observed that they were coming from the vicinity of the
hospital east of town; judging by sound alone, it seemed as if only one
weapon was firing. If this were so, the German gunners were getting
as many as twenty-seven shells in the air before the first exploded. Be-
cause of this fire, the company was withdrawn from the houses into
the woods, which were receiving no attention from the enemy mortar.
The following day, when the area was cleared, a 50mm belt-fed mortar
responsible for the above concentrations was discovered in one of the
pillboxes taken.

At the same time Company I closed up to the edge of the woods
in front of Beurig, Company K, on the right of the battalion, was look-
ing down into Irsch from the edge of the woods in its zone. Farther
to the right on the high ground across the stream flowing north into
Irsch, Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's men were in position above the
town.

During the afternoon of the 25th, prior to the completion of the
tread way bridge at Serrig, Combat Command B of the 10th Armored
Division began crossing at Taben. CCB was to move up the river road,
through Serrig to the Beurig-Irsch road, where it would turn east to
gain access to the Zerf-Pellingen road which led to Trier. At Irsch
the tankers were to pick up their armored infantrymen who had
crossed into the 376th bridgehead opposite Ayl and were fighting
south.

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DAYS

323

sisted of his own 2d and 3d Battalions and the 3d Battalion of the
301st. Colonel Hagerty in the southern sector was in command of the
1st and 2d Battalions 301st and the 1st Battalion 302d.

During the afternoon of the 25th there was considerable activity
in the southern half of the bridgehead. On Hocker Hill, Company A
of the 301st was counterattacked by the 506th SS Panzergrenadier
Battalion which had just moved into the area. Against this assault, the
company's front held fast, though at one point the SS troops were
able to advance their lines to within seventy-five yards of the American
positions.

This same afternoon, Company B of the 302d, less the 2d Platoon,
which was operating against the pillbox area on the ridge road, re-
lieved Company C on the hill east of Serrig. The latter company
moved into town for a well earned rest.

At 1315 hours on the 25th the position of the 5th Ranger Battalion
astride the Beurig-Zerf road also received a determined enemy coun-
terattack. After several hours of bitter fighting, the Germans were
repulsed. In the fracas the Rangers took 120 prisoners.

In the area of the 2d Battalion 301st, Captain Steinen's company
jumped off at 1800 hours, passing through Company E to assault
Wackelser Fels, a hill to the south of Hocker Hill. Advancing behind
their own marching fire the men of the composite company were able
to seize part of their objective. However, the highest ground remained
in German hands by reason of the volume of machine-gun, sniper,
artillery and mortar fire the enemy was able to bring to bear. It was
almost impossible to dig in on the rocky terrain and with the coming
of darkness the situation continued extremely fluid.

February 26, 1945

At 1000 hours on the morning of the 26th the 3d Battalion, 301st,
launched its attack against Beurig. The open ground surrounding the
town bristled with enemy fortifications and the companies moved
forward slowly. Surprisingly, the first pillboxes were taken with a
minimum of effort and after this there was practically no resistance.
Cautiously, the troops advanced in the silent, deserted town. Houses
were checked methodically as the leading elements pushed to the
center of the town. Suddenly, activity was noted in the northern and
yet unexplored portion of Beurig. A quick scrutiny sufficed to confirm
the fact that the troops to the front of Lieutenant Colonel McNulty's
battalion were Americans. As the forces joined, the newcomers identi-

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'UNIVERSITY OF MICHFGAN

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DAYS

327

outside the first box. He grenaded the position, then persuaded the
enemy to surrender. Among the prisoners taken was a German NCO
who agreed to negotiate the surrender of the other boxes. In short
order, the platoon had all seven pillboxes and seventy prisoners to its
credit. Without difficulty the town of Saarhausen was entered and
the desired roadblock erected and manned by riflemen. That night the
platoon dined on fried ham and eggs prepared by a German housewife.
Furthermore, they continued to fare well for the two days they held
this position after being reinforced by the battalion antitank platoon.

The same afternoon, Technical Sergeant Frank S. Drobinski of Com-
pany C of the 301st, received word that if he returned immediately to
the battalion CP in Taben, he could leave for the States on a rotation
furlough. As he started down Hocker Hill, geysers of water were
being thrown up in the river by the explosion of enemy shells. Through
their glasses, men of the battalion intelligence section followed the
sergeant's movement down the hill and across the treadway bridge.
He made the trip safely.

In Taben enemy artillery fell with clock-like precision and sur-
prising accuracy. It was soon discovered the best time to enter or
leave town was immediately after the German artillerymen finished a
concentration. All supplies for the battalions on Hocker Hill passed
through town, were brought across the river and then hauled to the
units by carrying parties that climbed the steep cliff trails. Battalion
headquarters companies furnished most of the men for these details,
but cooks, mail orderlies and artificers were included in the columns.

Medical evacuation from the outset of the operation was extremely
difficult in the Taben area. Casualties had to be carried from Hocker
Hill and the surrounding heights by litter teams, hauled across the
river and up the steep and sometimes fire-swept road into Taben. Prior
to the 26th, ambulances approaching the bridge site were subject to
sniper as well as artillery fire.

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Chapter 34: THE FIGHT FOR THE HILLTOPS

ON THE 27th, General Malony received orders to continue the
expansion of the bridgehead to the line Geizenburg (exclusive)
to the river bend at Hamm and Division Field Order No. 14
was issued indicating eleven hilltops, west of the Ruwer River, which
were the next objectives of the 94th. Eight of these were in the zone
of the 302d Infantry. Between the men of Colonel Johnson's regiment
and these strategic bits of high ground were twenty square kilometers
of wooded terrain which would have to be cleared. The 2d and 3d
Battalions, 302d, were ordered to continue their advance toward the
most northern of these objectives, while the 3d Battalion, 301st, cut-
ting in rear of the above units, moved east to seize Hills 4, 5, and 6
which surrounded Zerf.

The 3d Battalion, 301st, moved out of Ockfen the morning of the
27th and arrived in Irsch about noon. Since the 10th Armored Divi-
sion had priority on the roads, there was little possibility of obtaining
or using vehicles to move the battalion east toward its objectives,
some eight thousand yards beyond Irsch. Loaded with full equipment,
the tired infantrymen started their long march. It was growing dark
as Company K turned south from the Irsch-Zerf road to move against
Hill 4. Between the company and its objective were 1,500 yards of
woods which would have to be cleared before the hill could be
assaulted.

Unknown to Company K, the 5th Ranger Battalion had been hold-
ing these woods for the last four days against repeated enemy counter-
attacks. In turn the Rangers were unaware that elements of the Divi-
sion were in the immediate vicinity. As the company reached a point
some five hundred yards within the woods, from the darkness ahead
came a sharp command to halt. At the same time the unmistakable
sound of a machine gun being cocked was heard. Somewhere along
the line a rifle was fired; instantly a fire fight developed. Lieutenant
Robert L. Vinue, certain that the command to halt had been given
by an American, dashed toward the Ranger lines shouting for them
to hold their fire. In this he succeeded, after a few minutes in which
both units swapped lead at almost point-blank range. The engage-
ment proved costly to Company K which lost three men killed and
seven wounded. These losses brought the effective strength of the
company down to fifty men. Checking with the Rangers, Captain
Warren learned that his objective was occupied by the enemy and that
there were pillboxes to his front which would have to be reduced. In
view of these facts, it was decided to await the coming of light to
reconnoiter the objective.

328

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THE FIGHT FOR THE HILLTOPS

329

Meanwhile the remainder of the battalion marched into Zerf under
the cover of darkness. Patrols were dispatched to Hills 5 and 6, which
dominated the town, to learn if they were occupied by the enemy.
When it was discovered the Germans held Hill 5, Company L took
positions in Zerf for the night and laid plans for an assault the fol-
lowing morning. Hill 6 was free of the enemy, so Company I moved
immediately to occupy this objective.

With the receipt of the new orders, the 3d Battalion, 302d, made
preparations for a continuation of the advance to the northeast, against
the high ground from which the 3d Battalion, 376th, had received
so much fire while it was practically isolated on Scharfenberg Ridge.
Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt launched his attack at 1750 hours, under
the support of all available antiaircraft, tank and tank destroyer
weapons he could muster. This fire literally riddled the rocky crest
of his objective. When the assault elements of the battalion were
within five hundred yards of the hill, the enemy holding the position
began to surrender. The concentrated fire of the .50-calibers and 75s
had been too much. The position fell without resistance.

In proceeding along the ridge, Company L encountered four mu-
tually supporting pillboxes and negotiated for their surrender. A Ger-
man first sergeant, who was in charge of the strongpoint, agreed to
yield if the Americans would stage a mock battle to save his reputa-
tion. Company L made the desired demonstration, after which three
of the boxes surrendered. The fourth refused to capitulate and since
it was now dark, an attack on the last pillbox was postponed until
morning.

In moving forward Company K had discovered some large caves
in the side of a hill. These were crowded with German civilians who
were placed under guard and moved to Irsch. In moving to the rear
the guards were fired upon by a nine-man German patrol, but after
the first shot or two the attackers lost their ardor and elected to join
the captives. Meanwhile, the battalion continued forward and by 1950
hours all assigned objectives had been taken.

To the right, the 2d Battalion, 302d, also received orders during the
afternoon for a continuation of the advance. Since much of the ground
in its zone was open and without cover, Major Maixner elected to
accomplish his mission after dark. At 1915 hours the battalion moved
forward. The ridge to its front was taken without difficulty and the
advance continued. As Company F moved across a bald hill, the lead
scouts found themselves face to face with a group of Germans. Open-

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THE FIGHT FOR THE HILLTOPS

331

ing area. Throughout the 27th and the 28th the company continued
to hold these positions with little difficulty.

Also on the 27th the troublesome pillbox at the Hamm bend on
the ridge road again was taken. Led by Lieutenant Arthur A. Shock-
snyder and Lieutenant Eckstrom, the 2d and 3d Platoons of Company
B, 301st, reduced the position with a two-pronged attack which also
cleared the surrounding area. This action lifted the last German ob-
servation north of Taben within the Division zone.

To clear the heights of Wackelser Fels, the 2d Battalion, 301st,
launched another attack on the 27th. Perfect enemy observation from
the heights above and the understrength condition of Captain Steinen's
Company and Company G prevented the battalion from storming its
objective. Following this unsuccessful thrust, the lines reverted to the
same general positions previously held by Major Brumley's men. During
the morning Staff Sergeant Murry W. Forsyth of Company H, who
was manning a Company OP, was hit in the legs and back by artillery
fragments. He remained at his post, continuing to direct the fire of the
2d Battalion's 81s until late in the afternoon when he was carried from
the position. After dark Private David H. Troupe, a recent reinforce-
ment to Company E, was included on a patrol because of his ability
to speak German. When his party was challenged by an enemy sentry
in the vicinity of a known German strongpoint, Troupe snarled
angrily in German, "Shut your mouth! What do you want to do, call
the officers?" The patrol then moved off unmolested.

As the light of dawn was beginning to filter into the foggy valley
of the Ruwer River on the morning of the 28th, Company L launched
its attack against Hill 5. The enemy was taken completely by surprise
and the battle was short-lived. Things then remained fairly quiet
until about 1515 hours when, preceded by a ten-minute artillery con-
centration, a force estimated at one German rifle company stormed
out of the woods against the hill. Supporting the German infantry
were six tanks which rumbled up the road east of Hill 5. For half an
hour the battle raged at close quarters before the enemy was repulsed.
Following this engagement fourteen PWs were marched into Zerf.

Company K spent the morning of the 28th conducting reconnais-
sance, forming assault squads and completing plans for their attack
on Hill 4. At 1400 hours Captain Warren's men jumped off moving
slowly forward in the face of heavy fire from six well manned pill-
boxes. One by one these boxes were reduced by assault groups which
effectively employed their demolitions against embrasures and bunker

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332

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

doors. After two hours of hard fighting the hill was cleared and
occupied.

The battalion had gained all its objectives, but was scattered over
better than four thousand yards of frontage, holding Hills 4, 5, and 6.
Between these strong points the enemy was free to infiltrate, hampered
only by American patrols. Total strength in riflemen of the three line
companies did not exceed two hundred men. To make matters worse,
the amount of enemy artillery and mortar fire falling on the American
positions increased. A German 88, zeroed on the big bend in the road
southwest of Zerf, sniped at every vehicle entering or leaving town
and a shell fragment from this piece neatly removed the windshield
of General Malony's escort vehicle on one of his trips to Zerf.

The following morning the enemy again attacked Hill 5 in an
attempt to regain this valuable piece of terrain which afforded un-
obstructed observation of the town of Zerf and the American main
supply route which passed through it. This attack was repulsed, but
not without losses. Lieutenant Minnich, who had assumed command
of Company L a few days before, was among the wounded; command
passed to Lieutenant Robert H. Henley.

Hour by hour as the day progressed, the volume of mortar, artillery
and rocket fire on Zerf and the road into town increased. Before long,
and with good reason, the area was dubbed Dead Man's Corner. Be-
yond the town, the Division's strongpoints were pounded relentlessly
by the enemy. German patrols probed the area and minor counter-
attacks were frequent. Whenever things quieted, the men on the hills
took what steps they could to improve their positions. Wire entangle-
ments were spread, antitank mines and booby traps laid and trip flares
installed to warn of the enemy's approach. Between the strongpoints
and among the gaps in the final protective line fires, numerous pre-
arranged concentrations were plotted for the mortars and artillery.

On the morning of the 28th, Company L of the 302d moved against
the pillbox which had refused to capitulate after the mock battle.
As the infantrymen closed for the kill, the Germans manning the
bunker thought better of their decision and surrendered. Following
this action, the battalion received some badly needed reinforcements
and these were apportioned among the companies. However, even
with the new men the number of effectives was so low that one platoon
of Company K was attached to Company I and another to Company L
to form two moderate-sized units.

At 1605 hours the battalion continued its attack. On the next hill

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THE FIGHT FOR THE HILLTOPS

333

both Companies I and L encountered manned pillboxes. Company I
employed its attached platoon in a flanking movement to the right,
while the remainder of the company launched a frontal assault. After
a hard fight all positions in the company zone were reduced by 1940
hours. Company L had particular difficulty in reducing the last pillbox
in its sector. Yelling from the embrasures, the Germans lured a pla-
toon sergeant forward to negotiate a surrender, then shot him with
their machine gun. This action spurred the company to greater effort.
A satchel charge was worked forward and detonated against one of
the pillbox's embrasures; following this the enemy decided to yield.

Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's men then reorganized and moved off
through the dense woods on a compass bearing, against the next enemy
strongpoint they were scheduled to reduce. It was extremely dark as
the troops pushed down the steep slope to their front, into a ravine
and up the rugged slope on the far side. The battalion advanced
steadily but could find no trace of enemy pillboxes. In all directions
the woods were searched without a single bunker being discovered.
When daylight came and the objective had still not been located, the
artillery was requested to fire a smoke shell on the coordinates of the
enemy position. This shell exploded about one thousand yards to the
rear of the battalion; there the pillboxes were located. So cleverly were
these positions camouflaged that the scouts of the battalion had
walked over them in the darkness without detecting their presence.

The 2d Battalion, 302d, after receiving its replacements, attacked
at 1425 hours on the 28th, with its three rifle companies abreast. All
companies moved forward rapidly, mopping up a few scattered snipers
and some machine gun nests. On reaching the top of the ridge, Com-
pany F swept onward and with little difficulty occupied Hill 7. Com-
pany E moved into Baldringen where a hot street fight developed as
the enemy put up the first determined resistance since Irsch. Progress
was slow, but by 1845 hours the entire battalion was on its objective.

The following morning at 1030 hours Major Maixner's men moved
forward in the last phase of their attack, when Company F pushed
down the forward slope of Hill 7, into Hentern. German civilians
in the town presented a big problem as this was the first town in which
the civil population had remained to face the Division's advance.
Civilians were rounded up and herded into the schoolhouse in the
center of town where they were placed under guard. Staff Sergeant
Paul Pflueger continues the story.

In the early afternoon Private First Class Philip Moscinski and Private First

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Class Donald Lundquist came running to the outpost where I was stationed to
report that the schoolhouse was in a wild state of excitement because one of the
women was going to have a baby. All of the civilians were jabbering, so they
wanted me to try to restore order by speaking to them in German. Just as I
started in the direction of the schoolhouse, the expectant mother dashed down the
road, past our farthest outpost, over a small bridge to a house near the edge of
the woods which was held by the Germans. Despite the confusion created by a
group of excited civilians who gathered around me, I managed to find one old
woman who would act as midwife. She, Technician Fifth Grade Oscar Sommer-
ford [1st Platoon aid man] and I hurried to the house and into the basement
where we found the frightened woman. She had fled from the crowded school-
house to find a comfortable couch and a clean spot to have her baby. With
the aid of two other women, the midwife, Oscar and I prepared hot water
and clean bandages. Sommerford and I were like fish out of water. Neither
of us had ever been present for a childbirth, except our own. We hoped the
baby would come before nightfall, so that we could evacuate the whole group
to the center of town and have the security of the outposts. As it was, the
Germans could walk in on us without the knowledge of our outposts. But,
the baby didn't cooperate.

Six o'clock came. It was nearly dark outside. Sommerford decided to go to
the company CP to phone Captain Siegel at the aid station for instructions. I
was left behind in the candle-lit basement with the women. Some distant artil-
lery shells were bursting. With every explosion the women became terrified and
fell on their knees to pray in a droning, tearful way . . . "Heilige Maria' . . .
the young mother was in her labor pains. I had to help her strain, massage
her stomach and see if the baby was on its way. Time ground on. Seven o'clock.
Eight o'clock. It was now pitch-dark outside the bolted door. I kept thinking
to myself: I wonder what the Germans will do if they find me here? Especially
if they see the Luger pistol I took from a Nazi noncom after crossing the Saar.

Suddenly there was a sharp rapping at the door. I was relieved to hear the
voice of Sommerford and quickly opened the bolt. He told me we had orders
to draw back into town immediately as there was another report of a possible
counterattack. The baby was about to arrive. (I heard the next day a bouncing
boy made his appearance five minutes after we left.)

Leaving the scared women, we started out into the blackness. You couldn't
see your hand in front of your face. It was impossible to detect the road, you
had to feel it with your feet. We almost missed the bridge, which was packed
with dynamite, ready to be blown in case of an enemy attack. Just across the
bridge was a tank blockade of logs in which an opening had been sawed. Wav-
ing my hands in front of me, I felt the rear end of a horse which was standing
defiantly in the middle of the opening. I hit him with my hand and then the
butt of my rifle trying to get him to move. Instead he kicked out viciously with
his hind legs, hitting me directly in the stomach (which fortunately was padded
by a blanket I was carrying). Then the horse galloped off. Moving ahead,
Oscar called to me, "Hey, Pflueger, come over this way. Here's the road over
here." Just then I heard a loud splash. Oscar had mistaken the creek for the
road. Somehow we managed to feel our way to the company CP without
further incident.

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Company G, on the left of the battalion, swung to the east as it
cleared the last of the woods in its sector and moved across the open
ground to Paschel, Schomerick and Hill 8. Small groups of snipers
left behind by the Germans to delay the American advance were
quickly wiped out, and the battalion was in possession of its final
objective by 1300 hours on the 1st of March. Defensive positions
were prepared and continually improved during the following days.

The 2d Battalion, 301st, on the extreme southern flank of the bridge-
head, also continued to improve its positions on the 28th. The bat-
talion's lines were stretched thin and the enemy held considerable
ground which looked down on Major Brumley's position. Although
the situation was undesirable, this line had to be held.

Also on the 28th, the 5th Ranger Battalion, after assisting the 3d
Battalion, 301st, in the capture of Hill 4, moved forward and took
Hill 3 at 1540 hours after encountering stiff enemy resistance. At 1745
hours the Germans struck back with a counterattack which was re-
pulsed after Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan's men had inflicted heavy
casualties on the enemy and taken 150 prisoners.

On the 1st of March the 1st Battalion, 302d, attacked during the
morning to gain Hill 2, southeast of Serrig. Companies A and C
launched this thrust while Company B remained in a defensive posi-
tion on the left of the battalion sector. About three hundred yards
across the line of departure, the assault companies were hit by a hail
of enemy rocket, artillery, mortar and small-arms fire. Both units, al-
ready pitifully under strength, suffered heavily. In Company A, Ser-
geant Chester Burns was the only one of his seven-man squad to
escape death or injury. Some of Company Cs squads were down to
two men. As the advance stalled, the men dug in at the point of their
farthest advance. These positions were in full view of the high
ground held by the enemy from which they were pounded relentlessly.
About the middle of the afternoon, the intensity and accuracy of the
German fire forced the companies to withdraw. The battalion fell
back to its original lines where the troops dug in for the night.

In conjunction with the assault of the 1st Battalion, 302d, Company
A of the 301st, on the right of Major Stanion's command, moved for-
ward. The object of its advance was to hinge the left flank of Major
Hodges' battalion on the right of the 1st Battalion, 302d, if the attack-
were a success. Company A also encountered determined resistance
and stopped when the battalion on its left was halted. During the
attack, a section of Company D's machine guns, under Lieutenant

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Howard P. Rives, supported Company A. By the time the rifle pla-
toons began to withdraw, only two men and the lieutenant were still
in the action. Company A's strength had been seventy-five riflemen
when it moved to the attack. As it withdrew from this unsuccessful
venture, there were only twenty-eight effectives left.

On the evening of March 1, 1945, the 2d Battalion, 301st, obtained
an accurate bearing on some German mortars which had been causing
quite a bit of trouble. A fire mission was requested, but the 301st
Field Artillery could not respond immediately because of a priority
mission. Consequently, the task was bucked to Cannon Company of
the 301st, and six 105mm infantry howitzers went into action. The
mortars were silenced and enemy prisoners later reported this fire also
broke up a German counterattack by falling on the assembly area in
which it was forming.

The 3d Battalion, 302d, making a wide turn, pushed forward at
1115 hours on March 1, 1945. Companies I and K were to clear the
last of the woods while Company L remained in reserve. Encountering
little resistance, the assault companies soon broke into the open and
crossed the Zerf-Pellingen road which was the main route into Trier.
Through the afternoon the advance continued eastward and by 1830
hours, Company I had taken Lampaden and Company K was in
Obersehr. Early the following morning, they moved forward again
and by 0837 hours had occupied Hills 9, 10 and 11. During the after-
noon Company L was brought forward to Paschel to be within sup-
porting distance of the rest of the battalion.

At 0900 hours on the 2d of March, the 1st Battalion, 302d, attacked
Hill 2 for the second time. Fifty minutes later it made contact with
the 5th Rangers on the left and the assault forces continued forward
slowly, against increasing resistance, until shortly after noon when the
leading elements gained a foothold on the northern portion of the
objective. A patrol was then dispatched to the Rangers to request tank
support with which it was hoped the remainder of Hill 2 could be wron.
At 1426 hours Major Stanion's battalion reported to the 301st Infantry,
to whom it was attached, that thirty-seven men, elements of Companies
B and C, and a section of HMGs from Company D, were on the
northern half of the objective. This force represented remnants of
the 175 men who had jumped off for the attack at 0900 hours. There
was still no word of the fate of the patrol which had been sent to the
Rangers for tank support when the enemy launched a violent counter-

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attack at 1818 hours and drove the small force from the hill. In this
engagement the depleted companies again suffered heavily. One
enemy concentration alone, employed in the neighborhood of 200
rockets.

As on the previous day, Company A of the 301st attacked to tie in
on Major Stanion's right should Hill 2 be taken. The desired contact
was made about noon, but the enemy's counterattack dislodged the
company. Determined to hold the hill in question, the Germans were
willing to sacrifice the men necessary to accomplish this end.

On the morning of the 3d, Company C of the 302d, which had been
able to muster about seventy men, jumped off at 1000 hours to storm
Hill 2 again. En route it was held up by the intensity of the enemy's
fire. The battalion commander went forward to the company CP and
after personally checking the situation, sent his S-3, Lieutenant Robert
L. Woodburn, to Colonel Hagerty to explain the depleted condition
of the battalion and the impossibility of this understrength force taking
the assigned objective. As a result, the mission of the battalion was
changed. The 1st Battalion, 302d, was instructed to hold what ground
it had and establish contact with the units on its flanks. Orders were
received for the relief of this battalion by elements of the 3d Battalion,
376th, the following day.

While these actions were taking place along the front, the Division
engineers were destroying the pillboxes and bunkers of the Siegfried
Line which had already been taken. Many of the boxes held large
stores of ammunition with which they could be blown up readily.
Where the explosives on hand were insufficient for complete destruc-
tion, additional enemy ammunition was hauled forward from the
German dump in the vicinity of Beurig. In addition to handling demo-
litions, the engineers had their ever-present jobs of supply and mainte-
nance throughout the Division area.

During this period, February 27 to March 2, the Division added
1719 prisoners to its ever mounting total with scores of 556, 650,
278, and 235 on succeeding days.

With the exception of Hill 2, the objectives outlined by Division
Field Order No. 14 had been taken. All that remained was to hold
the bridgehead until additional troops could be brought into the area
by XX Corps for a new push to the east.

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Chapter 35: CT 376

ATTACHMENT OF THE 376th Combat Team to the 10th Armored
f\ Division was continued by Corps Field Order No. 11, which
XjJL also directed the tankers to effect a crossing of the Saar on the
morning of February 22. After taking their objectives of Wincheringen
and Bilzingen, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 376th were ordered into
Mannebach and accomplished the movement by marching. The 1st
Battalion, in regimental reserve, was picked up in Nennig and moved
by truck to join the rest of the regiment. At the same time the regi-
mental command post moved to Mannebach.

When Colonel McClune received orders from the 10th Armored
Division calling for an assault crossing of the Saar at 0400 hours on
the morning of the 22d, he dispatched liaison officers to contact his
various subordinate commanders and have them report to him without
delay, for a river crossing on this short notice presented numerous
problems. Adding to the enormity of the task was the swollen condi-
tion of the Saar and the fact that the main defenses of the Siegfried
Line lay just beyond it. No one had yet seen the river or the pillbox-
studded hills to the east, for the armored infantry was still engaged
in clearing the area west of the Saar from which the crossing would
have to be made. However, a map reconnaissance presented anything
but a pretty picture.

It was well after dark when the staff and commanders assembled
to receive the attack order. The regimental commander announced
that he had decided to employ two battalions abreast for the operation.
Lieutenant Colonel Thurston's 3d Battalion was to cross directly east
of Ayl and seize the steep bluffs north of Ockfen. The 1st Battalion,
under Lieutenant Colonel Miner, would cross several hundred yards
up stream to take the high ground south of town. Upon securing these
dominant pieces of terrain, the remaining battalion was to cross at
the northern site and assault Ockfen. Regimental objective had been
designated as Scharfenberg Ridge, located three thousand yards east
of Ockfen and looking down the valley formed by the two hills men-
tioned above. Once the entire regiment had crossed and seized its
initial objectives, the two flank battalions were to push east to the final
objective. With all three of these pieces of high ground secured, the
armor would have a bridgehead through the defenses of the Siegfried
Line. It was hoped that the Saar could then be bridged and tank
columns driven eastward, deep into the enemy rear. At about 2100
hours the meeting terminated. The infantry battalions and supporting
units began their preparations for the crossing.

Following the issuance of the attack order, the regimental com-

340

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mander decided to conduct a personal reconnaissance of the crossing
site beyond Ayl and at the same time to select a CP location within
the town. As his jeep rolled down the hill toward town, movement
could be seen through the darkness on the road ahead. The driver
slowed his vehicle, expecting to be challenged by an American sentry.
Then, one of the figures in the road became silhouetted — the dis-
tinctive outline of a German helmet was clearly visible. Luckily, the
enemy was as startled as the colonel and his driver. The jeep was
slammed into reverse and a hasty retrograde movement began. Return-
ing to Mannebach, Colonel McClune contacted 10th Armored Division
headquarters and was informed that the armored infantry was about
to take the town of Ayl.

The regimental kitchen trains had pulled into Mannebach after
dark; but before they could begin feeding, orders were received to move
to Ayl. In some of the companies, chow lines had already formed and
most of the men had liberated chinaware for their first hot meal in
days. As the prospects of a good meal faded, the plates were tossed
into the streets with a clatter; the troops shouldered their gear.

It was midnight before the leading elements of the 1st Battalion
entered Ayl, prepared for any eventuality; but in short order they en-
countered the armored infantrymen who had taken the town a little
while before. Lieutenant Colonel Miner's men then closed into Ayl
followed by the 3d Battalion. The 2d Battalion moved into the woods
on the hill behind town.

No assault boats had yet arrived, so Colonel McClune again con-
tacted armored division headquarters. He was assured the boats were
on the way and would arrive in time for the crossing. Since the fog
in the river valley was thick and to avoid any delay once the craft did
arrive, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved into position for their re-
spective crossings. 0400 hours, the designated crossing time, came and
went. Still there were no boats. Daylight began to break, but heavy
fog continued to blanket the river and the surrounding area. Conse-
quently, the troops were held in position. Against the time when the
fog would lift, smoke generators were moved forward and placed on
call. Late in the morning when the fog began to dispel and the boats
had not put in an appearance, the troops were withdrawn to Ayl
where they were dispersed in the buildings throughout town. Shortly
before noon, a small number of assault craft arrived, but they were
insufficient for a crossing operation involving a full infantry regiment
and its resupply until such time as a bridge could be constructed.

During the afternoon, General George S. Patton, Jr., U.S. Third

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Army commander, visited the 10th Armored command post and was
extremely perturbed that the crossing had not been initiated. Several
phone calls were made concerning the proposed operation and at 1625
hours orders were received by Colonel McClune to "cross at once."

The smoke generators went into action and soon the river valley
in the vicinity of the crossing sites was filled with dense, billowing,
white smoke. As the leading companies of each battalion moved to
the river, the enemy threw over some harassing artillery and mortar
fire and searched the area with automatic weapons. However, the
smoke denied all observation.

Then something went wrong and the smoke generators, many of
which had been damaged by the constant enemy machine-gun fire,
ceased to function one by one. A slight breeze in the valley dispelled
the smoke and before long the enemy had unobstructed observation
of the crossings. Their OPs registered and every German weapon
within range was brought to bear on the American positions. Mortar
and artillery fire rained on Companies C, L and the precious river
crossing equipment. Captain Brightman of Company L was killed and
Lieutenant Cornelius, commanding the 1st Battalion's assault company,
was wounded and had to be evacuated. As the tempo of enemy fire
increased, all hell broke loose. To avoid a slaughter, the troops were
ordered back to Ayl and frantic attempts were made to put the genera-
tors back into action. Many of these machines were riddled and useless.
In addition, the volume of enemy fire made it almost suicidal for the
generator operators to leave the cover of their foxholes. Not a single
boat escaped destruction and crossing operations came to a complete
halt.

10th Armored Division was informed of the situation and Colonel
McClune was requested to estimate the earliest possible time at which
he could resume crossing. To this he replied, "One hour after I
receive sufficient boats." Additional craft were promised.

At 2130 hours, the second shipment of assault boats began to arrive
at Ayl. Fog had again settled in the river valley and conditions seemed
ideal for a crossing, which was then scheduled for 2300 hours. The
boat convoy slipped through town and east to the junction with the
road paralleling the river. There the boats were divided, each of the
assault battalions receiving half of the shipment.

As H-hour approached, the advance elements of both battalions
again moved out of town. With Company C in the lead, the 1st Bat-
talion marched down the road east of Ayl and into position on the
flat, open plain along the river. The 3d Battalion used the road lead-

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ing north from town until it reached the small stream northeast of Ayl.
Then, leaving the road, it followed the stream down to the Saar. Com-
pany L, originally designated as the 3d Battalion assault unit, had
suffered heavily on the river bank during the first attempt and as a
result, Company I was assigned the lead.

The boats were moved to the river bank where the men who were to
man them waited impatiently for the last few minutes before crossing
time to tick away. Tension was great and the memory of the effective-
ness of the enemy fire during the afternoon made the short delay seem
an eternity. Then, suddenly the waiting was over. Down the line came
the signal to move forward.

The men jumped for the boats and paddled furiously into the swift-
moving stream. For the most part they were inexperienced in handling
assault craft and it took considerable time to negotiate the river. As
the boats grounded on the east bank, the infantrymen leaped ashore
and dashed forward while the engineer boat crews turned their craft
about to start back for the second wave.

In Company I's sector there was no initial resistance from the pill-
boxes that dominated the east bank of the Saar. Lieutenant William R.
Jacques, commanding the company, had his assault squads push for-
ward rapidly toward the enemy positions they were scheduled to re-
duce. Wire was encountered and breached and still there was no fire
directed against the company. Pushing farther forward, the assault
teams closed on the first pillboxes and began routing out the German
defenders. Then the silence was broken as local clashes for individual
bunkers began. Most of the enemy defenders quickly yielded, but a
few had to be dug out of their concrete emplacements the hard way.
It seemed impossible, but the 3d Battalion achieved complete surprise.
In an amazingly short time, Company I was atop the sheer cliffs of
Irminer Wald. To the south, could be heard the sounds of heavy
fighting. Obviously, the 1st Battalion was having no easy time.

As Company C landed on the enemy side of the river, they were
greeted by bursts of machine-gun fire; in short order a furious engage-
ment was under way. Lieutenant Chalkley urged his company forward
into the foggy area along the river bank, through which the final pro-
tective line fire of the enemy machine guns crossed and recrossed.
Visibility was so poor it was impossible for the Germans manning the
pillboxes to pick up the riflemen as they filtered forward. Carefully
watching the patterns of fire, the troops advanced in individual rushes
between bursts of fire. Gradually the enemy began to pound the area
with the inevitable mortar and artillery fire always at his command.

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The assault squads closed in on pillboxes one after another. It was
slow, dangerous work but the attack was pressed relentlessly. Gradu-
ally, as more and more pillboxes were taken the slender beachhead
expanded.

Meanwhile, on the far shore, Colonel McClune decided to personally
check the progress of the operation. Leaving his CP in Ayl, he moved
toward the river. En route the regimental commander's jeep was
caught in a terrific mortar concentration and Colonel McClune, his
driver, Corporal John R. Hills, and his radio operator, Technician
Fourth Grade Richard J. Scheibner took cover in the ditches along the
road. Here the colonel was wounded in both legs. While Corporals
Hill and Scheibner were attempting to locate a medic, the regimental
commander was wounded again, this time in the chest. After first aid
had been applied, the CO was evacuated and Lieutenant Colonel
Anderson, the regimental executive officer, took command of the 376th.

The enemy fire on the 1st Battalion's crossing site increased and
shell fragment hits on the assault boats materially reduced the number
of craft in operating condition. As the 3d Platoon of Company C,
under Technical Sergeant Jack C. Wallace, advanced up the steep
slope of the hill south of Ockf en against stubborn resistance, Company
B began crossing in the few boats that remained unscathed by the in-
tense concentrations falling on the crossing site and in the river.

Downstream, Company I made its way to the top of the ridge north
of Ockfen and Company K crossed, closely followed by Company L.
Harassing machine-gun fire was being received from the pillboxes
south of Schoden; but due to the fog this fire was inaccurate, causing
only a few casualties. Atop the hill Company I captured a German
messenger bearing orders for a battery of Russian 76.2mm guns.
Using this prisoner as a guide, a party started for the gun positions.
Totally unaware of the situation, the enemy artillerymen were captured
while at chow. As the battalion closed on top of Irminer Wald, it
organized a perimeter defense.

Lieutenant Colonel Martin's 2d Battalion, charged with the capture
of Ockfen, followed the 3d Battalion, crossing at the northern site.
They received some harassing machine-gun fire and a few rounds of
artillery. However, the weight of the enemy fire was directed against
the crossing to the south. Company F led, closely followed by the re-
mainder of the battalion which completed crossing by 0400 hours.

The 2d Battalion planned to move against Ockfen with two com-
panies. Companies E and F were chosen for the mission and with the

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latter leading, the column moved up the river, turned east, deployed
and approached the town. Because of the smoke and fog, visibility
was limited to a matter of feet. Control was difficult and progress slow.
In the lower units there were several instances of groups returning with
prisoners being mistaken for the enemy and fired upon. Little by little
the assault moved forward, down the valley and into the town.

With the coming of dawn it became lighter in the foggy valley and
the problem of clearing Ockfen, house by house, was simplified in
some small degree. Suddenly, at 0945 hours when part of the town
had been cleared, the rumble of tanks was heard. The noise grew
louder and enemy armor and infantry pushed into Ockfen from the
south and east. Throwing lead in all directions, the tanks roared for-
ward. It was evidently a large scale offensive, for the German infantry
was supported by no less than sixteen panzers. As the bazooka teams
went into action, the German tankers concentrated fire on the build-
ings in which the teams had taken position, attempting to blast them
into oblivion. The armored vehicles roamed the streets of Ockfen
pouring fire into every likely looking building. In the face of this
strong counterattack, orders were issued for a withdrawal to the hill
north of town. Here the companies re-formed for a new attack.

At the southern crossing site, there were no boats in operating condi-
tion by the time Company B had completed its crossing. Company A,
held at the road junction east of Ayl while Company B crossed, was
suffering heavy casualties from the mortar and artillery fire falling in
the area. The only cover available was the water-filled ditches along
the road and in these the troops had taken shelter. Lacking a means
of crossing at the southern site, the company moved north to follow
the 2d Battalion. When Company A arrived at the northern crossing
at 0500 hours, the fog was still extremely heavy. Guided by flash-
lights, the assault boats moved to the west bank and the unit loaded.

Staff Sergeant Robert J. Pailliotet, who crossed in one of the first
boats, was anxiously waiting the arrival of the rest of his platoon when
a boat nosed ashore. Its occupants were a bit slow about disembark-
ing, so the sergeant reached into the boat and grabbed the nearest man
by the arm, exclaiming: "Goddammit, are you going to get out or not?"
The sergeant was completely unaware he was addressing Lieutenant
Colonel Miner, his battalion commander.

When the company completed crossing, it moved south along the
railroad tracks and re-joined the 1st Battalion, taking positions on the
right flank, next to the river. In vain, the battalion attempted to push

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forward along the top of the hill which was their initial objective.
Fire from the line of pillboxes on the eastern end of the flat, open
ridge stopped each advance.

Company C had started the operation with only two officers and
both of these were wounded before the end of the day. When Lieu-
tenant Chalkley was evacuated, Technical Sergeant Thomas D. Huth-
nance took command of the company directing the attack until Captain
Malinski could come forward from battalion to assume command.

With the foot elements of the regiment across the river, two things
remained to be done. Ockfen, from which the 2d Battalion had with-
drawn, had to be retaken and the regimental objective, east of the
town, had to be seized. Careful plans were laid for driving the enemy
tanks out of town and as Lieutenant Colonel Martin's men moved
against Ockfen, the 3d Battalion was to push to Scharfenberg Ridge.
By way of preparation for the new attack, eight battalions of artillery
ranging in caliber from 105s to 240s serenaded Ockfen at 1345 hours.
Their TOT hit town with an earth-shattering crash and the artillery-
men kept the volume of fire at a peak. The proposed barrage was to
be of ten minutes' duration, but after half that time had elapsed it
became necessary to issue a cease-fire order for the shelling had begun
to affect the troops of the 2d Battalion who were within five hundred
yards of the target. Concerning this fire, the enemy later said: "A
tremendous artillery barrage landed on the town literally lifting it off
its foundation and piling it in its own streets."

Even before the artillery fire had completely lifted, the leading ele-
ments of Companies E and F were working their way down the hill
toward town. As they advanced, they could hear those German tanks
which survived the TOT pulling out to the east. Clearing the town
proved a simple matter for the artillerymen had done their work well.
Ockfen was a shambles and several of the ruined buildings had started
to burn. Of the enemy remaining alive, most were shocked and dazed
with little fight left in them. One six-man squad of Company E took
seventy-one prisoners with little difficulty. By 1630 hours the entire
town was cleared. Men of the Mine Platoon of Antitank Company
entered town close behind the infantry and soon had the eastern
approaches to Ockfen well mined, to prevent another thrust by enemy
armor. A heavy volume of fire was received from the pillboxes south-
east of Ockfen and enemy snipers beyond the town also proved
troublesome.

Company G, which had remained on the high ground to the north

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

as the rest of the battalion advanced against Ockfen, was to protect
the northern flank of the battalion after Lieutenant Colonel Thurston's
men moved to seize the regimental objective. In addition Company
G was to take the castle midway down the winding trail which led
from the top of Irminer Wald to Ockfen. As dusk fell, the company
less a security detachment moved over the crest of the hill and made
its way through the vineyards to the castle. Having witnessed the
artillery preparation on the town below them, the Germans holding
this position were more than willing to surrender. Following this,
Company G returned to the hill and set up a defensive line in the
woods on the crest.

With Company K leading, the 3d Battalion moved against the regi-
mental objective. It advanced rapidly along the top of the wooded
ridge, in single file with only light flank protection. A pillbox on the
crest was taken and two men were left to guard the prisoners in the
box as the battalion pushed forward. Gradually, the ridge dropped
away to the valley below. Early in the evening, Lieutenant Colonel
Thurston's men moved across this valley in the moonlight and ascended
Scharfenberg Ridge, the regimental objective. The crest of this second
ridge was known to be a maze of enemy pillboxes, so the battalion
commander set up a perimeter defense for the night on the northern
nose of the high ground.

Remembering the days in Nennig, Lieutenant Colonel Thurston was
deeply concerned with the necessity of keeping open a route of supply
to the rear. With this in mind, early the following morning, Company
L was sent back to the hill north of Ockfen and charged with the
mission of protecting the route along the ridge. This proved a wise
move, for when the other two battalions were unable to advance and
contact the 3d, Lieutenant Colonel Thurston's men were virtually
isolated on the regimental objective, with only this slender line of
communication to the rear.

The following three days proved extremely difficult for the 376th.
Although the regiment had seized all the assigned hills in the bridge-
head area, the enemy retained observation of the bridge site from the
pillboxes south of Schoden. These boxes employed an almost con-
tinuous rain of machine-gun fire which punctured pontons and riddled
bridging equipment as fast as the engineers hauled it to the river.
Moreover, the enemy artillery was doing its share toward making the
area untenable. Every attempt by the engineers to erect a bridge met
with failure and heavy casualties. With much difficulty, a ferry was

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

matic weapons. Hitting the dirt the party speedily camouflaged the
wooden containers. On the return trip, wounded were brought back
over this same precarious route. The second night, after the carrying
party crossed the stream in the valley, it was hit by an artillery con-
centration and the men took cover in an antitank ditch which they
shared with a general officer of the 10th Armored Division until
things quieted down.

After establishing its lines atop the ridge, Company G dispatched
patrols which encountered Germans at every turn. By some odd chance,
the 3d Battalion had slipped through the enemy defenses in what
amounted to a mass infiltration. On the 24th, Company G moved for-
ward to clear the woods atop Irminer Wald. This occupied most of
the day. When the new positions were assumed, the understrength
Company found that in some cases foxholes were as much as one hun-
dred yards apart. There were no blankets and the nights were still
extremely cold. Food was scarce and captured German rations were
put to good use.

Meanwhile, the situation of those elements of the 3d Battalion on
the regimental objective became more acute as the enemy directed in-
creasing amounts of artillery and mortar fire against Lieutenant Colonel
Thurston's men. A German machine gun crew infiltrated between
Companies I and K, effectively severing contact between the two units
for a time. Captain Ralph T. Brown of Company K finally worked
his way into a good firing position and eliminated this enemy group
with an Ml.

When it was found that the carrying parties were unable to bring
forward sufficient supplies to maintain the troops on Scharfenberg
Ridge, artillery liaison planes were pressed into service for vertical
re-supply. The Cubs made trip after trip, dropping food, ammunition,
radio batteries and medical supplies. As the planes swooped low over
the American positions for a drop, the Germans would send up a hail
of lead from every available weapon. On one occasion, two ME- 109s
jumped the aerial column. Only the maneuverability and slow air
speed of the tiny planes protected them from the speedy German
fighters. While most of the twenty Piper Cubs that participated in
these operations had scars to prove the accuracy of the enemy's fire,
not a single plane was lost.

On the afternoon of the 25 th, Company B of the 61 st Armored

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Infantry Battalion was attached to the 2d Battalion. Along with the
3d and 4th Platoons of Company F it was ordered to attack Schoden
and the enemy pillboxes harassing the bridge site from south of that
town. The armored infantry company worked north along the river
and, after some heavy fighting, forced its way into the southern edge
of the objective. To the right, Captain Frederick D. Standish led the
Company F group along the railroad tracks through a more heavily
fortified area. As they advanced, their right flank was exposed to the
fire of a series of enemy pillboxes on the high ground east of Schoden.
Progress was slow and only after bitter fighting were the first pillboxes
in their zone taken. Following this, attempts were made to reestablish
contact with the attached company on the left. Just about dusk, a
column of Germans was seen coming down the railroad tracks. Know-
ing that the armored infantrymen were farther to the north, it was
assumed the Germans were PWs being moved to the rear. This
column was almost on top of the security force outposting the pillbox
in which about half of the party was resting, before the group realized
that the Germans were not prisoners. Fighting developed at extremely
close quarters and the numerically superior enemy breached the Ameri-
can defenses. The Germans surrounded the pillbox and Captain
Standish 's repeated attempts to fight through the enemy and get his
men out of the surrounded box were of no avail.

Meanwhile, the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company F were in Ockfen.
Having been heavily hit by enemy artillery the previous night, they
were relieved late in the afternoon for a short rest. When word was
received that Captain Standish and the remainder of the company were
in trouble, the platoons organized and proceeded north. A small se-
curity group moved up the east side of the railroad to protect the
right flank, while the bulk of the small force advanced west of the
tracks. The relief party succeeded in breaking through the German
perimeter and fought its way up a communication trench to the Ameri-
can held pillbox. The group then discovered that it was against the
rear of a huge box; facing a blank, concrete wall. Both sides of the
fortification were receiving continuous streams of grazing machine-gun
fire from five or more weapons which spelled each other in raking the
box. Attempts were made to talk to the trapped men, but it was im-
possible to establish contact through walls of concrete six feet thick.

At the same time, the enemy was working on the front of the pillbox
in an effort to induce the trapped men to surrender. When this failed,
the Germans employed a bazooka which did no damage to the well
constructed fortification. A large demolition charge was next placed in

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

an embrasure of the pillbox by the enemy, and at 0145 hours there
was a terrific explosion. Groans and cries of agony followed. There
was a period of silence followed by the sound of movement north
along the railroad tracks. Repeated attempts by the relief party to
move around the position were stopped cold by the enemy's grazing
fire. At 0300 hours, the flank security of the relief party was forced
from position and nothing remained but for the 1st and 2d Platoons
to withdraw.

Months later, after the termination of hostilities, First Sergeant
Bower, in a personal letter to Staff Sergeant Shafto of Company F,
gave a complete account of this action from the viewpoint of the de-
fenders of the pillbox. The following is quoted from this letter.

32 W. Van Buren St.
Oswego, New York
13 June 45

Dear Harold:

Received your letter today and I sure was waiting for it. Thought maybe
you had writers cramp. Of course, you're excused this time, as I know you
must be busy.

Well, Shafto, it makes me feel better now to hear that you tried to get us
out of the pillbox that fateful night. I will tell you just what happened.

The first thing, we did not have enough security out and what was out,
was not out far enough from the CP ... I could not get communication
with the battalion at that time as the radio [SCR-300] was smashed by a
grenade and the operator was hit in the stomach. I had talked to Colonel
Martin and told him they were attacking from the right and front, down the
railroad. We had quite a few casualties and no aid man. The artillery officer
also was hit. Our men did not get out in time ... as they left the pillbox
they were hit. I don't know who was killed. There were some, as the bodies
were outside the pillbox. We had about twenty-two or twenty-five in the pill-
box. You know they never got us until 0130. Our ammunition gave out but
we would not let them in the pillbox. They blew two holes in it and threw
concussion grenades at us all night. The last thing they threw at us stunned
us and we never fired a shot after it went off and they came storming in.
I sure would have liked to know what it was. You know after our 300 radio
went out, I tried to contact Company CO with 536 every half hour up to
0100 — I tried, but to no avail. They had both entrances to the pillbox covered
— we were holed up like rats. By the way I have said many times since, if
I ever run into the medic, a T/5 — can't think of his name — I would smack
him. We had to tear our undershirts for bandages . . . when we needed him,
he was not there. It was a hell of a mess, Harold, men crying and screaming.
I had a hard time as most of them wanted to give up, and I thought sure
we would have been freed from that trap . . . All we had left was a few
tracers when they blew that last hole in the pillbox.

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As soon as we came out of the pillbox, they knocked off our helmets,
searched us and stripped us of everything. Mortar fire was hitting all around.
One went off just six feet from where I was standing. Two Krauts beside
me got it and I dove into a trench right on top of the Krauts. They raised
hell. I guess maybe I hurt them, as though I cared. It is just like a dream
that you want to forget.

I could have escaped the first night, but we had to carry our wounded . . .
even then we did not get half of them. I guess they [the Germans] carried
them out. There were a lot of Krauts all through the woods in the rear. We
hiked three days and two nights back and forth through the woods, never
on any roads. It was all hell. Nothing to eat or smoke.

Do you know, Shafto, you say I am too old for the Infantry. Well, I am.
But, as a prisoner I stood up better than the young ones. And I had those
shoepacs and they just about ruined my feet. Never got any shoes until after
we were liberated. You know my socks wore out and I was wearing them
with no socks at all. There were quite a few of us in the same condition.
Sure was hell, as we were hiking all the time I was a prisoner and nothing
to eat. I passed out twice but a lot of the boys passed out every day. Krauts
would wait until we came to and then it was up on your feet and catch up
to the rear of the column. We were strafed three times by our planes. Guess
I must have had a horseshoe . . .to get back without a scratch, outside of an
infected foot. Still got scars from it. Am having a nice time here, peace and
quiet. Don't let anybody tell you this isn't God's country . . .

Well, Harold, I never was much of a hand in writing letters, as you know,
but I could write pages . . . Give my regards to all of the boys that are left.
Also officers, Colonel Martin, Captains Whitman and Standish in particular.

By the way, took a fit in the pillbox that night. He was a mess.

Took two of us to hold him down and he was throwing up all over — what
a mess. He finally came out of it. You know, Shafto, I could not give up
all that. Am taking a double shot of Four Roses now in remembrance of our
many good times together . . . Hope to have some more as soon as time
permits. How about it, old boy? Another thing, your letter sure made me
feel good . . . Don't stop writing.

Sincerely,

TOP

P. S. Excuse writing as I am nervous as hell. Don't forget our reunion in New
York City. Could never find out anything about McGuinness. I guess he is
done for, may God bless him, sure was a good sport and a damn good soldier.

During these operations, Lieutenant Colonel Martin, the battalion
commander, and Major John R. Dossenbach, the executive officer, were
both wounded while working forward to check on the progress of the
attack. Captain Standish, in some unknown manner, made his way
from the battle position, through the German line, while in a complete
state of shock brought on by days of exhaustive fighting during which
he drove himself relentlessly. He was found wandering about in a
dazed condition.

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

For the regiment this was a period of low ebb. On the night of the
25th, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson informed General Malony of the
situation existing within his command in hope that Division might be
able to extend some help, even though the 376th was still attached to
the 10th Armored Division. The message read:

Our lines are so extended that we cannot prevent enemy infiltration. Enemy
occupied pillboxes still exist inside our bridgehead. All troops have been com-
mitted since the first day of the operation. I have no reserve. One company
of armored infantry has been attached temporarily. Except for two platoons
of tank destroyers on the friendly side of the river, we have no support of
heavy direct fire weapons. It is expected that these two platoons will be with-
drawn tomorrow. Until 1900 this date, all evacuation and supply has been
hand-carried. One weasel and seven jeeps may be able to cross tonight. At
present, all ferry service is out of order. I expect that all heavy trucks, prime-
movers, cannon and artillery weapons will have to cross the Saar at your
bridgehead. If so, this will be a critical period for the infantry battalions, and
they must be reinforced and supplied by another unit. If we cross all vehicles
here it will take two to three clays and place the vehicles in an area getting
observed artillery fire. In our beachhead we have captured about sixty per
cent of the pillboxes, one 88mm gun, one battery of mountain artillery, and
452 prisoners. Estimated killed, seven hundred. Since the 21st of February
I have lost 14 officers and 161 enlisted men. I am understrength 47 officers
and 506 enlisted men. I recommend that this combat team be passed through,
if the 94th Division is to continue the attack to the north. If the 94th Divi-
sion is to protect the Saarburg crossing, I recommend that this combat team
be reinforced to hold its present position. Such reinforcement should include
tank destroyers and infantry.

The following day the 3d Platoon of Company E, supported by one
tank was ordered to retake the area in which the platoons of Company
F had been overwhelmed, and conduct a thorough search for any
personnel still holding out. Without too much trouble the first pillbox
tackled was taken, but a second position put up a stiff fight. The
Germans defending the area directed the fire of all their available
weapons against the supporting tank. When the tank commander was
wounded, Technician Fifth Grade Paul E. Ramsey, fearlessly expos-
ing himself to the intense enemy fire, dashed to the vehicle, admin-
istered aid to the injured man and then took command of the tank.
He directed its fire against the weapons holding up the advance and
radioed the situation to the rear. In the last box taken by the platoon,
one soldier of Company F was found. By this time the strength of the
attackers was so low, it was impossible to hold the bitterly contested
position. Therefore, the remnants of the platoon moved back to the
original lines held by the battalion.

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^ On the morning of the 25th, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson had re-
ceived orders to launch a determined attack to the south, to link up with
the 3d Battalion, 301st, in the vicinity of Beurig. This would join the
two bridgeheads, thus eliminating the southern flank of the 376th
Infantry and clearing the Saarburg area of German fire to permit the
construction of a bridge connecting Saarburg and Beurig. Obviously,
the 1st Battalion would have to launch this attack since it was in
position south of Ockfen. When the remnants of Company A were
concentrated, the rest of Lieutenant Colonel Miner's battalion was
stretched to the breaking point along its rugged front. The company
attacked south along the river only to be met by a hail of machine-gun
fire from American positions west of the Saar. When the gunners
realized their mistake and lifted fire, the company moved down the
hill toward the enemy-held pillboxes in the valley. Tank destroyers
across the river opened fire against the German positions, and Lieu-
tenant Edwin R. Flynn, leading the group, was wounded. He hobbled
back to battalion, using his carbine as a cane, after Staff Sergeant
Edward J. Macejak had assumed command. The assault party then
pushed forward to the side of the first box while the TDs across the
river continued to assist the operation with their fire. To add to the
difficulty of the situation, the Germans manning the pillbox under
attack called for mortar fire. With his bazooka, Private First Class
Robert S. Scheer scored a direct hit on one of the embrasures, injuring
an enemy machine gunner and destroying his weapon. The box then
surrendered and the company moved south where more pillboxes were
taken. When darkness fell a defensive line was formed where the
Ockfen-Beurig road crossed the railroad tracks.

The next morning the entire 1st Battalion jumped off at 0500 hours
encountering only light resistance. Unknown to Lieutenant Colonel
Miner's men, the Germans had retreated during the night following
the advance of American armored columns into Irsch, through the
zone of the rest of the Division. The advance continued and the bat-
talion pushed into the northern edge of Beurig. House by house, the
search of the town began. The battalion rounded up a few Germans
and about noon made contact with Major O'Neil's men, who had
entered Beurig from the south.

When the vehicles of the 10th Armored Division moved south to
cross the treadway bridges at Taben and Serrig, the armored infantry
battalions were sent into the 376th bridgehead to clear the pillbox
area southeast of Ockfen which had held up the advance of the 1st

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and 3d Battalions of the 376th. The armored infantry was then to con-
tinue the attack and join the tankers in Irsch. It was this action that
permitted the concentration of the 1st Battalion for the attack to
Beurig.

While the 3d Battalion on Scharfenberg Ridge was waiting to be
passed through by the armored infantry, an enemy patrol approached
from Company K's rear. It was almost upon the company before it
realized they were Germans. At point-blank range, the troops opened
fire, killing or wounding all of the enemy party. Later the armored
infantry moved into the area, checked on the situation and pushed
through the woods west of Hill 426 on the southern nose of Scharfen-
berg Ridge. This released a good deal of the pressure on Lieutenant
Colonel Thurston's battalion. As the armored columns continued east
through Irsch the situation further improved. For the first time in
three days, the battalion had only one front with which to concern
itself. Late in the afternoon of the 26th, American troops swarmed
up from the south. It was the 3d Battalion, 302d. Lieutenant Colonel
Thurston's exhausted companies were soon relieved by the 3d Bat-
talion, 301st, which came forward from Beurig for this purpose.

During these operations, Companies G and L had doggedly held the
hill north of Ockfen and the supply route along the ridge. The enemy
constantly directed heavy mortar and artillery barrages against their
positions. On one occasion, an American strongpoint was pounded all
night and half of its twenty-two defenders were wounded. On another
occasion, two men of Company G's machine-gun section trailed a
seven-man German patrol through the darkness and succeeded in
capturing it.

On the 27th of February, the 1st Battalion passed through Company
L and the positions of Company E in the area along the river. The
battalion attacked north, seized Schoden and relieved Company B of
the 6lst Armored Infantry Battalion from the positions in which they
had been isolated for two days. Forty-two pillboxes were taken during
this drive.

By this time the strength of the 1st Battalion was extremely low and
in Company A it became necessary to use men of the Weapons Platoon
as riflemen. When two of these men detailed to Staff Sergeant W. T.
Pillow's platoon were captured by a German patrol, Sergeant Pillow,
with the remainder of the platoon covering his movement, slipped
down a communication trench, overtook the withdrawing Germans

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and recaptured his men. He then talked the Germans into arranging
the surrender of the rest of their unit, and marched back with an entire
enemy platoon under surveillance.

The following day the battalion's advance continued; by nightfall,
Lieutenant Colonel Miner's men were on the high ground overlooking
Wiltingen. In two days the battalion had advanced two thousand yards
and taken thirteen pillboxes.

On the 28th the 3d Battalion, after a good night's rest in Ockfen,
passed through Company G to push across the open ridge into the
woods. By late in the afternoon they were abreast of the 1st Battalion
and in position overlooking the Wiltingen-Oberemmel road. Across
the road, and the valley through which it ran, there rose a steep hill
with a ridgelike crest paralleling the battalion's front. The south side
of the slope, facing the battalion, was terraced and planted with vine-
yards. In the middle of one of these was a long bare swath cut by a
P-47, which lay in a crumpled heap where it had crashed. This hill,
called le Scharzberg, was the battalion's immediate objective and had
to be occupied that night. A platoon of Company K and a section of
heavy machine guns were assigned the task. The designated group
made its way up the steep slope and was just approaching the crest
when enemy forces on the hill opened fire. Hastily, one of the HMGs
went into action, hitting a German carrying a load of flares. He went
up in a multi-colored blaze of light. After a short battle, the position
was taken and all its defenders with the exception of one officer cap-
tured. This officer escaped down the reverse slope and a short time
later mortar fire began to fall. It was impossible to dig in on the rocky
crest, but since the ground had to be held, the men remained on the
exposed position. The shelling continued and casualties were frequent.
In an attempt to silence the enemy weapons, an artillery observer was
sent to the crest. He and his radio operator were soon wounded and
both had to be evacuated. A second observer came forward, but all
attempts to silence the German mortars proved unsuccessful. On the
following morning Lieutenant Colonel Thurston climbed the hill to
congratulate personally each man on the position for his splendid
stand. Of the thirty-eight men who had taken this high ground less
than half came through the night unharmed.

On the morning of the 1st of March a patrol from the A&P Platoon
was sent out to contact Company L. Taking a wrong turn, this party
moved into Wiltingen where they encountered Germans. As soon as
the mistake was realized the group withdrew. Following this, a patrol

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360 THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

from Company K was sent into the town. They entered it as loud
speakers west of the Saar began blasting surrender orders to the people
of Wiltingen. The American Psychological Warfare personnel in-
formed the local inhabitants that their situation was hopeless; an
American armored division was in their rear and all lines of supply
and communication had been severed. As signs of surrender, the towns-
people were instructed to display white flags from their houses and
report to the village church without delay. If they did not capitulate,
they were informed that their town would be blasted into rubble. As
German civilians flocked into the streets, Wiltingen was occupied with-
out a single shot being fired. While the Company K patrol searched
prisoners in the center of town, Company E entered from the south
where Major Dossenbach's battalion had passed through the 1st
Battalion.

To the north of town was a maze of pillboxes; interrogation of
prisoners taken revealed that these positions were manned. Sergeant
Rao persuaded a PW from the German company manning these forti-
fications to talk his companions into surrendering. Both Companies
E and G moved forward, and by the end of the day were 1,500 yards
beyond Wiltingen, having cleared twenty-five pillboxes.

The 3d Battalion also continued its advance. Outside Oberemmel it
encountered the 90th Reconnaissance Squadron, which was maintaining
contact between the 302d and 376th Infantry. Then the battalion
pushed into the woods, clearing out snipers and machine-gun positions.
Their objective was Kommlingen. The night was so dark the troops
had to clasp hands to keep from losing each other. When they reached
the far edge of the woods they halted until daylight. In the darkness
a squad of Company K took position in the area of one of the squads
of Company L, with neither aware of the others presence.

On the morning of the 2d, while the battalion was preparing to
attack Kommlingen, Lieutenant Colonel Thurston, Captain Di Lor-
enzo, and nine men of Company L entered the town. There was no
resistance and, by radio, the command group instructed the battalion
to move forward at once. Meanwhile, a patrol from Company G
entered Kommlingen from the northwest to make contact with the
CO of the 3d Battalion and his reconnaissance party. The remainder
of the 2d Battalion continued forward and Company F cleared the
Filzen Peninsula. During the day Major Dossenbach's battalion took
a bag of fifty-nine prisoners and was approaching Konz-Karthaus
before it was halted by heavy fire.

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^ l^ UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

turret: known to the Ckrnnu^ as No. 111. In these thrust^ Company

eng^e ?!h wemy in CoMZtkuofr He convinced' rhemol the hope-
Jessness nf ihcH position ^n^i ne^otiatetj a mttmrdgi The Germans
^esd feut made one stipulation, They would : capiralfatei hut to no

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

362

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Commander when he investigated it as "a sunken concrete submarine."
It housed a 50mm belt-fed mortar capable of putting more than twenty-
five rounds in the air at one time. This box was three stories deep,
equipped with Diesel motors which supplied light and heat. No. Ill
had shower facilities and boasted both hot and cold running water.
Equipped with shoulder stocks for accuracy, its machine-guns had
perfect fields of observation and grazing fire in all directions. It was
the most elaborate pillbox ever to fall to the Division.

When the 1st Battalion was passed through by Major Dossenbach's
men on the morning of the 1st, it moved back into Schoden where its
opportunity for rest was short lived. The 10th Armored Division
needed infantry assistance in Trier and shortly after midnight the bat-
talion started forward by motor. It moved east and then north through
the night, over second-grade roads, to outflank Trier and strike at the
city from the east. Lieutenant Colonel Miner's men were to fight
through to a task force from CCA, which had forced its way into
Trier seizing one of the vital river bridges across the Moselle. Exact
whereabouts of the tankers was unknown.

Missing the turnoff at Pellingen, the kitchen train, which was bring-
ing up the rear of the column, went sailing down the ridge road to
Trier. It entered the outskirts of town, stopping a few hundred yards
from an enemy manned roadblock which was covered by the fire of
an 88mm gun. Discovering its mistake, the kitchen train withdrew.

The rest of the battalion rolled into the little town of Irsch, a few
miles east of Trier, and began detrucking as dawn broke. A 10th
Armored Division messenger located Lieutenant Colonel Miner at
about this time and handed him orders to "just keep going/' Company
A, leading the column, was instructed to proceed straight into Trier.
The men were cold and tired from the all-night ride, but marching
soon started the blood circulating again. Not knowing what might lie
ahead, the leading elements entered the city cautiously. There was
practically no opposition and the tempo of the advance quickened.
As the column pushed into town, a few men were detailed to make
a cursory search of each house. This soon proved impractical; the
company advanced with a file on either side of the street.

As Company A approached a bridge over the railroad tracks in Trier,
a reconnaissance patrol was sent forward to investigate the span. It
located a German automatic weapon in position and while one of the
patrol was endeavoring to talk the machine-gun crew, on the far side
of the bridge, into surrendering, a recent replacement let go a shot.

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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Chapter 36: LAMPADEN RIDGE

THE MORNING OF MARCH 3, 1945 found the 94th holding
a vastly extended bridgehead across the Saar. Attached to the
division, the 3d Cavalry Group held the left flank from Tarforst
to Franzenheim; the 3d Battalion, 302d, was in the vicinity of Lam-
paden; the 2d Battalion, 302d, held Schomerich, Hen tern and Bald-
ringen; the 3d Battalion, 301st, was in position around Zerf and Ober
Zerf; the 5th Ranger Battalion continued to hold Hill 3; the 1st Bat-
talion, 302d, was located between the Rangers and the Ruwer River;
the 1st Battalion, 301st, perched on Hocker Hill; the 2d Battalion,
301st, held the extreme right of the line down to the Saar. The 94th
Reconnaissance Troop patrolled the area south of Taben, between the
bridgehead and the left of the 26th Division, maintaining defensive
positions west of the Saar and in the Saarlautern bridgehead. To the
north of General Malony's zone, the 10th Armored Division continued
its drive northeast from Trier along the banks of the Moselle.

Along the Division front enemy activity was comparatively light.
German patrols hit the line at several points, but in all cases were
repelled. There was a fair amount of artillery, mortar and rocket fire
within the Division area; Taben, the Taben bridge site, Hocker
Hill, Zerf and Lampaden received the heaviest concentrations. All
along the long front, the troops of the Division improved their posi-
tions: Foxholes were deepened, weapons cleaned and checked, mines
laid and wire entanglements erected. Reconnaissance parties probed the
enemy lines, examined the banks of the Ruwer River and maintained
contact with the units to their flanks.

Meanwhile the Germans were frantically organizing their defenses
and forming Kampfgruppe units from the shattered remnants of the
4l6th Infantry Division, the 256th Volksgrenadier Division and surviv-
ing personnel of the various fortress battalions, reinforcement battal-
ions, alarm companies and rear echelon units that had been thrown
into the fray. Most of the 2d Mountain Division had arrived from the
Bitche area and was sent directly into the lines.

Late in the afternoon of the 3d, Company L of the 301st captured
two prisoners from whom it learned that the enemy planned an
attack on Hill 5 the following morning. These PWs were from the
13th Company of the 137th Mountain Regiment, 2d Mountain Divi-
sion. They claimed the attack would be launched from along the Zerf-
Weiskirchen road by the III Battalion of their regiment, supported by
20mm, 75mm and 105mm artillery weapons. Later in the day Com-
pany I took two prisoners who confirmed this story, and Company K

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captured a man who revealed the attack was scheduled for 0330 hours.
Major O'Neill alerted his entire command and at the same time in-
formed Division of the information he had gained. Company L on
Hill 5 was in serious condition. It was holding the German objective
with a scant fifty-four men and for the past three days had been con-
tinuously pounded by enemy artillery. All three understrength platoons
were dug in on the southern slope of the hill in a crescent-like position,
reinforced with the remains of the company's Weapons Platoon and a
section of HMGs. Company L had received about forty reinforce-
ments, but the bulk of this group had been held in Zerf under the
first sergeant, since the constant rain of enemy fire on the forward
positions made the construction of additional emplacements impractical.

As casualties occurred on the hill, reinforcements sufficient to keep
all foxholes fully manned were brought forward. During the night
of the 3d, both heavy machine guns and one of the lights were knocked
out. In addition, in the Weapons Platoon there remained only one
of the three 60mm mortars. Lieutenant Henley, who was in command
of the company, moved from foxhole to foxhole encouraging and re-
assuring his men. Countless times he narrowly escaped being wounded
and his overcoat was torn by shell fragments in several places.

About 0430 hours enemy fire on the hill increased and the overdue
German attack got under way. With a deadly hail of fire from their
Mis and BARs, the riflemen of the company met the oncoming moun-
taineers. This stopped the German infantry, but two self-propelled
guns supporting the attack moved right up to the American line. When
Private First Class Frank A. Franchino tried to use his bazooka on
these vehicles, he found it useless because of a huge hole torn in the
side of the tube. Meeting no serious opposition, the assaulj: guns fired
a couple of colored flares, then moved over the crest. Two more enemy
self-propelled guns moved forward and all four weapons engaged the
pair of American TDs on the hill, neither of which was equipped
with night sights. In the meantime, the 3d Platoon had been forced
to give way. Lieutenant Henley, seeing the Germans moving in on
his command post went back to Zerf to bring up the reinforcements
as a counterattacking force.

Several enemy infantrymen following the leading assault gun came
upon Lieutenant Sylvester M. Beyer, a 356th Field Artillery forward
observer, Technician Fourth Grade Paul E. Neuman and Sergeant
Harry C. Gersbaugh, in the hole being used as the company CP. They
captured the three Americans and moved them a short distance down
the hill for questioning. When the trio refused to divulge any military

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information, one of the Germans used a Schmeisser on them. Sergeant
Neuman was killed and the other two men wounded. About this time
Private Irving S. Clemens of the 1st Platoon noticed the group and
opened fire with his BAR. In the confusion Lieutenant Beyer, whose
stomach was riddled with bullets, made a break reaching the foxhole
of Staff Sergeant Roy V. Urban. The Germans pursued the wounded
officer only to be knocked off by Sergeant Urban's Luger pistol. Private
First Class Robert D. Hanlon attempted to administer first aid, but the
Lieutenant refused treatment until a call was made to lift the American
artillery fire which by that time was pounding the hill. Unprotected
by their infantry and exposed to the artillery still falling on the position
the assault guns withdrew.

In Zerf, Major O'Neill had sent for Lieutenant Leon P. Johnson
and his platoon of Company G, 301st, which was in reserve at Bruchs-
muhle and had been made available, and was preparing to send for-
ward the Company L reinforcements. Just then, Staff Sergeant Ralph
O. Minnich appeared with information that the position on the hill
was still being held. Ordering the reinforcements forward on the
double, under command of Technical Sergeant Elmer H. Kinateder,
the battalion commander took off to stop the artillery and halt Lieu-
tenant Johnson. En route Sergeant Kinateder and his group were met
by Sergeant Urban who came down the hill to report that the enemy
assault had been stopped, the self-propelled guns had withdrawn and
that seventeen men of Company L were still holding the position.
Later in the morning, Lieutenant Johnson moved his platoon to Hill
5 to strengthen the line and assume command.

The 376th Combat Team had reverted to the control of the 94th
on March 3, having been away from Division since February 19. Dur-
ing this period of attachment to the 10th Armored, the 376th Infantry
Regiment suffered 21 officer casualties, 403 enlisted casualties, and 173
non-battle casualties. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson's men
had taken 1,483 prisoners, reduced 155 defended pillboxes and cap-
tured an estimated ten and one-half square miles of fortified territory
from the enemy. The 1st Battalion moved to Wiltingen and the 3d
to Schoden while the remaining battalion continued the reduction of
the pillbox area south of Konz-Karthaus. On the following afternoon
the 3d Battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson's regiment was at-
tached to the 301st and relieved the 1st Battalion, 302d, on line east
of Serrig and began the relief of the 5th Rangers. Major Stanion's
men assembled in Serrig, then moved to Irsch where they returned to

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Colonel Johnson's control becoming regimental reserve. On the 4th
the 2d Battalion, 376th, finished clearing the pillbox area and moved to
Oberemmel where it joined the Division reserve. Early on the morning
of the 5th, the 3d Battalion completed its relief of the 5th Rangers
who also became part of the Division reserve.

Back at Division Headquarters, plans were being laid for a general
relief in the bridgehead. The 65th Infantry Division was to replace
the 26th in the Saarlautern area, following which the latter unit would
move north and relieve the 94th during the nights of the 6th, 7th and
8th of March. Corps' plan called for General Malony's men to move
into Luxembourg to rest and refit. While the 465th AAA and the
774th TD Battalions were to accompany the 94th, the 778th Tank
Battalion was to pass to the 26th Division. Movement was scheduled
by motor and XX Corps provided 270 trucks for transporting the foot
elements of the Division. Secrecy required the removal of patches and
bumper markings. All movement was to be under cover of darkness
with strict adherence to blackout regulations. Temporarily corps op-
erators were assigned to the lower-frequency radio sets to eliminate
the necessity of a change over during the relief.

In the headquarters of the higher German commands there was
also a good deal of planning and preparation under way at this time.
Following the repulse of the III Battalion of the 137th Mountain
Regiment by the 3d Battalion, 301st, General Hahn, commanding the
German LXXXII Corps, had been assigned the 6th SS Mountain Divi-
sion. With this unit and the other forces under his command he
planned a second attack against the American bridgehead. The aim of
the enemy corps was to cut the Zerf-Pellingen road which was being
used as a supply route to Trier and to link forces with any German
units which might still be holding out south of Trier.

The 6th SS Mountain Division under the command of Gruppen-
jiihrer (Major General) Brenner was composed of two SS mountain
regiments, a mountain artillery regiment, one tank destroyer battalion,
and the normal complement of engineers, reconnaissance and service
troops. The division possessed a total strength of about three thousand
men, all in the 23- to 25-year age group. These troops had had three
years of combat experience, were in good physical condition and pos-
sessed high morale. Repeatedly they had fought with the fanaticism
peculiar to SS troops.

General Hahn's plan called for a coordinated attack to the west by

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the 6th SS Mountain Division, the 2d Mountain Division and the
remnants of the 256th Volksgrenadiers. The 6th SS Mountain Divi-
sion was to seize the high ground along which the Zerf-Pellingen road
ran, reconnoitering to the north and west for isolated German forces.
To the north the 256th Infantry Division was to take the heights south-
west of Gutweiler and be prepared to push the attack to the high
ground north of Geizenburg and west of Ollmuth, while the 2d Moun-
tain Division was to capture Muhlenberg on the south flank.

The 6th SS Mountain Division had been thoroughly trained in the
tactics of attack by infiltration, which is based upon the idea of ap-
proaching as close as possible to an objective under the cover of dark-
ness, capturing isolated posts, moving forward supporting weapons and
launching the final assault with the coming of daylight. This type of
attack had been developed as a result of countless bitter experiences
in which strong German assault groups melted away under the tremen-
dous fire superiority of massed American artillery. By such tactics, the
SS troops hoped to take Lampaden Ridge. However, the men of the
94th had been initiated in this type of warfare two months earlier by
the 11th Panzer Division, along the Siegfried Switch Line.

At 2300 hours on March 5, the men of the 6th SS Mountain Division
began movement from their assembly areas. In the inky darkness they
crossed the Ruwer River about midnight. Three quarters of an hour
later, the II Battalion of the 12th SS Mountain Regiment closed in on
the 3d Platoon of Company G, 302d, at Kummelerhof with its right
assault company while the left, or southern flank of the battalion,
worked its way up Hill 468 through Hardten Woods. A four-man
outpost under Sergeant Richard R. Wiles, at the edge of the woods
on the forward slope of the hill, had received orders to pull back,
but before the men could comply with these instructions, they were
cut off by infiltrating Germans. The sergeant ordered his men to make
a break for the strongpoint maintained by Company F in Hentern, but
under the terrific artillery fire falling on the area the men froze. Ser-
geant Wiles attempted to make it alone, only to be captured with
the coming of daylight. Farther south a force of forty Germans and
two light machine guns, under command of a Lieutenant Brockmann,
was connecting the flanks of the II Battalion of the 12th SS Mountain
Regiment, on its right, and Kampfgruppe Dahne, which was attacking
Hentern, on its left.

At 0125 hours the leading elements of the 11th SS Mountain Regi-
ment advanced up the draw south of Lampaden and were challenged
by the outposts of Company I of the 302d at Lampadener Muhle. Ser-

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

geant Samuel Mallich, manning a light machine gun in position beside
the house in the draw, fired a box of ammunition at what he thought
was merely a German patrol. Noticing some of the enemy were work-
ing around to his left, the sergeant moved his gun north across the
road and assumed a new firing position. It soon became apparent that
the opposing force was of considerable size and the outpost withdrew
to Lampaden. Moving back two men were lost to the enemy and
Private First Class James M. Bender was forced to move into Scho-
merich to escape the advancing SS troopers. Later in the morning he
was able to rejoin his company.

Following the withdrawal of the outpost, the Germans set fire to
the mill located in the vicinity, and the I Battalion, 11th SS Mountain
Regiment, continued up the draw between Lampaden and Schomerich.
In Lampaden sounds of the German advance could be heard, but the
density of the woods concealed the presence of the enemy even after
flares had been fired.

By 0130 hours communication between Captain James W. Griffin of
Company G, 302d, in Schomerich and his 3d Platoon in Kummelerhof
had been severed. Sergeant Vincent Sacco's last message informed the
company commander that small-arms and bazooka fire was being re-
ceived from all directions. Thereupon Captain Griffin requested re-
inforcements from Major Maixner, who ordered the 2d Platoon of
Company F to move from its reserve positions on Hill 467 to Scho-
merich. At 0200 hours men were observed on the ridge four hundred
yards east of the village. A patrol sent forward to investigate was
fired upon and one man was wounded. By this time bullets were
richocheting off the stone houses in Schomerich and the 2d Platoon
of Company G on Hill 468 was pumping lead into Hardter Wald,
which was also under fire from the 356th Field Artillery.

Shortly before 0200 hours Sergeant Max L. Ledesma of the 2d
Platoon of Company K, 302d, in Obersehr, crawled out of his foxhole
and headed for the cemetery north of Lampaden where regular contact
with Company I was made. In the vicinity of the contact point, the
sergeant, who was alone, encountered several soldiers one of whom
challenged him in the proper manner. Before he could reply, he
recognized them as Germans and opened fire. This fire was returned
and the sergeant severely wounded. He turned into the darkness, to
stagger and crawl back to Obersehr to give the alarm.

Soon afterward a German soldier, speaking perfect English, ap-
proached a security outpost of the 1st Platoon of Company B, 774th

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TD Battalion, in Obersehr. When challenged the German gave the
proper password from the darkness, then informed the sentinel that
he would return shortly with several other men. Soon a small group
of the enemy arrived, surrounded the sentry taking him prisoner. With
this accomplished, elements of the III Battalion of the 11th SS Moun-
tain Regiment moved against the village.

Technical Sergeant William B. Grose, commanding the 2d Platoon
of Company K, heard part of the enemy force attempting to infiltrate
into the village and ordered his men to open fire. After some sharp
fighting, the platoon drove back the attackers who proceeded to dig
in around Obersehr. Until daylight, the Americans engaged by fire
every sound of movement outside the town. Sergeant Flaud E. Long
heard groaning in the darkness in front of his position and recognized
a few words in Spanish. Certain of the identity of the wounded man,
the sergeant dashed from his house, ignoring the volume of fire cut-
ting through the area. In the darkness he located Sergeant Ledesma
and dragged him to shelter. Before dying of his wounds, Ledesma
muttered unintelligibly about the compromised password. The fire
fight continued.

By this time, Major Maixner had alerted Company F in Hentern and
Company E in Baldringen. Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt had done like-
wise in the 3d Battalion area. Captain Edwards reinforced the Com-
pany I outpost which had been driven from Lampadener Muhle and
sent them forward again, but the glare of the mill blazing in the draw
prevented their moving beyond the edge of Lampaden. Enemy move-
ment had been picked up in the draw to the north and heavy artillery
and mortar concentrations were fired on this area and on the draw to
the south. Company G continued to call for fire on Hardter Wald.
The 2d Platoon of Company F, under Sergeant Howard J. Morton,
reached Schomerich and went into position in the northeast edge of
the village.

By 0400 hours the full might of the attack of the 6th SS Mountain
Division was unleashed. A force of undetermined size assaulted the
1st Platoon of Company K, 302d, in Ollmuth but the thrust was re-
pelled by Lieutenant Riggs Mahoney's men. The III Battalion of the
11th SS Mountain Regiment advanced against and into Obersehr, lay-
ing siege to elements of the 774th TD Battalion, the 3d Platoon of
the 302d's Cannon Company and elements of Company K in the town.
At the same time, the II Battalion of the 11th hit the forward positions
of Company I in front of Lampaden, overrunning some and infiltrating

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

past others. Meanwhile, elements of the 12th SS Mountain Regiment
were attacking Schomerich and climbing the wooded, southeastern
slope of Hill 468 under heavy American artillery fire. Kampfgruppe
Dahne was starting a pincers movement against the 3d Platoon of
Company F in Hentern while Lieutenant Brockmann's force which had
been securing the left flank of the II Battalion, 12th SS Mountain
Regiment, began its secondary mission of disrupting communications
and harassing artillery positions. Farther south the II Battalion, 137th
Mountain Regiment, prepared to move against Muhlenberg.

In Obersehr men of Company K defended the front and flanks of
the position while the TDs covered the street between the two rows of
houses. When Sergeant Grose requested flares from his company
commander, Captain Joseph Bugel, in Neidersehr, the CO replied that
he had only three but promised to give warning before he fired these.
Prior to each firing, Sergeant Grose was notified by radio in sufficient
time to permit him to alert his men. As each flare illuminated the
area, all weapons went into action. In this manner the battle wore on,
between the Germans in and around the town and the Americans holed
up in a few of the houses.

In Lampaden Company I was hard pressed. The 3d Platoon, on
the forward slope of the ridge to the north, was first struck on the left
flank near the head of the draw. A group of Germans approached the
foxhole of Private Charles F. McCartney, on the extreme left of the
platoon, and were challenged. Receiving no reply, Private McCartney
opened fire and was killed by a return burst from an enemy machine
gun. Fire from the rest of the squad temporarily drove back the enemy
and Staff Sergeant Sidney Schrager arrived with half a platoon to
reinforce the position. As this group crawled toward the flank under
attack, Sergeant Schrager was wounded and evacuated with difficulty
under the grazing fire raking the area. While this was happening,
Staff Sergeant Dominick J. Bondi, platoon guide of the 2d Platoon,
led forward a squad and a half to strengthen the center of the line.
This group reached the crest of the ridge under heavy machine-gun
fire from Hill 464.

In Schomerich elements of Companies F and G were firing into the
darkness at the sounds of the enemy attack. On Hill 468, the moun-
taineers moved right up to the barbed wire in front of the 2d Platoon
of Company G. Sergeant Domer V. Miller and Sergeant John C.
Finger, manning one of the HMGs, opened fire at point-blank range.
They expended three boxes of ammunition, but were overrun, after
killing the first German who leaped into their emplacement, while they

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were attempting to reload. Meanwhile, the enemy continued to press
forward in the darkness against the sustained fire of the defenders.
Sergeant Patrick J. Hassett, in charge of the remaining heavy machine
gun, personally killed three Germans at the very edge of his emplace-
ment. Technical Sergeant Arthur C. Ernst, commanding the 2d Pla-
toon, reported his situation to Captain Griffin and was ordered to
make a break for town. The Americans came down the hill on the
double mixed with the attackers. Sergeant Milton H. Stern and Private
First Class Morgan H. Morgan dashed to the house being held by one
of the antitank squads yelling, "We're GIs! Let us in!" Remains of
the 2d Platoon then assumed positions in the southern portion of
Schomerich.

In Hentern the 3d Platoon of Company F and company headquarters
met the attack of Kampfgruppe Dahne with a furious volley of small-
arms fire which slowed the assault but could not prevent a small
group of Germans from reaching the roadblock at the northern edge
of the village, near the company command post. When the SS troopers
attempted to remove the antitank mines laid across the road here,
Captain Kops hurled a grenade into their midst. The resulting ex-
plosion detonated some of the mines, which killed five of the enemy,
blew in the side of a house and buried the man who had handed
Captain Kops the grenade. During this action, the reserve portion of
the Kampfgruppe circled to the rear of the town. Finding himself
surrounded, the CO of Company F ordered the 1st Platoon on Hill 467
to his assistance.

Under Lieutenant Brockmann, the German force which had been
wandering around in the area west of Hentern and Baldringen decided
to attack the latter town astride the road from the west. The southern
portion of this unit captured Sergeant Richard W. Finkbone, but in-
tense fire from the village destroyed the ardor of the attackers; they
sent their prisoner into town as a surrender envoy. Sergeant Finkbone,
who had been wounded in the arm, dashed into Baldringen forgetful
of the German blanket he had draped about himself. Fortunately he
was recognized before his comrades opened fire. The desired sur-
render was arranged. While the PWs were being marched to the
American lines, a German artillery concentration caused a minor panic.
Some of the prisoners started to run but Private First Class Michael A.
Scioli restored order with a few well placed bursts from a submachine
gun. A short time later the remainder of this force was also taken
prisoner. Before the second group of PWs could be moved to cover,

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an enemy artillery concentration eliminated all but their leader, Lieu-
tenant Brockmann.

The next stage of the German attack unrolled to the north, in the
sector of the 3d Cavalry Group. At 0630 hours approximately fifty
Germans took Hill 405 which was unoccupied and, after leaving a
security detachment, proceeded northward against Gutweiler. They
swarmed into town and occupied a few houses; however, the furious
fire of the cavalrymen caused so many casualties the enemy agreed to
surrender. In conjunction with this attack, another force of approxi-
mately one German company, moved westward against Hill 427, also
undefended. This group then swept to the northeast in an attempt to
capture Korlingen from the rear. It met with no success.

At 0700 hours, the II Battalion of the 137th Mountain Regiment,
2d Mountain Division, attacked the positions of Company I, 301st
Infantry, on Muhlenberg, in the bend of the Ruwer River northeast of
Zerf. Moving steadily up the wooded slope, the enemy assaulted some
and passed between other widely scattered positions of the 2d and 3d
Platoons. Bitter fighting developed during which Lieutenant James T.
Flower of the 2d Platoon, by shifting his men about for repeated
thrusts at the enemy, managed to hold the right knoll of the hill.

All along the front under attack, the situation was uncertain and
the outlook for the Division far from encouraging. Ollmuth was
quiet except for occasional artillery fire from across the Ruwer. In
Niedersehr Captain Bugel had posted snipers, drawn from his com-
pany headquarters, east and south of the village to harass the Germans
around the town. In Obersehr Lieutenant Joseph K. Harden, com-
manding one of the 302d's cannon platoons, was requesting tank and
infantry reinforcement. Around Lampaden, the men of Company I,
in disorganized groups, were trading shots with the enemy round for
round. Company G in Schomerich was surrounded and the 3d Platoon
of the company in Kummelerhof was an unknown factor. The 1st
Platoon of Company F was dispatched to Hentern to assist the 3d
Platoon in its battle with Ka?npfgruppe Dahne. On Hill 473, and still
unmolested, was the bulk of Company E. Other elements of the com-
pany in Baldringen had fourteen prisoners and were reporting heavy
artillery fire on the town. Company I of the 301st was embroiled in
the woods on Muhlenberg. The situation left much to be desired.

With the coming of daylight, Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt, in Lampa-
den, ordered the CO of Company L to send a platoon, supported by

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three tanks, to relieve Obersehr. This assignment was given to Lieu-
tenant Ramirez's 3d Platoon. The original plan of attack called for
one tank, supported by a squad of infantry, to take the road leading
west from Lampaden around Hill 500, while the remainder of the
force used the north-south road between the two towns. As the ad-
vance began, the riflemen encountered intense fire from Hill 500 and
it was discovered that all three tanks had taken the road to the west.
One of the mediums was hit and this occasioned their withdrawal.
Returning to Lampaden, Lieutenant Ramirez set his attack in motion
a second time. With the 3d Squad on the left, the 1st on the right and
the 2d in support, the platoon moved forward with the tanks against
terrific and accurate enemy fire. The Germans employed machine guns,
Scbmeissers and Panzerfausts. Moreover, they were supported by high-
velocity antitank fire from across the Ruwer. During the advance the
fog which blanketed the valley of the Ruwer alternately lifted and
fell; visibility varied from fairly good to poor. In the left squad, three
men including the squad leader were hit soon after they moved for-
ward. About the same time the platoon leader became a casualty and
command passed to Technical Sergeant Albert I. Orr. Part way up
Hill 500 the right tank stopped and withdrew a little. The other
followed suit. Technician Fifth Grade Harry E. Hebard, the platoon
aid man, who remained with a wounded man in front of the armor
was killed at this time. Sergeant Orr then committed the support be-
tween the two assault squads and after a hasty reorganization, fear-
lessly pressed the attack against the stubborn defense of the SS troopers.
Following the tanks, the infantry moved toward the crest of the hill,
tn the 3d Squad there remained only six effectives out of the eleven
men who had started the attack; Staff Sergeant Daniel Pash and Ser-
geant John A. Regan were both killed on Hill 500. One of the tanks
knocked out a German machine-gun nest emplaced behind a pile of
cattle beets and with this the depleted platoon and the armor swept
to the crest. There the infantrymen killed or captured some fifty
Germans.

Then trouble began again. Private First Class Russel E. Wellman,
a member of the platoon, continues the story:

An 88 on the next hill commenced firing on the tanks. The men hugged
the ground and prayed while the tank commander radioed for permission to
withdraw to defilade. We had been glad to have the tanks, but now we
were glad to see them go as they were drawing fire on us. From that time
until the next night we just stayed there . . . wet, cold, no food and little
water. Jerry threw concentrations of everything he had from mortars to rockets

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and 88s. We listened to the artillery around us and tried to figure out where
the line ran. The next day they told us there were Germans all around us.
Some of us found hard crackers and sardines on dead Germans. Hungry as
we were they tasted good! On the second night a few men went into town
for hot chow and the rest of us got K rations. The third day the platoon
was relieved.

Inside Obersehr, the American defenders continued to lash out
savagely, at the cordon of Germans surrounding them, with the fire of
their own weapons and the guns of the 356th Field Artillery support-
ing their defense. After daylight a German carrying a white flag
appeared at the northern edge of the village. He counseled surrender,
reminding the besieged forces that they were surrounded, that their
heavy machine guns had been captured and that even within the town
their forces were divided into isolated groups. Staff Sergeant William
J. Murphy of the 774th TD Battalion spoke for the group in replying
to the surrender emmissary: "See those tracks you made coming up
here? Well, you fill them a hell of a lot faster going back!" This
blunt refusal to yield brought a prompt renewal of hostilities. A short
time later, an enemy thrust was made against Ollmuth to the north-
east. Neither effort gained any ground for the Germans.

At 0800 hours Company C of the 302d left Irsch followed by the
1st Platoon of Company A, 778th Tank Battalion with orders to report
to Major Maixner and relieve Company G in Schomerich. The 1st
Platoon of Company F had left its positions on Hill 467, driven into
Hentern and mopped up the Germans working on Captain Kops and
his 3d Platoon. This action netted some twenty-four prisoners beside
destroying the remains of Kampfgruppe Dahne. Company F estab-
lished radio contact with the 3d Platoon of Company G and learned
it was still in action at Kummelerhof. Company E reported its situa-
tion was under control on Hill 472 and in Baldringen.

Farther to the south in the area of Company I of the 301st on
Muhlenberg, Private First Class Bennett P. Katzen organized a small
group and led it forward to help restore the line. The company's
machine guns and mortar support were active and about 0930 hours,
the enemy pulled back prior to dropping a heavy artillery barrage on
the hill. A half hour later the Germans launched another attack, but
this too was beaten off. In the meantime Captain Donovan, command-
ing Company I of the 301st, obtained a platoon of Company L from
Major O'Neil. This force, under Sergeant Kinateder, advanced up
the left side of Muhlenberg to reestablish that portion of the hill.

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Aside from sporadic artillery fire Company I's positions received no
further attention.

All during the morning there was furious fighting in and around
the town of Schomerich. As the visibility improved, so did the marks-
manship of the men of the 1st Platoon of Company G and the 2d
Platoon of Company F. Supported by the machine guns and mortars
of Company H, by the antitankers and tank destroyermen, they wrought
havoc upon those elements of the 12th SS Mountain Regiment com-
mitted against them. After the fog lifted the enemy made a second
assault on the town only to run into furious and well directed fire.
Captain Griffin, half-blind from a head wound received at Sinz, suf-
fered a second head injury but refused to relinquish command. He
continued to rally and direct his men. Private First Class Carl T.
Swift, commanding a squad of new men in the 2d Platoon, ably di-
rected their fire, which broke the enemy assault against the northeast
corner of the village. Staff Sergeant Milton H. Stern and Private First
Class Harvey J. Reynolds dropped hand grenades from a second story
window on several Germans who had approached close enough to set
fire to one of the TD's half-tracks. All morning long enemy artillery,
rockets and mortars rained on the village. German bazookas and
Panzerfausts fired into Schomerich, set several buildings afire, and there
were some enemy snipers within the town.

Relentlessly, the German attack continued. After the initial failures,
the enemy redoubled his efforts and succeeded in gaining entry into
the eastern and southeastern parts of the town. One squad of the 1st
Platoon of Company G, a heavy machine gun section and a mortar
section of Company H were surrounded and captured. Donning Ameri-
can helmets and field jackets, the Germans took up street fighting in
earnest, even pressing civilians into service as snipers. The defenders
met these assaults, stopped them and prepared to retake lost houses
and free captured comrades. Sergeant Orleane A. Jacobson and Private
First Class Francis A. Palet took a bazooka into the street, flanked an
enemy-held building and eliminated its defenders with a round through
the wall. Sergeant Ernst was wounded while attempting to storm the
house in which the mortar men were held prisoner. Private First Class
Clifford R. McCumber ran from house to house, distributing ammuni-
tion procured from Lieutenant Robert E. Gobin's machine-gun platoon.

In Lampaden Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt discovered he was cut off
and encircled when the crew of the TD position west of town dashed
back to report they had been overrun, and when Lieutenant Najjar of

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the A&P Platoon and his driver, on reconnaissance west of town,
brought back ten prisoners, including an Oberleutnant, taken at the
pumping station. A task force formed by Lieutenant Robert O. Kim-
ball of cooks, drivers, mechanics and TD-men set out to clear the area
in rear of town. From the road junction west of Lampaden, they en-
countered strong fire and went into a defensive position south of the
road, under the command of First Sergeant Bruno Felicelli. Sergeant
Eugene T. Hack of the 3d Battalion Intelligence Section and Sergeant
Robert A. Hawd of the I&R Platoon identified Lieutenant Najjar's
prisoners as members of the II Battalion, 11th SS Mountain Regiment
and learned that their mission was to cut the American supply route
to Trier by blocking the Zerf-Pellingen road.

Company L made another attempt to clear the road into Obersehr
when Lieutenant Travers sent Sergeant George H. Stockman's squad
of the 2d Platoon up Hill 500 with the tank that had not reached the
crest. This group moved up and over the hill; here the tank was
driven back by Panzerfausts and long-range antitank fire from the
northeast. Despite this fact Sergeant Stockman and his men continued
forward until they made contact with the 3d Platoon of Company I.
Fire from the machine gun in the cemetery killed Sergeant Stockman
and pinned down his riflemen. On the crest of Hill 500, the 3d Pla-
toon of Company L made two attempts to reach Sergeant Stockman's
men and the position of the 3d Platoon of Company I without success.
Sergeant Philip D. Grant's squad, supported by a tank, was sent
against the enemy position in the cemetery, but furious automatic-
weapons fire, Panzerfausts and artillery beat back both tank and
infantry.

During the morning, three men of the 7th Field Artillery Observa-
tion Battalion came into Lampaden. They reported that after spending
the night in Pellingen, they were on their way to Obersehr via Lampa-
den when west of the latter town their %-ton truck was hit by a
Panzerfaust. The lieutenant with them was seriously wounded and
three men captured. By running and crawling through the hail of
automatic-weapons fire directed against them, the rest of the group
managed to escape. This information confirmed the fact that the enemy
was well in rear of the town.

In Obersehr, Private First Class Paul L. Zaring of the 3d Platoon,
of the 302d's Cannon Company, spent the morning engaged in a
private feud with the SS troopers. He had been on guard at his gun
position southwest of the village when the Germans, infiltrating in

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the darkness, seriously wounded the other guard and penned the rest
of the platoon in a group of houses. Private First Class Zaring elected
to remain with the guns and his wounded companion to whom he
administered first aid. During the ensuing hours, he dodged artillery,
small-arms fire and an occasional Panzerfaust while picking off those
SS troopers who came within range. At one time, a German officer,
grenade in hand, got to within ten yards of the howitzers before he
was stopped. The action of this lone soldier saved the platoon's guns
from capture or destruction and resulted in the death of eight SS
troopers.

When the situation seemed a bit improved, the 3d Battalion, 302d,
sent an ambulance and a 2l/^-ton truck loaded with twenty-five wounded
Americans including Lieutenant Ramirez, fourteen wounded Germans
and a six-man ammunition detail westward toward Irsch. Near Drei-
kopf these vehicles were stopped by the enemy. Technician Fifth
Grade Albert H. Case and Private First Class Wilford Macon had all
but persuaded the Nazi commander to let them pass when one of the
German wounded complained of the treatment he had received. This
settled the matter. The group was taken prisoner and herded into a
vacant gun emplacement.

A 356th Field Artillery wire party which set out by jeep from
Steinbach to repair a break in the line running back to the artillery
CP in Oberemmel was hit by two Panzerfausts just west of Dreikopf.
Sergeant Robert A. Klahn was killed, Technician Fifth Grade John R.
Deller wounded and Sergeant Woodrow J. Boyette captured. The two
men surviving the encounter were led to the gun emplacement where
they joined the other American prisoners.

Throughout the morning reports of the German infiltration drifted
back to the various S-2s in the area. At 0700 hours a group of enemy
was seen in the woods at the road junction west of Baldringen. At
0930 hours an enemy patrol was sighted one mile south of Pellingen.
Half an hour later a four-man German patrol was fired on near Stein-
bach and withdrew to the north. At about 1100 hours tank destroyers
in the vicinity of Steinbach reported twenty Germans digging in on Hill
507 and brought them under fire. Some thirty minutes later an Ameri-
can half-track coming south from Pellingen was fired upon by about
fifty Germans as it passed Dreikopf. Occupants of the vehicle returned
the fire without slackening speed and passed through safely.

In Irsch Colonel Johnson's headquarters estimated the enemy force
at the roadblock at about one platoon and Company B was alerted for

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action. Lieutenant John C. Hanes, one of the regimental liaison offi-
cers, guided forward a platoon of light tanks from Company D of the
778th Tank Battalion which were to assist Captain Wancio's company
in clearing the Zerf-Pellingen road and reestablishing contact with
the 3d Battalion in Lampaden.

Meanwhile Company C of the 302d, followed by five medium tanks,
had moved east from Irsch on the highway, cut northeast over a moun-
tain trail to Kummerwald and reached the Zerf-Pellingen road, west
of Baldringen. Here Lieutenant Mark Hammer, commanding the
company, left Technical Sergeant James A. Davis and the 2d Platoon
to take positions in the woods at the road junction. The platoon's
mission was to keep both roads open and to capture any Germans dis-
covered in the immediate area. Meanwhile, the rest of the company
and the tanks moved north to the CP of the 2d Battalion located in a
pillbox five hundred yards south of Steinbach.

There the battalion commander informed Lieutenant Hammer that
the 3d Platoon of Company G was cut off in Kummelerhof, the 2d
Platoon had been driven off Hill 468 and that the remnants of Com-
pany G were bottled up in Schomerich. Company C was to retake the
hill and hold it, at which time Company G would break out of Scho-
merich and assist in consolidating the battalion front.

Company C proceeded east through the woods to an assembly area
in a small grove east of the objective. The company commander placed
his 3d Platoon, commanded by Technical Sergeant Marvin L. Kress,
in position to protect the left of the attack against any German thrust
that might develop from the direction of Schomerich, and instructed
the light-machine-gun section and one section of heavies to remain in
the assembly area until needed. Technical Sergeant Leonard T.
Paluszynski's 1st Platoon, the section of HMGs commanded by Staff
Sergeant Frank Schwemer and four medium tanks were to assault Hill
468. Without benefit of artillery preparation, Lieutenant Hammer led
the attacking force up the hill. Against light opposition, the ob-
jective was seized. About ten Germans were killed in the operation
and an equal number abandoned the position to escape. The 3d Pla-
toon was then brought forward and placed on the left, just west of
the road running down the hill into Schomerich. Also, the machine-
gun sections came forward to strengthen the company's flanks.

With the position organized, radio contact was made with Captain
Griffin in Schomerich who reported his strength was too low to enable
him to move from the town. His heavy machine guns and mortars

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

had been captured and he was holding only four of the house*.
Captain Griffin requested tank support.

As the medium tanks rolled toward Schomerich, the enemy troops,
who had expended most of their Panzerfausts against the houses de-
fended by elements of Companies F and G within the town, began a
hasty withdrawal. In short order the armor and infantry cleared the
town, retaking most of the Company H men who had been made
prisoner. The tanks then returned to Hill 468 and the CO of Company
C prepared to join Captain Griffin.

In the 3d Battalion sector, the relief of Obersehr still plagued
Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt. Consequently, Sergeant Grant's squad was
pulled back and with the 1st Squad of the 2d Platoon was placed
under command of Lieutenant Cerboskas. Both squads then moved
up Hill 500, and each mounted one of the medium tanks in the area
of the 3d Platoon. The armor roared straight over the hill and into
Obersehr, overrunning the enemy south of town. Dismounting in the
village, assault parties formed and with the assistance of the besieged
Americans within Obersehr, soon cleared the town.

Using the tanks in the same manner as Lieutenant Cerboskas had,
Sergeant Grose and Sergeant Long stormed through the German posi-
tions north and east of Obersehr, in that order. Seventy prisoners were
taken and over one hundred dead were counted on the north side of
the village alone. A police detail picked up twenty-six machine guns
and forty-two Panzerfausts.

About this time a German NCO and a sergeant from the 7th Field
Artillery Observation Battalion appeared in town from the enemy
roadblock at Dreikopf to effect a prisoner exchange. The matter was
referred to Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt, who, fearing to trade able-
bodied SS troopers who had seen the under-manned American positions
on Lampaden Ridge, stalled the parley until dusk. When he could
procrastinate no longer, the battalion commander sent word to the
German sergeant that he lacked the authority to approve such a
transaction.

Lieutenant Hammer arrived at Captain Griffin's CP in Schomerich
just as the remnants of the II Battalion of the 12th SS Mountain Regi-
ment launched another attack with fifty-odd men and two assault guns,
all that remained of their original strength. Riflemen from Companies
C, G and F; the machine gunners of Companies D and H; and the
tank destroyer men manning a .50-caliber machine gun prepared a
warm reception for the enemy, as German assault guns supporting the

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attack shelled the town from the ridge to the east. On Hill 468 Lieu-
tenant Norbert F. Krob moved his tanks forward and returned fire.
The first round from the American armor sheared the barrel off one
of the self-propelled guns and the remaining piece was damaged by
the tank destroyer south of town. This last enemy vehicle withdrew
in flames followed by the few SS troopers who survived the assault.

After the attack, Lieutenant Hammer received a radio message from
his company CP informing him that heavy casualties were being suf-
fered from enemy artillery that had continued to fall on the position
since its capture. Eighteen men had been hit including Sergeant
Paluszynski and Sergeant Schwemer. In conference with Captain
Griffin, both company commanders agreed that their combined
strength was barely sufficient to beat back another hostile thrust. This
situation was reported to Major Maixner by the CO of Company C,
who requested permission to leave a small force on Hill 468 and rein-
force Schomerich with the larger part of his company. The battalion
commander consented. This decision proved sound, for Company F
id Hen tern had received a message via SCR- 300 from the platoon in
Kummelerhof stating German self-propelled guns were moving up to
the one house they held, firing into the windows. Practically all the
Americans were wounded and their ammunition was exhausted. There
was nothing further they could do.

Throughout the day Captain Edwards had been attempting to round
up fragments of Company I. Part of his 1st Platoon was in the south-
eastern edge of Lampaden, having been driven out of Lampadener
Muhle before daylight. The rest of this unit and a section of machine
guns from Company M were somewhere to the front. The 2d Platoon,
which had been holding the center of the company line, had been cut
up by infiltrating SS troopers and some of the men from this platoon
had been able to work their way back into town. Company I's 3d
Platoon was on the forward slope of the ridge to the north, under
machine-gun fire from both flanks. One light machine gun had to be
abandoned and the other was cut off with a section of heavy machine
guns, east of Lampaden on the right flank of the 2d Platoon. Sergeant
Bondi led forward a squad and a half to reinforce the 2d Platoon.
En route a German automatic weapon stalled the advance until driven
off by one of the tanks supporting the 3d Battalion. Then the party
moved forward attempting to re-form the line. Later it became neces-
sary to withdraw to establish a new perimeter on the edge of Lampa-
den. Staff Sergeant John R. Routh and a BAR team remained in posi-

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tion on Hill 464 until late in the afternoon before being located and
ordered into town.

Meanwhile, several attempts were made to reach the 3d Platoon on
the left. Lieutenant John W. Bybee, commanding this platoon, had
left the position prior to the attack to contact the company CP and was
thus separated from his men. On three separate occasions he attempted
to rejoin his platoon, but each time was stopped by the machine-gun
fire raking the forward slope of the ridge. After daylight Technician
Fifth Grade William T. Raley, who was with the platoon, volun-
teered to make a break for Lampaden to report on the situation. In a
wild dash from the right flank, he reached the edge of the woods and
worked his way into town. Twice the corporal attempted to rejoin
Technical Sergeant Leland B. McKee and the rest of the platoon with-
out success. The enemy automatic weapons were perfectly sited and
their crews alert.

After relieving Obersehr, the two squads of Company L which had
been under Lieutenant Cerboskas were placed on the flanks of Ser-
geant Orr's position atop Hill 500. Along with the remnants of the
1st and 2d Platoons of Company I, the battalion A&P Platoon pro-
tected the southern and eastern approaches to Lampaden, while Com-
pany L, assisted by Sergeant Felicelli's force, guarded the rear of town.

Late in the afternoon Company B of the 302d and its supporting
tanks reached Steinbach. Here the 3d Platoon deployed and moved
across the open ground east of the Zerf-Pellingen highway, followed
by the tanks, while the 1st Platoon came abreast on the left to clear
the strip of woods on that flank. Almost immediately intense machine-
gun fire was received from Hill 507 to the north and Schtneisser fire
was directed against the 3d Platoon from both sides of the highway.
The tank on the extreme left was struck by a Panzerfaust and de-
stroyed. It soon became evident that the German roadblock was too
strong to be reduced by a single company. This fact was reported to
regiment and Captain Wancio was instructed to assume a defensive
position north of Steinbach for the night.

In preparation for any renewal of the attack by the enemy, the CO
of the 3d Battalion continued to straighten his lines. By late afternoon
the most worrisome problem was the German machine gun in the
cemetery along the road to Obersehr. This determined enemy force
had driven back three attacks and continued to cut off the 3d Platoon
of Company I and harass the line held by Company L and elements

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of the Battalion Headquarters Company. Against this position Ser-
geant Orr on Hill 500 was instructed to send an assault group to
eliminate it. Consequently, Staff Sergeant Cecil F. Durrette and the
1st Squad worked in from the northwest of the cemetery, while Ser-
geant Mertz, commanding one of the supporting tanks, rolled up from
the southwest. Between these two forces, the troublesome strongpoint
was reduced and the surrounding area cleared.

After their phone lines went dead, Lieutenant William J. Honan of
Company M had anxiously waited for someone to report back from
his machine-gun sections. Time passed and still there was no contact.
The Weapons Platoon leader had decided to go forward to personally
investigate the situation when he encountered Sergeant Walter L.
Cranford of Company I who was concerned over the safety of some
of his men. Arming himself with a light machine gun, Lieutenant
Honan took Sergeant Cranford with him as he moved out of Lampa-
den, paralleling the road running east from town. On the southern
end of Hill 464, they found Sergeant Wallace M. Gallant along with
three of his men manning the right gun of their section. The left gun
was in its emplacement and still in operating condition. Sergeant
Gallant and his crew reported they had been firing on groups of Ger-
mans in front of this position all day. To conserve ammunition, the
NCO employed his carbine against individuals while saving the HMG
for more renumerative targets. This small group had even managed to
capture six prisoners. Farther away, Private First Class Paul W. Chap-
man and his crew were found, still in action, at their light-machine-
gun position. Lieutenant Honan ordered all three guns and the crews
back into Lampaden. Then, with sheer contempt for the enemy, he
stood in a completely exposed position, firing his machine gun from
the hip to cover their withdrawal. Following this, the lieutenant and
Sergeant Cranford started a search for the other HMG section of the
platoon. Several times the two men were engaged by groups of SS
troopers, but on each occasion Lieutenant Honan fought it out with
the enemy, firing his machine gun like a BAR.

When a thorough search of the area in which the section had been
emplaced revealed no trace of the machine gunners, their weapons or
supporting riflemen, the two-man search party withdrew to Lampaden.
Unknown to Lieutenant Honan, the missing section was working its
way back to town over a circuitious route carrying the guns with them.

Under the cover of darkness Staff Sergeant Brice P. Potthoff and his
rifle squad of company I worked their way back to Lampaden. They
had remained in position all day, firing on the Germans that appeared

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

to their front and flanks. Having had no word from the rest of the
company and no idea of the situation, the squad leader withdrew from
his isolated position before his men were accurately located and over-
whelmed.

Lieutenant Bybee and Corporal Raley made a last attempt to reach
the 3d Platoon of Company I after nightfall. In the darkness they
managed to cross the ridge, but were met with German automatic-
weapons fire coming from the foxholes that had been manned by their
platoon. Obviously, the group had been either killed or captured
sometime during the day by the German mountain troops. When this
was reported to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Bybee was in-
structed to form a composite platoon from the cooks and headquarters
personnel of Companies I and M and commit them in the gap between
the A&P Platoon on the ridge and elements of Company I in the
western edge of Lampaden. At the same time Lieutenant Travers of
Company L formed his mess and supply personnel into a rifle squad,
posting them on the southern edge of the village. With a perimeter
thus completed, the 3d Battalion settled down to await the next Ger-
man attack.

During the night, Private First Class Daniel W. Aman and Private
Harry R. Ellis of Sergeant Stockman's squad of the 1st Platoon, Com-
pany L, crawled over the ridge to safety. Both men were wounded and
believed the other nine men of the squad were dead. This group had
been cut down by enemy machine-gun fire. Following this, SS troopers
came forward and shot up the Americans whose bodies were kicked,
spat upon and stripped of personal articles. Sergeant John Gedaminski,
who was still living was riddled with fire from a machine pistol. Aman
and Ellis survived by feigned death until the coming of nightfall.

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HEADQUARTERS XX CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 340 U. S. Army

5 March 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : Commanding General, 94th Infantry Division, APO

94, U. S. Army.

1. Your division has most expeditiously accomplished its mission
of clearing the Saar-Moselle triangle and seizing a bridgehead east
of the Saar River. In so doing, it made a vital contribution to the
capture of the fortified town of Trier.

2. The aggressive and efficient manner in which these missions
have been carried out reflects great credit upon the division in keep-
ing with the high traditions of the service and upon you as its
Commanding General.

3. Your ability to rapidly take advantage of opportunities with-
out becoming involved in unwarranted delay has contributed sub-
stantially to the successful accomplishment of your mission.

4. You and the personnel of your command are hereby highly
commended for your splendid performance of duty during this
operation.

WALTON H. WALKER
Major General,
United States Army
Commanding

1st Ind.

AG 201.22 (5Mar45) CG

HQ 94 INF DIV APO 94 US ARMY 28 Mar 45.

TO: All soldiers of the 94th Division and Attached Units.

1. This commendation from our Corps Commander has been
earned by the splendid efforts of each one of you individually and
of these efforts I am fully aware,

2. I take great pleasure in transmitting this letter to each mem-
ber of this command. It may be mailed to the United States pro-
vided no changes are made in it.

HARRY /. MALONY
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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Chapter 37: RESTORING THE BRIDGEHEAD

BY 1700 HOURS on the 6th of March, the front of the 94th
Division was in fairly good order. The 3d Battalion, 301st,
still held its positions on Muhlenberg. The 2d Battalion, 302d,
had restored all of its sector with the exception of the outpost at
Kummelerhof. Farther north, the 3d Battalion, 302d, reported its
position tenable although no attempt had been made to restore the
original line in front of Lampaden. On the extreme left flank of the
Division, the 3d Cavalry Group was maintaining its front. Only sub-
stantial gain to the enemy resulting from the fanatical attack of the
mountaineers was the roadblock on the Zerf-Pellingen road at Drei-
kopf, which was now known to be held by a strong German force.

General Malony was particularly anxious to wipe out the SS troopers
manning the roadblock behind his lines, so that the scheduled relief
by the 26th Division might be completed and the tired troops of the
94th might move to the Luxembourg rest area. To eliminate this SS
group astride the Zerf-Pellingen road, the CO of the 376th Infantry,
which was in reserve near Oberemmel, was instructed to commit a
battalion against the Dreikopf position. The 1st Battalion was se-
lected for this mission and instructed to attack south from Pellingen,
in conjunction with a northward thrust by Company B of the 302d
from its defensive positions above Steinbach.

Lieutenant Colonel Miner jeeped to Pellingen for a reconnaissance
while his troops started marching toward the town where a platoon
of medium tanks were to meet them. About dark the leading elements
of the battalion arrived at the road junction south of Pellingen. Com-
pany A, commanded by Lieutenant Joseph T. Koshoffer, started south
astride the Zerf-Pellingen highway to gain contact with the enemy.
Company C, under Lieutenant William P. Springer, followed. When
the leading unit halted north of Dreikopf to allow its flank patrols
to return, Lieutenant Springer deployed his company to protect the left
of the battalion. At the same time, patrols were sent out from Com-
pany C to gain contact with the 3d Battalion, 302d, in Obersehr and
Lampaden. Meanwhile, Company B led by Lieutenant William G.
Land, passed through Company A. It pushed south, on the west of
the highway, as far as the small ridge opposite Dreikopf. Company A
then came abreast of Lieutenant Land's men, taking positions east of
the Zerf-Pellingen road.

Lieutenant Carl A. Crouse led the 1st Platoon of Company B down
the wooded draw that extended in the direction of the Zerf-Pellingen
road. In the darkness the area was searched without encountering any
Germans. At the head of the draw, the platoon took a crescent-shaped

388

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RESTORING THE BRIDGEHEAD

389

position in the edge of the woods, facing south toward Hill 507 and
southeast toward the highway. A second patrol, from Technical Ser-
geant John F. Nagy's 3d Platoon, started south down the highway in
an attempt to contact Company B of the 302d. Running into heavy
fire, this group was unable to accomplish its mission. The patrols from
Company C attempting to gain contact with Lieutenant Colonel
Cloudt's men met with no better success. A reconnaissance group
under Sergeant Herbert L. Monroe, moving toward Lampaden at
about 2200 hours, stopped when a voice was heard in the darkness.
It proved to be a German soldier complaining about the bad weather
and the amount of water in his foxhole. Another group under Ser-
geant Harold P. Price using the same general route about 0200 hours
was stopped by the volume of enemy small-arms fire employed against
it.

Even after the return of the patrols, the situation remained sketchy.
The battalion commander decided to attack as soon as possible on the
morning of the 7th and gave word that he was to be notified imme-
diately when the supporting armor arrived.

During the night the 356th Field Artillery, from positions forward
of Oberemmel, continued harassing missions on the draws in front of
the positions of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 302d, in spite of the presence
of Germans on the ridge 1,500 yards to their front. By morning, the
battalion was also engaging the enemy roadblock itself, through the
liaison officer of the 919th Field Artillery Battalion with Lieutenant
Colonel Miner's Battalion.

Along the southern portion of the division front, the relief by the
26th Division began according to schedule on the night of the 6th.
The 328th Infantry Regiment took over the sector of Colonel Hagerty's
men while the 101st and 104th Regiments waited their turn to move
into the bridgehead. With the 3d Battalion, 376th replacing its own
3d Battalion, the 301st Infantry moved from the lines and across the
Moselle along with the 301st Field Artillery, the Rangers, the 319th
Engineers less Company B, the 94th Reconnaissance Troop, Battery B
of the 465th AAA Battalion and miscellaneous service units. The night
was extremely black. Slowly the columns crawled over the hills and
through the blasted towns under the guidance of the military police.
Throughout the night, the Division signalmen laid wire from Saarburg
to Mondorf in Luxembourg, that communications would be in place
when Division Headquarters was ready to move.

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On the night of March 6-7 the 1st Battalion, 376th, was not the
only one preparing an attack. Having taken stock of the situation,
the commanding general of the SS troopers decided on further offensive
action. The I Battalion of the 11th at Dreikopf had not yet received
a major attack from the Americans, but exploitation of its success was
impossible since the three other mountain battalions had been all but
annihilated. Still uncommitted were the I and III Battalions of the
12th SS Mountain Regiment. Therefore, the German general decided
to employ the battered remnants of the 11th Regiment for another
thrust at Lampaden. Their orders called for the capture of the town
and a junction with the I Battalion on Dreikopf, by an attack which
would jump off at 0400 hours the following morning. Were this
thrust successful, the two fresh battalions of the 12th SS Mountain
Regiment would be committed to exploit the German gains.

In the cold, foggy, early hours of the 7th, the German attack got
under way. The mountaineers, directly supported by self-propelled
assault guns, advanced against the east and south sides of Lampaden
following a blistering preparation by massed rocket, mortar and artil-
lery fire.

Within the town, the conglomerate American forces waited for their
first glimpse of the mountaineers through the fog. To their front, the
105s of the American artillery probed and stabbed the darkness. Fight-
ing really began when the leading German assault gun cut loose on
the houses in the eastern edge of the village. Technical Sergeant
James T. Chapman replied with fire from the 57mm manned by the
1st Squad of the battalion Antitank Platoon. A duel followed, in
which the opposing gunners engaged each other's muzzle flashes.
Lieutenant Charles H. Pausner, Jr., concentrated the fire of his artillery
on the open ground east of town while Captain Benjamin F. Buffing-
ton, at the battalion CP, dickered for heavier stuff from the 390th
Field Artillery Battalion. As darkness lifted and the mists began to
thin, the outer edge of Lampaden spit fire and flame. Sergeant Gallant
from his machine-gun position on a manure pile poured burst after
burst into the oncoming ranks of the attackers. Sergeant Chapman's
crew slammed out every last round of 57mm ammunition at their posi-
tion. Lieutenant Honan and Private First Class William T. Baxter,
each manned a 60mm mortar singlehanded to plaster the attackers.
Lieutenant Douglas H. Smith spotted six SS men behind a haystack
and dropped a round of 81mm squarely on top of them. Riflemen,
machine gunners, mortar crews, antitankers, tank destroyermen and

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artillerymen contributed to the curtain of fire that denied the village
to the mountaineers.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, 376th, had started its attack
southward against the Dreikopf roadblock. Company B was desig-
nated to clear Hill 507 which was now believed to be the enemy's
main position. This assault was launched by the 2d and 3d Platoons
which advanced astride the Zerf-Pellingen highway, each supported
by four medium tanks. Sergeant Nagy, on the right, moved the 3d
Platoon forward slowly through the fog. Control and contact became
increasingly difficult and then the Germans struck. Withering auto-
matic weapons fire was thrown against the platoon. Vainly the tankers
peered into the mists trying to locate the enemy gunners. Determined
SS troopers slipped up in the fog to employ bazookas and Panzerfausts
against the Shermans. Two tanks were destroyed and a third damaged.
In the face of this opposition, the platoon and the remaining tank
withdrew to reorganize. The 2d Platoon fared no better. Just after
crossing the line of departure, both infantry and tanks were hit from
the left flank. Two of the armored vehicles fell prey to the enemy
tank hunters and the remainder of the force withdrew. »

About 0900 hours the remains of the 11th SS Mountain Regiment
in front of Lampaden made their do-or-die assault. Their self-pro-
pelled guns pounded the village, reducing several buildings to mere
heaps of rubble and setting fire to the schoolhouse. Taking advantage
of the added confusion caused by the fire, the assault weapons swept
into town. At the road junction in the eastern section of Lampaden,
Lieutenant Charles M. Phillips had placed an American tank mounting
a 76mm gun. This weapon commanded the roads leading into the
village from the east and the southeast. It was so sited, that should
it be knocked out, it would serve as a roadblock to prevent farther
advance by German assault weapons or tanks. The enemy gunners
scored first and pumped three rounds into the tank, which, though it
became a total loss, prevented enemy vehicles from entering Lampaden.
Even without the support of their self-propelled guns, the SS troopers
succeeded in taking seven or eight buildings from which they pushed
toward the church in the center of town.

It was at this point that Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt instructed the
Battalion S-4, Lieutenant Warren C. Hubbard, to attempt to get
through to regiment to explain the seriousness of the situation. Also,
the S-4 was to endeavor to secure a quick resupply on ammunition.
Borrowing a half-track from the tank destroyers, Lieutenant Hubbard,

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

.luckily failed to do my serious though concuss km of I

plosion forced the half -track to s.werve' off - the read to the left:

its ex-
The

B;uk m iampaden, odd groups of the 3d l^tialKm were busy deaci-
ing up the i&wtt.. Private First .Class Baxter,: pmc to the ammunition/

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organized a small force which he led in a fierce assault against one of
the houses the enemy had occupied. By use of small arms and gre-
nades, the building was retaken and the SS troops defending it elimi-
nated. Meanwhile, Sergeant Kelly led a clearing party that went to
work on the German-held buildings across the road from the church.
At the same time, Staff Sergeant George L. Brinkerhoff and Private
First Class Louis A. Albert of the battalion S-3 section were mopping
up east of the church. This last attack of the 11th SS Mountain Regi-
ment cost them five assault guns destroyed and two more damaged;
thirty-five men killed and forty captured. Lampaden remained in
American hands.

During the morning, the size of the enemy force holding Dreikopf
was accurately determined when Major A. H. Middleton of the Division
artillery flew over the position in a liaison plane. A low ceiling neces-
sitated flying at about five hundred feet which gave a good view of the
area. On the second pass, a plane from the 195th Field Artillery
Group joined the major and both ships received a heavy volume of fire
from the ground. The observer in the 195th Cub was killed and Major
Middleton's plane sustained thirty-five hits. However, both ships
managed to land without crashing. Major Middleton reported that
the I Battalion, 11th SS Mountain Regiment, numbered approximately
four hundred men.

Supported by four medium tanks, Company B made its second
assault against Hill 507 during the afternoon. The 2d and 3d Platoons
moved on their objective from the northeast with the riflemen abreast
of the tanks. Against this advance the mountaineers directed a fear-
some volume of fire. Panzerfausts and the turret gun of one of the
knocked-out American tanks were brought to bear against the armor,
while the foot troops were the targets of numerous machine guns and
Schmeissers. All four of the supporting tanks were knocked out; the
few infantrymen who reached the objective were unable to hold it.
Before the support platoon could be committed, the impetus of the
attack was broken; the survivors were withdrawn to their original lines.
The battalion assumed positions for the night and considered a new
plan.

During the afternoon the 2d Battalion, 376th, was brought forward
and Company F attached to Lieutenant Colonel Miner's command.
Company G, followed by Company E, moved across country toward
Obersehr which the leading elements reached without opposition at

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

1640 hours. By 1800 hours the entire force was into town, preparing
to push on to Lampaden. The scheme of maneuver called for the 2d
Battalion less Company F, to plug the gap in the ruptured line of the
3d Battalion, 302d, and thus stabilize the division front.

Company G, commanded by Lieutenant Harry W. McLaughlin who
had joined the battalion nine days earlier at Wiltingen, moved from
Obersehr via the road west of Hill 500. Scarcely had the tail of the
column cleared the village before the leading elements were under
accurate automatic-weapons fire from the southwest. Lieutenant
McLaughlin and three men of the 1st Platoon were killed; six others
wounded. Assuming command, Lieutenant Marvin M. Kuers with-
drew the company to Obersehr to reorganize. By radio, a guide was
requested from Lampaden and Private First Class Felix J. Grzyninski
went to Obersehr to contact the CO of Company G. He led the unit
over Hill 500 and through Company L into town. Uncertain of his
mission Lieutenant Kuers placed himself at the disposal of the CO of
the 3d Battalion, 302d. The company was instructed to assume posi-
tions on the high ground north of Lampaden and did so shortly after
midnight. Company E remained in Obersehr.

Lieutenant Colonel Miner was ordered to attack again on the morn-
ing of the 8th. The new plan of operation called for Company C to
approach Hill 507 from the west while Companies A and B launched
an assault from the north. To the south, Company B of the 302d
would block any attempt by the enemy to withdraw in that direction.

Late in the afternoon, the enemy made another attempt at a PW
exchange when Lieutenant Ramirez and a German sergeant entered
Lampaden under a flag of truce. Again Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt
stalled and then refused, fearing to reinforce the enemy position with
able-bodied SS troopers familiar with the situation existing in and
around Lampaden. From the negotiators it was learned that the num-
ber of Americans wounded at Dreikopf now numbered sixty-five.
Lieutenant Ramirez was given a supply of blankets, drugs and bandages
and the exchange party returned after dark.

In the perimeter of the German battalion, the captured Americans
had spent a rugged day. Those who were able watched with intense
interest the attacks of the 1st Battalion, 376th, and were dismayed at
the destruction wrought on the tanks supporting Lieutenant Colonel
Miner's men. Several times the unwounded American prisoners were
sent forward to bring in the casualties of both sides. During the after-
noon and all through the night, American artillery rained on the posi-

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395

tion but fortunately none of the rounds fell in the emplacement serving
as a POW cage.

With the coming of night the situation began to look critical for the
SS troopers. They had beaten off two heavy attacks from the north
and turned back minor thrusts on the Steinbach road, Hill 507 and
Obersehr road. American artillery was falling on the position with
unnerving regularity and at any time a strong, combined attack might
develop from anyone of several different directions. Furthermore, the
only route of withdrawal, down the draw to the east, could be blocked
off at any time. With the Americans holding Lampaden and Scho-
merich resupply was impossible. The battalion had been without
food since the 5th, casualties had continued to mount, medical sup-
plies were exhausted and ammunition was dangerously low. More-
over, five of the six mortars with the battalion had been knocked out.

Then, to the German commander, came orders to abandon the posi-
tion. All of the captured American vehicles, with the exception of the
ambulance, were immobilized and the prisoners who were able to walk
were prepared for departure. Sergeant Boyette and several others
feigned sickness and were left with the litter cases. Technician Fifth
Grade Case and Private First Class Macon were allowed to remain
behind to care for the wounded, both American and German. At 0600
hours on the morning of the 8th, the I Battalion of the 11th SS Moun-
tain Regiment streamed off Dreikopf, yielding the ground for which
they had fought so bitterly. The wounded counted seventy-three Ger-
mans in one column which moved east, and 143 in a second that started
southeast.

Among the prisoners the Germans took with them when they aban-
doned the Dreikopf position was Sergeant Charles J. Mooney of Head-
quarters Company, 3d Battalion, 302d. Part of his story is quoted
below.

At about 0500 hours a Jerry woke up all the non-wounded and told us to
help carry the wounded. We filed out of our hole and went to the hole where
their wounded were. We were told we would carry the wounded on stretchers
about five kilometers to their aid station. We didn't like this and between
Ferguson's glib tongue and my aches and pains we impressed the captain that
we all had trench foot. So we got out of the carrying party. You no doubt
found their wounded there.

Then this captain took his whole outfit, column of twos, and marched out
about 0630. He must have passed right between our lines. We passed between
two towns in back of that outpost [Dreikopf]. A Jerry had a Schmeisser in
each of our backs and demonstrated what he'd do if we yelled out. We could

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see GIs in Lampaden as we passed to the right of it. They took twelve of
us non-wounded and left something like forty-nine wounded Americans. From
there on we just walked. Three hundred and one miles to our final stop
about thirty-five kilometers below Augsburg. Rub became very sick in Augs-
burg but we saw that he was placed in a hospital. I can't tell you too much
about our hike from Lampaden, but it was certainly one we'll never forget.
We ate dandelions and snails, rotten potato peelings and pig mash. Anything
to keep us going. Miller got deathly sick on dandelions but kept going every
step of the \/ay. Six of us stuck close together and we got along all right.

After we were liberated, the whole bunch [1,200 Americans and 800 Brit-
ish] were put on a big farm. The rations were terrible, so we decided to take
off. Pruett and Stoll didn't feel like going, so Ferg and I decided to go to
the biggest town nearby and "apartment hunt," and then bring in the rest of
the guys when we were settled. I had always warned the guys that even after
we were liberated we would have to sweat out another week or ten days of
no food. Nobody seemed to give a good goddamn about us out there.

Four of us took over a twelve-room mansion complete with bath, radios,
electricity, etc. It was really heaven. Three men from an artillery outfit moved
in with us to guard a warehouse next door. So we ate chow with them. Their
officer took quite a liking to us and got us clean clothes. Then came the payoff.
We got a brand new motorcycle from a Senegalese for one pack of butts!
This we used for contact with the group who were living like dogs on the
farm.

Ferg and I lived in our mansion for nine days and left it on the morning
of the day we flew out. Boy, we hated to give up that cycle! So that's it,
now we're waiting for the boat.

Even though I'm getting home, I wouldn't go through it again for the
same promise. Fergie is still the same old wit and Miller turned out to be
a pretty square guy. Rub proved himself to be the stoutest-hearted soldier
I've ever known. Nothing was too tough for the old man but the GIs finally
knocked him out. He was a real Airedale.

At 0745 hours, Sergeant Boyette saw two American riflemen ap-
proaching over Hill 495, toward the group of wounded on Dreikopf
and yelled to them. They failed to recognize him, and hit the ground
to assume firing positions. Technician Fifth Grade Case and Private
First Class Mason then approached the scouts, waving a red cross flag
taken from their vehicle. The situation was explained and word passed
back that the enemy had withdrawn from the position. Fire of the
American artillery on Dreikopf was speedily lifted.

One of the 2y2- ton trucks on the positions was repaired without
difficulty and this vehicle and the ambulance were loaded with the
more seriously wounded for a return to Lampaden where the nearest
aid station was located. Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt was informed of
the new development and soon the evacuation of both wounded and
prisoners from Lampaden and Obersehr was in full swing. Technician

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Fourth Grade Joseph F. Gaynor of the regimental Medical Detach-
ment who was with the 3d Battalion, 302d, reported the following.

There were many German wounded who insisted on being carried out when
a truck was backed up to evacute them. They insisted they were unable to
walk. So the medics, with a weary acceptance of the inevitable, carried them.
The truck was well filled with Jerry casualties when it was bracketed with
mortar fire. What followed came nearer to breaking our spirits than any of
the thousand incidents of the previous twenty-four hours. Those poor, crip-
pled, crying Jerries cleared the truck and found cover in faster time than it
takes to tell about it . . . When the fire lifted, they walked to the truck.

The 1st Battalion, 376th, with Company F attached, occupied the
Dreikopf area and Company B of the 302d patrolled the Zerf-Pellin-
gen road. A reinforced platoon from the latter company was sent into
Paschel.

As the tactical situation eased, the CO of the 376th took the oppor-
tunity to make the necessary adjustments in command personnel. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Anderson chose as his Executive Officer Lieutenant
Miner of the 1st Battalion. Major Eskel N. Miller, Jr. was transferred
from the 3d Battalion and assumed command of the 1st.

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PART SIX

GERMANY: THE RACE TO THE RHINE

// is my prejudiced but well founded belief
that the three actions of smashing the Siegfried
Switch Lme — clearing the Saar-Moselle Tri-
angle which culminated in the capture of Trier
— forcing the Soar Bridgehead, and the ten-day
drive to the Rhine were the outstanding actions
of the Third Army's advance to the Rhine.

MAJOR GENERAL HARRY J. MALONY

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Chapter 38: OUT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

THE DIVISION was half in and half out of the line on the
morning of March 8, 1945 when the Chief of Staff's telephone
rang in the CP at Saarburg. Colonel Bergquist picked up the
receiver and heard the G-3 of XX Corps say: "We have a change in
plans and we don't want the people who are with you to take over
any more of the zone than they have now. . . . You are to hold what
you have and rest as much of the unit that is out, as possible. ... I
will send complete details up to you by your liaison officer who is here.
. . . I think you can anticipate what is up." Colonel Bergquist replied
that he understood and the conversation terminated. The relief was to
be halted; a new attack was in the making.

At 1215 hours General Walker arrived at the Division command
post to confer with General Malony; General Paul, the CG of the 26th
Division; the artillery commanders and chiefs of staff of both divisions.
The corps commander confirmed the news of the impending attack
which was to be launched sometime in the next few days. Following
his departure, the conference, at which problems arising from the
change in plans were discussed at length, continued. With the southern
boundary of the 94th along the line from Saarburg through Zerf, the
bulk of the 26th Division was in General Malony's zone. As soon as
possible the 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments would have to be
moved south. The boundary between the 94th Division and the 10th
Armored on the north was also causing trouble. This line, which ran
from Ockfen to Kastel, gave the Division a frontage of some ten miles
while its rear area tapered down to about two. Therefore, permission
was sought and obtained for the 94th to use the roadnet south of a
line drawn from Konz-Karthaus to Kastel.

As originally planned, it was decided to relieve the 3d Battalion,
301st, since a portion of this battalion's area was in the 26th Division's
zone. The 301st Infantry, which was in reserve, was to return to the
lines to take over the front of the 302d. The latter regiment would
then become Division reserve until it was time for the attack. Third
Cavalry Group was to shift to the north after the 376th relieved their
positions on the left of Colonel Hagerty's regiment. While these
changes in the front line were under way, the artillery would move for-
ward and service units would cross the Saar to close up behind the
combat troops. In close column by night, and by infiltration during
daylight hours, the new deployment of the 94th and 26th Divisions
began.

On March 8, the 2d Battalion, 376th, which was already reinforcing

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401

the northern sector of Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's battalion, remained
in position. Companies K and L of the 301st, now on the left flank
of the 26th at Zerf and Ober Zerf, were relieved by the 2d Battalion,
104th, while Company I on Muhlenberg was replaced by Company A
of the 302d. Third Battalion, 301st, pulled back to Beurig. The relief
continued the following day with Company A and the 2d and 3d Bat-
talions of the 302d turning their sectors over to the 1st and 2d Battal-
ions, 301st, which were brought forward from the rest area, while
the 1st Battalion, 376th, assumed the positions formerly held by the
3d Cavalry Group. The 3d Battalion, 376th, moved to regimental
reserve at Krettnach-Obermennig, and the 302d Infantry moved across
the Saar for several days rest in Division reserve. The 778th Tank-
Battalion moved to reserve at Tawern. Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan's
Ranger battalion, already in Luxembourg, was released from Division
control on the 11th. As a result of these shifts and reliefs the line-up
from north to south along the Ruwer River ran as follows: 3d Cavalry
Group; 1st Battalion, 376th; 2d Battalion, 376th; 1st Battalion, 301st;
2d Battalion, 301st.

XX Corps' plan of attack called for a push to the east as far as the
Nahe River. There the corps was to turn northeast, attack up the river
valley and seize successive objectives in the vicinity of Oberthal, Ober-
kirchen, Meiseham, Spreadingen and Mainz-Kastel. The 3d Cavalry
Group, on the left of the 94th, was to protect the north flank of XX
Corps; while the 80th Division, passing through the southern elements
of the 94th and the northern elements of the 26th, was to protect the
right flank as it moved forward parallel to General Malony's troops.
Pushing south, along the Saar River, the 26th Division was to roll up
the Siegfried Line, heading toward Merzig, then turn east toward the
Rhine on the right of the rest of the corps.

Within the Division, the thrust eastward was to be made by the 302d
Infantry on the north and the 301st on the south. Contact between
the right of Colonel Hagerty's regiment and the left of the 80th Divi-
sion was assigned to the 94th Reconnaissance Troop. The 376th, which
was already on line, would remain in place until passed through by
Colonel Johnson's men on the morning of the attack. It would then
revert to Division reserve. From their positions on line, Colonel
Hagerty's troops were to jump off with the 1st and 2d Battalions in
the assault. Hermeskeil was the immediate objective. Each of the
attacking regiments was assigned an axis of advance with both routes
converging on the above town.

On the night of the 12th, last-minute preparations were made and

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

the battalions of the 302d Infantry moved to their forward assembly
areas behind Colonel McClune's front line. To the rear, the Division
artillery was poised for the attack. Fofthe initial phase of the opera-
tion, the cannon companies of all three regiments had been attached
to General Fortier's command. In addition, the artillerymen were to
be assisted by the fire power of the 5th and 195th Field Artillery
Groups. Patrols from the 319th Engineer Battalion had conducted
extensive reconnaissance for suitable bridge sites and fords over the
Ruwer River for the preceding four days. Bulldozers and bridging
equipment had been brought forward and Lieutenant Colonel Ellis*
men were ready for the coming show.

While the men of the 94th Division and the rest of XX Corps made
final preparations for this attack, back in Washington, D. C, General
of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States
Army, had in his possession a letter from General Eisenhower, dated
March 12, 1945, which in part was concerned with the coming offensive:

Tomorrow morning the XX Corps of Patton's Army begins a local attack
in the Trier area as a preliminary to the general attack by Seventh Army on
the 15th ... If we can get a quick break-through, the advance should go
very rapidly and success in the region will multiply the advantage we have
secured in the bridgehead at Remagen. It will probably be a nasty business
breaking through the fortified lines, but once this is accomplished losses should
not be great and we should capture another big bag of prisoners. I have given
Seventh Army 14 divisions for their part of the job, and XX Corps jumps
off with four.

At 0300 hours on the morning of March 13, 1945, the stillness of
the night was shattered by the thunder of the attack's artillery prepara-
tion. Corps and division battalions unleashed the might of their guns
and the initial volley of the 105s, 155s, 240s and 8-inch weapons hit
the designated target area at the same split second. For fifteen minutes
this hellish fire continued, blasting enemy personnel, communications
and materiel.

Within the 2d Battalion, 302d, Companies E and F had been desig-
nated to lead the attack. The machine guns of Company H were
divided between the assault companies and the 81mm mortars contri-
buted direct support. Lieutenant Thomas J. Wellems' platoon of Com-
pany B of the 319th Engineers was attached to the battalion and pre-
pared to assist the leading elements by clearing mines or preparing
demolitions. Company G, in reserve, was to join the battalion at Schon-
dorf, which was the immediate objective.

While the fearful artillery barrage was still falling on the enemy

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side of the Ruwer, the two assault units, led by Company F in a column
of platoons, moved to the river directly east of Geizenburg. Short of
the river, the head of the column halted momentarily. Instinctively
some of the men moved toward the ditches paralleling the road. A
series of loud explosions followed and the cry "Schii mines!" passed
down the files. Quickly ascertaining the extent of the minefield, Lieu-
tenant Wellems set his engineers to work. Eight infantrymen and five
engineers fell victim to this first enemy obstacle.

Then the advance continued as the troops waded the Ruwer, hip-
deep in the swirling waters. As Company F gained the far shore, the
scouts passed back word that German voices could be heard to the
front. Captain Kops came forward and, after speaking to the enemy
in their own language, convinced them they should surrender. Mean-
while, Company E had crossed, deployed and pushed forward some
two hundred yards before it encountered rifle, machine-gun and 88mm
fire coming from the high ground northeast of Schondorf . As the com-
pany continued forward dispite this fire, a direct hit by an 88 knocked
out one section of HMGs.

After the first prisoners taken by Company F were searched and sent
to the rear under guard, the advance resumed. Within a hundred yards,
the leading platoon was engaged by an enemy machine gun located in
a house to the right front of the company. A base of fire was estab-
lished and the 2d Squad of the 3d Platoon moved to outflank the Ger-
man weapon. This maneuvering element was picked up by a 40mm
gun crew who engaged the squad as it advanced by rushes. By 0800
hours the squad had knocked out the machine gun and taken twenty
prisoners. Following this, the company continued along the winding
road leading into Schondorf. When a 77mm enemy gun engaged the
advancing column, Sergeant Paul E. Pflueger led his men against it,
speedily silencing the weapon.

As the two companies approached Schondorf, they were again
brought under fire. The leading platoon of Company F had gained a
foothold in town and a second platoon, organized into assault groups,
was about to be committed when two Americans were seen approaching
from the direction of the enemy lines. These men, Staff Sergeant Gil-
bert E. Kenyon and Sergeant Malcolm R. Horton, reported that after
accounting for a couple of Germans they had worked their way into
town and found the Germans in the process of evacuating. By 1730
hours the town was completely searched and outposted.

During the morning, the 1st Battalion of Colonel Johnson's regi-
ment was ordered from its assembly area in the vicinity of Franzen-

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heim. Engineer reconnaissance had located a ford near Gusterath, in
the vicinity of a bridge blown by the enemy. This bridge was judged
repairable while beyond the river were two wooded draws leading
toward Bonerath. Therefore, at about 1000 hours Company B was
sent forward to secure this crossing for the battalion. Captain Wancio's
men, approaching the river cautiously, easily avoided the hasty mine-
field laid by the Germans and gained the far shore without opposition.
The 2d Platoon under Technical Sergeant Robert A. Gilbert moved up
the right draw, while Technical Sergeant James A. Graham's 3d Pla-
toon searched the one on the left. The remaining rifle platoon, com-
manded by Lieutenant Odint T. Olsen, held the crossing site while this
reconnaissance of the approaches to Bonerath was in progress. At the
completion of the search of the southern route to the battalion's first
objective, Captain Wancio ordered the 2d Platoon to join the force
in the northern draw.

At 1300 hours Companies A and C left their assembly areas, moved
to the river and crossed. While the former unit worked forward in the
southern valley, Company C, advancing through the thick underbrush
of the northern approach, passed through Captain Wancio's men. Both
companies then moved to the high ground north of their objective.
There they received heavy fire from enemy mortars, artillery and rocket
batteries.

Major Meyers, who now commanded the battalion, had decided to
take the town with a two-pronged attack which would send Company
C eastward while the troops of Company A hit the village from the
south flank. Company B, which had moved to positions on the high
ground overlooking town, was to protect the heavy machine guns which
would support the attack by overhead fire. At 1700 hours the operation
began with the men of Companies A and C advancing as skirmishers.
To the front of the attacking units, the ground was open and rolling.
Due to the formation of the terrain, the objective, which was within
a few hundred yards of the assaulting units, was entirely invisible to
the troops. However, the twin village of Holzerath, some eight hun-
dred yards to the south, was in full view. Toward this the companies
moved.

During the initial phases of the attack, Lieutenant Malachi A.
Zecchin radioed the CO of Company A and said: 'There's a small
village over here to my left. Shall I search it?" Lieutenant Baum-
gaertner replied, "Hell no! Let's get this town of Bonerath. We'll
worry about that other one later." Hence, Companies A and C entered
what they thought was their objective, taking the northern and south-

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OUT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

405

ern corners, respectively. All units pushed forward rapidly. Near the
center of town, an 88 opened at almost point-blank range against the
advancing infantry. The enemy weapon had excellent infantry support
and initial attempts to neutralize or destroy it came to naught. Sub-
sequently, Sergeant Myron L. Wagner managed to work his way
to within bazooka range and let fly. He scored a hit, but the round
failed to explode. Nevertheless, the enemy gunners had had enough
and withdrew. Following this, the remainder of the town was taken
without difficulty.

Once the village was cleared, Lieutenant Baumgaertner radioed
Major Meyers that Bonerath had fallen; the CP could move forward.
Gathering his command group and the 1st Platoon of Company A
which had been holding the bridgehead east of Geizenburg, the battal-
ion commander moved out. Seeing no sign of either of the assault
companies at the edge of town, the major had a civilian interrogated.
This German was as cooperative as his information was startling.

At approximately this same time, the CO of Company A noticed a
column of Germans moving along the road leading northeast from
the town in which he was located and called for an artillery concentra-
tion. (There was a similar road leading out of Bonerath.) The artillery
replied promptly with "on the way" and Lieutenant Baumgaertner
waited. To his disgust, the rounds were at least two thousand yards
off the target. When a confirming round was requested, this too fell
in the area of the first concentration. Fearing the worst, the lieutenant
sent a runner to check the signpost on the outskirts of town while the
machine gunners of Company C engaged the retreating Germans. On
his return the runner announced: "The sign sez Holzerath."

A hasty radio message was dispatched to battalion, warning against
any movement into Bonerath. In reply, the CO of the 1st Battalion
informed his forces in Holzerath that their real objective had been
taken without opposition by the 1st Platoon of Company A and the
command group. Later interrogation of prisoners revealed that the
enemy had abandoned Bonerath to make a more determined stand in
the twin town to the south. Companies A and C had swept into the
town while preparations for its defense were still in progress.

Subsequent to the crossing of the 2d Battalion, the engineers moved
forward and discovered it would be impossible to construct a treadway
bridge in the vicinity of their crossing. Captain Harold J. Helbling
informed regiment of this fact, suggesting that the bridge to the north,
at the ford used by the 1st Battalion, be repaired. This recommendation
was approved. By 1300 Lieutenant Bailey's platoon and a caterpillar

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OUT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

407

taken, but the 3d Platoon of Company A moving to seize the southern
crossing was less fortunate. It crossed the foot bridge by infiltration,
the men taking shelter around a mill on the far shore. With the entire
platoon across, the scouts moved forward to the nearest high ground.
It was then the enemy elected to reveal their positions. They did so
with a volley of rifle and machine-gun fire. Immediately, the platoon
took cover in some abandoned German foxholes and attempted to work
a flanking group against the enemy position. Fire from the high
ground stalled all American efforts and the platoon, after sending a
runner to inform battalion of the existing situation, settled down to
hold its slender bridgehead.

At 0300 hours, under the terrific artillery barrage that preceded the
attack, Company A, commanded by Captain Howard W. McKee,
pushed into the 3d Platoon's bridgehead. Moving along the sides of
the mill, the company fought its way to the railroad tracks paralleling
the river. There it met a deluge of small-arms fire and hand grenades.
A fierce fire fight developed in which every attempt to cross the tracks
was stopped by the enemy. Staff Sergeant Hubert Mikukenka moved
his machine-gun section to the north end of a deep cut to support the
left flank of the unit. As his crew went into position, an enemy auto-
matic weapon opened fire destroying the piece.

About daylight, under the overhead fire of the battalion's HMGs,
Company C began its crossing. Once on the east bank of the Ruwer,
the 1st Platoon moved to the right of Company A, crossed the tracks
by employing marching fire, and assaulted the high ground beyond
where an enemy machine-gun position was overrun and twelve pris-
oners taken.

Company B, the battalion reserve, followed. The account below is
by an anonymous member of the 1st Platoon of Company B.

"Moving up!" [came the cry], "Damn it! Every time I open a K ration
. . ." "Listen you guys! When we hit that curve down there we'll find an
open space. About seventy-five yards. Planks across the creek and thirty more
yards to the mill. Three at a time. Quick! See! Mortars coming in all the
time and snipers too. Hold it up at the back of the mill. Second Platoon's
there. Got it? Any questions? Good, let's go! Shep, Frenchy, Jesco. You
three first. Remember, fast!"

The next three men to go made even better time dashing across the foot-
bridge and up to the mill. Finally all of the platoon was huddled close to
the back of the building. The 2d Platoon had already moved out and rifle
fire was cracking up ahead. We could hear the shouts and curses of the men
above it all.

"What are we going to do?" "Stay right here for awhile." "Why?"

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

ao«'ft nearby, "Who i* it? Turn him over;.' /On'T y.Why?" "I'm Afraid ; .
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. " • UNIVERSITY 'OF MICHfGA W'"

OUT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

409

fire falling in the valley of the Ruwer made construction of a treadway
bridge impossible. Smoke was placed on the high ground east of the
river which caused the German fire to slacken as observation became
obscured. Following this, construction began and a bridge was rapidly
completed.

Company A, meanwhile, turned to the north to take Berg Heid and
make contact with the 3d Battalion. Instead of a village, the troops
found a castle surrounded by a high wall. The machine-gun section
was called forward to support an assault and was going into action
as a column of twenty-five Germans came into view. This enemy group
was promptly engaged and decimated. Without opposition, at 1430
hours the castle itself fell.

Back at the bridge site the supporting tanks and TDs encountered
considerable difficulty in negotiating a crossing. Between the east ap-
proach of the bridge and the road beyond the ground was extremely
soft. It was only by routing each vehicle over a slightly different course,
once it had crossed, that sufficient flotation was achieved to reach the
road. Shortly before dark the last of the tracklaying vehicles crossed.
Two TDs were put at the head of the column and the platoon of Com-
pany A, which was still at the mill, mounted the tanks to furnish local
security. This column then started north and reached Berg Heid with-
out incident.

At the footbridge to the north, Company I of the 301st crossed on
schedule without opposition from the enemy. The company pushed
forward and had started up the high ground to the front when it was
hit by an artillery concentration which inflicted nine casualties on the
support platoon. As this fire lifted, the advance resumed and daylight
found the troops in possession of the crest of the ridge To clear the
houses in the valley most of the company pushed down the far slope
of the hill while Company K, which had crossed behind Company I,
moved to the right flank of the battalion line.

At about this time, the 1st Platoon of Company I, atop the ridge,
was hit by a local counterattack which they repelled after some close
and difficult fighting. Eleven prisoners were taken, seven Germans
killed, and two more wounded. Companies I and K next moved south*
east, along the high ground toward the 1st Battalion, against increase
ing enemy opposition which caused the leading elements to give way
to the left. Consequently, Company L, which had also crossed by this
time, moved into position to protect the battalion right flank. Late in
the afternoon the company was hit by a vicious counterattack from the

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OUT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

411

hill west of Heddert. Until elements of Company K outflanked the
counterattacking force and came up in its rear, the situation remained
fluid. The battalion then halted to reorganize.

With the arrival of its armor, the 1st Battalion, 301st, continued to
advance along the road running northward from Berg Heid. Progress
was extremely slow; the enemy in withdrawing had felled trees across
the road. Throughout the night, the infantry and attached engineers
worked on these roadblocks and late on the morning of the 14th made
contact with the 3d Battalion.

As a result of the operations on the 13th, the Division penetrated
the German line in two places to a depth of three thousand yards and
sent 129 prisoners back to the PW cages.

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Chapter 39: PUSH TO THE EAST

RDERS FROM REGIMENT sent the 1st Battalion, 302d, east-

ward again on the morning of March 14, to take its next

immediate objective, the high ground to the east of Holzerath.
Once this had been seized, the attack would continue east to Check
Point 1, a road junction west of Hill 708 and about 3,500 yards beyond
Holzerath. There contact was to be made with the 2d Battalion, 302d,
which was also continuing its attack.

At 0700 hours Companies A and C, both badly under strength,
jumped off supported by a platoon of tanks from Company A of the
778th Tank Battalion. The line of departure was crossed with Com-
pany A on the north, the tanks in the center and Company C on the
south. All units moved forward rapidly and were halfway up the hill
beyond town before the enemy opened fire with small-arms and self-
propelled 88s which drove back the attack. The tanks and Company
A, which had suffered very heavy casualties, returned to Holzerath
while Company C took positions in the woods directly south of the hill.

With the same forces participating, a second attack was launched
at 1600 hours. This thrust took the hill but netted only fifteen pris-
oners. While the rest of the battalion prepared to continue the attack
according to plan, Company A was ordered to hold the objective and
the crossroads adjacent to it. With Company B, which had been
brought up from reserve, taking the lead, the new drive began at 2200
hours. The night was inky black, the rate of march rapid. Luminous
enemy road markers were frequently encountered, along with road-
blocks and felled trees. After an advance of some two thousand yards,
the head of the column was engaged by a direct-fire artillery piece
and four men were wounded. As the leading elements returned fire,
the enemy weapon, an assault gun, withdrew. The advance continued.
In the vicinity of Check Point 1, the Germans again attempted a delay-
ing action. This time the force involved consisted of an armored vehi-
cle supported by a few infantry. A sharp fire fight caused the enemy
to fall back again. Finding no sign of the 2d Battalion at Check Point
1, Major Meyers pulled back his troops to the last high ground and
prepared positions for what was left of the night.

For the continuation of the advance on the 14th, Major Maixner
ordered Company G, in reserve, to cross the Ruwer River and move
to Holzerath. There at 1630 hours, Company E was to join Company
G; together they would push eastward along a road net generally paral-
lel to and south of Major Meyers' route of advance with contact to

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THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

be made at Check Point 1. Because of the amount of enemy artillery
fire falling on Holzerath, Company E avoided the town. Junction
with Company G was made five hundred yards to the east of the as-
signed rendezvous. From there the advance continued in a column
of companies. Company G led, followed by the platoon of attached
tanks and Company E. At approximately 0300 hours, the leading ele-
ments reached the vicinity of Check Point 1. A perimeter was formed
by the riflemen and into this the armor moved. Two reconnaissance
patrols, one under Lieutenant Davis F. Nations and the other led by
Staff Sergeant James L. Mundy, moved to the rendezvous point in
search of the 1st Battalion. Lieutenant Nation's patrol returned shortly,
reporting no sign of Major Meyers' troops. Following this, footsteps
were heard and the men on the perimeter challenged what they thought
was the second patrol. From the darkness a voice spoke in broken
English: "I want to surrender/' One of the tankers, standing next to
his vehicle, asked the would-be-POW if he was alone. Reply came in
the form of a Panzerfaust, which struck the tank, smashing a track. In
the confusion the enemy group escaped.

During the early hours of the 15th, contact between the 1st and 2d
Battalions, 302d, was made by radio and plans were laid for a coor-
dinated attack on Hill 708 and the town of Reinsfeld beyond it. At
0600 hours, with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 2d on the right,
this attack jumped off.

After advancing some four hundred yards, the 2d Platoon of Com-
pany G encountered a German self-propelled 77mm gun. Its crew
went into action and the artillery forward observer with the company
rapidly adjusted on the enemy weapon. As the American fire fell, the
crew of the assault gun set fire to their piece and abandoned the posi-
tion. The advance was resumed and, after some stiff fighting in which
a number of machine-gun positions were overwhelmed and Panzerfaust
teams knocked out, the hill was taken.

Both battalions reorganized at 1230 hours to continue the attack
toward Reinsfeld. As Major Maixner's troops advanced, two enemy
assault guns opened fire knocking out their leading tank. This vehicle
burst into flames and all but one of the crew escaped. Seeing this,
Captain Kops of Company F dashed to the burning tank and without
assistance succeeded in rescuing the injured man. Meanwhile, one of
the enemy guns was eliminated by a second tank and the remaining
88 withdrew. Armor and infantry then swept to the edge of the wroods
west of Reinsfeld from which, at 1545 hours, Lieutenant Baumgaertner
observed a German artillery battery harnessing its horses and prepar-

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PUSH TO THE EAST

415

ing to move. He requested a fire mission of his forward observer and
the resulting concentrations annihilated both gunners and their mounts.
Not a single man or horse escaped the carnage.

Again the battalions reorganized, preparatory to continuing the attack
under cover of darkness. At 2000 hours the troops moved from the
woods and quickly crossed the open ground separating them from the
town. There was some light resistance from the enemy, but within
an hour and a half Reinsfeld was cleared and outposted. The tired
troops organized the position and waited for the 3d Battalion, which
had been in reserve since the beginning of the drive, to pass through
them the following morning.

In Colonel Hagerty's sector the 3d Battalion, 301st, and its support-
ing units advanced against Heddert, some 2,500 yards east of Berg
Heid, on the morning of the 14th while the 1st Battalion was mopping
up what enemy resistance remained between the bridge site and the
initial objective. Following an artillery preparation, the men of Major
O'Neil's battalion swept into Heddert which they cleared of all re-
sistance by 1245 hours. Companies I and K then pushed on and had
secured the high ground to the east and northeast by dark.

To the right of General Malony's troops, the 80th Division which
had advanced far beyond Zerf, reported it was receiving German
sniper and artillery fire from the zone of the 94th in this vicinity.
Therefore, the 2d Battalion, 301st, was assigned the mission of clear-
ing the extreme right of the Division area and flanking the Germans
still in position on the hills overlooking Berg Heid and the bridge
site. From Zerf, Major Brumley's men Jumped off at 0500 hours on
the morning of the 14th, attacking northeast against Hill 489- Appar-
ently the enemy had been expecting an American thrust from the
direction of Heddert and was caught off guard. By mid-morning the
hill was cleared. After a speedy reorganization, the battalion con-
tinued northeast through a heavily wooded area. Progress was slow,
particularly during the late afternoon when roadblocks, antipersonnel
minefields and machine-gun positions were encountered. When the
advance halted for the night, enemy artillery began to hit the battalion
and the companies were drawn back a short distance.

At 0500 hours on the morning of the 15th the 3d Battalion, 301st,
jumped off from Heddert to take the town of Schillingen. Plan of
attack called for Company I to flank the village and assault from the
north while Company K pushed forward from the west. The night was

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ported no opposition in Schill'mgeo. This esSlsHslwd the fact that the
wmr*£ town had bccto entered. After dwriru* the te^t of the village
and destroying an ^nemy arriUery bstterv. the party learned it had

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1 MICHIGAN

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418

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

including a trailer-truck carrying over two thousand gallons of gaso-
line sorely needed by the enemy's tanks and self-propelled weapons.

Far to the rear of the rest of the 94th, the 2d Battalion, 301st, clear-
ing the right flank of the Division zone, also had a busy day on the
1 5th. As the Germans fell back in the face of their onslaughts, Major
Brumley's men pushed northwest through the woods toward Heddert.
Many of the enemy were rounded up by one of the batteries of the
301st Field Artillery which had crossed the Ruwer and assumed posi-
tions south of Heddert. While the artillerymen were only slightly less
surprised than their captives, at this turn of events, they had reacted
more quickly. Upon the completion of this clean-up task, the 2d Bat-
talion moved into Heddert.

At 0200 hours on the morning of the 16th, the 2d Battalion came
forward by marching, to pass through the 1st Battalion and continue
the drive to Hermeskeil. Just as dawn was breaking, Major Brumley's
men passed through Gusenburg to swing to the northeast against the
new objective. Unknown to the battalion commander, an air mission
had been requested and, as the assault troops moved against Hermes-
keil, a squadron of P-47s swept down for a bombing run. Huge
columns of smoke and debris rose in the town; the infantrymen took
what cover they could find. A yellow smoke grenade, signifying
friendly troops, was uncorked before the planes began strafing and as
the fighter-bombers pulled away, the battalion gave vent to a collective
sigh of relief before continuing the attack, Resistance encountered in
Hermeskeil was sporadic and by 1000 hours fighting within the town
had ended. The 301st Infantry then reverted to Division reserve as
the 376th came forward to continue the advance.

During the morning of the 15th, the 376th Infantry was ordered
to clear Hinzenburg, and assigned the task to Company B. This town,
located across the Ruwer River, southeast of Ollmuth, had been by-
passed in the advance of the 302d Infantry. The mission was com-
pleted by 1100 hours and the company moved on to secure the high
ground beyond. At the same time, the 2d Battalion of Lieutenant
Colonel Anderson's regiment entrucked and moved to the vicinity of
Heddert while the 3d Battalion moved by motor to an assembly area
in the woods just west of Schillingen.

At 2000 hours the same evening the 3d Battalion, 376th, set out on
foot to take its first objective, the town of Grimburg, east and south
of Schillingen. The night was clear and visibility was further improved
by artificial moonlight produced by searchlight battalions far to the

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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420

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

In the attack on the former objective, Captain Ralph T. Brown,
commanding Company K, located a well camouflaged enemy 77mm
artillery piece which commanded his company's route of advance,
holding up the attack. Arming himself with a grenade launcher, the
CO of Company K courageously assaulted the German gun, which
was protected by several rocket-launcher teams. Although he was ob-
served and seriously wounded by almost point-blank fire from the
enemy position, the captain forced the withdrawal of the rocket-
launcher teams. This permitted friendly tanks to advance and silence
the artillery piece. Tanks and infantry then successfully stormed
Sitzerath. In like manner, Bierfeld was taken and Lieutenant Colonel
Thurston's men pushed to Nonnweiler only to find that the armored
task force had beaten them to this objective.

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 376th, kept closely in touch with the
situation, prepared to take over the attack upon orders. At 0915 hours
on the 16th, the latter battalion marched to Grimburg and from there
to Sitzerath where it spent the night. The 1st Battalion left Franzen-
heim at 1415 hours and arrived at Grimburg five hours later.

On the morning of the 16th at 0815 hours, the 3d Battalion, 302d,
attacked southeast from Reinsfeld in the face of heavy rocket and
artillery fire that failed to halt its advance. Beyond the town the
battalion stormed into an area infested with enemy pillboxes and
bunkers. One by one these were assaulted, reduced and then manned
by men of Company I until they could be demolished by the engineers.
In this manner thirty-seven pillboxes were reduced. Lieutenant Colonel
Cloudt's men then continued to the southeast and by 1740 hours they
had reached Hermeskeil.

During the 14th, 15th and 16th of March, the attack of the 94th
continued to gain momentum. On the 14th, the Division front line
moved forward about two thousand yards and 344 prisoners were
added to the ever-mounting total to the credit of the Division. On the
following day both assault regiments, the 301st and the 302d, turned
in gains of approximately ten thousand yards apiece and sent 341 more
PWs to the Division cage. On the 16th, Colonels Hagerty and Johnson
pressed their advantages. What had been a fairly well ordered Ger-
man retreat became a rout. The day's advance was measured in miles
and the 94th continued to lead the other divisions of XX Corps. As
a result of this day's fighting more than 700 prisoners were taken.

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Chapter 40: THE PURSUIT

BY MARCH 17 organized German resistance along the front of
the 94th Division had begun to collapse. Little opposition was
met in any of the towns taken and similar conditions were being
reported all along the adjoining fronts. The enemy was beaten and
fleeing. From Division came the order to pursue. The next stop was
the Rhine!

To facilitate a speedy continuation of the push, the CG of the 94th
formed his two remaining regiments into combat teams and motorized
their infantry elements. Each of the regimental CTs was reinforced
with attachments from the tank, AAA and chemical mortar battalions
at the Division's disposal.

At 0815 hours on the 17th, the 3d Battalion, 302d, left Hermeskeil
with Zusch as its immediate objective. Initially the advance was im-
peded by a series of roadblocks and abatis which were covered by
enemy automatic-weapons fire. For seven hours progress was slow;
it was not until 1530 hours that Zusch was taken. The battalion was
behind schedule, but renewed efforts gained twenty kilometers in the
following five hours netting the towns of Schmelz, Neuhutten, Zinser-
shutten, Adentheuer, Buhlenberg, Ellenberg, Feckweiler and the ulti-
mate objective of the day's advance, Birkenfeld.

Along the southern axis of the Division's attack, the 376th Infantry
also was having a field day. The 2d Battalion passed through Lieu-
tenant Colonel Thurston's positions at Nonnweiler and had taken
Otzenhausen by 0810 hours. Before noon Schwarzenback was added
to the bag. During the afternoon, the 2d Battalion seized Eisen and
Achtelsbach. By this time the attack had become an endurance contest.
Objectives fell as fast as troops could get to them. During the after-
noon, the 1st Battalion, 376th, was ordered to pass through the 2d
Battalion and at 2130 hours the leading elements of Lieutenant Colonel
Hodges' command left Achtelsbach and took Brucken. They continued
on through the night making contact with Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's
3d Battalion, 302d, in Birkenfeld. In Elchweiler, a few Volkssturm
troops put up a token resistance, but were soon overwhelmed and the
town cleared.

The Reconnaissance Troop was likewise busy during the day of the
17th. In addition to keeping contact with the 80th Division, it added
Wadrill, Gehweiler, Oberlostern and Kostenbach to the total of towns
taken by the Division and captured two German tanks and an AA gun.

Echeloned to the right rear of the 94th, the 80th Division encoun-
tered a similar situation along its front. Combat Command A of the
10th Armored Division operating in its zone, reported its leading

421

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THE PURSUIT

423

elements as Tiirkismuhle while Combat Command B, in the zone of
the 94th, rolled to Birkenfeld and then turned south into the 80th
Division's sector. This action outflanked much of the enemy resistance
to the south. To the north and in rear of the 94th, the 3d Cavalry
Group was attacking southeast and had reached Beuren and Prostrath.
During the day the 12th Armored Division came under control of
XX Corps and was assembling in Trier for employment the following
day in the 94th's sector. The Division had advanced some twenty
miles, taken forty towns and captured over 1,500 PWs. Still it con-
tinued to lead the corps, several miles in advance of the units on its
flanks.

The speed of the advance prevented the issuance of field orders for
each new objective and the G-3 section solved this problem by pre-
paring supplements to the basic order. In some cases it became neces-
sary to issue several of these in a single day. Liaison officers and check
points were relied upon to keep the regimental and Division staffs
informed of the location of the plunging spearheads.

The 302d Combat Team continued its advance to the east on the
morning of the 18th as Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt's 3d Battalion
jumped off at 0805 hours. Against practically no resistance, the towns
of Rimsberg, Bohen, Reichenbach, Baumholder and Breitsesterhof
were taken. The battalion outposted Baumholder while Major Meyers'
troops passed through to take Mambachel. As the day ended the 2d
Battalion, in regimental reserve, moved forward to Birkenfeld.

On the southern flank of the Division, the 376th Combat Team also
moved forward in Blitzkrieg style. After it reached Elchweiler, north-
east of Birkenfeld, the 1st Battalion received a change of orders and
had to backtrack to the latter town. It turned south, took Hoppstadten,
then continued toward Heimbach. Outside the latter town, an armored
column was being delayed by the fire of enemy antiaircraft guns em-
ployed as ground weapons. These guns had already knocked out two
tanks when Major Miller offered to have his infantry flank the posi-
tion. This assistance was declined; the battalion remained immobile
for four hours. An air mission was requested by the armor and inter-
mittently for two hours P-51s bombed and strafed the 20mm and
88mm flak guns. When the road was finally cleared, the battalion
moved into town and from there advanced to Mettweiler. Within the
latter town, some of the remnants of the 256th Volksgrenadier Divi-
sion, first encountered by the 94th in the Triangle, were taken prisoner.

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burnt and gutted German cohirnrtt >as ma>urueied. Vebiiles toilet*,
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426

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

Elzweiler, Horschbach, Hinzweiler, Aschbach and Wolfstein to the
long list of towns taken. While the battalion was advancing on Mor-
bach, there was a second change of route. The 3d Battalion shuttled
to Bedesbach and the 2d assembled in Olsbriicken in readiness to pass
through Major Miller's men for a continuation of the drive eastward.

Each passing day communications with and control of the advancing
battalions became increasingly difficult. Moreover, the division had
completely outdistanced the units on its flanks. The infantry, in several
cases, was far in front of the armor that was to support it. In an
attempt to improve the situation, the 94th Reconnaissance Troop was
given the additional mission of maintaining contact between the lead-
ing infantry assault teams and those armored columns in or adjacent
to the division zone. While performing this task, Captain Ashton's
men overran and captured an enemy vehicle column loaded with sup-
plies and equipment.

The day's operation showed the Division had taken thirty-three more
towns, over three thousand prisoners, and numerous guns, howitzers
and vehicles, in addition to huge supplies of equipment and munitions.

On the 20th the action was merely a continuation of the previous
day's activities. In the zone of the 302d Combat Team, battalions
continued to leap-frog one another and thirteen more towns were
added to the regiment's total. Outside the city of Grunstadt, the enemy
offered some resistance when approximately 1 50 Germans armed with
rifles and automatic weapons manned* a roadblock and went into
action. There was a brief fight, but soon more PWs were streaming to
the rear.

In the sector of the 376th Combat Team, the 2d Battalion continued
the drive eastward after spending a cold, uncomfortable night huddled
in their halted trucks. These troops passed through the 1st Battalion to
close in Neunkirchen at 1600 hours. From there they pressed forward
toward Enkenbach and Carlsberg, the regimental objective for the day.
Enemy troops in position in the woods southeast of the former town
had halted advance elements of the 12th Armored Division, attempting
to cut the Reich s-Autobahtu stretching through Kaiserslautern to the
Rhine, and knocked out fifteen American tanks. Upon arriving, the
3d Battalion dismounted, deployed and moved against the enemy
strongpoint. Although the Germans were well situated and heavily
armed, there was little resistance. A mass surrender was soon under
way.

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

428

THE 94th INFANTRY DIVISION

halted the convoy, taking off on foot to investigate a small light which
blinked alternately green and yellow, directly to the front. In seconds
he was back, on the double, to report a huge German tank lumbering
down the road.

The troops were ordered off their trucks immediately. Staff Sergeant
Aaron L. Kupferschmidt led forward a bazooka team which worked
to within a few yards of the panzer and went into action. However,
their weapon had developed a malfunction and would not fire. Un-
able to locate the rest of their 57mm gun crew, Staff Sergeant Joseph R.
Frantz and Private First Class Jack S. Crayne were attempting to get
their weapon into firing position when the enemy tank opened up.
Its first round was high, the second hit the leading truck squarely and
subsequent rounds demolished the 21/2-ton truck and set fire to a jeep.
Then, the 57 opened fire, aiming at the muzzle blast of the German
tank. There was little hope of stopping the enemy vehicle, but at least
a diversion might be created in which the undamaged vehicles could
be withdrawn. To the rear, Captain Hodges turned the column while
the understrength gun crew used up the last of their ammunition.
Loading the wounded first and then the rest of the troops, a hasty
withdrawal began. Obviously, Major Maixner and the rest of the
battalion had not yet taken the town.

At 0900 hours the following morning, what were supposedly the
leading elements of the 2d Battalion made contact with Captain
Hodges and his men. TDs mounting 90mm guns were spearheading
the advance. Once the battalion had been reorganized, the push east-
ward continued. At the scene of the previous night's encounter the
wreckage of the 2^-ton truck and jeep were located. The 57mm gun,
which had suffered a sprung trail, was recovered and salvaged. Farther
beyond was a Panther tank which had been hit three times. The sign
post outside the city read: Frankenthal.

Within the town little resistance was encountered by the 2d Bat-
talion, and the column pressed forward toward the last objective, the
Rhine River, now in sight. By 1215 hours on the 21st of March, the
2d Battalion, 302d, was in Petersau, a small town on the very bank of
the river, northeast of Frankenthal. The leading element of the XX
Corps had reached the Rhine!

The 1st Battalion, 376th, moved from Otterberg on the 21st, passed
through the 3d Battalion in Carlsberg at 1100 hours and proceeded to
Studernheim where the companies detrucked and proceeded into Oppau
on foot.

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Origiral from
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THE PURSUIT

429

The 3d Battalion, 302d, closed in Frankenthal late on the 21st and
moved immediately to Oppau where it took positions along the Rhine.
The 1st Battalion, 302d, was also brought forward arriving in Franken-
thal about 2100 hours. In the 376th Infantry, the 2d and 3d Battalions
moved to Oggersheim, located just west of Ludwigshafen, with the
latter unit closing there at 1330 on the 22d of March. During the
drive eastward the 301st Infantry came forward by bounds after being
released from control of the 10th Armored and returned to the Divi-
sion. Colonel Hagerty's biggest problem was keeping his regiment
within supporting distance of the rapidly moving spearheads. The
roads were clogged with traffic and most of his transportation had been
diverted to other elements. Until the 19th the regiment remained in
Hermeskeil, then it moved to Birkenfeld. It pushed to Baumholder
on the 20th and almost immediately continued to Wolfstein. In this
vicinity, enemy forces bypassed by the spearheads had begun to con-
verge and Colonel Hagerty's men were given the mission of cleari

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